LATINS AND GREEKS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AFTER 1204

edited by
Benjamin Arbel, Bernard Hamilton
and David Jacoby

LATINS AND GREEKS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AFTER 1204

LATINS AND GREEKS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AFTER 1204

Edited by

BENJAMIN ARBEL
BERNARD HAMILTON
DAVID JACOBY

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 1989 in Great Britain by
Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park,
Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
270 Madison Ave, New York NY 10016

Transferred to Digital Printing 2007

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204.
1. Byzantine civilization, 1204–1453
I. Arbel, Benjamin, 1945– II. Hamilton, Bernard, 1932– III. Jacoby, David, 1928– IIII. Mediterranean historical review
949.5'04

ISBN 0-7146-3372-0

This group of studies first appeared in a Special Issue on Latin and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204, *Mediterranean Historical Review*, Vol.4, No.1.

Cover photograph
The coronation of Baldwin of Flanders, emperor of the latin states with Venetian support. Ms. Gr. 9081. F. 99v. (Courtesy of the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris).

Publisher's Note
The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original may be apparent

Contents

Preface

This volume includes twelve of the main papers given at the Joint Meeting of the XXII Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies and of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East held at the University of Nottingham from 26–29 March 1988. The Conference brought together a wide range of scholars and dealt with four main themes: relations between native Greeks and western settlers in the states founded by the Latin conquerors in former Byzantine lands in the wake of the Fourth Crusade; the Byzantine successor states at Nicaea, Epirus, and Thessalonica; the influence of the Italian maritime communes on the eastern Mediterranean in the later Middle Ages and the Renaissance; and the impact on Christian societies there of the Mongols and the Ottoman Turks, as well as the perception of Greeks and Latins by other groups in the eastern Mediterranean.

The two sponsoring societies reached an agreement with the *Mediterranean Historical Review*, edited at the School of History of Tel Aviv University, to publish a special issue on the subject. Authors were requested to submit their papers in article form, and the editors suggested certain amendments. In the spelling of Byzantine Greek names of persons and places, we have largely used the familiar Latin equivalents and Anglicized Greek. Less well-known names have simply been transliterated.

Restrictions of space precluded the publication in this volume of some excellent communications which were also given at the same conference. Several of these will be published in a forthcoming volume of the *MHR*.

The Conference received financial support from the British Academy, the Hellenic Foundation, the Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies, and the British Council and we should like to express our thanks to those sponsors. Our special thanks are also due to the Department of Adult Education of the University of Nottingham, particularly to Sylvia Stephens, for organizing the Conference administration so efficiently. Warm personal acknowledgements are also due to Judith Dekel, from the Institute of Archaeology of Tel Aviv University, who prepared the figures for the volume, and to Marva Roth, who undertook the typing with such patience. The editors are particularly grateful to Ann Ussishkin, the assistant editor of the *MHR*, who accompanied this volume through the entire editorial and production process.

From Byzantium to Latin Romania: Continuity and Change

DAVID JACOBY

The Fourth Crusade ended in April 1204 with the western or Latin conquest of Constantinople and signalled the beginning of a new era in the history of the Byzantine lands or Romania. Extensive areas of the empire were conquered by western or Latin armies during and shortly after the crusade. Some of these territories were recovered by Byzantium, while others remained for two centuries or more under Latin rule. Such was the case with Attica and Boeotia, most of the Peloponnese or the Morea, as well as Crete, Euboea, and numerous other islands of the Aegean. It is in these areas that the transition from Byzantine to Latin rule and some of its repercussions will be examined, though evidence bearing on other parts of Latin Romania will also be adduced when necessary.[1]

Military conquest and political upheaval have always attracted the attention of contemporaries, chroniclers sometimes recording these fateful events in minute detail. On the other hand, they were little interested, if at all, in the less conspicuous, almost subterranean flow of daily life expressed in the survival of social structures, legal and administrative institutions, or economic patterns and practices. In the idiom of the modern mass media, continuity never made headlines. It should be noted, however, that once the savagery of battle had subsided, conquerors who intended to settle in their newly acquired lands adopted a pragmatic approach. Irrespective of the new regime they introduced in these lands, they had to deal with some urgent practical matters such as the division of spoils, especially of real estate, and how to ensure their daily livelihood. Their physical survival as individuals and their collective superiority acquired by conquest were at stake. Their first concern, therefore, was to find ways to tap the resources of their new lands and ensure a smooth flow of revenue to their treasuries. In order to succeed in this endeavour, they had to rely on the administrative and fiscal institutions and practices of the past. In this respect continuity was a matter of both necessity and convenience.

All these features appear in Latin Romania after the Fourth Crusade. Yet the Latin occupation implied a complex and much wider encounter between Latins and Byzantine populations, with their

respective social structure, institutions, legal and religious traditions, culture and mentality. In order to gauge the effects of the Latin conquest, therefore, we have to determine, as far as possible, the balance between continuity and change in each of these spheres. To be more precise, it is essential to detect the factors that account for varying degrees of continuity in some of them, change and accomodation in others, and a break elsewhere. Unfortunately, the evidence at our disposal is fragmentary and unevenly distributed both in time and space. It is impossible, therefore, to shed light to the same extent on all the aspects of transition from Byzantine to Latin rule.

The most striking and abrupt deviation from the Byzantine past generated by the Latin conquest was of a political nature. To be sure, the empire had begun to disintegrate in the years immediately preceding the Fourth Crusade,[2] yet this process was hastened and intensified by the Latin conquest. By 1210 Romania – Latin Romania in particular – was fragmented into numerous political and territorial entities. The impact of the conquest differed from one territory to another. The spheres, nature, and degree of both continuity and change in each of them largely depended on the combination of three factors: the existence of local or regional features prior to the Latin occupation; the conditions in which the conquest took place; and, finally, the political and social impact of the various groups of conquerors on their respective territories. As we shall see, the initial phase of Latin occupation determined to a large extent the specific long-term development of each of these territories.

Let us now briefly consider the three factors just mentioned. Largely seen through the prisma of imperial documentation, the Byzantine empire before 1204 appears to have been more or less uniform in character, in numerous spheres, while in others there was diversity: the existence of specific local or regional features in the twelfth-century empire is illustrated by later sources, to which we shall return in due course. As for the conditions in which the conquest occurred, one may point, for instance, to important differences between the Peloponnese and Crete. In the Peloponnese the Latins progressively occupied one area after the other, mostly after reaching accommodation with their respective leaders and only seldom encountering armed resistance. By contrast Crete was conquered by force within a short period and maintained under Venetian rule with the help of military might. The specific encounter between Latins and indigenous population in each of these two territories goes far to explain their diverging social evolution in later years.[3] The most important factor in this respect, however, was the composition and character of the

conquering elites, the political organization and social structure they established in conquered territories, and the particular conception of authority underlying their institutions. The Peloponnese – save for Venetian Messenia – as well as Attica, Boeotia, and Negroponte, were conquered and subsequently ruled by knights who imposed a feudal superstructure on Byzantine society. The importation of western feudalism implied a marked departure from Byzantine tradition, as it involved the disappearance of the state and the transfer of its authority and prerogatives to private hands. Privatization was one of the most fundamental expressions of the process of feudalization, and had important, long-lasting social implications, to which we shall later return.[4] In many Aegean islands the Italian lords instituted what may be called a pseudo-feudal regime: they used feudal terminology and applied rules of feudal law imported from the Morea, which somewhat changed the social stratification of the indigenous population, yet averted the privatization of Byzantine state rights.[5]

By contrast, in Crete and a section of southern Messenia around Coron and Modon there was an almost direct transition from the empire's rule to that of Venice, a city governed by a non-feudal elite imbued with a firm sense of statehood. In these Venetian territories, therefore, the measure of continuity was likely to be much greater than in feudalized areas. Indeed, although using the feudal vocabulary, Venice upheld the supreme authority of the state and prevented any definitive privatization of Byzantine imperial prerogatives in judicial or fiscal matters. Venice also inherited state lands, their peasantry, as well as state prerogatives, and established a highly centralized bureaucratic system of government and supervision.[6] In sum, it is obvious that whatever the regime established by the conquering leaders in their respective territories, the indigenous societies were affected by their submission to Latin rule. Social mobility in their midst was no more governed by the social and institutional forces at play in the empire; it was arrested by the conquest and henceforth largely depended upon Latin acquiesence.

Around 1200, at the time of the conquest, the differences between Byzantine and western societies were rather striking.[7] In Byzantine society all free men enjoyed equal legal status and were justiciable in imperial courts according to the same Byzantine law, regardless of their social and economic standing or the imperial privileges they held. Such was also the case with members of the social elite. Byzantine society thus lacked formal legal stratification. In the western provinces, as elsewhere in the empire, the social elite included rich landlords, imperial officials, and imperial dignitaries, all known as *archontes*. Occasionally the great landlords enhanced their prestige and social

ascendancy by acquiring governmental functions or honorary titles in the imperial hierarchy. Some *archontes* developed in their own interest a network of personal bonds, yet these always retained their private nature and were never recognized by law or sanctioned by custom. These bonds were thus basically different from western vassalage. The chiefs of Slav groups settled in the Peloponnese, such as the Melings of Mount Taygetus, were also considered *archontes* after receiving imperial titles that strengthened their traditional authority and status. In the western provinces the breakdown of imperial supervision shortly before 1204 enabled some *archontes* to usurp imperial land and exercise state prerogatives in military, fiscal, and judicial matters. The Latin conquest deprived them of these short-lived benefits.

Somewhat exceptional in Byzantine society and law was the status of the *paroikos* or dependent peasant. Paradoxically he was considered free, though subject to some important personal restrictions and tied to the state or to his lord by links of dependence of a legal nature.[8] Yet this did not imply the existence in the empire of an overall rigid social and legal stratification, such as found in the feudal West in the same period. Nor did the imperial grant of a *paroikos* to an individual or an ecclesiastical institution involve a definitive alienation of state prerogatives or the replacement of imperial by private jurisdiction.

The issue of state prerogative around 1200 requires some elaboration with regard to the *pronoia.* The *pronoia* was an imperial concession of fiscal revenues to an individual, often in return for military service. The peasants from whom the holder of the *pronoia* collected these revenues and the imperial land they cultivated were generally transferred to the grantee for his lifetime. It has been claimed that the *pronoia* was similar to the western fief; moreover, that it was the basis of the Byzantine military system and constituted a major factor in the so-called feudalization of the empire, which allegedly led to its downfall; finally that the similarity between *pronoia* and fief supposedly explains the easy adaptation of the conquering Latin knights to local Byzantine conditions. However, neither Byzantine and Latin sources around the time of the conquest, nor later sources yield a single conclusive piece of evidence about the *pronoia* or about *pronoia* holders in the conquered territories we are dealing with. Several factors may explain the absence of such evidence. The paucity of Byzantine sources bearing in this area should be taken into account; the diffusion of the *pronoia* in the western provinces may have been more limited than elsewhere in the empire; or the *pronoia* existing before 1204 may have been assimilated to patrimonial estates and registered as such when imperial supervision collapsed shortly before 1204. Whatever the case, in this period the *pronoia* was definitely not the dominant form of

landed property in the empire, nor the backbone of its military forces. It was basically a fiscal grant and did not entail the transfer of imperial prerogatives such as taxation and jurisdiction to individuals. Moreover, fundamental differences existed between the Byzantine *pronoia* and the western fief with regard to inheritance, the exercise of jurisdiction, as well as social, political, and military functions within Byzantium and western Europe, respectively. In short, the use of 'feudalization' in the Byzantine context, whether or not in connection with the *pronoia*, appears to be inappropriate, is misleading and may therefore be safely rejected.[9]

In contrast to Byzantine society, society in the areas of the West from which the conquerors originated was highly stratified around 1200. With the exception of the major Italian cities, including Venice, there was a clear-cut distinction between noblemen, burgesses,and dependent peasants. Each class was governed by its own set of laws, and social status was virtually synonymous with legal status, both being hereditary. Social promotion involving the crossing of class boundaries was mainly restricted to the lower strata of society. Access to the nobility was severely hampered by the development of class-consciousness within the ranks of the feudatories, illustrated by specific rituals such as the ceremony of dubbing, as well as by a particular social ethos, lifestyle, and group mentality. It is not surprising, therefore, that the French and Italian knights settling in continental Greece and some of the Aegean islands brought with them various institutions such as vassalage – bonds of a private nature constituting the foundation of their political and social hierarchy – as well as attitudes and values common to the feudal upper class in the West in the early thirteenth century. In conformity with their own concepts and traditions, the Latin leaders distinguished, as in the West, between noblemen and non-nobles within their own society.[10] It was, however, the extension of their socio-legal stratification to the indigenous population that generated the most important changes in the social fabric of their new lands.

As a result of the conquest, society in Latin Romania was divided into two distinct groups. One of these included the Latin conquerors, the western immigrants of all ranks who joined them, and their descendants; the other group comprised the indigenous Greeks, as well as Slavs in the Peloponnese. The scale of penalties to be inflicted upon those who aided Greek rebels in Crete, according to a Venetian resolution of 1273, provides a vivid expression of stratification within the Latin society and of the social cleavage separating the latter from the Greek community. Help extended to Greek rebels was to be severely punished: Latin feudatories were threatened with the loss of

their military tenements, other Latins with the loss of non-feudal assets, in addition to exile or imprisonment, while Greeks were to incur physical punishment by losing a hand and a foot.[11] Religious affiliation did not constitute an important factor in daily life, yet it became a basic criterion of social stratification and individual status; moreover, it provided a convenient means of group identification. Those who recognized the authority of the Roman Church were freemen; *Latinus* was synonymous with *Francus*, a word that acquired both an ethnic and a social connotation, as it meant 'westerner' as well as 'free'. On the other hand, the Greeks and Slavs, who remained faithful to the Byzantine Church, were relegated to the rank of *villani*, villeins or dependent persons, regardless of their status prior to the Latin conquest. Only few of them escaped this process of debasement and levelling. Among those who remained free we find the *archontes*: by their wealth, social ascendancy, life-style, and the fiscal exemptions some of them enjoyed at the time of the conquest, they markedly differed from the rest of the local population, like the Latin elite in the West. Freedom was also enjoyed by some other men and women of lesser standing, as well as by emancipated villeins and slaves.

It thus appears that the Latins translated the social realities they found in Romania into legal terms and ascribed the socio-legal stratification to which they were accustomed to the relatively 'open' Byzantine society, in which social mobility was more pronounced than in the West. As a result, the *archontes* encountered at the time of the conquest and their descendants became a closed socio-legal class enjoying hereditary status and privileges. The distinction between them and the villeins was recognized both in the feudal law of the Morea and neighbouring feudalized areas, as well as in Venetian courts. Unless an *archon* had sufficient proof of his status, he faced debasement: such was the case with Theodoros Makrembolites, who fled from Constantinople in 1204 and became a *paroikos* or dependent person in Corfu.[12] In Venetian Crete freedom was so exceptional among Greeks in rural areas that the free Greeks who were not *archontes* sometimes specified their status in documents, and emancipated villeins who lost the privilege granting them enfranchisement reverted to their former unfree status.[13]

The Latin conquest displaced the local elite from its dominant social position. After openly or secretly resisting the Latins for some time, several *archontes* fled from the Morea and Negroponte, while others left Crete by agreement, like the 20 *archontes* who in 1213 joined Duke Marco I Sanudo and settled on his island of Naxos. Some of the remaining *archontes* were dispossessed: others who submitted to the Latins without struggle or returned to their land and co-operated with

them retained most or all of their landed property.[14] In short, the fate of the *archontes* under Latin rule greatly varied, yet in none of the conquered territories did it imply a complete break with the past. Indeed, in some fields there was continuity, while in others the accommodation between conquerors and local *archontes* gradually grew in scope in the course of the thirteenth century.

As already mentioned, Latin and Greek leaders concluded agreements in several areas of the Morea.[15] These agreements at first led to the inclusion of *archontes* within the group of non-noble Latin feudatories. Since the mid-thirteenth century, however, some *archontes* achieved further social promotion: they were dubbed to knighthood and joined the ranks of the Latin or Frankish nobility. This process of social integration was also related to land holding. The Latin leaders confirmed the rights of the *archontes* to their patrimonial estates and dependent peasants, who were governed as before the conquest according to Byzantine law. In addition, the Latin leaders granted some *archontes* fiefs similar to those enjoyed by Latin feudatories, in return for military service. These and other *archontes* also held administrative positions entailing economic benefits. Social and economic interests thus prompted Greeks to seek integration within the Latin elite. On the other hand, the absence of qualified administrative personnel familiar with the Byzantine tradition and the lack of sufficient military forces account for the attitude of the princes and barons of Frankish Morea: they gradually loosened the rigid system of social and legal stratification initially devised by the conquerors. It is hardly surprising that the integration of the *archontes* and other Greeks proceeded after the return of the Byzantine forces to the Peloponnese in 1262: it was then imperative for the Frankish leaders to ensure the services and full co-operation of these Greeks.

Following the death of Prince William II of Villehardouin in 1278, the principality was governed by bailiffs on behalf of Charles I of Anjou and his successor Charles II, kings of Sicily, until Isabelle of Villehardouin and her husband Florent of Hainault took up residence there in 1289. During these 11 troubled years there was warfare between Frankish and imperial forces, and some *archontes* in the principality entertained hopes of a speedy Byzantine reconquest of the entire Peloponnese. These *archontes* requested imperial charters granting or confirming patrimonial estates and fiscal exemptions that would go into effect once the grantees came under Byzantine rule.[16] Yet the Byzantine expansion was slow to proceed and was halted for extended periods of time at several occasions.[17] Most *archontes*, while fully aware of this fact, anyhow believed that their interests coincided with those of their Latin lords. Their integration within the Latin elite enhanced

their position with regard to their Latin peers and, in addition, strengthened their power and social ascendancy within their own Greek community. Intermarriage between members of the Latin and Greek elites, however, seems to have been rare, save for political purposes at the princely level.

By the fourteenth century integrated Greeks displayed an eagerness to further their assimilation to the Latin elite in yet other ways. Some of them may have adhered to the Latin Church, although most Greeks remained faithful to the Orthodox creed and ritual. Of a more general nature was the strong identification of many *archontes* and other Greeks with the values, attitudes, and class-consciousness of the Latin feudatories. It is for them that an anonymous Greek author, relying on a French work, composed the fourteenth-century Greek version of the *Chronicle of Morea*, an epic exalting the Latin conquest and the Latin leaders of the Morea. Yet the acculturation of the Greek upper group to the Latin elite was never fully achieved, save perhaps in very few cases: thus, for instance, by 1350 Nicholas Misito was among the most influential men of Frankish Morea, and by 1377 his son John II was among the mightiest, which supposes a firm integration within the upper stratum of the nobility. As for the overwhelming majority of Greek feudatories, they also were undoubtedly bilingual, yet the composition of the Greek version of the *Chronicle of Morea* illustrates their preference for a Greek work suited to their own literary tradition and taste. Although subdued, Greek religious and social group consciousness come to the fore in several passages of the Greek version. In short, there was no fusion between the Latin and Greek elites, and both groups preserved their distinctive identity.[18]

A process of integration also occurred in Venetian Crete, yet it was neither progressive nor generalized as in the Morea, nor did it imply large scale identification with Venetian attitudes and values. It took place in stages as a response to the numerous Greek rebellions led by *archontes* that shook one or several areas of the island in the thirteenth century, and remained limited in extent. Venetian rule in Crete, as in the Morea, was based on extensive confiscations of land previously held by the state, the Greek Church and a number of *archontes*; on the existence of a permanent garrison composed of Venetian and other Latin settlers rendering military service in return for the property they held from the state; and, finally, on a strong, highly centralized administration. All these elements generated strong resentment within the Greek population, especially among its leaders. In the Byzantine period most Cretan *archontes* had presumably resided on their rural estates in the midst of their followers and dependents, where we find them after the conquest. It is not impossible, however, that some

archontes were compelled to abandon the cities along the northern coast of Crete, which the Venetians wanted to turn into military strongholds by populating them with Latins.

In order to conciliate the leading *archontes*, Venice followed a policy similar to the one adopted by the Latin lords in the Morea. She acknowledged their property rights on their large estates; in addition she granted them and some of their followers military tenements and thereby assimilated these Greeks to the Latin holders of such property. This move, initiated in 1219, enhanced the social standing of the leading *archontes*, all the more so as some of them were able to obtain the emancipation of a number of *paroikoi* or villeins held by Latin masters or the Venetian state and improve the lot of others who remained under Latin rule. Their ascendancy over the peasantry is further illustrated by the fact that numerous villeins joined them during their rebellions. In 1299 Venice went so far as to recognize the validity of the sentences pronounced by Alexius Kallergis and the judges he had appointed during his long revolt, which lasted from about 1282 until 1299. Alexius was also allowed to receive voluntary payments and services from Greeks, other than those living on his lands. It follows that, throughout the thirteenth century, social networks headed by some powerful Cretan *archontes* survived alongside the social and legal networks built and recognized by Venice. They rested on the exercise of independent judicial authority and the perpetuation of Byzantine legal, as well as fiscal institutions and practices.[19]

The nature, extent, and rhythm of the cumulative process of accomodation with the *archontes* in the Morea was not only different from that occurring in Crete; it also affected the Greek society of these territories in different ways. The more generalized, continuous, and profound integration of the *archontes* in the Morea deprived the local Greek population of an elite willing to provide active support to the Greek Church in its opposition to Latin rule, and to favour the Byzantine expansion in the Peloponnese initiated in 1262.[20] By contrast, the slow pace at which Venice rallied the leading Cretan *archontes* to her cause, as well as the latter's power, prestige, and large estates account for the alliance of many *archontes* with the Greek Church.

On the whole Venice remained suspicious of the Cretan *archontes*, in spite of agreements concluded with several of them. She therefore implemented a policy of social segregation in order to prevent intermarriage between members of the Latin and Greek elites. Only exceptionally was the ban on mixed marriages lifted, as in 1272 and 1299, in the latter case in favour of Alexius Kallergis and his followers. Yet the number of such marriages seems to have remained small, and

the offspring of mixed parentage were mostly children of Latin fathers and Greek women of equal or lower rank, many of them illegitimate. It thus appears that the holding of military tenures did not lead to the social integration of the *archontes* within the Latin elite of Crete, save in few instances. The Latin feudatories strongly opposed the participation of the Greeks in their assemblies, which functioned in an advisory capacity within the Venetian governmental system of Crete. One of the issues closely connected with the ban on intermarriage at this social level was the determination of Venice to prevent, as far as possible, the transfer of military and other land to Greeks, and this policy was upheld well into the fourteenth century.

It is noteworthy that Venice extended institutionalized segregation to the middle and lower ranks of society in Crete. The coexistence of Latins and Greeks in urban centres, the pursuit of identical or similar economic activities, in addition to daily social and economic intercourse, threatened to erode the distinctive character of the Latin community, especially since in the Venetian colonies there was no link between occupation and social status as in feudalized areas. Venice nevertheless could not entirely prevent mixed marriages. Some Latin notaries and craftsmen are known to have wedded Greek women in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, and intermarriage undoubtedly increased as time passed. Venice acted vigorously in the 1360s and 1370s to prevent peasant women from escaping villeinage by marrying Latins.[21]

The social evolution examined so far has revealed that the Latins' compromise with members of the Greek elite secured the survival of Byzantine institutions and practices within the framework of the Greek community. Continuity in varying degrees was to be found in landholding, jurisdiction, law, taxation, and administration. The perpetuation of the Byzantine heritage in these closely related fields was not limited, however, to the pattern of relations between the *archontes* and other Greeks. It also extended at various levels to Greeks subjected to Latin lords and even to Latins among themselves and, therefore, affected the entire social and economic fabric of Latin Romania.

We have seen that one of the main concerns of the Latin conquerors was to establish their rule on solid economic foundations. However, having no knowledge of the language in which Byzantine documents were couched, nor any familiarity with the intricate Byzantine fiscal system and its operation, they depended at the outset on those among the indigenous population who were willing to provide them with information and services needed for the partition of the land and the levy of taxes. The Latins indeed enlisted the help of local Greek leaders and former members of the imperial bureaucracy. It has been rightly

suggested that in April or May 1204 the leaders of the Fourth Crusade relied on imperial cadastral registers and other fiscal documents found in Constantinople when they divided the Byzantine empire.[22] The *Chronicle of Morea* reports that in the Peloponnese the Frankish leaders consulted such records with the assistance of local *archontes*, who may have been rich landlords, former officers in charge of the imperial administration, or former military commanders. Although not explicitly stated, such collaboration also occurred in other territories of Latin Romania. In 1211 Ravano dalle Carceri, lord of the island of Negroponte, promised to maintain his Greek subjects in the status they had enjoyed under Manuel I Comnenus. This implied the continuity of landholding, as well as that of the Byzantine agrarian, legal, and fiscal regime.[23] In Crete the Venetian authorities gathered oral evidence and evidently also used cadastral registers, before taking hold of former imperial estates and confiscating the property of *archontes* and ecclesiastical institutions. Such was also the case in Venetian Messenia, where some land was attributed by the state to Venetian settlers.[24] As in the empire, there were always individuals, including peasants, willing to provide information about landholding, taxation, and the personal status of others.[25]

In 1312 the Great Council of Venice ordered the Venetian governors serving in Messenia to undertake a general *anagraffi*, or survey for fiscal purposes, in the territories of Coron and Modon where it had not been carried out for a long time. The use of the Byzantine technical term *anagraphi* was coupled with the injunction that 'not a single person should be omitted'. At the same occasion it was also stated that 'according to the custom of the empire, the survey used to be carried out at the beginning of [a] thirty-year [period]'.[26] Thirty-year periodic surveys are indeed attested in the empire prior to the Fourth Crusade, and the injunction of 1312 indicates that this procedure had somehow survived under Venetian rule during the thirteenth century. In Messenia the data collected by the surveyors was listed in official registers called *catastica*, like the Byzantine *katasticha* or cadastral registers of the same type compiled and preserved by the imperial fisc. These registers were updated periodically by state officers, or occasionally following land transactions at the request of individuals. In the Byzantine registers each entry, called *stichos*, or 'line', corresponded to a fiscal unit and as a rule recorded the names of the responsible taxpayer and the members of his family; their common *stasis*, consisting of land, animals, other means of production, and houses; and, finally, the nature and amount of the taxes, dues and labour services they owed to the state, whether individually or collectively as members of a community comprising a whole village or part of

one. State taxes, dues, and services were occasionally awarded by the emperor, partly or entirely, to an individual or a collective beneficiary such as a monastery.[27] In Venetian Messenia the same registration practices are implied by the survey ordered in 1312, the use of the terms *catastica* and *stico* (from the Greek *stichos*), the updating of the fiscal entries attested at several occasions, as well as by the functions of the *veterani* or *gerontes*, village elders who dealt with, and provided evidence on fiscal matters. Yet no cadastral registers covering this region have survived. The transmission of Byzantine practices and the involvement of Greeks in this process are also illustrated by the fact that the data was recorded in Greek for more than a century after the Latin conquest. Eventually, in 1318, the Venetian Great Council ordered the governors in Messenia to translate their registers into Latin, yet the Byzantine terminology remained in use.[28] It also survived in Venetian Crete, where the term *catasticum* was applied to various registers listing land holdings, as well as their borders, surface, and content, including dependent peasants.[29]

A parallel, though somewhat different development took place in the principality of the Morea, the feudalized part of the Peloponnese. The princely register, written in French and enumerating the fiefs, their holders and the services they owed, was compiled for the first time in 1209 and later updated; it was to be accessible to the Frankish leaders, their vassals and officers, and was occasionally used in the princely court.[30] We may safely assume that similar registers existed in the baronial courts. Yet at the level of local and manorial administration, conditions were different. An intimate knowledge of the Greek language and the complex Byzantine fiscal idiom was imperative. The co-operation of the *archontes* and native Greek-speaking bureaucracy, already mentioned, was not limited to the initial phase of Latin rule. It continued well into the second half of the fourteenth century and we find Greeks, at times several members of the same family, at all the levels of the princely, baronial and manorial administration, from the highest offices to those of simple scribes. In 1287 one Vassilopoulos appears as *protovestiarius*, the officer in charge of the wardrobe or privy purse of the prince. The Greek knight Stephanus Cutrullus or Koutroules and Johannes Murmurus or Mourmoures, who belonged to a family of Greek officers in the Morea, served in the same capacity in 1336 and 1337, respectively. The use of the Greek term for the office, rather than a western equivalent, is most significant. The *protovestiarius* handed out fiefs on behalf of the prince, controlled their content and revenue, and sold the produce of the princely estates. Nikolakos of Patras, who in 1319 or 1320 was governor of the castle of St George in

Skorta, presumably also dealt with fiscal matters.[31] These Greek officers were obviously bilingual.

As in Venetian Messenia, the participation of Greeks in the administration, the supply of evidence and the collection of taxes in the Morea were closely related to the survival of Byzantine practices and the drafting of documents in Greek in this area. Twelve surveys or reports bearing on feudal estates, compiled between 1336 and 1379, provide important evidence in this respect.[32] While lacking uniformity, these documents use the same registration techniques and are similar in content and disposition to contemporary Byzantine *praktika*, or are based on such documents. The *praktika* were fiscal inventories of specific estates copied from the imperial cadastral registers, or compiled on location and later transcribed in such registers.[33] The striking kinship of the fourteenth-century Byzantine, Moreot, and Venetian surveys points to their common twelfth-century Byzantine models. Significantly, one of the Moreot surveys, compiled in 1337, explicitly refers 'to the *praktikon* written in Greek script' (*practico in greca scriptura scripto*) drafted by Johannes Murmurus.[34] Some Latins may also have compiled surveys in Greek. Nicola de Boiano, a south Italian officer, was sent in 1360 by Empress Mary of Bourbon to report on her Moreot estates. While referring to several villages Nicola de Boiano wrote at one point: 'I have compiled the inventories in Greek' (*o facti li inventarii in greco*).[35] The continuous involvement of Greek officers in the drafting of Greek *praktika* is also attested for the thirteenth century in the island of Cephalonia and in the region of Athens. The inventory listing the properties and income of the Latin diocese of Cephalonia was confirmed by Count Riccardo Orsini in 1264.[36] It must have updated an earlier *praktikon*, the prototype of which was compiled prior to the Latin conquest. As for the *praktikon* referring to the region of Athens, it was copied in a thirteenth-century hand in a codex, and not on a roll as was then customary in Byzantine practice, a fact that seems to point to its execution for a Latin chancery. This hypothesis is further enhanced by the consecutive Latin numbers appearing on the two surviving folios of this survey.[37]

There is no evidence to suggest that in feudal Morea there was a definitive switch from Greek to Latin or western idioms in fiscal surveys, similar to the one attested for Venetian Messenia. The use of Greek continued at the registration level and the transcription of surveys into Latin characters must have been made only when required by the Italian fief-holders, mostly absentee landlords, who wanted a detailed account of their feudal revenues. The replacement of Greek by Latin or the Venetian dialect in Venetian Messenia and presumably also in Crete, where it may have occurred even earlier than 1318, is

easily explained. At its highest level, the centralized Venetian colonial administration was manned by officers sent from Venice who remained overseas for short periods only, generally two years or somewhat less.[38] Upon their return to the metropolis, these officers had to provide detailed financial reports. The adoption of western languages in the local administration was to enable them direct access to the records and a first-hand knowledge of their content.

The original Greek data collected in Latin Romania is abundantly reflected in the Latin and Italian transcriptions in which they have survived. In the Morea, for instance, a western scribe recorded in 1357 a peasant having a *filius ypomasius* or 'nursing son'. He failed to translate into Latin the word *hypomazios* and mistook it for a proper name.[39] The transcription of a Greek Moreot survey into a barbarous mixture of Latin and south Italian dialect, executed in 1354, produced some amusing blunders. The bilingual Greek scribe obviously recorded the data by dictation and ascribed to the Latin letter *b* the phonetic value of the medieval Greek *beta*, which was then pronounced *v*. As a result, *vacca* or cow became in his text *bacca*, *vassalus* appears as *bassalus*, *virum* as *birum*, and the Neapolitan *da novu*, 'recently', as *da nobu*. Other oddities resulted from the literal or phonetic transcription of Greek words: thus *baltos*, 'swamp', became both *balto* and *vauldo* in the same survey of 1354.[40] At times Byzantine terms are hardly recognizable when transcribed into Latin or another western language: thus *aerikon* appears in the guise of *aricum*, *zeugaratikion* as *socaraticum*, and *kapnikon* as *capinicho*.[41] In Crete practically all technical terms referring to vine-growing were of Greek origin,[42] and this vocabulary was shared elsewhere in Latin Romania by Latin landholders and Greek peasants. The administrative idiom and the documents drafted by Latin notaries were thus heavily tainted by spoken Greek and by Byzantine terms, especially when dealing with rural taxation and landholding.

The use of the Greek language and Byzantine administrative practices, as well as the presence of Greeks in the bureaucracy of Latin Romania were closely related to a much wider phenomenon of continuity, namely the survival of imperial taxation. Byzantine commercial and maritime dues are attested in feudalized areas as well as in Venetian territories. Shortly after 1209 or 1210 Geoffrey I of Villehardouin, prince of Morea, granted the sum of 400 *hyperpyra* on the revenue derived from the *commerchium* or *kommerkion* of Corinth as a money-fief to his vassal Othon of La Roche.[43] This *commerchium* was presumably a custom due levied on imports and exports as in the empire. It appears again in Corinth as *chomerchio grande* in 1365, when the collection of this tax was farmed out 'according to custom' to some

Jews.[44] The *chomerchio* of the market, a sales tax, and those imposed on the shoemakers, the butchers, and others mentioned in this connection were most likely also of Byzantine origin.[45] The *messetarius*, like the Byzantine *mesites*, was an official broker supervising commercial deals and collecting the taxes imposed upon them. In the Venetian colonies the *messetarius* regularly reported to the local *officium commerchi et messetarie*, recorded in 1310 in Crete, which kept a detailed record of commercial transactions and collected the revenue gathered by the *messetarii*.[46] The *jus ligni* or *limena*, identical to the Byzantine *limeniatikon*, was a tax on ships anchoring in harbours. It is recorded in 1338 and 1354 for the port of Navarino, situated on the eastern coast of Frankish Messenia, when part of its revenue was held as money-fief by Niccolò Acciaiuoli.[47]

The survival of Byzantine commercial and maritime taxes was not synonymous with strict continuity in fiscal matters. The rate of taxes did not necessarily remain unchanged under Latin rule, nor was their levy always handled in the same way as before 1204; moreover, the destination of these taxes varied. In this last respect it is essential to emphasize a fundamental difference between Venetian and feudalized territories. The collection of taxes in the former was generally entrusted to the state bureaucracy, as in the empire. The office of *messetarius* may have been the exception to this rule, as it was farmed out by auction for short periods. Yet in Venetian lands taxation remained, as in the Byzantine era, an exclusive prerogative of the state, even if temporarily granted to an individual.[48] On the other hand, in feudalized areas former imperial state taxes were privatized and their revenue flowed to the treasuries of feudal lords, regardless of the way in which they were gathered. As we have seen, these lords occasionally farmed out the collection of taxes to individuals or groups and granted income, whether entirely or partly, as money-fiefs to their vassals. In the field of taxation, continuity was obviously more pronounced under Venetian rule.

Fiscal continuity, with the limitations and variations just mentioned, is also illustrated by the taxes imposed on the peasantry. These are attested by numerous sources and especially the fourteenth-century cadastral surveys of Frankish Morea. It would be tedious to consider each of them separately,[49] yet not in all cases was there absolute continuity. The adherence to the Byzantine inheritance in matters of taxation and the way some of it was handled are revealed by the treatment of the dependent peasants who were ordained priests. In 1219 the Latin Church reached an agreement about the fiscal obligations of these priests with Venice and the lay lords of the Latin empire. This settlement, also adopted for the kingdom of Thessalonica, was partly extended in 1223 to the principality of Morea and the duchy of

Athens. All village priests, their families and servants were to be exempted from labour services, exactions and special dues once owed to the state, while paying to their lords the *acrosticum* or *akrostichon*, a tax imposed on their fiscal unit, at the rate applied during the reign of Alexius III Angelus (1195–1204); in addition they were liable to the taxes imposed by their Latin lords. A limited number of these priests, however, were granted total exemption, save for the *acrosticum*: two in villages comprising twenty-five to seventy hearths, four in somewhat larger villages, and so on.[50]

These provisions recall those issued in 1144 by Emperor Manuel I Commenus, first in favour of the rural priests who were *dēmosiarioi paroikoi*, or *paroikoi* established on state land and submitted to the imperial fisc, then to village priests living on the estates of private landlords and ecclesiastical institutions, and possibly to all rural priests. The priests were exempted from extraordinary taxes and exactions, which may have included labour, army, and fleet services to the state or payments replacing them. Yet in order to limit the loss of imperial revenue, Manuel I restricted the number of *dēmosiarioi paroikoi* enjoying the exemptions to those who were specifically registered as being entitled to them. Patriarch Luke Chrysoberges (1157–1169) claimed in 1168 that the imperial fisc had compelled village priests on state land in excess of the permitted number to perform public services. The emperor agreed that the matter should be considered by the patriarchal synod, which advocated a general exemption for all the priests who were *dēmosiarioi paroikoi*. Emperor Manuel's final decision is not known.[51] At any rate, the agreements of 1219 and 1223 seem to have relied on the Byzantine regulations. On the one hand they extended certain exemptions to all village priests; on the other, they ensured the limitation of the number of exempted priests in each village, regardless of its lord, in the spirit of Emperor Manuel's legislation. The first provision satisfied the Latin Church, while the second safeguarded the interests of the lay lords. The most important conclusion to be drawn from the whole issue is that the Latins had obtained from Greek informants precise evidence on Byzantine taxes and ensured the latter's continuity as a matter of convenience, while adapting them or innovating whenever it suited their own conceptions or interests.

A similar picture emerges from the evolution of the *zovadego* in Venetian Messenia.[52] This tax, called *zovaticum* in Latin, was obviously identical to the Byzantine *zeugaratikion* paid in wheat or in cash by peasants holding land and owning oxen. Under Venetian rule the *zovadego* was originally collected in the area of Modon only, yet not in the neighbouring district of Coron. In 1384, however, the Venetian

authorities extended this tax to peasants who held land but no plough animals. Two years later it was the turn of the state peasants in the district to be taxed. In 1414 the tax was further extended to landless peasants. Contrary to Byzantine practice, it was then paid in wheat only, except when the state officers collected overdue payments.

The specific developments connected with the *zovadego* enable us to draw some further conclusions about the lack of uniformity in Byzantine taxation. Continuity and change in fiscal matters in Messenia were not restricted to the *zovadego*. They also extended to labour services imposed on state *paroikoi*, those in the area of Modon owing 13 days a year and those in the district of Coron 12 only.[53] One might argue, of course, that the discrepancies between the two districts, each of which had its own *castellanus*, were due to the Venetian authorities who imported the *zovadego* from their possessions in northern Italy. Had this been the case, however, one would expect the Venetians to have introduced the new tax simultaneously in both closely connected districts, and not only in one of them. It is most likely, therefore, that after the conquest Venice found the *zeugaratikion*, a Byzantine tax similar in nature to the *zovadego*, and applied to it the term customary in some areas of northern Italy. We may thus assume that the different rates of taxation applied in each of the districts originated in the period preceding the Fourth Crusade. This would indicate that, contrary to a widely held view, there was no fiscal uniformity in the empire, even within the boundaries of a single *horion*, or large district, such as that of Patras-Modon covering the western Peloponnese.[54] It is noteworthy that the *zeugaratikion* does not appear in all the Byzantine *praktika* and was therefore not necessarily levied throughout the empire. More to the point in our context, the case of the *zovadego* clearly proves that local or regional features existing prior to 1204 were perpetuated for more than a century under Latin rule. The imposition of this tax on categories of peasants previously exempted from it and the emphasis on its payment in kind reflect the specific needs of the Venetian authorities in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, and the subtle combination of continuity, adaption, and innovation.

The Latin conquerors developed and adapted their legal traditions in Romania in accordance with their specific needs and mentality, relying on judicial precedents, borrowings, and legislation.[55] They imposed their own criminal law immediately after the conquest. In other fields, however, the transition from Byzantine to Latin rule generated more complex developments. The perpetuation of Byzantine administrative and fiscal practices was necessarily related to the survival and implementation of Byzantine law, with which the Latins likewise became acquainted.[56] It is highly significant that in all the territories of Latin

Romania the conquerors incorporated this law in their own legal system, the nature and range of this move differing according to their specific political and social regime. Jurisdiction being one of the foremost expressions of political power and authority, it was inevitable that the survival of Byzantine law should be constantly challenged and its application restricted by Latin inroads into its realm.

We are fortunate to have a first-rate source of Moreot law: the *Assizes of Romania*, a private legal treatise, the final version of which was compiled between 1333 and 1346.[57] This treatise reveals that Byzantine private law survived in the feudal principality in numerous fields. With the exception of feudal estates, it was applied to land held by Greeks, which was transmitted by equal partible inheritance, regardless of the heirs' social status or gender. This rule was equally valid for patrimonial estates owned by the Moreot *archontes* and plots of land belonging to the *staseis* or fiscal units of the *paroikoi*. It contradicted the feudal practice of primogeniture and the precedence of male over female governing the inheritance of fiefs, including those granted to *archontes*.[58] The *Assizes of Romania* also prove that land exploitation was regulated by Byzantine law. Thus the contract of *hemiseia* or *hemisophyteusia*, attested in feudal Morea as well as in Venetian Crete and Messenia, provided for the division into equal parts of newly planted trees and vines between the landlord and the peasant responsible for their cultivation. It should be noted that this and other agricultural contracts were drafted according to Byzantine models even when they involved Latin farmers tilling small plots of land.[59] In this field, then, Byzantine law definitely maintained a strong standing.

Other sources bearing on the personal status and obligations of the Greek peasantry in Latin Romania also point to the survival of Byzantine law and enable us to fill numerous gaps in our knowledge of the pre-1204 empire.[60] This is not to say that Byzantine law enjoyed a quasi-monopoly in the realm of rural landholding and exploitation or with regard to the status of the Greek peasantry. As indicated by the *Assizes of Romania*, in feudalized areas Frankish law dealt with vassalic relations, fiefs, Latin burgesses and their economic activities, yet also with Greek *archontes* or peasants and their land, in addition to jurisdiction, fiscal rights, and economic prerogatives exercised by the state prior to 1204 and taken over by landlords after the conquest.[61] Paradoxically, the privatization of the state's authority benefitted not only the Latin feudal lords, but also the Greek *archontes*. Under Latin rule, the latter could fully implement Byzantine law on their estates without any state limitation or supervision.

It follows that feudal custom and Byzantine law cohabited in various

fields. This, however, did not imply the existence of clear, stable, and definitive boundaries between the two legal systems in feudalized areas. The struggle between them may be illustrated here by a specific issue: the status of the patrimonial estates owned by the Greek *archontes* in the Morea. In the thirties and forties of the fourteenth century the Latin feudatories, especially those of lower rank, seem to have resented what they perceived as a preferential treatment of their Greek peers, whose patrimonial land was exempted from the restrictive rules of primogeniture governing the inheritance of fiefs and in many cases also from military service. The feudatories therefore urged the imposition of these rules. Although not documented for an earlier period, their claim was presumably first voiced in the second half of the thirteenth century, when the number of Greek fief-holders rapidly increased, and was expressed more forcefully when *archontes* began to join the ranks of the knights. It is impossible to ascertain whether these feudatories eventually imposed their view.[62] Whatever the case, the whole issue is indicative of the growing pressures exerted against the application of Byzantine law and the possible limitations of the fields in which it survived.

The developments in Venetian colonial territories were different, largely because the basic conception of political authority underlying Venice's legal system was similar to that of the empire. For the Venetians – as for the Byzantines – the state enjoyed a monopoly in the exercise of jurisdiction, especially criminal jurisdiction, and Venetian law was enforced whenever state rights and prerogatives were at stake.[63] In addition, Venice like the empire upheld the principle that state interests took precedence over private interests. As a result, Venice applied Byzantine law in a wide range of fields after integrating it into her own legal system, yet only as long as it was compatible with her interests. Venetian law of this type covered primarily state land and peasants settled on it, whether directly held by the state, granted as military holding or temporarily leased, yet also covered lordless land and peasants, as well as peasants submitted to the *archontes*. As a result, there was no room for the privatization of jurisdiction as applied in feudalized territories. Nevertheless, there was an area in which Byzantine jurisdiction and law survived in entirety: the socio-spatial networks headed by the *archontes*. The authority wielded by the *archontes* within these boundaries may have been even more extensive than in the Byzantine era as there was little state interference, save in criminal matters. Moreover, in periods of upheaval, rebellious *archontes* and the judges they appointed exercised unrestricted jurisdiction in the territories they controlled. The operation of Byzantine law within these same networks was further enhanced by the

tendency of Greeks to have recourse to their own, rather than to Latin notaries, especially when they wished to conceal from their lords or the state private transactions or avoid the expenses involved in official registration.[64] As these contracts were not recognized by Venetian courts, conflicts between the parties concerned bolstered the influence of archontal jurisdiction.

Continuity in such closely related fields as administration, taxation, landholding, law, and jurisdiction does not necessarily imply that the effects of the Latin conquest on the peasantry were limited to the replacement of a number of Greek by Latin landlords, nor that the Byzantine rural world remained practically unchanged. The survival of Byzantine terminology and institutions is somewhat deceptive, and we would fail to understand its overall implications after 1204 unless we examine the empire's inheritance in the countryside within the specific political, social, and legal context of Latin Romania.

The interaction between Byzantine and western legal and fiscal traditions is particularly obvious with regard to the *paroikoi*, called *villani* or *rustici* in Latin Romania. The eleventh- and twelfth-century evidence on the condition of the Byzantine *paroikoi* is rather meagre when compared with that available for the conquered territories. It is impossible, therefore, to determine whether all the legal restrictions enforced after 1204 on the *paroikos* and the exercise of his property rights derived from Byzantine practice. It should be stressed that by the twelfth century the Byzantine *paroikos* was still considered legally free. He thus enjoyed a status different from that of the slave, although his status was also permanent and hereditary. There were, however, some legal and practical factors limiting his freedom, and the subjection to his lord (an individual, an ecclesiastical institution, or the state) had become very tight. Various sources vividly convey the perceptions of contemporaries with respect to the condition of the *paroikos*. In a letter written between 1097 and 1104, Theophylactus of Bulgaria complained about one of his *paroikoi* 'aspiring to more liberty and desirous to shed the yoke of his *paroikia*': the issue of freedom was thus paramount to both sides. About two centuries later, around 1228, a *pronoia* holder of Thessaly used force against a *paroikos* who had refused to obey his orders and accidentally killed him. He thereafter submitted to ecclesiastical penance for his crime, yet there is no evidence that he was prosecuted by an imperial court.[65]

In contrast to the Byzantine *paroikos*, the *villanus* of Latin Romania was unfree: his legal and social demotion was a feature common to areas with such different regimes as Venetian Crete, feudalized Morea and Negroponte. While this development constituted a break with the past, there were some Byzantine features that survived. In the twelfth-

century empire, the dependent peasantry was divided into two groups: *demosiarioi paroikoi*, or *paroikoi* of the state, and *paroikoi* of individuals or ecclesiastical institutions. The same two groups are to be found among the *paroikoi* or *villani* of Venetian Crete and Messenia. In these territories Venice succeeded to the Byzantine state and maintained strict supervision over the movement and distribution of the dependent peasantry, a subject to which we shall soon return. The *villani* of the state, however, seem to have enjoyed slightly better conditions than their peers submitted to individuals or to ecclesiastical institutions. The state control over individual peasants could not be as rigorous as that of other landlords, who resided on their estates or visited them regularly; on the other hand, it is true that state control was not limited by territorial boundaries. State villeins had access to public courts and they were more likely, under certain circumstances, to be freed from residential restriction, benefit from tax exemptions or be emancipated. The evolution in feudalized areas was different. The removal of imperial supervision and the disappearance of imperial public courts opened the way to the privatization of former state *paroikoi*, and to a stronger subordination of the peasants to their lords, regardless of whether these were Latins or Greeks. There still remains an unsolved problem: what happened to the free Byzantine peasants who, according to some scholars, were still to be found shortly before the Latin conquest? The Venetians may have assimilated them to the state *paroikoi*. At any rate, there is hardly any trace of free peasants in the thirteenth century Venetian colonies, save for a few individuals, and there seems to have been none in feudalized areas.[66]

The different conceptions of the ruling Latin elites with regard to the nature of political authority also affected the fiscal obligations of the peasantry, which closely reflected the latter's social and legal status. In Crete and southern Messenia, Venice strictly maintained the distinction between private and public taxes and services, in conformity with Byzantine usage. Indeed, in these territories, occupied by Venice shortly after the collapse of imperial rule, the peasants' individual or collective obligations towards the state were never assimilated to those discharged to landlords, although some state taxes and labour services were permanently ceded to holders of military tenements or temporarily only to individuals leasing state land.[67] In the territories of Coron and Modon the transportation of lime and other building material, the supply of grass and straw to the Venetian governors, and the service aboard Venetian warships clearly originated in the period preceding the Fourth Crusade. It should be noted that maritime service also persisted in areas such as Tenos and Myconos that went through a period of limited feudalization before being annexed by Venice in the

course of the fourteenth century, as well as in Rhodes under the rule of the Hospitallers.[68]

In spite of pronounced differences between their respective political and social regimes, the territories of Latin Romania shared a large number of legal and fiscal rules and procedures governing the status of the dependent peasant. Some of these, which were inherited from the twelfth-century empire, are unrecorded in extant Byzantine sources. Thus, for instance, the process by which a peasant became the *paroikos* of a specific landlord in the empire is revealed only by later sources from Venetian Crete, feudal Morea, and Negroponte. The subjection of the *paroikos* seems to have become binding one year after his settlement on the land of his lord, and hereditary after a period of thirty years during which the peasant and his descendants fulfilled their fiscal and manorial obligations. This thirty-year prescription was obviously connected with a similar prescription regarding land held by *paroikoi*.[69]

In the empire the *paroikos* who did not pay any taxes, was not subjected to a specific landlord or the state, nor registered as *paroikos* was known as *anagraphos*, 'non-inscribed', *xenos*, 'foreigner', or *eleutheros*, 'free', while in Latin Romania his counterpart became an *extraneus* or 'foreigner'. Yet their so-called freedom did not entail any change in their legal status, as it was temporary and lasted only until they were reintegrated within the ranks of the *paroikoi* or *villani*. Fugitives could be claimed by their lords or the state, respectively, and when caught, were forcibly returned to the estate from which they had escaped if their lord or the state wished so. In Venetian territories lordless *villani* belonged to the state, while in feudalized areas these *villani* became subjected to feudal lords or *archontes*. Except for this privatization, Latin Romania thus followed Byzantine precedents with regard to the *eleutheroi* or *extranei*.[70] There is yet another Byzantine rule documented by later Latin sources only, which should be mentioned here. The issue when peasants attained legal majority entailing fiscal responsibility was raised on several occasions in Venetian Crete. Two thirteenth-century references to *paroikoi* or villeins in this island point to sixteen as the age of majority 'according to the custom of this land', or Byzantine custom.[71] This rule, which has been overlooked, is of particular importance: it may enable us to assess with greater precision than in the past the reliability of the demographic data listed in the cadastral surveys of the empire and Frankish Morea, and improve thereby our quantitative interpretation of this evidence.[72]

Continuity was also obvious in the social fabric of the Greek peasantry. The use of names and surnames, the kinship patterns, and the structure and size of families and households within the Greek peasantry of the Morea bear a strong affinity with those appearing in

fourteenth-century Byzantium. As revealed by the Moreot sources of this period, there were striking variations between neighbouring areas, villages, and even portions of the same villages held by different landlords with respect to the relative, fluctuating number of vertically extended, laterally extended, or nuclear families. On the whole, the kinship patterns reflect the existence of relatively stable families and households in villages shielded from warfare for long periods of time.[73] Nuclear families, however, seem to predominate, especially in newly resettled areas along common borders with the empire.[74] Extensive migration due to various factors was facilitated by the political fragmentation of Latin Romania.[75] The evidence on the Cretan peasantry does not enable us to arrive at a quantitative evaluation of migration, as for fourteenth-century Morea.[76] Yet we may safely assume that on the island the frequent revolts of the thirteenth century and their repression had a destabilizing effect on the peasantry in specific areas. Migration mainly occurred within the island, the escape to other territories being more difficult than in continental Greece.[77]

Occasionally the sources, especially those of Venetian Messenia, offer a glimpse of the functions of the village community operating as a fiscal entity and as a social body defending its collective rights against the landlord or the state. Here again the affinity with the empire is striking.[78] The village elders, known as *gerontes, protogerontes, homines seniores, homines antiqui, anciani*, or *veterani*, provided information to surveyors on landholding and taxation, carried out surveys of land boundaries when ordered to do so, presented the peasants when an inquest was made, and were responsible for the collection of certain taxes and their transfer to the landlord, or to the state as in Venetian Messenia. They were involved in legal matters, whether in an advisory capacity or as court agents. They also convened their fellow peasants and represented their interests when necessary. In short, they served as intermediaries between the villeins and the landlord or the state. The *gerontes* were most likely rich peasants who inherited their particular social standing within the village community. In Venetian Messenia the governors annually entrusted a number of them with specific administrative responsibilities.[79]

Latin rule ensured the supremacy of the Roman Church in the conquered territories and generated important changes in the life and organization of the Greek Church.[80] Our main concern here is with the social implications of these changes, rather than with their reflection in the ecclesiastical body. To be sure, the Latins promised at several occasions to maintain the Greek Church and its religious practice, yet it was forcefully subjected to papal authority and supervision, gradually stripped of its higher ranks, and weakened by large scale confiscations

of its property and income. The Latin conquest of Constantinople severely diminished the prospects of reconciliation between the Latin and Greek churches, and the aggressive propaganda of the Dominicans and Franciscans further antagonized the Greeks. Following a short period of demoralization in the aftermath of the conquest, Greek priests and monks engaged in passive resistance to Latin domination. Some of them went even further and actively co-operated with the Greeks of Epirus and those of Nicaea, yet without notable effects. Latin political and ecclesiastical domination were interwoven and this was especially true in Venetian territories.

Considering the Latin Church an instrument of government, Venice repeatedly interfered in ecclesiastical appointments, exerting a strong control on the activities of both Latin and Greek ecclesiastical bodies, and preventing the Latin Church from taking any action she considered as dangerous to peace and stability within her territories.[81] Neither Venice nor the feudal lords were eager to encourage the adhesion of Greeks to the Latin Church, especially on a large scale by villeins. Such a move would have disrupted the existing social order, since members of the Roman Church were considered freemen.[82] It is obvious, therefore, why a change in the status of the villeins was strongly opposed by their lords. The number of Greeks joining the Roman Church in any case remained small,[83] a fact that was closely related to the evolution of the Greek Church under Latin rule.

The evolution of the Greek Church was in a way paradoxical. Despite the blows suffered, it displayed a remarkable vitality at the popular level, especially in rural areas where *papates* or priests and monks lived among the Greek laymen and shared their fate. As already noted, most *papates* were villeins.[84] In Crete, moreover, the Greek Church enjoyed the constant support of the *archontes* who, as before the conquest, exercised rights of patronage entailing economic benefits over monasteries and churches and repeatedly intervened on behalf of these institutions or individual monks and priests, as illustrated by their treaties with the Venetian government. In 1299 Alexius Kallergis even received permission to negotiate with the Roman Church in order to ensure the consecration of a Greek bishop in Crete. Such a prelate is mentioned in 1331 at Milopotamo.[85]

The attitudes within the Greek community are well reflected in the writings of Marino Sanudo, an acute Venetian observer of Latin Romania. Around 1330, more than a century after the imposition of Latin rule, he described the situation in Cyprus, Rhodes, the Morea, Euboea, Crete, and other Aegean islands in the following terms: 'Although these places are subjected to the rule of the Franks and obedient to the Roman Church, almost all the population is Greek and

is inclined toward this sect [namely, the Greek Church], and their hearts are turned toward Greek matters, and when they can show this freely, they do so.'[86] Indeed, the Greek Church acted as a cultural focus and played a major role in the crystallization of a new Greek collective identity, in which religious and ethnic responses to Latin rule merged, and which had long-term effects, especially in Venetian territories. Occasionally it manifested itself openly, as noted by Marino Sanudo. In the fifteenth century the influx of Greek clergymen from Byzantine territories aroused religious and social unrest on several occasions.[87] More indicative perhaps of the permanent mood within the Greek community in this period are two dedicatory inscriptions painted in 1436 and 1445 respectively, and displayed in two small Cretan churches commissioned by priests.[88] Both inscriptions mention Emperor John VIII Palaeologus in their dating and thus clearly proclaim the Byzantine allegiance of the Greek clergy, undoubtedly shared by the majority of Greek laymen. These Cretan inscriptions sharply contrast with those found in thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century archontic churches in the Morea and Negroponte, which bear no reference to emperors.[89]

The evolution of the Greek Church and its determinant role in the shaping of new attitudes were also fostered by the weak standing of the Latin Church in the conquered territories.[90] Most Latins were settled in urban centres along the Greek coasts. Elsewhere Latin laymen were scattered and lived in small communities established in inland cities and rural areas. Such was also the case with Latin monks, who remained few in number and on the whole failed to expand in Latin Greece.[91] Under these circumstances, massive investments in ecclesiastical buildings were neither necessary nor possible. In the thirteenth and first half of the fourteenth century the Latins were mostly content with the enlargement and embellishment of existing Greek churches and monasteries, and built only few new churches.[92]

One of the main functions assigned to the Roman Church in the conquered territories was the promotion and preservation of Latin solidarity and collective identity, especially important in the midst of a much more numerous and occasionally hostile Greek population. The Roman Church, however, was severely weakened by the lack of priests in sufficient numbers, especially inland, and the absenteeism of the higher clergy. As it was unable to supply ecclesiastical services to many small, scattered Latin communities, growing numbers of Latins turned to Greek priests and monks, received sacraments according to the Greek rite, and mingled with Greek laymen at religious services. Such a case occurred in Melos during a five-year vacancy in the local Latin church, which ended in 1253 when Pope Innocent IV responded to the appeal of the Latin population of the island and appointed a new

bishop. In the thirteenth century there must have been similar cases elsewhere. Religious symbiosis in Latin Romania is better documented for the following two centuries. Although limited in scope and largely restricted to common worship, this symbiosis, in addition to intermarriage, daily social and economic intercourse between Greeks and Latins, and a growing knowledge of Greek among the latter, generated some degree of hellenization that worried the papacy, the Latin lay lords, and the Venetian government. They feared the assimilation of the Latins to their Greek neighbours, and took various measures to prevent this process, such as institutionalized ethnic segregation in Crete.[93] All these phenomena, however, did not blur the distinctive identity of the Latin and Greek communities, which pursued their separate existence.

The economic evolution of the western provinces of the empire between the twelfth and the fourteenth century was also marked by continuity, adaptation, and change. In the twelfth century the economy of this region was largely shaped by a set of interconnected factors.[94] Land was the main source of income, wealth, and taxation, large estates constituting the major element in this context. Local *archontes*, to whom many of these estates belonged, played a dominant role in both the rural and urban economy. Their attitudes and interests were largely responsible for the slow development of a market economy supported by manufacture and trade in some urban centres, and by extra-regional trade largely oriented towards Constantinople.

Let us now briefly examine these factors. Large estates owned or held by the imperial fisc, members of the imperial and other prominent families as well as by ecclesiastical institutions of the capital, local *archontes*, churches and monasteries, are well attested for the period of the conquest.[95] There is no direct evidence about the structure, management, or profitability of these estates. However, from Byzantine sources referring to other provinces of the empire and later evidence bearing on Latin Romania we may gather that they usually consisted of small peasant holdings directly exploited by *paroikoi*, and of demesne land cultivated with the help of compulsory labour services provided by *paroikoi* or slaves, joined by a salaried labour force (*misthioi*) and by peasants leasing small scattered tracts of land from rich landlords.[96] These estates raised livestock and mainly produced wheat, olive oil, wine, various fruits, wool, and raw silk.

From the writings of Michael Choniates, self-exiled archbishop of Athens, it would seem that the countryside of Attica and neighbouring areas were severely suffering from desertion, neglect by absentee landlords, attacks by pirates, and above all fiscal oppression by greedy

and corrupt tax-collectors.[97] It is likely, however, that this picture is somewhat biased and mainly reflects the evils besetting ecclesiastical estates; at best it is valid for specific small areas only. In the twelfth century the empire enjoyed demographic stability and a flourishing agriculture. More specifically, most *archontes* were presumably not defenceless like ecclesiastical institutions when it came to taxation. This was particularly the case with powerful *archontes*, who often held positions in the administrative or military hierarchy of the empire. These *archontes* must have enjoyed substantial revenues accruing from their estates, their urban property, and their official functions or dignities.[98] These revenues go far to explain the power they wielded and their ability to offer protection to, and muster extensive support within the local Greek population. At the time of the conquest, power and social standing, rather than economic development, were at the top of the *archontes*' priorities and were closely related to their ideal of self-sufficiency.[99] We may therefore assume that they were willing to go to considerable expense in order to obtain and maintain a following, as well as to acquire and display status symbols. On the other hand, it is most unlikely that they should have heavily invested or innovated in their estates, while monasteries were more willing to do so as they were not concerned about social standing. The development of an increasingly market-oriented economy in continental Greece in the course of the twelfth century hardly affected the attitudes of lay landlords with regard to land use, management, or marketing. The same holds true, it seems, of ecclesiastical institutions, which for different reasons strove to achieve self-sufficiency, a goal that could be all the more easily attained when a monastery held land in different areas, as St John of Patmos did on that island and in Crete.[100]

The growth of manufacture in the eleventh and twelfth centuries mainly occurred in the framework of numerous small, scattered workshops, and this was also the case with the silk and glass industries. The concentration of craftsmen remained limited to few specific urban centres, primarily Corinth, Thebes, and Sparta.[101] In continental Greece local *archontes* were the dominant element in the urban economy. Their estates supplied agricultural commodities and industrial raw materials, the most important of which was raw silk. They owned shops and dwellings in the cities, controlled local manufacturing to some extent, and occasionally provided capital for commercial ventures.[102] Yet, on the other hand, their involvement in urban life seriously hampered the development of a sizeable mercantile group, free trade, and a full-fledged market economy. These *archontes* generally lived in cities fairly close to their estates, which presumably ensured their own supply and that of many of their urban followers and

dependents. Moreover, *archontes* and monasteries often delivered the surplus of their estates directly to regional fairs and consumer markets, and in rather exceptional cases to large distant markets, primarily Constantinople, by using their own agents and ships rather than independent intermediaries.[103] We may safely assume that to some extent the agents overseeing the estates of Constantinopolitan owners acted similarly and also shipped some of their merchandise directly to the capital.

It is within this extra-regional trade pattern, largely geared towards Constantinople, the main emporium of the empire, that Venetian traders expanded their operations since the second half of the eleventh century; they were followed by other Latins. The range and consequences of their intrusion into the Byzantine market have been grossly overestimated.[104] Venetian traders were primarily attracted to western Greece and Crete by agricultural produce and some luxury items, such as raw silk and silken cloth, which they seem to have often purchased from local *archontes*. Their exemption from Byzantine taxation, as well as their combination of innovative commercial techniques, trade, and shipping, gave them a definite edge over Byzantine competitors. At first they operated between the western provinces and Constantinople, but very soon they took advantage of their simultaneous links with the empire and particularly its capital, Alexandria, and Venice, and from the last quarter of the eleventh century they shipped grain, oil, Cretan cheese, and precious wares to these destinations.[105] In the twelfth century, Venetian and other Italian traders appear to have gradually replaced the Byzantines on the maritime route linking Constantinople with Alexandria. The impact of the Italians' activity on the Byzantine economy and on urban life in the western provinces seems to have been restricted to specific localities enjoying a modest infusion of western capital, a growth in population, and a boom in construction.[106] The volume of capital, shipping tonnage, and manpower invested by the Latins in Romania was still small, compared with what it became in the second half of the thirteenth century. It was limited by the heavy Italian involvement in trade with Egypt and the crusader Levant and, more generally, by a negative balance of trade with the East.[107] In sum, the western provinces fulfilled a marginal role within the framework of the empire's economy, and this role was not basically altered by twelfth-century developments.

The following century witnessed important changes in the economy of the region that came under Latin rule, generated by the dismantling of the Byzantine empire in the wake of the Fourth Crusade, amplified by long-lasting demographic, social, and economic processes in the West, and shaped by factors specific to Latin Romania. As a result, this

vast area was entirely drawn into the economic orbit of the West, and its orientation markedly changed.[108] To be sure, land remained the main factor of its economy, the rural infrastructure was hardly affected by the conquest, and the patterns of agricultural production on the whole persisted. This continuity is attested by the survival of Byzantine administrative, fiscal, and legal institutions and practices, by the structure of the large Moreot estates described in the fourteenth-century surveys, save for a few innovations discussed below, and by numerous agricultural contracts dealing with the cultivation of small plots of land and the raising of livestock.[109] In the aftermath of the conquest, however, there were some major changes in agricultural management, production, and marketing.

As a result of expropriation, most land was transferred from Greek to Latin landlords. This shift severely curtailed the share of the *archontes* and the Greek monasteries in the rural economy as well as their impact on cities and trade. More importantly, it established a new pattern of interaction between these three factors. In varying degrees, though definitely more than their predecessors, the Latin landlords were aware of the economic benefits resulting from co-operation with an expanding group of traders and craftsmen, which after the conquest comprised numerous Latins established in cities involved in maritime trade.[110] This awareness was shared by the conquering knights, who highly valued investments in social standing, and by Latin burgesses, particularly Italians. All these new settlers originated in areas of the West experiencing by 1200 an ever stronger interaction between the rural world and a developed urban economy.[111] It is hardly surprising that after a short period the Greek *archontes* should also have adopted the approach of their Latin peers.

We have seen that before the conquest *archontes* and ecclesiastical landlords were the main source of liquid capital, albeit in small amounts. The strictly localized infusions of additional capital provided by Latin traders did not basically alter the nature of the Byzantine economy, although it foreshadowed later developments. The conquest, however, broke the strong hold of the landlords on the financing of economic activities and abolished the last restrictive barriers of Byzantine state control. It thus enabled the free flow of cash between various sectors of the economy. Several demographic and economic factors also contributed to this crucial mutation: the permanent settlement or temporary stay of Latins in cities, especially coastal cities along the main maritime lanes, or their presence in castles as in the Morea; the population growth in coastal cities; the supply of goods and services to traders and ships in transit; finally, the expanding demand for specific agricultural commodities in Venice, the Angevin kingdom of

Sicily, and other areas of the West. The growing volume of demand and exchange, particularly in connection with long-distance trade, generated an influx of cash that stimulated the economy of Latin Romania, and so did new forms of credit and profit-sharing ventures.[112]

The incentives provided by the new economic pattern had a major impact on the agricultural sector, and account for the growth in productivity and total output. Agricultural production in the fertile areas of Latin Romania, especially the Peloponnese and Crete, became increasingly geared to export in the course of the thirteenth century. The sale of Cretan wheat to Venice began in the late sixties. Since 1281 the Venetian government occasionally guaranteed Cretan producers and traders higher prices than on the free market, in order to ensure a massive supply of this commodity. Wine, raisins, oil, cheese, hides, wool, silk, honey, and kermes, a dye-material, were also in high demand in the West. Latin landlords and Greek *archontes*, living on their land or in its vicinity, enhanced security, stability, and continuity in cultivation, and were among the main beneficiaries of growth in output. Burgesses investing in agricultural ventures and peasants farming their own or leased land and raising cattle also had a share in the prosperity it generated.[113]

It should be noted that the increase in agricultural produce was largely achieved within the inherited agrarian and social structures. Eventually, however, the urge to ensure growing profits determined a departure from Byzantine traditions in the management of large estates. This process is documented for the fourteenth century, although it may have begun earlier. From the Moreot surveys it appears that the agents of some absentee Italian fief-holders increased agricultural output by introducing structural changes in the organization and exploitation of their employers' large estates, together with new types of cultures and new agricultural techniques. They established large farms of a kind known in southern Italy as *massarie*, directly exploited by the landlord with the help of the peasants' labour services and hired labour. In the Morea these farms were mainly devoted to intensive cultivation based on irrigation and the use of manure. The agents also improved the marketing process of agricultural produce by co-operating with Italian traders active in the coastal towns of the Peloponnese. The commercial approach of the Italian landlords to their estates is well illustrated by the survey of the area of Corinth compiled in 1365 for Niccolò Acciaiuoli, member of a Florentine banking family: this survey displays registration techniques and double-entry book-keeping similar to those used by contemporary Italian trading and banking firms.[114] In spite of fluctuations in agricultural production, it seems that on the whole the countryside of Latin

Romania was more prosperous than before the conquest, except in areas devastated and depopulated by warfare and piracy.[115]

Little is known about the organization and productive capacity of crafts and industries in Latin Romania. The greater concentration of population in urban centers obviously enhanced the production of wares for the local consumer market. However, there was no growth in export industries, with the exception perhaps of tanning. The silk industry appears to have declined. The large-scale export to the West of raw silk and kermes is indicative in this respect, though the silk workshops also remained active. Between 1300 and 1330 a Jewish entrepeneur of Negroponte supplied silk and dyes to local craftsmen. The production of samit continued, but was not sufficient to enable sizeable exports. Significantly, neither the survey of 1365 covering Corinth, nor sources bearing on Thebes mention the manufacture of silk in these cities, known for their industry in the twelfth century.[116] Glass production also seems to have declined, presumably in connection with its rise in Venice in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century. Greek craftsmen and painters in this city were then involved in the manufacturing of large amounts of glass vessels intended for export to Romania.[117] Latin Romania increasingly became a supplier of raw materials for industries in the West and absorbed the latter's finished products. The economic development of the cities determined their demographic growth and altered their relative importance. The course of land and sea routes was gradually adjusted so as to integrate them into the new supply system of the area. In addition to economic factors, however, the pattern of Latin settlement as well as the foundation of new urban centres, such as Canea in Crete and Clarence in the Morea, were also related to political and military developments. In some cases the latter affected the level of economic activity: in 1365 the *commercium* of Corinth, a city suffering from Catalan raids in the area, was leased for the sum of 340 *hyperpyra*, rather small considering the city's location and bustling economy in the twelfth century.[118]

An important departure from Byzantine economic patterns occurred in yet another field. To be sure, Greeks continued to participate in local and regional land trade, as at seasonal fairs like the one held in 1296 at Vervena, in the region of Skorta, where a Byzantine *archon* came to sell his raw silk.[119] Greeks were also involved in short-range and regional maritime trade and shipping.[120] Yet Venetians and other Latin settlers in this area participated in growing numbers in these activities at the expense of indigenous merchants and ship operators, and since the 1270s local Greek traders in the Aegean seem to have increasingly relied on Latin crafts. The influx of capital derived from long-distance commerce and transport, and the protection

provided by Venice to its citizens and subjects settled and active in various cities of Latin Romania. Local and regional trade and shipping were increasingly subordinated to the requirements, course, and rhythm of this long-distance activity, which became the almost exclusive preserve of Venetian citizens acting as itinerant merchants. The Venetian web of commercial outposts established on foreign soil and colonies under direct state rule greatly fostered the range, variety, and volume of Venetian maritime trade flowing within and through Latin Romania. The overwhelming importance in this area of Venetian coinage, which replaced that of Byzantium, is but one aspect of the economic hegemony of Venice. Thanks to its geographical position and to Venetian activity, Latin Romania became firmly integrated within the triangular eastern Mediterranean trade pattern linking the Black Sea, Constantinople, and the imperial lands, with the crusader and Muslim Levant as well as with the West.[121]

The Latin conquest was followed by a definite rupture on three different levels. First, political power became a Latin monopoly, although its exercise differed in feudalized and non-feudalized territories. Secondly, the new social stratification, common to all territories regardless of their specific political and social regime, was not only a reflection of the conquerors' social attitudes, but also an instrument of domination and as such an expression of their political power. Thirdly, the symbiotic relationship that developed between Latins and Greeks in daily life did not conceal the persistent, only marginally bridged rift, which existed between the two communities, nor their contrasting orientation, with strong Latin links to the West and the Greeks firmly rooted in the Byzantine past. It is within these parameters that the evolution of Latin Romania took place in the first century or so after the conquest.

Latin pragmatism and flexibility, as well as the strength inherent in the Byzantine institutional and operational infrastucture account for the large measure of continuity displayed by the rural world of Latin Romania. The Greek peasantry and the rural economy constituted the main sources of revenue of the Latin elite and the Venetian government, who maintained the Byzantine social and economic fabric as long as it furthered their interests, did not restrict their exercise of power and authority, or endanger the Latins' collective survival. The continuity of microeconomic structures, also expressed in legal and operational terms, extended even further to crafts as well as to local and regional trade. It is most significant that the great shift that occurred in the economic evolution of Latin Romania only marginally affected these structures.

Continuity was most pronounced in the portion of the Greek community headed by the *archontes*, which functioned as an aggregation of autonomous socio-spatial networks. In this framework the *archontes* preserved their traditional standing, based on rural wealth in an initially underdeveloped market economy, and to some extent acted as heirs to the Byzantine state. In the absence of any system of power-sharing, the exercise of their traditional authority within the Greek community served as a safety-valve for the Latins. The co-ordination of the Greek social networks with the political, social, and economic superstructures instituted by the Latins was an expression of the latter's accomodation, imperative for a small ruling minority intent on preserving its group identity in the midst of an overwhelmingly indigenous population. The interpenetration of Byzantine and western elements at the institutional level was of a general nature, although Byzantine and Latin conceptions of political authority often clashed, particularly in feudalized areas. This is yet another aspect of the Latins' attitude to the Byzantine environment, and the measure of accomodation they were willing to accept. In sum, continuity, adaptation, and change were interconnecting and intersecting phenomena in Latin Romania.

NOTES

1. For an extensive bibliography, see my chapter 'Social Evolution in Latin Greece', in K.M. Setton (ed.), *A History of the Crusades*, Vol. 6 (Madison, WI, 1989), pp. 175–221, on which some sections of this study rely, though from a different perspective.
2. For a recent, concise survey of this process, see M. Angold, *The Byzantine Empire, 1025–1204: A Political History* (London and New York, 1984), pp.263–83. More specific are J. Hoffman, *Rudimente von Territorialstaaten im byzantinischen Reich (1071–1210). Untersuchungen über Unabhängigkeitsbestrebungen und ihr Verhältnis zu Kaiser und Reich* (Munich, 1974); N. Oikonomidès, 'La décomposition de l'empire byzantin de 1204 et les origines de l'empire de Nicée: à propos de la "Partitio Romaniae"', *XV^e Congrès international d'études byzantines. Rapports et co-rapports* (Athens, 1976) (hereafter *CIEB*, 15), I/1, pp.1–22; J.-Cl. Cheynet, 'Philadelphie, un quart de siècle de dissidence, 1182–1206', in H. Ahrweiler (ed.), *Philadelphie et autres études*, Byzantina Sorbonensia, 4 (Paris, 1984), pp.39–54; R. Radić, 'Odpacni gospodari i vizantiji krajem XII i prvim dečenijama XIII veka' (Local rulers in Byzantium at the end of the twelfth and in the first decades of the thirteenth century), *Zbornik radova vizantološkog instituta*, 24/25 (1986), 151–283 [English summary, pp.283–90].
3. For more details, see below.
4. On the Morea, see D. Jacoby, 'The Encounter of Two Societies: Western Conquerors and Byzantines in the Peloponnesus after the Fourth Crusade', *American Historical Review*, 78 (1973), 875–6, 879–91, repr. in id., *Recherches sur la Méditerranée orientale du XII^e au XV^e siècle. Peuples, sociétés, economies* (London, 1979), No. II; also id., 'Social Evolution', pp.189–92. On the island of Negroponte in the thirteenth century, see D. Jacoby, *La féodalité en Grèce mediévale. Les 'Assises de Romanie': sources, application et diffusion* (Paris–The

Hague, 1971), pp.185–211. Only the Venetian quarter in the city of Negroponte escaped feudal rule.

5. See Jacoby, *La féodalité*, pp.237–9, 242–52, 271–80, 284, and id., 'Social Evolution', pp.191–2, 200. B.J. Slot, *Archipelagus turbatus: les Cyclades entre colonisation et occupation ottomane c.1500–1718* (Istanbul, 1982), Vol. 1, pp.35–65, has some useful remarks relevant to our subject.
6. For a general view, see F. Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne au Moyen Age. Le développement et l'exploitation du domaine colonial vénitien (XII^e–XV^e siècles)*, 2nd edn. (Paris, 1975), with an updated bibliography, pp.467–81, pp.73ff., and numerous studies, several of which are now available in his *Etudes sur la Romanie gréco-vénitienne (X^e–XV^e siècles)* (London, 1977); see also S. Borsari, *Il dominio veneziano a Creta nel XIII secolo* (Naples, 1963), which includes numerous excerpts from unpublished sources; id., *Studi sulle colonie veneziane in Romania nel XIII secolo* (Naples, 1966). On the use of feudal terminology in Venetian Messenia and Crete see Jacoby, *La féodalité*, pp.225–6, 295–7, and E. Santschi, *La notion de 'feudum' en Crète vénitienne, XIII^e–XV^e siècles* (Montreux, 1976), useful on the status of military tenures in Crete, but mistaken about 'feudalism' in the island.
7. For what follows, see n. 4 above, and Jacoby, 'Social Evolution', pp.180–82, 185. For recent work on the Byzantine elite in general, see A.P. Každan, *Social'nyi sostav gospodstvujuščego klassa Vizantii XI–XII vv.* (Moscow, 1974), summarized by I. Sorlin, 'Bulletin byzantino-slave. Publications soviétiques sur le XII^e siècle', *Travaux et mémoires du Centre de Recherche d'Histoire et Civilisation Byzantines* (hereafter *Travaux et mémoires*), 6 (1976), 367–80; the papers of the symposium on *The Byzantine Aristocracy* (BAR International Series, 221), ed. M. Angold (Oxford, 1984), especially M. Angold, 'Archons and Dynasts: Local Aristocracies and the Cities of the Later Byzantine Empire', ibid., pp.236–53; A.P. Kazhdan and A.W. Epstein, *Change in Byzantine Culture in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries* (Berkeley–Los Angeles–London, 1985), pp.56–73; see also J. Herrin, 'Realities of Byzantine Provincial Government: Hellas and Peloponnesos, 1180–1205', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 26 (1975), 253–84, and E. Malamut, 'Les îles de la mer Egée de la fin du XI^e siècle à 1204', *Byzantion*, 52 (1982), 344–8.
8. On the *paroikos*, see pp.16–18, 20–23 below.
9. The most vigorous proponent of the 'feudalization' view was G. Ostrogorsky in numerous works and especially in his *Pour l'histoire de la féodalité byzantine* (Brussels, 1954), pp.9–61. For my criticism of his argumentation, see Jacoby, 'The Encounter', 876–9, with bibliographical references, and id., 'Social Evolution', pp.182–5. A. Carile, 'Sulla *pronoia* nel Peloponneso bizantino anteriormente alla conquista latina', *Zbornik radova*, 16 (1975), 55–61, has contested my views and asserted that the *pronoia* was to be found in the Morea before 1204, although he fails to provide conclusive evidence to this effect. Moreover, his claim that there was continuity between *pronoia* and fief is not convincing, as he disregards the basic differences between the rules of succession governing the patrimonial estates of the *archontes* and the fiefs granted by Frankish lords. The fiefs, also called *pronoiai* in Greek sources, were transmitted solely according to primogeniture, while the former estates were equally divided between all heirs, whether male or female: on this subject, see D. Jacoby, 'Les archontes grecs et la féodalité en Morée franque', *Travaux et mémoires*, 2 (1967), 451–63, repr. in D. Jacoby, *Société et démographie à Byzance et en Romanie latine (XIII^e–XV^e siècles)* (London, 1975), No. VI. Writing around 1220, John Apocaucus, metropolitan of Naupactus, mentions Greeks held *eis pronoian* by Latins: N.A. Bees, 'Unedierte Schriftstücke aus der Kanzlei des Johannes Apokaukos des Metropoliten von Naupaktos (in Aetiolen)', *Byzantinische-neugriechische Jahrbücher*, 21 (1971–74; published in 1976), 132, No. 71, ll. 66–8. It is most unlikely that he should have used *pronoia* in a technical sense as equivalent to 'fief'; the term in this context rather means 'provision', or else refers to the Byzantine *pronoia*, with which the metropolitan was well acquainted.

10. See n.4 above and Jacoby, 'Social Evolution', pp.197–8.
11. R. Cessi (ed.), *Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio di Venezia* (Bologna, 1931–50), Vol. 2, pp.342–3, No. XV.
12. Demetrius Chomatianus, ed. J.B. Pitra, *Analecta sacra et classica spicilegio solesmensi parata*, Vol. 7 (Rome, 1891), col. 228, No. L.
13. See D. Jacoby, 'Les états latins en Romanie: phénomènes sociaux et économiques (1204–1350 environ)', *CIEB*, 15, I/3, pp.23–4, 41–2, repr. in Jacoby, *Recherches*, No. I.
14. See Jacoby, 'Les *archontes*', pp.430–32, 443; P. Magdalino, 'A Neglected Authority for the History of the Peloponnese in the Early Thirteenth Century: Demetrios Chomatianos, Archbishop of Bulgaria', *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 70 (1977), 316–23. The *archontes* of Euboea are mentioned as *magnates greci* in 1209 and 1216: G.L.Fr. Tafel und G.M. Thomas, *Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig* (Vienna, 1856–57) (hereafter T Th), Vol. 2, pp.92, 95, 183. Michael Chalkoutzes, a rich, powerful *archon*, abandoned this island: see the letters of the expatriate Greek archbishop of Athens Michael Choniates, written between 1208 and 1214: Sp. P. Lampros, *Michael Akominatou tou Choniatou ta sōzomena* (Athens, 1879–80), Vol. 2, pp.276–80. Indirect evidence on the *archontes* of Negroponte is also provided by seven small Greek churches built and decorated between 1303 and 1311 in the region of Kyme, in central Euboea, presumably by the same atelier; the work was most likely commissioned by *archontes*, and not by wealthy free peasants as suggested by J. Koder, *Negroponte. Untersuchungen zur Topographie und Siedlungsgeschichte der Insel Euboia während der Zeit der Venezianerherrschaft* (= *Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Philos. histor. klasse, Denkschriften, Vol. 112.) (Vienna, 1973), p.172; on these churches, see ibid., pp.51, 159–64. The agreement of Marco I with Venice is edited by T Th, Vol. 2, pp.159–66, and especially p.163; for its dating, see J.K. Fotheringham, *Marco Sanudo, Conqueror of the Archipelago* (Oxford, 1915), p.97, n.1.
15. For what follows on the Morea, see Jacoby, 'The Encounter', 891–903, and id., 'Knightly Values', 163–79.
16. One case appears in a letter by Gregory of Cyprus, patriarch of Constantinople from 1283 to 1289, referring to two Greeks holding patrimonial land in Arcadia, a district of the northern Morea: see S. Eustratiades (ed.), 'Tou sophotatou kai logistotatou oikoumenikou patriarchou kyrou Gregoriou tou Kypriou epistolai', *Ekklesiastikos pharos* (Alexandria), 5 (1910), pp.348–9, No. 181; the relevant passages of this letter appear in D.A. Zakythinos, *Le despotat grec de Morée. II. Vie et institutions* (2nd edn., London, 1975), p.194, n. 1. The other case, dated 1288, involved the possession of Kranidion in the Argolid although it was then under Frankish rule: see F. Dölger, 'Ein Chrysobull des Kaisers Andronikos II. für Theodoros Nomikopulos aus dem Jahre 1288', *Orientalia christiana periodica*, 21 (1958), 58–62, repr. in id., *Paraspora* (Ettal, 1961), pp.189–93. On the political situation in these years, see A. Bon, *La Morée franque. Recherches historiques, topographiques et archéologiques sur la principauté d'Achaïe (1205–1403)* (Paris, 1969), pp.145–6, 154, 164–6; on limited Greek revolts then and later, see n.21 below.
17. On agreements reached between Byzantines and Franks in this period, see D. Jacoby, 'Un régime de coseigneurie gréco-franque en Morée: les "casaux de parçon"', Ecole Français de Rome, *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire*, 75 (1963), 189–228, repr. in id., *Société de démographie*, No. VIII.
18. On the Misito family, see Jacoby, 'The Encounter', 895; on possible conversion to the Roman creed, see the evidence provided by two Greek inscriptions dated 1244/1245 and 1354, respectively, ibid., 898; id., 'Les états latins', pp.25–6; see n. 89 below. On the attitude of the Greek Church towards mixed marriages, see D.M. Nicol, 'Mixed Marriages in Byzantium in the Thirteenth Century', *Studies in Church History*, 1 (1964), 160–72, especially 168, n. 4, repr. in id., *Byzantium: Its Ecclesiastical History and Relations with the Western World* (London, 1972), No.

IV; H. Hunger, 'Byzantinisches Eherecht im 14. Jahrhundert: Theorie und Praxis', *Zbornik radova*, 14/15 (1973), 65–79.

19. On developments in Venetian Crete, see n. 6 above; Jacoby, 'Les états latins', pp.26–33, especially p.28. On the villeins, id., 'Social Evolution', pp.200–5. A petition of c.1224–25 submitted by Cretan Greeks mentions expulsions from the city and area of Candia: G. Cervellini (ed.), *Documento inedito veneto-cretese del dugento* (Padua, 1906), pp.13–18. On the standing and influence of Alexius Kallergis in Crete, see also P. Topping, 'Co-existence of Greeks and Latins in Frankish Morea and Venetian Crete', *CIEB*, 15, I/3, pp.15–17, repr. in id., *Studies on Latin Greece*, No. XI.
20. The few instances of revolt after the return of Byzantium to the Peloponnese were rather exceptional and did not reflect the general attitude of the *archontes*; see Jacoby, 'The Encounter', 902–3.
21. See Jacoby, 'Social Evolution', pp.202–5, and especially nn. 44–5; on Marco Venier and his Greek wife Zoe, see also a document dated 1263 published by A. Stussi, *Studi e documenti di storia della lingua e dei dialetti italiani* (Bologne, 1982), pp.115–19. See also R.I. Blachake, 'Hē diathēkē tēs Agnes korēs tou Alexiou Kallergē (1331) kai ho orthodoxos episkopos Makarios', in *Pepragmena tou E' diethnous krētologikou synedriou*, (= Proceedings of the Fifth International Cretological Congress) (Heraklion, 1985), Vol. 2, pp.56–8.
22. See Oikonomides, 'La décomposition de l'empire byzantin', pp.3–22, especially pp.11–12, 22.
23. For the Morea, see J. Longnon (ed.), *Livre de la conqueste de la princée de l'Amorée: Chronique de Morée (1204–1305)* (Paris, 1911), paras. 106–7, 120, and J. Schmitt (ed.), *The Chronicle of Morea: Chronikon tou Moreos* (London, 1904), vv. 1641–50, 1830–35. On the circumstances, see Jacoby, 'Les archontes', pp.430–32, 441–2; for Negroponte, see T Th, Vol. 2, p.95; also Jacoby, *La féodalité*, p.188. Latin lords nevertheless confiscated the estates of *archontes*.
24. See Borsari, *Il dominio veneziano*, pp.17–18, especially n.26, and pp.27–30, 109–10, 124–5, and Jacoby, *La féodalité*, p.225, respectively.
25. See some earlier cases in D.A. Xanalatos, *Beiträge zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte Makedoniens im Mittelalter, hauptsächlich auf Grund der Briefe des Erzbischofs Theophylaktos von Achrida* (Munich, 1937), pp.54–5. It is noteworthy that in the Morea the testimony of villeins was admitted in court in cases concerning land and its boundaries: G. Recoura (ed.), *Les Assises de Romanie: édition critique avec une introduction et des notes* (Paris, 1930), p.270, para. 175.
26. Text in F. Thiriet, *Délibérations des assemblées vénitiennes concernant la Romanie* (Paris, 1966–71), Vol. 1, p.297, No. 254 (22 Feb. 1312).
27. On the Byzantine cadastral registers and the *praktika* referred to below, see N.G. Svoronos, 'Recherches sur le cadastre byzantin et la fiscalité aux XI^e^ et XII^e^ siècles: le cadastre de Thèbes', *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*, 83 (1959), 19–33, 57–67 (also published separately), and the review by J. Karayannopulos in *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 56 (1963), especially 363–6. On the late Byzantine *praktika*, see A.E. Laiou-Thomadakis, *Peasant Society in the Late Byzantine Empire: A Social and Demographic Study* (Princeton, 1977), pp.8–13. On the twelfth-century *anagrapheus*, see Herrin, 'Realities', pp.271–2.
28. R. Cessi and P. Sambin (eds.), *Le deliberazioni del Consiglio dei Rogati (Senato), Serie mixtorum*, Vol. 1, (Venice, 1960), p.190, Reg. 5, No. 160: *Reducantur catastica in linguam latinam*. On the importance of these registers in Venetian Messenia, see D. Jacoby, 'Un aspect de la fiscalité vénitienne dans le Péloponnèse aux XIV^e^ et XV^e^ siècles: le "zovaticum"', *Travaux et mémoires*, 1 (1965), 407–9, repr. in id., *Société et démographie*, No. IV; also Ch. Hodgetts, 'Land Problems in Coron 1298–1347: A Contribution on Venetian Colonial Rule', *Byzantina*, 12 (1983), 149–50, 152. On the village elders, see n.79 below.
29. See E. Gerland, *Das Archiv des Herzogs von Kandia im königlichen Staatsarchiv zu Venedig* (Strasburg, 1899), pp.19–23, and Borsari, *Il dominio veneziano*, p.7, and pp.143–54, for excerpts of such *catastica*; Z.N. Tsirpanlēs, *'Katasticho*

ekklēsiōn kai monastēriōn tou koinou (1248–1548)', *Symbolē stē meletē tōn scheseōn Politeias kai Ekklēsias stē benetokratoumenē Krētē* (Ioannina, 1985). The listing of measurements in the *catasticum* is illustrated by documents dated 1317 and 1318 referring to the surface area of a plot of land situated in the city of Candia and belonging to a military tenement: Sp. M. Theotokēs (ed.), *Historika krētika eggrapha: Apophaseis meizonos symbouliou Benetias, 1255–1689 (Mnēmēia tēs hellenikēs historias, A/II)* (Athens, 1933), pp.90–1, No. 39, and p.96, No. 48. In 1309 the Venetian Minor Council agreed to the request submitted by the holder of a military tenement in Crete that his dependent peasants should be registered in the *catasticum* of the Commune: G. Giomo (ed.), 'Lettere segrete del Collegio, *rectius* Minor Consiglio', in *R. Deputazione di storia patria per le Venezie*, 3rd ser., 1 (1910), *Miscellanea di storia veneta*, No. 201; see also D. Jacoby, 'Une classe fiscale à Byzance et en Romanie latine: les inconnus du fisc, éleuthères ou étrangers', *Actes du XIV^e Congrès international des études byzantines (Bucarest, 1971)*, II (Bucharest, 1975), (hereafter *CIEB*, 14) pp.141–2, 149, repr. in id., *Recherches*, No.III.

30. See Jacoby, 'Les archontes', pp.433, 449–50; id., *La féodalité*, pp.53–5.
31. J. Longnon and P. Topping (eds.), *Documents sur le régime des terres dans la principauté de Morée au XIV^e siècle* (Paris and The Hague, 1969) (hereafter LT), p.21, ll. 11–12, and p.33, ll. 8–9 for Cutrullus and Murmurus; see also Jacoby, 'The Encounter', 895, 900, 902–3. On the *protovestiarius*, see P. Topping, *Feudal Institutions as Revealed in the Assizes of Romania, the Law Code of Frankish Greece* (Philadelphia, 1949), pp.123–4, repr. with some corrections in id., *Studies on Latin Greece A.D. 1205–1715* (London, 1977), No. I; on the Byzantine officer, see Herrin, 'Realities', 273.
32. Published by LT, pp.19–215.
33. See n.27 above.
34. LT, p.52, ll. 14–15, 17, and see also p.164, ll. 5–6 (1365).
35. LT, p.147, l. 9, and see the summary preceding this report on pp.141–4. Yet one may wonder whether Nicola compiled the Greek survey by himself or merely supervised its drafting.
36. Th. St. Tzannetatos (ed.), *To praktikon tēs latinikēs episkopēs Kephallēnias tou 1264 kai hē epitomē autou* (Athens, 1965). See also the extensive review by N. Panayiotakis in *Epetēris hetaireias byzantinōn spoudōn*, 34 (1965), pp.372–84.
37. Edition, dating, and commentary by E. Granstrem, *et al.* 'Fragment d'un *praktikon* de la région d'Athènes (avant 1204)', *Revue des études byzantines*, 34 (1976), 5–44. For the dating of the script, see 5–6, 8. The editors were not aware that *praktika* were still compiled in Greek after the Latin conquest, hence their attribution of the original survey to the twelfth century, which is not convincing. The consecutive Latin numerals point to an orderly transcription of the data, and not to a disorganized manuscript as claimed by the editors (p.7). Their inscription on the *verso* of the two surviving folios is nevertheless puzzling.
38. See the list of dukes and rectors of Crete from 1208 to 1310, compiled by Borsari, *Il dominio veneziano*, pp.127–31; for Coron and Modon, see Ch. Hopf, *Chroniques gréco-romanes inédites ou peu connues* (Berlin, 1873), pp.378–9; for Negroponte, see ibid., pp.371–2.
39. So did, incidentally, the recent editors of this text: LT, p.135, l. 33. In all the known Byzantine *praktika* there is only one instance of a child explicitly mentioned as a nursing baby: J. Lefort (ed.), *Actes d'Esphigménou (Archives de l'Athos*, Vol. 6) (Paris, 1973), p.65, No. 7, ll. 3–4. Yet others may have been recorded without being mentioned as such: see D. Jacoby, 'Phénomènes de démographie rurale à Byzance aux XIII^e, XIV^e et XV^e siècles', *Etudes rurales*, 5–6 (1962), 166–7, repr. in id., *Société et démographie*, No. III.
40. For these words, see *Index rerum* in LT, pp.312–24; s.v. *ambellonia, brivilegio, vestia*, and in the *Index nominum*, pp.284–309, s.v. *Bauldi Calami, Blacchus* and *Vlacchus, Mabrobodi* and *Mabroponte*. Another illustration of the oral testimony or written model in Greek is provided by the following, p.72, l. 14, and see l. 27:

stasia (= fiscal unit) *tu* (= the Greek *tou*) *Chinu*, instead of the Latin *de*.

41. See Jacoby, 'Un aspect', p.406.
42. See P. Topping, 'Viticulture in Venetian Crete (XIIIth C.)', in *Pepragmena tou D' diethnous krētologikou synedriou* (Heraklion, 1976, Athens, 1981), Vol. 2, pp.509–20, and especially the glossary on pp.519–20.
43. Marino Sanudo Torsello, *Istoria del Regno di Romania*, fol. 1v, in Hopf, *Chroniques*, p.100.
44. Text in LT, p.162, ll. 3–7, and commentary pp.275–6. See also S.B. Bowman, *The Jews of Byzantium, 1204–1453* (n.p., 1985), pp.84–5, 118, yet my interpretation partly differs. The tax on imports and exports appears in 1261 on the island of Negroponte as *comerclum maris*: see Jacoby, *La féodalité*, pp.192–3; also Borsari, *Studi*, p.128, n. 71. The similar *dirictus commercii vel dohane* is attested in Clarence in 1294: Ch. Perrat and J. Longnon (eds.), *Actes relatifs à la principauté de Morée, 1289–1300* (Paris, 1967), p.97, No. 94. See also Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, p.231. On the Byzantine *komerkion*, see H. Antoniadis-Bibicou, *Recherches sur les douanes à byzance* (Paris, 1963), and the important review of this work by P. Lemerle in *Revue historique*, 232 (1964), 225–31.
45. LT, p.162, ll. 8–25. The *chomerchio del mercato* must be identical with the *chomerchio* on commercial transactions within the principality of the Morea, mentioned in the *Assizes of Romania*: Recoura, *Les Assises de Romanie* (Paris, 1930), pp.255–6, para. 152, and see Jacoby, *La féodalité*, p.56.
46. See Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, p.230, and D. Jacoby, 'Venice, the Inquisition and the Jewish Communities of Crete in the Early 14th Century', *Studi veneziani*, 12 (1970), 130–32, repr. in id., *Recherches*, No. IX.
47. LT, p.63, l. 17; p.82, l. 6; p.83, l. 13. On this tax and its Byzantine prototype, see ibid., p.63, n. 20, and Antoniadis-Bibicou, *Recherches sur les douanes*, pp.123, 134.
48. On such cases, see also Jacoby, 'Un aspect', pp.418–20.
49. Some of them have already been mentioned above, pp.14–15. For these and others, see the extensive commentary in LT, pp.268–75; Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, p.225 (yet on the *zovaticum* and *zeugaratikion*, see below); Jacoby, *La féodalité*, p.351, Index of technical terms. The dispositions of the treaty of 1219 between Venice and some Cretan *archontes* about taxes and labour services imposed on the *villani* seem to reflect those owed by the latter's ancestors prior to 1204, with one major difference: some of the military tenements held by Latins in 1219 may have previously been state land, in which case the *paroikoi* would have provided taxes and services to the imperial fisc; for these dispositions, see T Th, Vol. 2, p.212.
50. See R.L. Wolff, 'Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople, 1204–1261', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 8 (1954), pp.267–74, especially 268; also the letter of Pope Honorius III, ibid., 298–301, especially 299; repr. in id., *Studies in the Latin Empire of Constantinople* (London, 1976), No. IX. The partial exemption for all rural priests covers *angarie, perangerie, exactiones* and *talie*, rather imprecise terms inherited from the empire, yet definitely pointing to former state dues and labour services: see, for example, the *angaria de castellis* in the *praktikon* of 1219 for Lampsakos, where this obligation was commuted for a cash payment: new edition by A. Carile, 'La signoria rurale nell' impero latino di Costantinopoli (1204–1261)', *CIEB*, 15, Vol. 4 (Athens, 1980), p.77; also the *angaria* for the maintenance of the castle of Hagios Nikolaos in Crete, mentioned in a corrupted form (*in aquariis*) in 1234–35: T Th, Vol. 2, p.327; for the dating, see Borsari, *Il dominio veneziano*, p.44, n. 50. On public dues and services, see also nn. 67–8 below.
51. On the whole issue, see N. Svoronos, 'Les privilèges de l'Eglise à l'époque des Comnènes: un rescrit inédit de Manuel 1er Comnène', *Travaux et mémoires*, 1 (1965), 356–60. On special taxes and exactions, see id., 'Recherches sur le cadastre byzantin', pp.81–3, 93–7. On the *demosiakē epereia*, see also P. Lemerle, *The Agrarian History of Byzantium from the Origins to the Twelfth Century* (Galway, 1979), pp.167–8, 174, 208, and for service in the fleet or the army, pp.143 and 147;

on the *ploïmon* in the twelfth century, then a regular tax for the outfitting of the navy included among these obligations, see H. Glykatzi, *Byzance et la mer. La marine de guerre, la politique et les institutions maritimes de Byzance aux VII^e^–XV^e^ siècles* (Paris, 1966), p.212 (and n.3), 276, 278; see also n.68 below.

52. For what follows, see Jacoby, 'Un aspect', pp.405–20. Yet on the derivation of the term *zovadego*, see K. Ntokos, 'Zovaticum', *Mnēmē*, 1 (1971), pp.175–96, especially 180–84, 187–9.
53. See Jacoby, 'Un aspect', p.408. On the administration of the two districts in the thirteenth century, see Borsari, *Studi*, pp.96–8.
54. On which see the new edition of a crucial text by A. Carile, 'Partitio terrarum Imperii Romanie', *Studi veneziani*, 7 (1965), 219, ll. 57–62, and commentary by A. Bon, *Le Péloponnèse byzantin jusqu'en 1204* (Paris, 1951), pp.100–102; Glykatzi, *Byzance et la mer*, pp.277–8; Jacoby, 'Les *archontes*', pp.423–6.
55. For the Morea, for instance, see Jacoby, *La féodalité*, pp.29–74.
56. A particularly revealing, though somewhat exceptional case is mentioned in the agreement of 1234–35 between Venice and two Cretan *archontes*: T Th, Vol. 2, p.327. The Venetian castellan of Hagios Nikolaos was to obtain the agreement of these Greeks in order to exercise jurisdiction; this supposes the transmission of information on Byzantine law and procedure.
57. See Jacoby, *La féodalité*, pp.75–82.
58. Ibid., pp.32–6, and Jacoby, 'Les archontes', p.451–9.
59. See Jacoby, *La féodalité*, pp.36–7; K. Mertzios, 'Hē synthēkē Eneton-Kallergē kai hoi synodeuontes autēn katalogoi', *Krētika chronika*, 3 (1949), 272, para. 27; Topping, 'Viticulture', pp.510–17; Hodgetts, 'Land Problems', 140–41, and the document on 154–5.
60. These sources are discussed on pp.20–23 below.
61. For a convenient summary of issues raised in the *Assizes*, see Topping, *Feudal Institutions*, pp.103–77, and different interpretations in Jacoby, 'Les archontes', pp.445–76; id., *La féodalité*, pp.29–74, and see also the index, ibid., pp.353–6, for individual assizes.
62. See Jacoby, 'Les *archontes*', pp.455–9, 475–6, and see n.58 above.
63. On the evolution in Crete in particular, see Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, pp.235–43. On the general principles guiding the Venetian government in the preservation of local custom or law and the application of Venetian law, see Jacoby, *La féodalité*, pp.295–9.
64. On the rebellions, see above, pp.8–9, and on the Greek notaries, see Hodgetts, 'Land Problems', 149–51.
65. See Jacoby, 'Social Evolution', pp.185–9. On legal freedom in Byzantium with respect to the *paroikoi*, see G. Weiss, 'Formen von Unfreiheit in Byzantium im 14. Jahrhundert', *CIEB*, 14, pp.291–5; see also the studies by Weiss and Oikonmides cited in n. 69 below. On the attitudes to freedom, see P. Gauthier (ed.), *Theophylacte d'Achrida. Lettres* (Salonika, 1986), p.485, ll. 26–9; A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, 'Ioannes Apokaukos kai Niketas Choniates', *Tessarakontaeteris tēs kathēgēsias K.S. Kontou* (Athens, 1909), pp.379ff., was not accessible to me, but see the summary by Zakythinos, *Le despotat grec*, Vol. 2, p.204, n. 6. For a different view on the *paroikoi* and their economic standing, see the studies of K.V. Hostova, mentioned and conveniently summarized by I. Sorlin, 'Bulletin des publications en langues slaves: les recherches soviétiques sur l'histoire byzantine. IV. 1978–1985', *Travaux et mémoires*, 10 (1987), 494–9.
66. On the status and the numerous restrictions imposed on the *villani*, including state villeins, see Jacoby, 'Social Evolution', pp.207–14; on Venetian Messenia and especially the state villeins, see also id., 'Un aspect', pp.417–18, and Hodgetts, 'Land Problems', 142–53. The hereditary condition of the *paroikos* in Latin Romania is also illustrated by the survey compiled in 1264 in the island of Cephalonia: Tzannetatos, *To praktikon*, p.68, ll. 588–9. This document is not relevant for the Byzantine *paroikos*, as assumed by Weiss, 'Formen von Unfreiheit', p.293 and n. 12, who cites an older edition of this text. On the

opposing views expressed about the existence of a free Greek peasantry, see Jacoby, 'Social Evolution', pp.185–6; on free peasants in Latin Romania, see Jacoby, 'Les états latins', pp.41–2.

67. See Jacoby, 'Un aspect', pp.410, 415, 417–20.
68. On the public *angaria* for the castle of Hagios Nikolaos in Crete, see n.50 above. On maritime service in particular, see ibid., pp.410–11, and Jacoby, 'Les gens de mer dans la marine de guerre vénitienne de la mer Egée aux XIV^{e} et XV^{e} siècles', in R. Ragosta (ed.), *Le genti del mare Mediterraneo* [= *XVII Colloquio internazionale di storia marittima, Napoli, 1980*] (Naples, 1981), Vol. 1, pp.169–201; on Coron and Modon, see also Hodgetts, 'Land Problems', 142; on Rhodes, see A. Luttrell, 'The *servitudo marina* at Rhodes: 1306–1462', in *Serta Neograeca*, ed. K. Dimaras and P. Wirth (Amsterdam, 1975), pp.50–65, repr. in id., *The Hospitallers in Cyprus, Rhodes and the West, 1291–1440* (London, 1978), No. IV; also id., 'Medieval Rhodes', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 11 (1987), 363, 374. On naval service and taxes in the Byzantine period, see Herrin, 'Realities', 275, 278–9.
69. See Jacoby, 'Social Evolution', pp.208–9. On the thirty- year Byzantine prescription regarding property, see Weiss, 'Die Entscheidung des Kosmas Magistros über das Parökenrecht. Ein Beitrag zur Rechtsgrundlage bäuerlicher Ansiedlungen in Byzanz', *Byzantion*, 48 (1978), 477–500, and N. Oikonomides, 'Hē "Peira" peri paroikōn', in B. Kremmydas, *et al.* (eds.), *Aphierōma stōn Niko Svoronos* (Rethymnon, 1986), Vol. 1, pp.236–41.
70. See Jacoby, 'Une classe fiscale', pp.139–52. It is noteworthy that in 1307 the Greek monastery of St John on Patmos received permission from the Venetian government to settle 38 villeins ransomed from pirates on its own land in Crete: F. Miklosich und J. Müller, *Acta et diplomata medii aevi sacra et profana* (Vienna, 1860–90), Vol. 6, pp.389–90 (Greek version on p.221). These villeins were in fact *eleutheroi* and as such state villeins. They remained so afterwards, as illustrated by the obligation of the monastery to pay the state an annual sum of one *hyperpyron* for each of them; this was the *villanazio*, imposed on state villeins: see Jacoby, 'Les états latins', p.38, and id., 'Social Evolution', pp.210, 213.
71. Sources in Borsari, *Il dominio veneziano*, p.91, and nn. 110–11.
72. The detection of minors in some Byzantine *praktika* (see n. 39 above) raises the question whether all of them were registered, or whether this was only the case with
paroikoi having attained legal majority. It should be noted that the registration of women in these documents was unsystematic: see Jacoby, 'Phénomènes de démographie rurale', 164–71. Exactly the same features characterize the Moreot *praktika*. I am therefore unable to share Laiou's conviction that the Byzantine documents reflect the real distribution of the peasant population in terms of sex and age, nor can I accept her calculations as presented in Laiou-Thomadakis, *Peasant Society*, especially pp.267–98.
73. For Byzantium, see ibid., pp.223–98. There is no similar, exhaustive study on the Moreot peasantry, yet a perusal of the sources provides the same general impression. A. Carile, *La rendita feudale nella Morea latina del XIV secolo* (Bologna, 1974), deals with the society, economy, and demography of the Principality, yet many of his conclusions have to be rejected on methodological grounds, and this is also the case with his treatment of social categories in the Morea; see also A. Carile, 'Rapporti fra signoria rurale e "Despoteia" alla luce della formazione della rendita feudale nella Morea latina del secolo XIV', *Rivista storica italiana*, 88 (1976), pp.554–5. See my extensive review in *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 73 (1980), 356–61, especially 358–9.
74. See, for example, Jacoby 'Un régime de coseigneurie', pp.111–25, especially 121–3.
75. See ibid., pp.117–20; my review cited in n.73 above, 358; Jacoby, 'Une classe fiscale', pp.140–43, 145, 151–2; Hodgetts, 'Land Problems', 147.
76. For the Morea, see my review cited in n. 73 above, 358–9.
77. See Jacoby, 'Les gens de mer', pp.182–4, and p.198 on the escape to Asia Minor.

78. On Byzantium, see Laiou–Thomadakis, *Peasant Society*, pp.24–66.
79. On the Morea, see LT, p.66, *l.* 9; p.102, *ll.* 2–4; p.113, *ll.* 15–17; pp.262–3; on Messenia, see Jacoby, 'Un aspect', pp.413–14, and on representatives of the *villani*, pp.409–10; Hodgetts 'Land Problems', 149–53; Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, pp.286–7.
80. Among the numerous studies on this subject, the following are especially relevant here: R.L. Wolff, 'The Organization of the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople, 1204–1261: Social and Administrative Consequences of the Latin Conquest', *Traditio*, 6 (1948), 33–60; id., 'Politics in the Latin Patriarchate', pp.228–303; both repr. in id., *Studies*, Nos. VIII and IX. The most recent contribution on this subject is by J. Richard, 'The Establishment of the Latin Church in the Empire of Constantinople (1204–1227)' in this volume. On the friars, see R.L. Wolff, 'The Latin Empire of Constantinople and the Franciscans', *Traditio*, 2 (1944), 213–37, repr. in id., *Studies*, No. VI; E.A. Brown, 'The Cistercians in the Latin Empire of Constantinople and Greece, 1204–1276', *Traditio*, 14 (1958), 63–120; B.M. Bolton, 'A Mission to the Orthodox? The Cistercians in Romania', in *Studies in Church History*, Vol. 13: *The Orthodox Churches and the West*, ed. D. Baker (Oxford, 1976), pp.169–81; also M. Angold, 'Greeks and Latins after 1204: The Perspective of Exile', in this volume; Bon, *La Morée franque*, pp.89–102, and on the Athenian Church, K.M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571)*, Vol. 1, *The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (Philadelphia, 1976), pp.405–17. On Venetian religious policy in general, see Borsari, *Il dominio veneziano*, pp.62–4, 106–25; id., *Studi*, pp.99–105; G. Fedalto, *La chiesa latina in Oriente*, Vol. 1 (2nd revd. edn., Verona, 1981), pp.377–448, and Vol 3. (Verona, 1978), pp.9–24; F. Thiriet, 'La symbiose dans les états latins formés sur les territoires de la *Romania* byzantine (1202 à 1261): phénomènes religieux', *CIEB*, 15, I/3, pp.26–35, and his 'Eglises, fidèles et clergés en Crète vénitienne (de la conquête, 1204/1211 au XV^{e} siècle)', *Pepragmena* (see n.42 above), Vol. 2, pp.484–500; Zakythinos, *Le despotat grec*, Vol. 2, pp.275–6, and the additional bibliography in the appendix. For a general view, see Jacoby, 'Social Evolution', pp.205–6, 218–20.
81. See, for instance, the Venetian opposition to the activities of a Dominican inquisitor in Crete: Jacoby, 'Venice, the Inquisition and the Jewish Communities', 127–44.
82. See p.6 above.
83. See, for example, n.18 above.
84. See n.50 above. The agreement of 1299 between Venice and Alexius Kallergis mentions *papates* and *diaconi* who were not villeins: Mertzios, 'Hē synthēkē', p.271, para. 18.
85. See Jacoby, 'Les états latins', 29; Blachake, 'Hē diathēkē tēs Agnes korēs tou Alexiou Kallergē (1331)', pp.58–62.
86. Sanudo, *Istoria*, fol. 15v. in Hopf, *Chroniques*, p.143, and see also Jacoby, 'The Encounter', 890, n.75.
87. See Jacoby, 'Social Evolution', pp.205, 220–21.
88. See T.H. Gouma-Peterson, 'Manuel and John Phokas and Artistic Personality in Late Byzantine Painting', *Gesta*, 22 (1983), 160–61.
89. On these inscriptions, see Jacoby, 'The Encounter', 898, and Koder, *Negroponte* (n.14 above). For Moreot inscriptions not mentioning the emperors, see D. Feissel and A. Philippidis-Braat, 'Inventaires en vue d'un recueil des inscriptions historiques de Byzance. III. Inscriptions du Péloponnèse (à l'exception de Mistra)', *Travaux et mémoires*, 9 (1985), 311, No. 54 (1244/45), and 335–6, No. 74 (mid-fourteenth century?).
90. For what follows, see Jacoby, 'Social Evolution, pp.205–6, 218–20.
91. The Cistercians' loss of most of their monasteries by 1276 is significant; see Brown, 'The Cistercians in the Latin Empire', and Bolton, 'A Mission' (n.80 above).
92. See C.D. Sheppard, 'Excavations at the Cathedral of Haghia Sophia, Andravida, Greece', *Gesta*, 25 (1986), pp.139–44, on the church of the princes of Morea; Bon,

La Morée franque, pp.537–47, 553–99; B.K. Panagopoulos, *Cistercian and Mendicant Monasteries in Medieval Greece* (Chicago, 1979), pp.25–111, 127–42; Koder, *Negroponte*, pp.164–7.

93. On Melos, see Wolff, 'The Organization of the Latin Patriarchate', p.43; for a general view, see Jacoby, 'Social Evolution', pp.205–6, 218–221, id., 'Les états latins', pp.21–2. On the knowledge of Greek among Latins, see A.E. Laiou-Thomadakis, 'The Greek Merchant of the Paleologian Period: A Collective Portrait', *Praktika tēs Akademias Athenōn*, 57 (1982), 121–3; A.E. Laiou, 'Quelques observations sur l'économie et la société de Crète vénitienne (ca.1270–ca.1305)', in *Bisanzio e l'Italia. Raccolta di studi in memoria di Agostino Pertusi* (Milan, 1982), pp.197–8; A.E. Laiou, 'Observations on the Results of the Fourth Crusade: Greeks and Latins in Port and Market', *Medievalia et humanistica*, NS, 12 (1984), 53–4. According to the French and Greek versions of the *Chronicle of Morea* (Longnon, *Livre de la conquestse*, para. 308, and Schmitt, *The Chronicle of Morea*, verse 4130), William II of Villehardouin, prince of Morea, spoke fluent Greek, yet the fact that this was stressed proves that it was not the rule.
94. For what follows, see M.F. Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy, c.300–1450* (Cambridge, 1985), pp.44–58, 69–90, 513–19, 561–602; Kazhdan and Epstein, *Change in Byzantine Culture*, pp.24–62; M. Angold, 'The Shaping of the Medieval Byzantine "City"', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 10 (1985), 1–39, especially 18–28; id., 'Archons and Dynasts: Local Aristocracies and the Cities of the Later Byzantine Empire', in Angold, *The Byzantine Aristocracy*, pp.236–53.
95. See respectively Jacoby, 'Les archontes', pp.422–6; see n.14 above on Negroponte; Borsari, *Il dominio veneziano*, pp.13–20; Jacoby, 'Social Evolution', p.181; P. Karlin– Hayter, 'Notes sur les archives de Patmos comme source pour la démographie et l'économie de l'île', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 5 (1977), 198–210, 214–15.
96. See n.94 above, and Karlin-Hayter, 'Notes sur les archives de Patmos', 198–210, 214–15; N.Svoronos, 'Remarques sur les structures économiques de l'empire byzantin au XI^{e} siècle', *Travaux et mémoires*, 6 (1976), pp.51–60, and n.114 below; Malamut, 'Les îles de la mer Egée', 310–28.
97. See G. Stadtmüller, 'Michael Choniates, Metropolit von Athen', *Orientalia christiana*, 33/2 (1934), 154–60, 167–78. This generalized depiction is usually accepted as truthful.
98. On urban property, see Svoronos, 'Remarques', 65, and Angold, 'Archons and Dynasts', pp.239–40; on revenues accruing from official functions and dignities, see Svoronos, 'Remarques', pp.59–60, n.35, and p.62; Kazhdan and Epstein, *Change in Byzantine Culture*, p.58.
99. On which see Hendy, *Studies*, pp.565–9.
100. See Svoronos, 'Remarques', pp.61–2, on investments by the monastery of Lavra. On St John of Patmos, see Karlin-Hayter, as n.95 above, and Borsari, *Il dominio veneziano*, pp.121–3.
101. The production of silken cloth in Euboea before the conquest is implied by documents dated 1209 and 1216: T Th, Vol. 2, pp.90, 93, 181. It seems to me that generalizations are not warranted, especially for other areas later included in Latin Romania, such as Crete, for which few sources on urban development have survived.
102. On the role of the *archontes* in the urban economy of continental Greece, see Angold, 'Archons and Dynasts', pp.236–41; id., 'The Shaping of the Medieval Byzantine "City"', 22–5; Hendy, *Studies*, pp.85–90; Svoronos, 'Remarques', pp.65–7, who argues (pp. 61–2) that *archontes* only were capable of investments, but these were restricted to short periods and to the initial stage of business ventures.
103. On fairs, see n.119 below: the Greek term *panegyris* was maintained under Latin rule. On distant markets, see P. Lemerle, 'Notes sur l'administration byzantine à la veille de la IV^{e} croisade d'après deux documents inédits des archives de Lavra',

Revue des études byzantines, 19 (1961), pp.258–72; Svoronos, 'Remarques', pp.65–7; Karlin-Hayter, 'Notes', pp.210–14; Hendy, *Studies*, pp.567, 591. On the dominance of Constantinople in this context, see ibid., pp.51–4, 561–2.

104. Recently again: see Angold, 'The Shaping of the Medieval Byzantine "City"', 25–8, 32–4, 37. For a different approach, see M.F. Hendy, 'Byzantium, 1081–1204: An Economic Reappraisal', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th ser., 20 (1970), 31–52, and with particular reference to the West, Jacoby, 'Les états latins', pp.42–3.
105. See R.-J. Lilie, *Handel und Politik zwischen dem byzantinischen Reich und den italienischen Kommunen Venedig, Pisa und Genua in der Epoche der Komnenen und der Angeloi (1081–1204)* (Amsterdam, 1984), especially pp.117–324. There are also sources not used by this author; for example, on Cretan cheese exported to Alexandria, see S.D. Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza*, Vol. 1 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), pp.46, 124.
106. Elsewhere the process of urbanization was even more limited in scope and not necessarily related to Italian trade: see Malamut, 'Les îles de la mer Egée', 328–39, and n.107 below.
107. See Jacoby, 'Les états latins', pp.42–3.
108. For what follows, see Jacoby, 'Les états latins', pp.42–8, and id., 'Social Evolution', 216–18; Borsari, *Il dominio veneziano*, pp.67–87; id., *Studi*, pp.123–32, and the studies of Laiou cited in n.120 below. I shall deal with this subject in more detail in a forthcoming study.
109. On which see pp.10–23 above.
110. The financial power of the *archontes* also declined after the loss of their revenues deriving from urban assets, offices and dignities, on which see n.98 above. On the predominantly urban settlement of the Latins, see Jacoby, 'Les états latins', pp.19–22, 45–7. The Greeks are obviously under-represented in the sources of Latin Romania.
111. For a general view of this interaction in the West, see G. Duby, *Rural Economy and Country Life in the Medieval West* (Columbia, SC, 1968), pp.126–65, 279–89.
112. Loans repaid in agricultural products and profit-sharing ventures are abundantly documented by Venetian notarial sources and Moreot *praktika*: see among others Topping, 'Viticulture', pp.510–18; Jacoby's review mentioned in n.73 above, 360–61; Laiou, 'Quelques observations', pp.177–98.
113. See nn.108 and 112 above; my reviews mentioned in n.114 below W. Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au Moyen-Age* (Paris, 1885–86), Vol. 1, pp.272, 279–80; A. Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte der romanischen Völker des Mittelmeergebiets bis zum Ende der Kreuzzüge* (Munich and Berlin, 1906), pp.264, 266; for the first half of the fourteenth century in particular, see Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, *La pratica della mercatura*, ed. A. Evans (Cambridge, MA, 1936), pp.24–5, 39–40, 93, 104, 117, 143, 145, 149, 157, 159, 198. On tanning, see n.116 below.
114. On the structure and revenues of these estates, see P. Topping, 'Le régime agraire dans le Péloponnèse latin au XIV^{e} siècle', *L'Hellénisme contemporain*, 2nd ser., 10 (1956), repr. in the author's *Studies on Latin Greece*, No. III; Carile, 'Rapporti fra signoria rurale e "Despoteia"', pp.548–68; also my review mentioned above, n.73, 359–61, and another of LT in *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 69 (1976), 91.
115. See Jacoby, 'Les états latins', pp.44–5. Although Latin Romania exported wheat, there is also evidence for its importation to this area in years of dearth: see, for example, E.A. Zachariadou, 'Prix et marchés des céréales en Romanie (1343–1405)', *Nuova rivista storica*, 61 (1977), 291–305, repr. in id., *Romania and the Turks (c.1300–c.1500)* (London, 1985), No. IX. On piracy, see Thiriet, *La Romanie, vénitienne*, p.243–56; P. Charanis, 'Piracy in the Aegean during the Reign of Michael VIII Palaeologus', *Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves*, 10 (1950), 127–36; G. Morgan, 'The Venetian

Claims Commission of 1278', *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 69 (1976), 411–38; A.E. Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins: The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II, 1281–1328* (Cambridge, MA, 1972), Index, s.v. piracy; E.A. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade: Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin (1300–1415)* (Venice, 1983), *passim*; I.B. Katele, 'Piracy and the Venetian State: The Dilemma of Maritime Defense in the Fourteenth Century', *Speculum*, 63 (1988), 865–89.

116. There were many Jewish tanners: see D. Jacoby, 'Venice and the Venetian Jews in the Eastern Mediterranean', in *Gli Ebrei e Venezia (secoli XIV–XVIII)* (Venice, 1987), pp.47–8. On the export of silk and kermes, see Heyd, *Histoire*, Vol. 1, pp.272, 279, and Vol. 2, pp.282, 295–6, 607–9; Pegolotti, *La pratica*, pp.119, 145, 149, 159, 198, 208, 297; on a large amount of silk from Negroponte to Venice, see Jacoby, 'Venice and the Venetian Jews', p.56, n.71. On silken cloth, see Heyd, *Histoire*, Vol. 2, pp.295–6, 699–700; Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte*, pp.265–6; Jacoby, 'Venice and the Venetian Jews', 48; the Hebrew document of c.1330 providing the evidence has been translated by Bowman, *The Jews of Byzantium*, especially p.235, and see commentary on pp.238 and 240 for the dating. See also Pegolotti, *La pratica*, p.145; on Moreot samit, Carile, *La rendita feudale*, p.18; on Cretan samit, P. Ratti-Vidulich (ed.), *Duca di Candia. Bandi (1313–1329)* (Venice, 1965), p.15, No. 27 (April 1314), and Theotokis, *Thespismata*, Vol. 1, p.225 (July 1342).
117. See A.E. Laiou, 'Venice as a Center of Trade and of Artistic Production in the Thirteenth Century', in H. Belting (ed.), *Il Medio Oriente e l'Occidente nell'arte del XIII Secolo* [= *Atti del XXIV Congresso internazionale di storia dell'arte, (Bologna, 1975)*] Vol. 2 (Bologne, 1982), pp.14–15, 18–19.
118. See Jacoby, 'Les états latins', p.45, and n.44 above for Corinth in 1365; also Carile, *La rendita feudale*, pp.28–9. Around 1210 the revenue accruing from the *commerchium* of this city was undoubtedly larger than the 400 *hyperpyra* granted by Prince Geoffrey I, on which see n.43 above. H. Saranti-Mendelovici, 'A propos de la ville de Patras aux 13^{e}–15^{e} siècles', *Revue des études byzantines*, 38 (1980), 219–32, is insufficiently documented.
119. See Longnon, *Livre de la Conqueste*, paras. 802–3; LT, p.274.
120. See Laiou, 'Quelques observations', pp.180–82, 188, 194–7; id., 'Observations on
the Results of the Fourth Crusade', pp.50–54; Laiou-Thomadakis, 'The Greek Merchant', especially 115–23; id., 'The Byzantine Economy in the Mediterranean Trade System: Thirteenth-Fifteenth Centuries', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 34–5 (1980–81), 177–222. On regional trade in the Morea, see n.119 above, and Pegolotti, *La pratica*, pp.116–19.
121. See my forthcoming study mentioned in n.108 above. On coinage, see A.M. Stahl, 'Venetian Coinage in Medieval Greece', *Actes du II^{e} Colloque international d'histoire: Economies méditerranéennes; équilibres et intercommunications* (Athens, 1985), pp.365–9; id., *The Venetian Tornesello: a Medieval Colonial Coinage*, American Numismatic Notes and Monographs, No. 163 (New York, 1985).

The Establishment of the Latin Church in the Empire of Constantinople (1204–1227)

JEAN RICHARD

Long before the year 1204, the first steps had been taken towards assuring the coexistence of the Greek and Latin rites in formerly Byzantine territories which had come under Latin domination. In southern Italy, where the Normans had come to power by virtue of the tensions which made the Langobards oppose Byzantine domination in Apulia, the population was originally split between the two rites. The Normans tipped the balance in favour of the Latin rite: each Norman garrison established in a town was accompanied by its Latin clergy and bishop. As an old Council canon forbade the presence of two bishops in the same city, the Greek bishop generally gave up his seat; this did not happen in Reggio di Calabria until several years of coexistence had gone by. Where the Greek population was predominant, the Greek bishop remained.[1] Custom consecrated this division: in 1198, Innocent III quashed the appointment of a Latin bishop at Santa Severina, noting that this church was to maintain the Greek language and the Greek rite.[2] In some cases, when the bishop was Latin and the population partially Greek, Greek clerics were to be ordained by the Latin prelate, but were headed by a *protopapas*, sometimes referred to as *archipresbyter Graecorum*.[3] Greek monasticism flourished: on the Italian mainland, Casola, founded by Bohemond (1099) and Patirion, founded in 1103, enjoyed the protection of the Holy See;[4] and more than eighty monasteries of the Greek rite were established on the island of Sicily.

Another model prevailed in the Holy Land.[5] Bohemond had forced the Greek patriarch of Antioch to abandon his cathedral, originally restored to him by the crusaders; the Greek patriarch did not return to Jerusalem after 1099. The Franks' episcopal hierarchy was headed by two Latin patriarchs: when the Byzantine emperor imposed a Greek patriarch on Antioch, the Latin patriarch moved to Cursat (Quṣair), from where he continued to preside over the Latin hierarchy. In the kingdom of Jerusalem, the Church took advantage of the fact that several existing dioceses had been united under the same Latin bishop,[6] in order to award the title of one of the vacant episcopal sees to a Greek

Greek bishop, who received the canonical status of vicar to the Latin bishop, for the benefit of the Greek worshippers and clergy. This enabled the Greek (or Melkite) clerics to be ordained in accordance with their rite.

This solution was also to prevail in Cyprus, where the Latin Church was founded in 1196 (five years after the conquest). None the less, not until 1220 was it decided that the Greek hierarchy would be modeled on the Latin, with the number of bishops reduced from fourteen to four; this, in turn, engendered difficulties which were not resolved until 1260. In Cyprus, as in the Holy Land, a Latin Church and a Greek Church existed side by side. The former, that of the rulers, was the established Church; the latter had to recognize the Roman primacy (which was not to difficult) and maintain obedience to the Latin diocesans (which was much less simple).[7]

The Latin Christian institutions which had functioned in the empire of Constantinople before 1204 consisted of churches serving national communities (Danes, Amalfitans, Pisans, Genoese, Venetians), a hospital, some monasteries; occasionally, a vicar representing the pope would make an appearance in that area.[8] This Latin settlement was incapable of providing a sound basis for the ecclesiastical organization necessitated by the conquest. The latter, in fact, had caught Innocent III unprepared. Following the re-establishment of Isaac II, he had stipulated the conditions required for the return of the Greek Church to the union, as promised by Alexius IV: the patriarch would have to recognize the *magisterium et primatus* of the Roman Church, and the pope would send him the pallium, as a token of confirmation of his authority over his Church.[9] Learning of the accession of Baldwin I, he had rejoiced to see the empire transferred from schismatic to Catholic hands; at the same time, he had warned the new emperor against the temptation of resuming the tradition practiced by his predecessors, who had failed to restore the *regnum Graecorum* to the obedience of the Apostolic See.[10]

A short time later, having learned that some of the Greek clergy had left Constantinople, he became concerned over the fate of the abandoned churches, fearing that, once the masses of crusaders departed, 'this kingdom would remain as if without priests, and that there would no longer be anyone to hold services for the Latins who would dwell there, according to their rite, and to administer the sacraments to them'. He instructed that those churches left without incumbents be assigned to Latin clerics, and that a *provisor* be appointed to head them pending the arrival of a legate. This was a temporary solution, while at the same time establishing the foundations for a Latin Church assigned to serve the new Latin community.[11]

He soon learned, however – to his great surprise and indignation – that, in addition to the excesses committed during and since the taking of the city (which he considered as having caused the Greeks to distance themselves from the Latins), the crusaders had permitted themselves to take over Church property, to institute an ecclesiastical hierarchy, and to assign its titles to themselves. Annulling the conventions concluded between the crusaders and the Venetians, he deposed the legate Peter of Capua, who had ratified the *fait accompli*. None the less, not being able to cause a total break with the new emperor, he was forced to accept the establishment of this Church, which had been made without his approval.[12]

In order to ensure a *modus vivendi* between Greeks and Latins, the pope was inspired by the model provided by southern Italy. Indeed, it was Abbot Nicholas of the Casola monastery who served as interpreter and counselor to the legate Benedict of Santa Susanna.[13] In August 1206, Innocent III recommended to Patriarch Thomas that, when episcopal sees became vacant, those vacancies should be filled by Greek bishops wherever the population was Greek, and Latin bishops in cases of mixed Greek and Latin population.[14] This assumed that the Greek clergy, in dioceses assigned to Latin bishops, would be headed by a *protopapas*, as in Sicily.

The implementation of that plan apparently did not correspond to the pope's intentions (although it must be admitted that our data on this are incomplete). Several Greek bishops swore obedience to the Latin patriarch and remained in charge of their dioceses; in March 1208, the pope recommended to Patriarch Thomas that those bishops should not be made to undergo a new consecration *more latino*. The case of the bishops of Rodosto and Negroponte was undoubtedly less exceptional than one would believe.[15] Moreover, Innocent III insisted that the Greek archbishops of Athens and Corinth be kept on in those posts, but both of them preferred exile to submission to Rome.[16] Yet, although the pope had intended to appoint new Greek bishops, Greek prelates were normally succeeded by Latin bishops.

One might assume that the Greeks recoiled at receiving Latin consecration and swearing obedience. None the less, we will observe that many *hegoumenoi* accepted being blessed by and submitting to Latin bishops. We must ask ourselves whether it was not, in fact, the Latin clergy who, having intended to keep the vacated episcopal sees for themselves, had difficulty tolerating access to them by the Greeks. The difficulties encountered by Theodore of Negroponte with his archbishop, Bérard of Athens, are indicative in this connection.

In 1206, the Greek patriarch John X died at his place of retirement, Didymoteichus, having neither opposed Latin power nor submitted to

his Latin successor. The Greek clergy of Constantinople petitioned the pope for permission to appoint a Greek successor, citing the (hardly decisive) case of Jerusalem and Antioch as precedent for the coexistence of a Latin and a Greek patriarch in the same see.[17] This request was not followed up, and the election of a new Greek patriarch, closely allied with the new Byzantine imperial throne, took place in Nicaea in 1208. This must certainly have made the situation of the Greek bishops dependent on the Latin patriarch even more difficult.

The unification of several episcopal sees under a single bishop is explained, in several letters, by the fact that bishops 'had not been appointed at the time of the Latins, and that there were no Latins there.'[18] By contrast, the people of Spigat (Pegai), who were of the Latin rite, refused to allow the unification of that city's bishopric with the archbishopric of Parion; eventually they acquired their own Spigatensis bishop.[19] There is no evidence of any instances in which Innocent III's dispositions of 1206 were used as an excuse for allowing the appointment of a Greek bishop in the absence of Latin inhabitants. In 1224, the bishop of Loretos complained to the pope that the bishop of Negroponte had used the unification of the see of Loretos with that of Negroponte as an excuse for making a Greek priest his *vicarius in spiritualibus et temporalibus in episcopatu Loretensi*.[20] That priest was undoubtedly no more than a *protopapas* (as was the case in Candia, Rethymnon, Negroponte, and Corfu). The complaint did not state whether the bishop of Negroponte had made him his vicar *in pontificalibus*, taking advantage of the fact that the Lateran Council, in 1215, had proclaimed as licit the appointment of a prelate of another rite as vicar to a Latin bishop for the benefit of the members of his rite, as long as that prelate did not bear the title of the episcopal see occupied by the Latin bishop. It is not impossible that some such vicars had (more or less clandestinely) received episcopal consecration, which would have enabled them to ordain Greek priests according to their rite, without having to administer to those priests the unction scorned by the Greeks. In 1218, Legate John of St Praxedes warned that a number of Greeks 'had secretly been given holy orders by persons other than their bishops'.[21] Yet only in the fourteenth century do we encounter cases of Greek clerics, exercising sacerdotal functions in countries under Frankish rule, who had gone to Byzantine territory for their ordination; while, at Coron and Modon, the coexistence of Greek and Latin bishops was permitted, on condition that the former reside outside these cities.[22]

All in all, the episcopal hierarchy of the empire of Constantinople was a Latin hierarchy. The Greek clergy (as proclaimed in 1210 by the Parlement of Ravennica) shared the same privileges (canonical protec-

tion, personal freedom) as the Latin clergy; at most, its recruitment was limited in numbers, to avoid a proliferation deleterious to seigneurial interests.[23] It enjoyed a great degree of autonomy: the *papates* chose the new recruits themselves. Yet it was dominated by Latin bishops, who demanded acts of obedience from the priests ordained by them.[24] Thus, the Latin Church was destined to serve not only the dominant (or Latin) society, but also to exercise its authority over the members of the Greek rite, without (as was the case in the Latin East) passing through a parallel hierarchy.

The conventions concluded in March 1204 between the Venetians and the crusaders determined the assignment of the cathedral of St Sophia and its Church offices to one of the two parties. The Venetians, to whom it was given, established canons there; the latter hurriedly elected a patriarch. Innocent III kept Thomas Morosini on in that office, while annulling his election, in order not to appear to recognize the legitimacy of the cathedral's chapter. He confirmed Thomas's right to all of the traditional prerogatives of the patriarch of Constantinople, thus cutting short the shilly-shallying of certain archbishops, who would have preferred to be directly responsible to Rome.[25] Nevertheless, Honorius III took umbrage at the actions of Patriarch Gervasius, who aspired to send legates into the dioceses of his patriarchate; he accused the patriarch of wanting to revive the schism. Yet Innocent III had already invested his legates with powers limiting those of the patriarch.[26]

Thomas Morosini, concerned at the *nimia multitudo* of bishoprics prior to 1204, proposed to reduce their numbers to a reasonable figure. The pope reminded him of the intangibility of the diocesan structure; he later reiterated that reminder in bulls confirming the nomination of the new archbishops and listing the episcopal sees under each metropolis, in accordance with the existing official lists of bishoprics (*Notitiae*). Nevertheless, the pope agreed to confirm his legates' decision to assign the administration of certain vacant dioceses to the bishops of neighbouring dioceses. These unifications of sees, which Innocent III would have preferred to consider as exceptions, multiplied; it even happened that an existing diocese was split between two other bishoprics. In this way, the epoch of Latin domination was characterized by a change, as it were, of the diocesan map.[27]

Thomas would have liked to be able to depose summarily those bishops who failed to assume office: more than one of those appointed by him departed for the West, taking with them relics which they had seized. Innocent III advised him to be patient.[28] Yet, at least at the beginning, the episcopal lists continue to betray a certain instability.

The Church of Romania easily adopted the structure, customary in

the West, which associated a bishop with a cathedral chapter. In July 1208, Innocent III proposed that the canons of Athens adopt the institutions of the Paris church – that is, model themselves on the latter in matters concerning the temporal division of the Church into capitulary and archepiscopal *mensae*, the distribution of prebends and offices.[29] This, it should be noted, was not always the rule in the Latin East: in Cyprus, the salary of the canons was deducted from the revenues of the Church, which were managed by the bishop.

There was presumably no other case similar to that of Patras, where it was planned to replace the secular canons with a community of regular canons of the congregation of St Rufus of Valence, to which Archbishop Antelmus intended to assign the possession of half the property of his church. This attempt does not seem to have been realized: the regular canons found the cathedral in the hands of the secular canons, whom the archbishop had described as having abandoned the church, and were forced to withdraw (1210–12).[30]

Besides the bishop and the chapter, each cathedral doubtless had a group of clerics, in order to attend to the spiritual needs of its congregation. In places where Latins were few in number, the cathedral was probably the only Latin church of the diocese.[31] In any event, in 1210, Othon de la Roche asked the pope to see that, in every city or town whose residents included twelve Latins, those Latins would have their own priest, to be rewarded with the tithes paid by his faithful.[32] It is not certain whether this request was fulfilled in practice. We do know that, in Cyprus, where the bishops received all tithes, and where they maintained 'parish priors' for the Latins, the Latin parishes were at first quite few in number, to the point that a pontifical legate, in 1223, urged lords to have their own chaplains to officiate for them.[33]

The situation was different in cities with a large Latin population, and especially in Constantinople. In 1208, it was found necessary to put an end to the privileged status of the 'national' churches established prior to 1204, to oblige the English, Danes, Amalfitans, Lombards, and Pisans to pay their tithes where they received their sacraments, and to deprive the 'prior of the Pisans' of the right to confirm children.[34] Nevertheless, the Venetians continued to enjoy extraterritoriality for those of their churches which, before the conquest, had been subordinate to the patriarchate of Grado; and Thomas Morosini, in 1208, sought ways to secure for himself the tithes which had previously been paid to the latter.[35]

Did all of the 30 or so *praepositure* mentioned in our texts enjoy parish privileges? We cannot answer this question, as many of these churches were former monasteries transformed into *ecclesiae conventuales* – no more than we can state whether other parish churches

were established in Constantinople.[36] The number of 3,000 persons who evacuated the city in 1261 gives an idea of the population which had to be served; however, at the beginning of the Latin domination, this population might have been envisaged as eventually becoming more important, allowing the parishes to be defined accordingly. This secular church was almost entirely devoted to the spiritual service of the Latin colonies; thus, it may be seen to have been essentially urban, the Franks having basically confined themselves to fortified localities, where nearly all of their cathedrals and parish churches were situated. Did it play a role in the *rapprochement* of the two Churches? We know the text of Innocent III's invitation to the masters of the schools of Paris to come to the new empire and work towards unification; it does not, however, seem to have had much effect.[37] The Latin bishops do not appear to have done more than solicit acts of obedience, basing their measures on canonical sanctions, but avoiding recourse to the secular arm.[38] The functions of the Latin clergy subordinate to them were limited to ensuring liturgical services and the administration of sacraments to the Latin population. Only after 1220 did the Dominicans and Franciscans arrive in the empire and begin to work among the Greeks, yet without neglecting their preaching among the Latins.[39]

The implantation of a regular Church of the Latin rite complied with the same imperatives: spiritual service to Frankish society, and activity among the Greeks. It, too, was integrated into the framework of a pre-existing situation. Monasticism flourished in the empire of the Comneni and the Angeli, with a wide variety of status: from self-administered monasteries which elected their own *hegoumenoi* to simple *metochia* run by stewards. Many of these monasteries had been donated as benefices (*charistika*) to lay persons or attached to the temporal possessions of bishoprics; in this case, their incomes served both to support the monks and to enrich the bishops or beneficiaries.[40] From the Latin standpoint, all of these monasteries followed St Basil's Rule, considered by the Latin Church as one of the approved rules, and well known to the papacy through the Greek monasteries of Rome, southern Italy, and Sicily.

The conquerors of Constantinople viewed the monasteries as spoils to be shared out, yet did not necessarily force them to change their character. It is said that many – though definitely not all – of the monks abandoned their convents and fled; there were undoubtedly also cases where they were urged to evacuate their monasteries. We do know that many of the latter were found available for transformation into 'conventual churches' of the Latin rite, especially those whose representatives participated in the election of the patriarch. The 30 *majores praepositure* mentioned above seem to have been colleges of

secular canons, complete with provosts, deans, and other officers; they included a number of famous monasteries (Holy Apostles, Pantocrator, Theotokos of the Chalkoprateia, Forty Martyrs, St George of the Mangana). To this list may be added the two imperial chapels of Boukoleon and the Blachernae, both raised to the rank of collegiates, but exempted from patriarchal jurisdiction.[41]

This transformation of monasteries into secular collegiates was, no doubt, convenient for the Latin clerics among the armed forces. It went against the doctrine defended by the popes, who had foreseen no change in observance other than the adoption of stricter (*arctior*) discipline. Thus, Innocent III advised Thomas Morosini not to implement such a transformation: the only recourse to such a move, he stated, should be in cases where no monks, Latins or Greeks, could be found to serve the abandoned churches.[42] Legate John Colonna, in 1221, recalled the aim of the papacy 'to restore the destroyed monasteries and *metochia*, and to keep intact those which have been restored.'[43]

In effect, the western form of worship gave a privileged status to the regular forms of religious life, irrespective of the fashion of collegiates which sprang up in the castles. Benedictine priories, Cistercian abbeys, and similar communities developed close relationships with seigneurial families, taking upon themselves the burial of their dead, celebrating offices on their behalf, and accepting their children as members of the order. The Latins established in Romania maintained the same attitude, providing for themselves the indispensable monastic environment.[44] The La Roches of Franche-Comté were linked to the abbey of Bellevaux; Otho de la Roche brought in monks from that abbey to create a Cistercian abbey at Daphne – we do not know, however, under what conditions that monastery had been abandoned by its Greek monks.[45]

Yet the religious establishments of the West could not spare enough members to staff a large number of convents. When it was proposed to bring in Cistercians to replace the Greek monks who had abandoned the convent at Rufinianai – 'which had been very famous ever since the times of the Greeks' – the abbot of St Angelos of Pera had to transport his community there. In spite of everything, the foundation of Latin religious houses was limited in number.[46]

The idea came up of bringing in the military orders to participate in the defence of the empire, as had been the case in the Latin East. Baldwin I had donated one-quarter of the duchy of Neokastro to the Hospitallers, and the port of Adalia to the Templars – these locations being two stops on the route by which pilgrims and crusaders crossed western Anatolia on their way to the Holy Land; this gift, however,

remained without effect.[47] On the other hand, the Hospitallers received a house in the kingdom of Thessalonica, from which they attempted to assemble a vast domain in Thessaly; noteworthy was the case of Gardikion, which the Hospitallers fortified in an attempt to wrest it from its bishop. The Templars, for their part, fortified Zeitounion (Lamia), which was then taken from them by the emperor. Both of those orders also had houses in the Morea.[48]

Yet it was, no doubt, a Byzantine *xenodochion* which gave rise to the establishment of a small hospital order specific to the Latin empire, that of St Samson of Constantinople, whose constitution was approved by the legate Benedict (1208). The order had a military vocation; it was assigned the castle of Garella by the emperor in 1209, and its master and brothers were given the right to own horses and arms in 1222. The order of St Samson spread to Corinth and Hungary and was given hospitals at Douai, Orleans, and Namur; among its donors were Archbishop Garinus of Thessalonica and Emperor Baldwin II.[49]

In this connection, we must also mention the large numbers of existing monasteries donated to sanctuaries in the Holy Land, or to religious houses from the countries of origin of Latins settled in the empire. The abbey of regular canons of Templum Domini, in Jerusalem, was itself awarded, in 1209, several monasteries, including St Nicholas of Varvar in Constantinople, Holy Trinity in Athens, St Nicholas of Thebes, St Nicholas of Negroponte, and St Mary of La Clisura; these appear to have been assigned to priors.[50] Boniface of Montferrat donated St Demetrius of Thessalonica to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, without taking into account the fact that that monastery belonged to the archbishop. An agreement reached in 1212 divided the income of the monastery in equal shares between the cathedral of St Sophia and the Holy Sepulchre, charging the latter with supplying St Demetrius with clerics and chaplains, under a prior designated by the patriarch of Jerusalem. In this case, the monks were apparently replaced by Latin seculars; yet we must ask whether this was the St Demetrius which, among other Greek convents, was granted privileges by Innocent III in 1216.[51]

In effect, the concession of a Greek monastery to a Latin religious establishment did not necessarily involve the abolition of Greek monastic life within its walls. Following the donation of St George of Verlocopo to the abbey of Nonantola by Thomas Morosini, the pope asked the latter to send monks to take possession of that monastery (1207).[52] However, the legate Benedict, donating St Mary of Euergetes to the Benedictines of Monte Cassino, stated that that donation should not obligate the Greek monks to leave; similarly, John Colonna did not dispossess the Greek brothers of a monastery which he donated to the

prior of the Pisans of Constantinople.[53] These donations were intended to fill the coffers of religious houses, rather than to suppress existing monasteries; the Latin priors may have been no more than administrators, charged with directing to their own convents that portion of the monastery income not devoted to supporting the monks. In 1210, the Holy Sepulchre complained that the abbot and monks of St Luke in Phocida, a monastery donated to it by the legate Benedict, did not show due reverence to the representatives of the chapter. This did not prevent Innocent III, in 1216, from granting privileges to the monastery of St Luke, which continued to live under its own rule and its own *hegoumenos*.[54]

The conquerors undoubtedly dispensed with formality in taking possession of a large number of monasteries. In doing so, they claimed that the authority of their right as 'patrons' (*jus patronatus*) permitted them to dispose of the churches on their lands as they saw fit – a claim censured by Innocent III.[55] The legate John Colonna, following the accord of 1221 by which the emperor and his barons renounced Church property hitherto held by them, disposed of several monasteries and *metochia* which had been taken out of lay hands.[56] The bishoprics, for their part, retained the monasteries donated to them by the Byzantine emperors – without interrupting the religious life of these institutions.

We are familiar with the case of Mount Athos. Innocent III had originally intended to assign the bishop of Sebaste as protector to that monastery; the latter's greed was denounced by the monks, and the pope was forced to revoke his earlier concession and restore the liberty of the Holy Mountain.[57] Mount Sinai and the laura of St Theodosius in the Judaean Desert maintained their own endowments in the empire, with no intervention by intermediaries.[58] In 1211 or 1212, Innocent III took under his protection the monastery of the Akapnoi in Thessalonica, which was registered in the *Liber censuum* for the annual payment of ten *hyperpyra*. In 1216, he granted privileges to several large monasteries, exempting them from tithes on the profit of the monks' labours. Honorius III took several monasteries near Athens under his protection in 1218.[59]

Thus we see that a number of these religious houses continued to exist under Frankish domination, recognizing the jurisdiction of Latin prelates who blessed their *hegoumenoi*, but without other changes in their lifestyle.[60] None the less, Innocent III echoed Baldwin I's appeal to the prelates in the kingdom of France to send *viros religiosos et providos* from the orders of Cluny and Citeaux, as well as the regular canons, 'to reinforce the truth of the Catholic faith'.[61] Was their intention, in establishing these monks in the empire, solely to have the brilliance of their life kindle the fervour of the Greeks for Church

union (the Cistercians being at this time the missionary order *par excellence*)? We may well ask if they did not also intend to 'reform' those monasteries which had fallen into decadence, by the usual process: the dispatch of an abbot or prior, accompanied by a colony of monks, to induce the monks present in the convent to adopt a more exemplary way of life.[62] Let us recall Chortaïtis, where Boniface of Montferrat called in the Cistercians of Lucedio; these were forced to withdraw by the resistance of the Greek monks; a renewed injection of Lucedian monks encountered further resistance, which was finally overcome (1212–14). St Thomas of Torcello was given three abbeys; in 1218, the patriarch called for an inquest to determine whether one of them had indeed embraced the Cistercian rule, failing which it was to be taken away from St Thomas. The astonishing propagation of Cistercian abbeys in Romania may have been partially due to that desire for reform, which obviously brought about the Latinization of the convents in question, by substituting St Benedict's Rule for that of St Basil. This, in turn, must have limited the success of the enterprise.[63]

Let us note that the other crusader states were not affected to the same degree by the phenomenon of the takeover and reform of existing monasteries. Noteworthy is the case of Cyprus, where, despite some despoilment, Greek monasticism prevailed and prospered; although the possibility of 'reforming' Iallia and Mangana was discussed, it was never effected.

The endowment of the Church was equally problematic in the Latin empire. The convention of March 1204 had specified that 'of the possessions of the churches, the clerics and churches should be given as much as they require to live and meet their needs honourably; the rest of these possessions should be divided and shared in accordance with the stated order'.[64] In reality, the church treasuries were pillaged, and their property fell into the possession of the conquerors, who later donated their share to the churches of their own rite.

Innocent III denounced the illicit nature of this occupation as early as 2 February 1205, stating that the property of the Church of Constantinople was as inalienable as any other Church property.[65] However, as the conditions under which the takeover of that property had been accomplished made the restoration to its former state impossible, the legate Benedict concluded an initial concordat with the emperor and his barons (17 March 1206), stipulating an indemnity, amounting to one-fifteenth of the lands and fiscal revenues appropriated by the Franks, monasteries being exempt from that calculation. The agreement went on to state that the churches should receive tithes from their Latin congregations, under the same conditions prevailing in the West – that is, tithes on agriculture and cattle.[66] The agreement

concerned itself only with the empire proper – specifically, the region east of Makri. For the kingdom of Thessalonica and its dependencies between Makri and Corinth, the question was settled by the concordat of Ravennica (2 May 1210), which stipulated the return of the churches, the monasteries, and their property to the Church, but made the ecclesiastical domains liable to the payment of land tax (*akrostichon*), in conformity with the custom which had applied before the conquest.[67] The terms of this agreement were extended, in 1223, to cover the principality of Morea and the duchy of Athens, at the end of a protracted conflict which involved the excommunication of Geoffrey of Villehardouin and Otho de la Roche – who, not content with having appropriated Church property, had subjected the Greek clerics and monks to new taxation. Geoffrey nevertheless obtained the right to continue this taxation for another 20 years, 'for the defence of the empire.' However, in order to compensate the churches for what they should have received up to 1223, annual rents were to be paid to the archbishops of Corinth and Patras, and to the bishops of Nikli (Amyclae), Argos, Lacedaemonia, Modon, and Volenos.[68]

Meanwhile, the concordat of 1206 had been annulled by the legate Pelagius, who insisted on raising the indemnity from one-fifteenth to one-twelfth. John Colonna proposed that the indemnity be replaced by the restoration of those lands which had been taken from the churches. A new agreement was finally reached in 1221. The cathedral churches regained what they had possessed under Alexius I; the monasteries were returned to the Church; the indemnity was raised to one-eleventh, and supplemented by annual rents of 3,000 *hyperpyra*.[69]

The beneficiaries of these agreements were, essentially, the Latin patriarch, archbishops, and bishops. The concordat of 1206 had specified that a commission would distribute the indemnity among the assignees. In practice, the patriarch Thomas intended to do the distribution himself, reserving half of everything for his own use; the legate and the pope suggested that he limit his share to one-quarter. Moreover, as we have noted, the main clause of these agreements concerned the restoration to the cathedral churches of all that they had possessed under Alexius I. Were they also to become the receivers of tithes? Theoretically, yes, according to the precedent set by pontifical acts regarding monasteries. However, at least in the case of Constantinople, Innocent III stipulated that the tithes be paid to the parish churches. In the Latin East, tithes were, as a rule, paid to bishops; this was presumably the most common rule, which explains why, in the Morea, the bishops were in charge of maintaining abandoned churches.[70]

Should the Greeks be subjected to the payment of tithes (which they

had not known under Byzantine rule)? The Latin East solved this problem by stating that tithes be paid by the lords on the totality of seigneurial income.[71] The concordat of 1206 imposed the payment of tithes on the Latins, and authorized the clergy to urge the Greeks to submit to tithing, provided that this be done *per exhortationem et admonitionem*. Innocent III asked the barons of the kingdom of Thessalonica to oblige the Greeks to make these payments; yet not until 1215 did he add to the stipulations of the Ravennica concordat, the obligation for the Greeks to pay tithes, in accordance with the decisions of the Fourth Lateran Council[72] – tithes conceived as a payment owed to God in return for enjoying the fruits of His earth, which were thus not linked to the service of any particular church. It is difficult to know to what extent the Greeks submitted to this obligation, hitherto foreign to the customs of their Church, which had subjected them to a different form of taxation.

The main beneficiaries of the provisions of these agreements were the Latin bishops. We know that, in the Morea, the latter were given the rank of seigneurs of fiefs, the archbishop of Patras becoming a baron, by virtue of his acquisition of the local barony. Integrated into the feudal structure of the principality, they had to fulfil their duty to serve in the court and in the army. The situation was, no doubt, less favourable in other places, and many bishops complained of poverty; yet the Byzantine reconquest rapidly changed the conditions which had prevailed at the beginning of the thirteenth century.

It is interesting to compare this state of affairs with that encountered in Cyprus. Pope Honorius III attempted to introduce into that kingdom the terms finally included in the concordats reached in Romania: restitution of Church property occupied by lay persons, and extension of tithing to the Greeks. The legate Pelagius came up against an opposition which he could not overcome, and the concordat of 1220 confirmed the existing situation. Actually, following an agreement reached with Pope Celestine III, King Aimery had given the Latin Church an endowment out of the royal domain. This included the assignation of one or more villages to each cathedral church, as well as the right to tithes, the latter being calculated on the global income of each fief and that of the kingdom itself, including revenue from the old land tax. In return, the landed property of the churches and monasteries, which had been confiscated by the first Latin lords, remained with their lay possessors.

Given the above, it would not be correct to state that the crusaders of 1204 introduced into the empire of Constantinople ecclesiastical institutions which had been worked out in the Holy Land and imitated on Cyprus. The papacy wished to draw inspiration from the model

adopted in southern Italy and Sicily; yet the conditions of the conquest and subsequent developments – notably the renaissance of the Nicaean patriarchate, closely associated with the lay power – prevented the full realization of that plan. The absence of Greek prelates from the episcopal hierarchy ensured that the Church of Constantinople remained firmly Latin in character, though initially conceived as intended for both Greeks and Latins. None the less, religious life was able to continue in accordance with the Greek traditions, despite the systematic introduction of regular communities founded on the western model, in conditions which were, once again, rather different from those which had prevailed in the Latin East.

NOTES

This article was translated from French by Sharon Neeman.

1. I am unable to accept the interpretation given by P. Decarreaux, *Normands, Papes et Moines* (Paris, 1974), who considers the Normans to be the instruments of a papal policy directed against the Greek rite.
2. *Acta Innocentii pp. III* (hereafter *Acta Inn. III*), ed. T. Haluscinskyi (Rome, 1944), in the *Fontes* of the Pontificia commissio ad redigendum codicem juris canonici orientalis, 3rd ser., p.169.
3. *Acta Inn. III*, p.207 (the *archipresbyter Graecorum de Brundusio* sent to the king of Bulgaria). Cf. J. Gay, 'Notes sur la conservation du rite grec dans la Calabre et la Terre d'Otrante au XIV^e^ siècle', *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 4 (1895), 59–66.
4. *Acta Inn. III*, p.176.
5. B. Hamilton, *The Latin Church in the Crusader States: The Secular Church* (London, 1980), pp.159–80.
6. H.E. Mayer, *Bistümer, Kloster und Stifte im Königreich Jerusalem* (Stuttgart, 1977).
7. J. Gill, 'The Tribulations of the Greek Church in Cyprus, 1196–1280', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 5 (1977), 77–83, repr. in J. Gill, *Church Union: Rome and Byzantium* (London, 1979), No. IV.
8. A. Belin, *Histoire de la Latinité de Constantinople*, 2nd edn., by Fr. Arsène du Chatel (Paris, 1984); E. Dallegio d'Asseglio, 'Recherches sur l'histoire de la latinité de Constantinople', *Echos d'Orient*, 23 (1924), 448–60; G. Fedalto, *La chiesa latina in Oriente* (Verona, 1973–78), Vol. 1, pp.144–60.
9. *Acta Inn. III*, pp.178, 187, 195, 213, 245. On the illusion which created the hope of a patriarchal agreement, cf. D.M. Nicol, 'The Papal Scandal', *Studies in Church History*, 13 (1976), 146.
10. *Acta Inn. III*, pp.276–7 (7 Nov. 1204).
11. *Acta Inn. III*, p.283. K.M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, Vol. I (Philadelphia, 1976), p.14, believes that the pope intended for that *provisor* to be 'presumably a patriarch'. This is not certain.
12. *Acta Inn. III*, pp.285, 290–91: letters annulling the conventions concluded between the Franks and the Venetians (21–29 Jan. 1205). The Pope was not informed of the conditions involved in the taking of the city until later: *Acta Inn. III*, pp.307, 311 (12 June 1205). Cf. R.L. Wolff, 'Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople, 1204–1261', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 8 (1954), 255–303, and 'The Organization of the Latin Patriarchate', *Traditio*, 6 (1948), 33–60.
13. J. Hoeck and R.J. Loenertz, *Nikolaos-Nektarios von Otranto, Abt von Casole* (Ettal, 1965), Studia patristica et byzantina, Vol. 11.

14. *Acta Inn. III*, pp.317–20.
15. Wolff, 'Organization', 36–40 (there were five Greek bishops present at the cathedral of Thessalonica in 1213).
16. The Greek bishop of Corfu adopted this as an argument for refusing to attend the council of 1215 (Nicol, 'Papal Scandal', 151–4).
17. J.-P. Migne (ed.), *Patrologiae graecae cursus completus* ..., 161 vols. (Paris, 1857–), Vol. 140, cols. 293–8. Cf. Nicol, 'Papal Scandal', 147–9 (the latter author considers the pamphlet denouncing the occupation of the patriarchal see by a Latin to have been the work of John X).
18. A. Bon, *La Morée franque* (Paris, 1969), Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 213, pp.97–99.
19. Wolff, 'Organization', p.47; Fedalto, *La chiesa latina*, Vol. 2, pp.212–13.
20. *Acta Honorii pp. III et Gregorii IX* (hereafter *Acta. Hon. III*), ed. A.L. Tautu (Rome, 1950), pp.165–6; cf. Wolff, 'Organization', 123.
21. *Acta Hon. III*, p.63.
22. Bon, *La Morée franque*, p.102; F. Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne au Moyen Age* (Paris, 1959), Bibl. des écoles franç., 193, pp.288, 291, 403–5; id., *La symbiose dans les états latins formés sur les territoires de la Romaine byzantine (1204 à 1261)* (Athens, 1976), XV^e^ Congrès international d'études byzantines. Rapports et co-rapports, I/3; P. Topping, *Co-existence of Greeks and Latins in Frankish Morea and Greece* (ibid.), repr. in *Studies in Latin Greece, A.D. 1204–1715* (London, 1977), No. XI. Cf. also G. Fedalto, *La chiesa latina*, 3, pp.91, 164, 165, 217. On the failure of an attempt to create a Greek bishopric in Crete, envisaged by the popes of Avignon, see: J. Gill, 'Pope Urban V (1362–1370) and the Greeks of Crete', *Orientalia christiana periodica*, 39 (1973), pp.461–8, repr. in Gill, *Church Union*, No. VIII.
23. *Acta Hon. III*, pp.72, 154.
24. Innocent III had stated, in principle, that the Latin patriarch could consecrate Greek bishops, and that the fact of receiving consecration according to the Latin rite did not require the Greek clergy to change their rite (*Acta Inn. III*, pp.317–20, 352, 371; cf. Wolff, 'Organization', 36 and n.).
25. *Acta Inn. III*, pp.295–8, 310. That pope refused Morosini jurisdiction over the Church in Cyprus, on the basis of the latter's autocephaly.
26. *Acta Hon. III*, pp.24, 52; Wolff, 'Politics', 274–5. In later years, patriarchs were often vested with legislative powers; cf. L. Santifaller, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Lateinischen Patriarchats von Konstantinopel, 1204–1261* (Weimar, 1938), pp.167–216 (digest of acts concerning the patriarchate).
27. Cf. Wolff, 'Politics', and Fedalto, *La chiesa latina*.
28. *Acta Inn. III*, pp.317–20 (2 Aug. 1206).
29. J. Longnon, 'L'organisation de l'église d'Athènes par Innocent III', *Memorial Louis Petit (Archives de l'Orient chrétien, Vol. 1)* (Bucharest, 1948), pp.336–46. The capitulary *mensa* of St. Sophia of Constantinople was divided among 35 canonries and 40 prebends (1215–16), and then among only 40 prebends (1225).
30. J.-P. Migne (ed.), *Patrologiae latinae cursus completus*, 221 vols. (Paris, 1844–) (hereafter *PL*), Vol. 216, cols. 336–8, 340, 342, 559–60; Bon, *La Morée franque*, p.92. The prince of Morea, in order to fortify the upper town, had damaged the cathedral of St Theodore; it was necessary to use a church in the lower town as the cathedral, which may explain the archbishop's argument about withdrawal.
31. The case of Melos, in 1253, see Wolff, 'Organization', 43.
32. *Acta Inn. III*, p.377.
33. This despite the fact that the archbishop of Nicosia had denounced the excessive number of private chapels in 1221; see L. de Mas-Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne de la maison de Lusignan*, Vol. 3 (Paris, 1857), pp.618, 625.
34. *Acta Inn. III*, p.508. The rectors of St Peter of the Pisans and St George of the Genoese were titled 'priors'.
35. *PL* 215, col. 1350.
36. R. Janin, 'Les sanctuaires de Byzance sous la domination latine', *Etudes byzan-*

tines, 2 (1944), 134–84; Fedalto, *La chiesa latina*, Vol. 1, pp.204–5. The question is obscured by the controversy between the patriarch and the emperor concerning the collation of these *praepositurae*, which led the legate Benedict to reduce their number (Wolff, 'Politics', 244 ff). In 1209, the Church of Forty Martyrs was *una de majoribus triginta praeposituris*: E. Martène and U. Durand, *Thesaurus novus anecdotorum*, Vol. 1 (Paris, 1717), p.800.

37. *PL* 215, cols. 637–8.
38. There were some excesses of unionist zeal; cf. P. Pressuti, *Regesta Honorii papae III*, Vol. 2 (Rome, 1895), No. 3866.
39. R.L. Wolff, 'The Latin Empire of Constantinople and the Franciscans', *Traditio*, 2 (1944), 213–37. We know that, as from 1228, the Dominicans had houses in Constantinople, Thebes, Clarentza, Negroponte, and Candia; see B. Altaner, *Die Dominikanermissionen des 13 Jhdts.* (Habelschwerdt, 1924).
40. L. Bréhier, *Les institutions de l'empire byzantin* (Paris, 1949), Le monde byzantin, 2, pp.528–70.
41. By the decision of 11 May 1208 (*PL* 215, col. 1364). Cf. Janin, 'Les sanctuaires'. The future bishop of Domokos Gales of Dampierre had *custodiam cantoriae in ecclesia sanctorum XL martyrum ... et custodiam alterius praepositurae* (Martène and Durand, *Thesaurus*, p.800). The heads of these communities, in accordance with one of the usual rules of canon law, participated in the election of the patriarch along with the canons of St Sophia; see Wolff, 'Politics', 297.
42. 'De monasteriis quoque Graecorum in saeculares canonicos convertendos, quamdiu per regulares viros, sive Graecos sive latinos, remanere poterunt ordinata, non sunt ad saeculares canonicos transferenda' (*Acta Inn. III*, pp.317–20).
43. 'Cupientes monasteria et metochia relevari destructa et relevata, illaesa servari': F. Ughello, *Italia sacra*, Vol. 3 (Venice, 1718), p.420.
44. Cf. C.B. Bouchard, *Sword, Miter, and Cloister: Nobility and the Church in Burgundy, 980–1198* (Ithaca and London, 1987).
45. The monastery of Daphne is one and the same as that of Laurus, sometimes wrongly located near Constantinople: J. Richard, 'Laurum, une abbaye cistercienne fantôme', *Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartes*, 139 (1971), 409–10.
46. The main ones were the Cistercian foundations; cf. E.A.R. Brown, 'The Cistercians in the Latin Empire of Constantinople and Greece', *Traditio*, 14 (1958), pp.78–96; B.M. Bolton, 'A Mission to the Orthodox: Cistercians in the Latin Empire', *Studies in Church History*, 19 (1976), 169–82 (this study stresses the role played by the Cistercians in leading the Greeks into union).
47. J. Delaville le Roulx, *Cartulaire général de l'ordre des hospitaliers de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem* (Paris, 1894–1904) (hereafter *Cart. gen.*), Vol. 2, pp.47–8. Cf. J. Longnon, 'La campagne de Henri de Hainaut en Asie mineure en 1211', *Bulletin de l'Academie royale de Belgique. Classe des lettres*, 5th ser. 34 (1948), p.449.
48. D. and L. Stiernon, 'Gardikion', *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclesiastiques*, 19, cols. 1239–40; *PL* 216, cols. 323–4, 327–32; *Acta Inn. III*, p.509; Bon, *La Morée franque*, p.92.
49. Janin, 'Les sanctuaires', 170–71; Delaville le Roulx, *Cart. gen.*, 2, p.497; 3, pp.788–9; 4, pp.3–7, 221–2; R. Röhricht, *Regesta regni hierosolymitani* (Innsbruck, 1891), Nos. 1483–4; F. Brasart, 'Notes sur l'ancien hôpital Saint-Samson de Douai', *Souvenir de la Flandre wallonne*, 8 (1868), 167–9, and 13 (1873), 73–82.
50. *PL* 215, col. 1555.
51. *Acta Inn. III*, p.431. Designation of *prior et provisor: Le cartulaire du Saint-Sépulcre*, ed. G. Bresc-Bautier, Documents relatifs à l'histoire des croisades, 15 (Paris, 1984), p.340. Only the title of the bull of 1216 has come down to us (*Acta Inn. III*, p.543). The Holy Sepulchre had another house in Constantinople.
52. G. Tiraboschi, *Storia dell'augusta badia di S. Silvestro di Nonantola* (Modena, 1785), Vol. 2, p.339.

53. *Acta Hon. III*, pp.30–32 (Janin, 'Les sanctuaires', 177–8); Ughelli, *Italia sacra*, 3, p.493.
54. *PL* 216, cols. 299–300; *Acta Inn. III*, p.543; cf. R.J. Loenertz, 'Hosios Lukas de Stiris dans quelques documents latins (1210–1309)', *Thesaurismata*, 11 (1974), 21–35.
55. *PL* 216, col. 298 ('se habere jus patronatus in monasteriis, abbatiis et ecclesiis asserentes'). On the Hospitallers' renunciation of *omnes abbatias et papates* on their lands, as well as of an abbey which they possessed at Halmyros, see Delaville le Roulx, *Cart. gen.*, 2. pp.143–5.
56. Notable are the dispositions made in favour of the Pisans of Constantinople (dependencies of Holy Saviour of Logothetes, which they had received as a parish church in 1205, in compensation for damages suffered) and the churches of Rome. See Ughelli, *Italia sacra*, 3, pp.490, 493–4; *Acta Hon. III*, pp.119, 136–7 (1221–22); each of these abbeys is assigned to a cleric. The monks of another abbey are termed 'schismatics and rebels'.
57. *Acta Inn. III*, pp.323, 381.
58. J. Richard, 'Un monastère grec de Palestine et son domaine chypriote: le monachisme orthodoxe et l'établissement de la domination franque', *Praktika B'Diethnous Kyprologikou Synedriou* (Nicosia, 1986), Vol. 2, pp.61–75.
59. Fedalto, *La chiesa latina*, 1, p.160; *Acta Inn. III*, p.543; *Acta Hon. III*, pp.67–8.
60. *Acta Inn. III*, p.352. None the less, in 1212, the archbishop of Corinth complained that he had difficulty in gaining recognition by the Greek *hegoumenoi* (ibid., p.421). This corresponds to the situation described by Michael Choniates in his famous letter to the *hegoumenos* of Kaisariani. We will not go into the controversy which sprang up over the stauropegiai monasteries, which Innocent III agreed to recognize as direct dependencies of the patriarch, in contrast to Honorius III.
61. *PL* 215, cols. 637–8 (25 May 1205).
62. The king of Hungary, in 1204, in an effort to restore Greek monasteries (which he termed *valde dissoluti*) to regularity, had asked the pope to assign Latin abbots or provosts to them, in order to restore discipline, but without calling for changes in rite (*Acta Inn. III*, pp.269–70). On the other hand, the Archbishop of Patras stressed that the installation of the canons of St. Rufus would favour the extension of the Latin rite (*PL* 216, col. 338).
63. Cf. E.A.R. Brown, 'The Cistercians', pp.79–81, 82–85. At Rufinianai, the Cistercians were invited to take over a monastery which its original monks had abandoned, despite having promised to 'mend their ways' (pp.87–90).
64. G.L.Fr. Tafel and G.M. Thomas, *Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig* (Vienna, 1856), Vol. 1, p.447.
65. *PL* 215, col. 967. On this entire question, see Wolff, 'Politics', pp.255–74.
66. 'Decimas Latinorum, videlicet de blado, legumine et omnibus fructibus terrae et vinearum quas excolent vel propriis sumptibus excoli facient, et de fructibus arborum et hortorum ... de nutrimentis animalium quadrupedum et de apibus et lanis'. On the conditions of tithing in the Latin East, see J. Richard, *Documents chypriotes des Archives du Vatican, XIV^e et XV^e siècles*, Bibliothèque archéologique et historique de l'institut français de Beyrouth, Vol. 73 (Paris, 1962), pp.62–3.
67. *Acta Inn. III*, pp.463–5.
68. Bon, *La Morée franque*, pp.94–6; *Acta Hon. III*, pp.154–9, 161–2, 172–4.
69. Wolff, 'Politics', 258–62, 298–301.
70. On 23 Nov. 1209, Innocent III confirmed the patriarch's right to collect the *cathedraticum* (rental fee of two solidi paid to the diocesan bishop by the incumbents of the churches in his diocese, also known as *synodaticum*) and to constrain the Greeks in his diocese, by means of ecclesiastical censure, to pay tithes: *PL* 216, col. 163. The convention regarding the principality of Morea stipulated payment of tithes and other *spiritualia* by monasteries to cathedral churches, and mentioned *fabricae* (*Acta Hon. III*, pp.161–2).
71. An exception is noted in a text concerning the diocese of Beirut, which mentions tithing of non-Latin lands; see R. Hiestand, *Papsturkunden für Kirchen im Heiligen*

Lande, Vorbereitungen zum Oriens pontificius, Vol. 3 (Göttingen, 1985), pp.303–5.

72. *PL* 215, cols. 1434–5 (July 1208): The pope invited the nobles of the dioceses of Thebes, Platamon, Domokos, Negroponte, Thermopylae, and the duke of Athens to pay, and to have their Greek and Latin subjects pay, 'decimas quas quilibet christianus tenetur de jure solvere, cum Dominus preceperit in horrea sua decimationes inferri'.

Greeks and Latins after 1204: The Perspective of Exile

MICHAEL ANGOLD

> For they were not as yet well-acquainted with the beef-eating Latins and they did not know that they served a wine as pure and unmixed as unadulterated bile, nor that they would treat the Romans with utter contempt.[1]

With these words the historian Nicetas Choniates tried to explain the uncharitable reception which refugees from Constantinople received at the hands of the Thracians after the fall of the City to the crusaders in 1204. The truth of the matter is that before 1204 neither did the citizens of Constantinople fully appreciate how bloody the 'beef-eating Latins' could be. In Constantinople it was the Latins who had cause to go in fear, as the massacre of 1182 was to prove. The terror it inspired comes across in an exchange between Latin refugees and the crew of a Venetian boat that was standing off Cape Malea waiting to enter Byzantine waters: 'What are you doing here? If you aren't gone, you will all be dead, because we and all the Latins have been driven out of Constantinople'.[2] The Norman attack on Thessalonica three years later was seen as being in part a retaliation for the massacre of 1182. The savagery of the sack bore witness to western contempt for the Byzantines and their faith. They made a mockery of the services the citizens of Thessalonica tried to hold in the church of St Demetrius.[3] The Cypriots also suffered at the hands of westerners after the conquest of their island in 1191 by Richard I, King of England.[4] These events have been seen as symptomatic of what Steven Runciman has described as the 'Growth of Popular Animosity' between Greek and Latin. This he has singled out as perhaps the most important single factor in the developing schism between the Latin and the Orthodox churches.[5] He is surely right, but whether it would have been the force it was without the fall of Constantinople to the crusaders and the Byzantine experience of exile is another matter.

The sufferings of the Cypriots and the people of Thessalonica are not likely to have meant very much to the Byzantine establishment in Constantinople. Michael Choniates, the archbishop of Athens, is scathing about its indifference to the provinces.[6] One of its main

concerns in the wake of the Third Crusade was to return to the old pattern of relations between the two churches.[7] As so often in the past, an accommodation could be reached, because an underlying spirit of conciliation on both sides made it seem possible to reconcile irreconcilable objectives. The essential unity of Christendom was an ideal on which all were agreed, even if the Byzantines insisted that this must not be allowed to compromise Orthodox teaching; and even if the papacy was adamant that unity had to be achieved on the basis of recognizing the primacy of jurisdiction of the successor to St Peter. The arguments were well worn and the same texts were used over and over again. On both sides there was something comfortably academic about the approach to the differences that separated the two churches. *Furor academicus* is not to be underestimated: it is 'a spirit unappeased and peregrine' that can easily flare up, and this happened in 1054. However, on both sides there were forces of moderation: in Byzantium it was usually the emperor. For diplomatic and political purposes he had an interest in cultivating good relations with the papacy and was usually able to find a theologian who would minimize the differences separating the two churches. The onset of the crusades may have produced some modifications to this pattern: at the very least, it made an understanding with the papacy the more urgent. Initially, however, though feared by the Byzantines, the crusade was a rare occurrence. Nearly fifty years separated the First and Second Crusades; there was a gap of forty years before the Third Crusade. Thereafter, they occurred fairly regularly, as the crusade acquired greater scope and more effective organization. Perhaps, more to the point, the First Crusade allowed westerners to establish a permanent presence in the eastern Mediterranean. The creation of the crusader states undermined the Orthodox patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem. The Orthodox patriarchs were forced to live in exile in Constantinople, while the Orthodox clergy and community in the crusader states came under the authority of a Latin hierarchy. Bernard Hamilton believes that there was a tolerant spirit abroad. Orthodox clergy continued to officiate in the church of the Holy Sepulchre, and Orthodox monasteries flourished, but, as was happening in the Norman lands in southern Italy and Sicily, the Orthodox Church was being reduced to a largely monastic church.[8]

At Constantinople the exiled Orthodox patriarchs of Antioch and Jerusalem might, like John Oxites, patriarch of Antioch, be men of some influence.[9] The restoration of the Orthodox patriarchate to Antioch, at least, was one of the aims of Comnenian foreign policy. Manuel I Comnenus achieved this in 1166, when the Orthodox patriarch Athanasius III was allowed to return to the cathedral of St

Peter. His Latin rival was forced to leave the city of Antioch. He was to return in triumph four years later, when the cathedral collapsed in an earthquake and the Orthodox patriarch died of the injuries he sustained.[10] Until towards the end of Manuel I Comnenus's reign there are few signs of friction between Orthodox and Latin in the kingdom of Jerusalem. Manuel acted as the protector of the Orthodox community. Several Orthodox monasteries were the recipients of his generosity and he helped to finance the refurbishing of the Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem.[11] Defeat at Myriokephalon in 1176 weakened Manuel's commitment to the defence of the crusader states and prepared the way for that political realignment which would see Byzantium allied to Saladin. It would be the Orthodox community in Jerusalem that opened the gates of the city to Saladin in 1187.[12] The *Life* of Leontius, patriarch of Jerusalem (1176–84/5), illuminates the changing situation. It hardly needs to be emphasized that this is hagiography and is a matter as much of propaganda as of hard fact. In addition, the work was written on the eve of the fall of Constantinople to the crusaders by a monk of Patmos.[13] Leontius visited Jerusalem towards the end of Manuel I Comnenus's reign. He came in secret but his arrival coincided with the ending of a three-year drought, and the Orthodox hailed him as a miracle worker. The rumours to this effect that were circulating enraged the Latins. Their patriarch recruited assassins to dispatch Leontius, who was miraculously saved. The *Life* displays a certain animus against the Latins. Their faith is dismissed as mumbo-jumbo (*tethreia*).[14] Leontius received an invitation from Saladin to take up residence in Damascus, but he had politely to decline because the emperor Manuel had already recalled him. The approach from Saladin and his favourable treatment at the hands of a Byzantine hagiographer are reminders that the Orthodox had had high hopes that Saladin would return the Church of the Holy Sepulchre to their care.

An anti-Latin bias can also be detected in the writings of the canonist Theodore Balsamon after he had been made Orthodox patriarch of Antioch in 1185. He never, of course, left Constantinople. He had, however, to deal with a series of enquiries sent by his colleague, Mark, the Orthodox patriarch of Alexandria. Among other things he wanted to know if it was permissible to administer the sacraments to Latin prisoners of war in Egypt. Balsamon insisted that this was not possible until they had renounced their Latin errors.[15] He was an advocate of imperial authority in the Orthodox church, and was largely responsible for developing the notion of the emperor as the disciplinarian of the church. He introduced, however, one important qualification: in no circumstances could the emperor use his authority within the church to subordinate the Orthodox patriarch of Constantinople to the papacy,

for this would not only defy the traditions of Orthodoxy, but imperil its very existence.[16]

The true leader of anti-Latin opinion at Constantinople at this time was the former patriarch of Jerusalem, Dositheus. He was translated to the patriarchal throne of Constantinople, where he inspired opposition to the passage of the Third Crusade in 1189–90. He is portrayed by his enemy, the historian Nicetas Choniates, as a time-server.[17] His anti-Latin stance may conceivably be connected with shame at his Venetian parentage, but it is more likely to be a continuation of the anti-Latin views of Leontius, his predecessor as Orthodox patriarch of Jerusalem. There was a surge of anti-Latin feeling at Constantinople around the time of the Third Crusade, and it suited the direction of Byzantine foreign policy to exploit this. Its sources were various, but an important strand was supplied by the exiled Orthodox patriarchs of Antioch and Jerusalem, and it would be reinforced within a few years by the arrival in Constantinople of refugees from Cyprus, bringing with them authentic tales of Latin brutality. Exile provided a perspective that magnified the threat to Orthodoxy from the Latins. The exiled prelates only exercised intermittent influence on Byzantine relations with the West and the papacy, usually at moments of tension. They acted as a counterbalance to those within the Byzantine establishment who sought reconciliation at almost any price. This current of hostility to the West surfaced in the exchange between the patriarch John X Camaterus and Pope Innocent III on the eve of the Fourth Crusade. The patriarch's denunciation of Rome's claim to a primacy over the Church universal was as trenchant and cogent as any ever made.[18] Innocent III for his part charged that the Byzantines hated the crusaders more than dogs,[19] echoing accusations made at the time of the Third Crusade against the Patriarch Dositheus: he was supposed to have preached against the crusaders calling them dogs and urging their destruction.[20]

However sour relations had become between the pope and the patriarch they little contemplated that Byzantium would be overthrown by the action of a crusade. The Byzantine hierarchy was overwhelmed by the 'cosmic cataclysm' that submerged Constantinople.[21] The Byzantines were everywhere demoralized and inclined to come to terms with their conquerors, as advantageously as they could. Innocent III was well aware that a terrible crime had been perpetrated upon the Byzantines, but sought to salve his conscience by using persuasion to reconcile them to a *fait accompli*. A series of meetings between papal legates and representatives of the Orthodox clergy of Constantinople followed. One of the objectives was to get the Orthodox to recognize the new Latin patriarch of Constantinople,

Thomas Morosini. This they refused to do on the grounds that they still had their own patriarch, John Camaterus, even if he was now in exile among the Bulgarians. The papal legate Cardinal Benedict of Santa Susanna was exasperated. He accused the Orthodox spokesmen – monks of Constantinople in the absence of the hierarchy which had fled – of disobedience. They protested that this was scarcely fair, for they too could have fled from Constantinople. They could have sought refuge in exile with Theodore Lascaris at Nicaea or David Comnenus in Paphlagonia, or even with the Turks, but they had preferred to stay in Constantinople. They had done so because they thought this more pleasing to God; the Latins had been sent by God to chastise them for their sins, but not for their lack of faith. They took pleasure in the fact that each day they suffered at the hands of the Latins, for it meant that their sins were being wiped away. They had been deprived of almost everything, 'but one source of riches they still possessed, their Orthodox faith, which the Latins were not able to take from them.'[22] As long as its integrity could be guaranteed, the Greeks of Constantinople were willing to accept Latin rule. To that end, the Orthodox community in Constantinople tried to persuade Innocent III to allow the election of an Orthodox patriarch after the death of John Camaterus in 1206. Though they had the backing of the Latin emperor Henry of Hainault, they were unable to convince Innocent III. It was to be a delegation from the Greeks of Constantinople – disillusioned by papal obduracy – which persuaded the exiled Byzantine Emperor Theodore I Lascaris to have an Orthodox patriarch elected at Nicaea in March 1208.[23]

The period of uncertainty and demoralization was at an end. The sack of Constantinople and the Latin conquest were recognized as criminal acts. They were an affront to Orthodoxy, not a divinely instigated punishment for sins. The man who first articulated Orthodox indignation at the fall of Constantinople to the crusaders was the exiled metropolitan of Cyzicus, Constantine/Cyril Stilbes.[24] His griefs (*aitiamata*) against the Latin Church must have been compiled soon after the mission of the papal legate Cardinal Pelagius to Constantinople in 1213.[25] He included many of the old charges: the addition of the *filioque* to the creed and the Latin use of the azymes in the communion service, for instance. He attacked the papal notion of primacy, but in far more extravagant terms than had been the practice earlier. The Latins, he charged, did not consider the pope merely to be the successor of St Peter, but to be Peter in person, or perhaps more than Peter, since they came close to deifying the pope and proclaiming him lord of all Christendom. Still worse, they insisted that the Church universal recognize this deification.[26] Stilbes made no pretence of any

rational rebuttal of the ideas supporting papal primacy. It was a travesty and all the more appealing at that moment for Orthodox opinion. Stilbes paid relatively little attention to the matters of doctrine which separated the two churches, preferring to concentrate on differences of practice. He was perhaps the first Byzantine polemicist to denounce the Latin practice of granting indulgences: these meant that it was possible to pardon not only past sins and crimes, but those still to be committed. What Stilbes found especially ridiculous was the practice of granting absolution for specific periods of time down to a few days, whether in the past or the future. He doubted that the Latins could justify their use of indulgences even in terms of their own suspect ecclesiastical traditions.[27] Oaths had little meaning for the Latins because the pope was capable of releasing them not just from those that they had taken, but also from those they might take in the future.[28] The Latin Church was seen to connive at, even promote, Latin criminality and to encourage warfare, in which their priests and bishops indulged.[29] Prominent prelates were supposed to celebrate mass escorted by skimpily clad youths. These they would sprinkle with holy water and then send on their way. This ceremony turned them apparently into invincible warriors.[30] There seems to be an echo here of the Latin Church's involvement in the making of a knight. In the same way, crusading theory is caught in the charge that the Latins taught that those dying in battle went to paradise.[31] The western Church never sanctioned any such teaching, but it had strong popular support on the First Crusade. In other ways, too, Latin practice differed in important essentials from the Byzantine. The Latins did not venerate images;[32] they sat through church services;[33] the sanctuary was open for all to see and the laity, including sometimes women, had been known to congregate around the altar during services, chiming in as if they were in a lawcourt.[34] These are a few examples of the many that Stilbes cites. They were differences that were easy to grasp: they needed no grounding in theology or canon law, neither did an appreciation of the contempt that the Latins had for Greek practices. They made fun of the Greeks for the way they ate before taking communion.[35] They claimed that the Bogomils were the most pious of the Greeks, whom they disparaged as worse than Jews or Saracens:[36] petty insults, but ones that hurt.

Constantine Stilbes ended his catalogue of charges against the Latin Church with a series of indictments arising from the sack of Constantinople. He presented them in a way that confirmed his portrayal of the Latin faith as one perverted by its espousal and promotion of war. The crusaders had desecrated the churches of Constantinople and had profaned the cathedral of St Sophia; they

slaughtered Orthodox Christians in the churches where they had sought sanctuary; knights rode their horses into St Sophia; they burnt or trampled under foot the sacred images; their priests and bishops were supposed to have desecrated the holy images while celebrating the liturgy. A bishop holding aloft a cross was seen leading the crusader assault on the City. Stilbes catalogues in detail the excesses of the Latins, but for him the worst of it was that the prelates with the crusade made no effort to check them, but condoned them, where they did not positively encourage them.[37] He closes his pamphlet with a demonstration that the Latins were heretics, not just because of the addition of the *filioque* to the creed, but because their teachings matched those of a whole series of past heresies.[38]

This tract was symptomatic of the hardening of attitudes towards the Latins which occurred in exile. The war against the Latins received religious sanction from Michael Autorianus, the new patriarch at Nicaea. He remitted all the sins committed in this life by soldiers dying in battle for the defence of their country and the safety of God's people.[39] The recovery of Constantinople, the New Jerusalem, became the avowed aim of the empire established in exile at Nicaea. It was not only a matter of a return from exile, but also of the rescue of the Orthodox who had stayed behind in Constantinople and were left at the mercy of the heretical Latins. The condition of the Orthodox community in Constantinople was therefore of intense interest to the patriarchs at Nicaea. The perspective of exile helped to magnify the sufferings that it endured, but it also exaggerated the dangers it ran: individuals might succumb to Latin persecution or even persuasion and acknowledge the Catholic faith. This is evident in the encyclical which the patriarch Theodore Irenicus sent to the Greeks of Constantinople in the autumn of 1214. It was intended to strengthen them in the face of the pressure that the papal legate Cardinal Pelagius was putting on them to accept papal supremacy, and was also to remind them that the theological defence of Orthodoxy belonged not to them, but to the patriarch, even if he was in exile. This was backed up by the threat of excommunication for those submitting to the teaching of the Latin church.[40]

The patriarch Germanus II (1223–40) was equally concerned about the Orthodox community in Constantinople. He sent an encyclical announcing his elevation to the patriarchal throne and congratulating the Orthodox of Constantinople for remaining steadfast in their faith in the face of Latin oppression.[41] He was to intervene on behalf of some Greek priests who had been imprisoned on account of their faith by the Latin patriarch of Constantinople.[42] He wrote to the monastic community of St John of Petra applauding its opposition to the Latins, but

warning its members to be on their guard against the Latin heresy, which was insidious.[43] Not all were able to resist: a monk of the monastery of St Mamas, once ruled over by St Symeon the New Theologian, was induced to put his adhesion to Latin teachings in writing. The monk was thoroughly penitent and he was received back into the Orthodox communion after appropriate penance had been fixed by the patriarch. The monk had been seduced by the wiles of the Dominicans,[44] who had a house in Constantinople from shortly after 1228; there is evidence of Franciscans in the City as early as 1220.[45]

As we shall see, the friars injected a new element into the relations of the two churches, creating new tensions and holding out new possibilities. Time and again, representatives of the Orthodox Church would find themselves at loggerheads with the friars. Their activities heightened concern among the Orthodox about the safety from their depredations of the Orthodox under Latin rule, whether in Constantinople, Cyprus, or even southern Italy. During the twelfth century the Greek Church in southern Italy and Sicily slipped below the horizon of Byzantine concern. The Greeks submitted fairly happily to Norman rule, while their monasteries benefited from Norman generosity. Recognition of papal primacy did not seem a terrible burden and was not allowed to interfere with the celebration of the Orthodox faith.[46] All this ended with the collapse of Norman rule in 1194. The minority of Frederick II was a decisive factor, allowing Pope Innocent III to interfere directly in the affairs of the Sicilian Church. He was prepared to tolerate Greek rites only in so far as they coincided with Latin practice. He forbade any concessions to the Greeks if they could involve spiritual dangers: a rider which gave the Latin clergy *carte blanche* to interfere in the affairs of the Greek Church. The remnants of the Greek episcopate found itself under attack. Greek bishops were not to ordain Latin priests. The insistence that there could only be a single bishop for each diocese was one that favoured the replacement of the few remaining Greek bishops in southern Italy by Latins. While Innocent III's attack on the Greek Church was largely juridical, Pope Gregory IX (1227–41) questioned the validity of the Greek rite. There were doubts about the Greek sacrament of *teleiosis*, which combined elements of baptism and confirmation.[47] The Latin archbishop of Bari consulted the pope on the matter, with the result that in November 1231 Gregory IX expressed his opinion that it was invalid and that all Greeks would have to be rebaptized.

Baptism was always one test of the relationship of the two churches. As long as each recognized the validity of the other's rite of baptism, the essential community of faith could be upheld. The moment that the one or the other began demanding rebaptism that unity was thoroughly

compromised. The papal decision produced a vigorous protest on the part of the Greeks of southern Italy. On 20 February 1232, the archbishop of Bari was told to postpone the rebaptism of the Greeks so that they could defend their position. The Greek spokesman was Nicholas or Nectarius, abbot of the Greek monastery of Casole in the Terra d'Otranto. He knew the Byzantine world very well, having served the papal legate Cardinal Benedict of Santa Susanna as an interpreter during his mission to Constantinople in the years 1205–7. He acted in the same capacity for the papal legate Cardinal Pelagius in 1214–15, and may also have headed a mission sent by the Emperor Frederick II in the 1220s to a patriarchal synod that met at Nicaea. During his first visit to Constantinople he composed two treatises, one on the question of the procession of the Holy Ghost, the other on that of the azymes. Apparently based on disputations that took place between representatives of the Greek and Latin churches, he contrived to present the Orthodox point of view as sympathetically (and convincingly) as possible.[48]

Nicholas's two stays in Constantinople allowed him to make the acquaintance of various Byzantine churchmen, including George Bardanes, the future metropolitan of Corfu. Bardanes's correspondence with Nicholas is a major source for the latter's life and career.[49] Bardanes applauded his success in defending the Orthodox position over the *teleiosis*: 'He overcame the perverse errors of the heretics, giving judgment rather than being judged.'[50]

The fate of Orthodox in the heel of Italy, across the straits of Otranto from Corfu, was of immediate concern to Bardanes. The situation there confirmed the dangers that existed to the teachings and sacraments of Orthodoxy wherever its followers were subject to the jurisdiction of the Latin Church. In July 1235, soon after the death of Nicholas, Bardanes was sent on a secret mission to southern Italy by the Byzantine ruler of Thessalonica. He made his way to the monastery of Casole.[51] There it fell to him to debate with a Franciscan, Bartholomew by name, over the question of purgatory. This is the first recorded occasion on which the topic arose between representatives of the two churches. It was not on the agenda the previous year when papal delegates came to an Orthodox council which was held at Nymphaeum to discuss the possibility of a reunion of churches. In the debate over Purgatory Bardanes was closely questioned by the Franciscan about the fate of the souls of sinners after death. Bardanes did not think that sinners necessarily went straight to hell, but were likely to have a foretaste of the tortures to come. The Franciscan countered with the Latin teaching on purgatory. So new and strange was the idea to Bardanes that in his report he had to refer to Purgatory as '*Porgatorion*,

that is to say a place of cleansing'. In other words, he had to fall back on glossing the Latin term. He nevertheless recognized affinities between this new-fangled Latin teaching and Origenist heresy with its notions that Hell was not eternal and that even demons might eventually be released from their torments. The friar was not persuaded by the patristic texts that Bardanes assembled. Bardanes was sufficiently alarmed by this meeting to write to the patriarch of Nicaea, informing him of the Latin doctrine and inviting him to prepare a rebuttal.[52]

This encounter in the south of Italy would have alerted the patriarch Germanus II to the dangers facing Orthodoxy under Latin rule. It would also have fed a conviction that the Latins were intent on a pernicious innovation that spilled over into heresy. It could only have intensified the impression that he had already obtained from the experiences of the Cypriots under Latin rule. In some ways, the Orthodox Church in Cyprus was as distant from the mainstream of Byzantine ecclesiastical history as was the Greek Church in southern Italy. The autocephalous status of the Church of St Barnabas placed it outside the direct jurisdiction of the patriarch of Constantinople.[53] The election of a new archbishop of the island had only to be approved by the Byzantine emperor. The Latin occupation of the island compromised the old arrangements. When the old archbishop died (*circa* 1203) the Greek prelates of Cyprus sought the permission of the Lusignan king Aimery to proceed to a new election. This cannot have been entirely satisfactory, for in 1209 the new archbishop turned for confirmation of his election to the recently elected patriarch at Nicaea.[54] The Cypriot Church was thus the first Orthodox community to accord recognition of the new patriarch's claim to be the successor of the Orthodox patriarchs of Constantinople. This was a token of the determination of the Cypriots to remain in touch with the Byzantine Church, rather than to become dependent upon a Latin king and the Latin Church. It also allowed the patriarch at Nicaea to pose as the protector of the Cypriots in the face of Latin oppression.

The Nicaean connection was worrying to the Latin authorities in Cyprus and contributed to their decision taken in 1222 to wind up the Greek archbishopric and banish Archbishop Neophytus, leaving only a Latin archbishop with responsibility for both communities. The Cypriots dispatched a delegation to the patriarch at Nicaea to seek guidance about how far they should go in submitting to Latin demands. Should they promise obedience to the Latin archbishop and be prepared to take their cases to his court? At first, the patriarch and his synod thought in terms of acquiescing, invoking the notion of *oikonomia*: better to concede on externals than to jeopardize the very existence of the Orthodox community on the island. This was not to the liking of

those Greeks from Constantinople who were present. It seemed to them an abject surrender to Latin demands which ill-accorded with the patriarch's stirring words in the encyclical he had sent less than a year previously to the Greeks of Constantinople. Accordingly, the synod retracted its earlier decision and forbade any act of obedience to the Latin archbishop of Cyprus.[55] This episode provides a neat example of how the patriarchs at Nicaea might be bound by their professed concern for the fate of Orthodox communities under Latin rule.

As so often happens there were complications. On this occasion, it was the appearance of the exiled Archbishop Neophytus at Nicaea. He came to have his election confirmed by the Nicaean emperor John Vatatzes, thus reviving the traditional practice of his Church. Then, apparently with the blessing and good offices of the emperor, he was able to return to Cyprus. Before long Neophytus would be protesting against the patriarch's quite unprecedented interference in the affairs of the Cypriot Church.[56] In retaliation, the patriarch denounced those in Cyprus who were willing to submit to the Latin Church. Priests who professed obedience to Rome were to be hounded from their Churches.[57] His stand was justified by the Latin persecution of the Orthodox in Cyprus, which culminated in 1231 in the martyrdom of thirteen monks of the Kantariotissa monastery.[58] Patriarch Germanus II complained to Pope Gregory IX in 1232 about the martyrdom when he tried to intercede on behalf of the Cypriots.[59]

The monks may well have brought martyrdom upon themselves by their intransigence. The rights and wrongs of the matter are less important than how it was remembered in hagiography. The incident starts with a friar – almost certainly a Dominican[60] – who began to pressurize the Cypriots over the question of the use of azymes. The monks of Kantariotissa came forward to defend the Greek practice of using leavened bread in the communion service. They proposed a form of ordeal: consecrated bread and the Latin wafer were to be consigned to the flames to see which, if either, would come through unscathed. The friar disdained so primitive and irrational a test.[61] This was to be the start of a concerted campaign waged by the monks against the Latin use of azymes. The Latin Church on the island found it highly embarrassing and tried to ignore the situation until, exasperated beyond measure, the Latin authorities had the monks thrown into jail and eventually burnt at the stake outside Nicosia.[62] Archbishop Neophytus found himself in a false position. He rejected the patriarch's charge that he had connived at the martyrdom of the Kantariotissa monks,[63] but he had found their activities an embarrassment at a time when he was striving to come to terms with the Latin Church. He considered that they had brought their fate upon themselves. The fact remains that they

were the first Orthodox to suffer martyrdom at the hands of the Latins, living proof, one might almost say, of the latters' implacable hostility to Orthodoxy. It was also monks who led active opposition to the Latins, while the official hierarchy appeared in the compromising role of collaborators.

This illustrates the apparently contradictory forces that were at work among the Orthodox of Cyprus during the period of exile. There was bitter opposition to Latin domination, but there was also a willingness to compromise, which became more pronounced. The Cypriot Church was in the peculiar position of enjoying autocephalous status. It did not relish the interference of a patriarch resident in Nicaea. When Archbishop Neophytus died in 1251, the Orthodox bishops on the island turned to Rome, seeking permission to elect a successor. Why should they not safeguard the privileges of their Church by dependence upon the papacy instead of, as in the past, by deferring to the Byzantine emperor? Such a solution was all the more attractive because of the enlightened policy followed by Pope Innocent IV (1243–54) in his dealings with the eastern churches. It was unprecedented. He was the first pope to confront the Mongol threat and it concentrated his mind wonderfully. It was clear that persecution and repression had not reconciled the oriental churches to Rome, while the Latin empire of Constantinople was on its last legs. Innocent IV appointed Eudes de Châteauroux, Cardinal bishop of Tusculum, as his legate in the East. In his dealings with the Cypriots he was to be moved 'by the inner bowels of paternal charity.' Differences of custom and practice were to be treated with the greatest sympathy.[64] Innocent IV even pronounced on the question of Purgatory, which was a new issue separating the two churches. In his opinion, Greeks' views about the fate of a sinner's soul after death were not so very different from Latin teaching. All that the Orthodox had failed to do was to elaborate an appropriate terminology. He therefore insisted that for want of a proper Greek word they should use the term Purgatory, since the Greeks apparently believed 'that the souls of those who die after receiving penance but without having time to complete it, or who die without mortal sin but guilty of venial ones or minor faults, are purged after death and may be helped by the prayers of intercession of the Church.'[65]

The spirit of reconciliation did not survive Innocent IV's death. The Latin hierarchy in Cyprus protested about the latitude that was being allowed the Orthodox Church on the island. The possibility that it would be subject only to the papacy and no longer to the Latin archbishop was especially worrying. Pope Alexander IV bowed to the demands of the Latin authorities in Cyprus. His *Constitutio Cypria* of

1260 returned the Orthodox Church in Cyprus to its subordination to the Latin archbishop.[66]

In many ways, the history of the Orthodox Church in Cyprus during the period of exile is paralleled by that of the Orthodox patriarchate of Antioch. In 1206 Bohemund IV, the prince of Antioch, at loggerheads with the Latin patriarch, allowed the Orthodox to elect their own patriarch, Symeon III, and threw the Latin patriarch into jail. Symeon was soon to be sacrificed as part of the prince of Antioch's reconciliation with the Latin Church. Together with members of his clergy he made his way to Nicaea, where the patriarch pardoned him for any submission he may have made to Rome. He stayed on at Nicaea, where he was one of the leaders of anti-Latin opinion.[67] He was still there in 1236 when Bardanes wrote to him from Italy, commiserating with him and hoping that one day he might recover his throne. He was sorry that there was nothing that he could do to help.[68] At the same time Bardanes was in correspondence with Athanasius, the Orthodox patriarch of Jerusalem, who had recently returned to Jerusalem after visitng Nicaea. Bardanes had regretfully to decline his invitation to go on pilgrimage to Jerusalem. The picture the patriarch painted of the holy city was grim. It was no longer the capital of the tribes of Israel, but was desolate, overturned by outlandish peoples. He was set around *tum ab impiis hominibus tum ab irreligiosis*, by which he meant that he was isolated among Muslims and Latins.[69] The impression was of a suffering community. Athanasius was to be martyred on 24 August 1244 when the Khwarismians stormed the city. Once again, the fall of Jerusalem made its impact in the West. It contributed to Pope Innocent IV's determination to seek a reconciliation with the eastern churches. At Antioch, as in Cyprus, he contemplated the direct dependence of the Orthodox Church on the papacy. The Orthodox patriarch was allowed to return to the city, but again, as in Cyprus, this was not to the liking of the local Latin Church. After Innocent IV's death the rights of the Latin patriarch were restored and the Orthodox patriarch was driven out of Antioch. He was briefly reinstated in 1260 on the insistence of the Mongol leader Hulagu.[70]

The history of the Orthodox communities in Cyprus and the Holy Land during the period of exile points to that alternation, even coexistence, of contrasting currents of compromise and of enmity which were always a feature of the relations between the two churches. They were also to surface in the relations between the patriarchs at Nicaea and the papacy. This may seem surprising, given the Orthodox reaction to the sack of Constantinople and the Latin conquest; given, also, the way that the vantage point of exile heightened apprehension

about the nature of the Latin threat to Orthodoxy. It was clear that the Latins set out to undermine the organization of the Orthodox Church and called in question any of its teachings, rites, or practices that did not conform with those of the Latin Church. Resistance to Latin pressure produced persecution. The patriarchs in exile in Nicaea saw it as their duty both to protect those Orthodox living under Latin rule and to strengthen them in their faith. This might mean interceding with the papacy of the Latin authorities, which necessarily involved an element of compromise. The unwritten fear was that the patriarchs might not be able to exercise any effective control over the Orthodox under Latin rule and that the Orthodox Church would fragment, jeopardizing the integrity of Orthodoxy. Recourse to the papacy at least allowed the patriarchs at Nicaea to pose as the protectors of the Orthodox under Latin rule.

It was not entirely a matter of a return to an old pattern of relations. On the Latin side there was a new force which we have already seen at work – the friars. In the wake of their founder the Franciscans were operating in the East by the early 1220s and the Dominicans were not far behind. They made a point of learning Greek and acquainting themselves with Greek theology, so that they could use it and its inconsistencies against the Greeks. They were able to recruit from the mixed Greek and Latin population of Constantinople. Perhaps the most distinguished Dominican operating in the Greek lands was William of Moerbeke, who became Latin archbishhop of Corinth. He is best known as a translator of Aristotle from the Greek. His earliest surviving translation is of Alexander of Aphrodisias's commentaries on Aristotle's *Meterologica*. This he completed on 24 April 1260 at Nicaea – a testimony to the intellectual contacts there were during the period of exile between the Dominicans and Byzantine scholars.[71]

We have also seen how aggressively the friars operated among the Greeks. It was the Dominicans who persuaded the monk of St Mamas to subscribe to Latin teachings on the azymes.[72] Their weapons were those of persuasion: preaching, debate, and the use of reason. These were more powerful than the Greeks at first realized. The *Contra Errores Graecorum* compiled in 1252 by a Dominican of Constantinople is an impressive witness to their activities, especially if in its original form it was a bilingual text in both Greek and Latin.[73] At first glance it seems to be going over old ground: the defence of the addition of the *filioque* to the creed; the justification of the Latin use of azymes, and the upholding of papal *plenitudo potestatis*. But it did take account of Purgatory which was only just surfacing as an issue separating the two churches. The tract was so organized that it would have been easy to use for preaching and for debate. On a particular topic the

Greek arguments are set out and counter-arguments produced. There is little recourse to Latin theology and the Latin Fathers, because such an approach was not likely to convince their Greek opponents. Instead they put their case with the aid of the Greek Fathers of the Church, notably St Athanasius, St Cyril, St John Chrysostom, and the Cappadocian Fathers. It fitted with the Dominicans' conviction that the 'Modern Greeks', as they called them, had strayed from the Orthodoxy of their greatest teachers.[74] Obviously, the compiler knew Greek. He was capable of discussing the precise meaning of key Greek words,[75] and was building on the work of the Latin theologian Hugh Eteriano who had been retained by the Emperor Manuel I Comnenus.[76] As a result, he was well informed about the controversies of the twelfth century and could use against the Greeks the doubts and divisions these revealed. The Greeks might rebuke the Latin Church for allowing their priests to bear arms, but Eteriano had seen Greek priests do the same when he accompanied the emperor through Cappadocia and the Seljuk lands.[77] Parish churches had become redundant because private chapels were preferred, some so small that it was like celebrating the mass in bed.[78] The flight from the parish church was very much a concern of the Byzantine Church in the twelfth century, as was the way that confession seemed to be becoming a monopoly of the monks. This was echoed in the charge made by the Dominican that monks in the Orthodox Church had acquired the power of binding and loosing at the expense of the priesthood.[79] The Dominicans made it their business to know their opponents' weak points and were not averse to fabrication to strengthen their case. The most glaring example in the tract has to do with Theophylact, archbishop of Bulgaria, under Alexius I Comnenus; and incidentally rather liberal in his opinion of the Latins. The Dominican has him being sent by the patriarch Photius to Bulgaria, where he doctored the works of St John Chrysostom, cutting out anything favourable to the Latins or making additions that corrupted the meaning. He avowed that there were uncorrupted originals of Chrysostom's works to be found in the archives of Greek monasteries in Constantinople.[80]

The Dominican is usually very careful to give his sources, but when it came to the exposition of 1 Corinthians, iii, 15: 'But he himself shall be saved; yet so as by fire' – one of the key texts in the debate over Purgatory – he claimed that one unnamed Greek father had glossed the passage as follows: 'We believe that fire *kathartērion*, that is to say cleansing, in which the souls of the dead are assayed like gold in a furnace.'[81] It has to be assumed that his refusal to identify his source means that it should be treated with some suspicion. His treatment of the question of Purgatory nevertheless reveals a deep knowledge of the

Greek Church and its customs. In order to combat what he took – perhaps erroneously – to be official Orthodox teaching on the fate of the soul after death, that before the Day of Judgement neither do the good go to Paradise nor sinners to Hell, he cited the evidence of Byzantine wall-paintings and mosaics which he had seen. These showed 'angels of light escorting the souls of saints to heaven and the angels of Satan separating with a fair degree of force the souls of dead sinners from their bodies and bearing them away with them to Hell'.[82] He was also able to support his case by quoting from the Orthodox office for the dead: 'Ordain them in paradise, where the choirs of saints are.'[83]

Superficially, at least, such knowledge of the Orthodox faith gave an impression of sympathy and understanding. Taken to task by indignant representatives of the Orthodox Church for the sack of Constantinople, the friars expressed their sorrow, but disclaimed responsibility for the Latin Church, because the crusaders had been under ban of excommunication.[84] It changed almost nothing, but it was an admission that the Fourth Crusade was an unholy enterprise. It was made at the Council of Nymphaeum which met in 1234 and ought to have helped to ease negotiations taking place there over the reunion of churches. The papacy was represented by a delegation of four friars, two Dominicans and two Franciscans. The initial overtures had come from the patriarch at Nicaea. Two years previously a party of Franciscans travelling overland across Anatolia had been seized by the Turks and imprisoned. They were rescued thanks to the good offices of the Patriarch Germanus II. This was almost certainly the first time that the Orthodox at Nicaea had been exposed to the Franciscan spirit. The patriarch was impressed by their apostolic poverty and their humility, so unlike the usual run of Latins. There were long talks about the schism and the friars urged peace and reconciliation between the Greeks and Latins. They seemed to offer a new path to understanding between the churches.[85]

The delegation sent to the Council of Nymphaeum in 1234 was exceedingly well prepared. At least one of their number knew Greek. They brought with them a cartload of Greek manuscripts the better to present their case and were well versed in the writings of the Greek Fathers. The outcome was not as happy as all this seemed to augur. The Greeks at the council found that for all their piety and sympathy they were making the old case for reunion on papal terms and that they had no intention of making a single concession over the *filioque* or the azymes. They told the emperor John Vatatzes in no uncertain terms that 'the Lord Pope and the Roman Church would not abandon one *iota* of their faith.' The council broke up in confusion with the Greeks

calling after the hastily departing friars: 'It is you who are the heretics.'[86] The years that followed were a time of utter alienation between the two churches, but the Nicaean court did not lose all contact with the Franciscans. Elias of Cortona, master general of the order, was sent on a mission to the East by the emperor Frederick II, which included negotiating a truce between the Nicaeans and the Latin empire and may have been connected with the marriage of the Nicaean emperor John Vatatzes and Frederick's bastard daughter Constance of Lancia (1241/42).[87]

Vatatzes' alliance with Frederick II was beginning to wear thin by the late 1240s. The news that John of Parma had been elected master-general of the Franciscans in 1247 aroused the Nicaean emperor's interest. He apparently had a very high opinion of the new minister-general. Why this should have been remains mysterious. He may have met John of Parma at the time of Elias's mission, or he may simply have heard good reports of him from two Constantinopolitan Franciscans whom he chose to act as his intermediaries with the papacy. They were the lector Thomas and the half-Greek Salimbene, both of whom knew the Greek language well. They passed on to Pope Innocent IV both Vatatzes' desire for renewed negotiations over the reunion of churches and his insistence that these be conducted on the Latin side by John of Parma, under whose lead the pope duly dispatched a delegation. There was a meeting with the patriarch and representatives of the Orthodox Church at Nymphaeum. The emperor played a decisive role: in return for papal assurances that there would be no more help for the Latins of Constantinople, he was willing to offer recognition of papal *plenitudo potestatis* and a compromise on the question of the procession of the Holy Spirit. The meeting produced a series of proposals for more detailed discussion. Serious negotiations over a possible reunion of churches on these terms continued until 1254, when the architects of *entente*, John Vatatzes, the Patriarch Manuel II, and Pope Innocent IV all died within a few months of each other. The impetus was lost. On both sides more cautious counsels prevailed.[88]

These negotiations appeared to have come close to success. Michael VIII Palaeologus (1259–82) was to take them as a precedent and a justification for his unionist policy.[89] This was to bring great bitterness and leave the emperor nearly isolated, rejected by members of his family, hated by the monks who led the agitation against the union, and despised by the people. Does the experience of exile shed any light on Michael VIII's difficulties? Why had Manuel I Comnenus and John III Vatatzes been able to attempt much the same policy without arousing anything like comparable opposition? There was always some degree of tension between those who saw negotiations with the papacy over

the reunion of churches as part of Byzantium's diplomatic armoury and those who regarded them as a potential betrayal of Orthodoxy. The gap between these two positions widened significantly during the period of exile. The Byzantines now tasted Latin rule whether directly or 'in the agony of others.' There was increased hatred for the Latins and a new apprehension about the danger that the Latins posed to Orthodoxy. It was no longer an academic matter. Though the main theological differences continued to be aired, theology mattered less than practice, custom, and attitude. The patriarchal Church in exile took upon itself the responsibility of safeguarding Orthodoxy, but on the ground it was the monks that came forward as its staunchest defenders, laying the foundations for a political role that they had not exercised since the days of iconoclasm. There should have been no room for negotiations over the reunion of churches, no return to the diplomatic game. When Theodore I Lascaris tried diplomacy in 1220 he found that there was no support forthcoming from the Church and dropped it.[90] John Vatatzes was more successful, at least, at the end of his reign, but by then he had established his ascendancy over the Church. If there is little or no sign of opposition to his unionist proposals, the criticism provoked by his notorious liaison with the Marchesina – a lady-in-waiting of his Staufen bride – suggests that there were undercurrents of hostility.[91] In a sense, Vatatzes and his patriarchs had a cover and a justification for their negotiations with the papacy. The advent of the friars introduced a new element which it would take time for the Greeks to assess. They gave the illusion that the Roman Church was changing in ways that would permit the reunion of churches on terms that the Greeks could accept. It was an illusion, but one that hid the dangers which a unionist policy held for any emperor who followed that path.

POSTSCRIPT: THE ORTHODOX CHURCH IN GREECE DURING THE PERIOD OF EXILE

I have ignored the fate of the Orthodox in Greece after 1204.[92] This might seem to be a glaring gap: the problem is a lack of historical evidence. There are few signs either of unrest on the part of the Greeks or of Latin oppression. By and large the Greeks of the Peloponnese submitted voluntarily to Frankish rule on condition that they keep their property and their faith, demands respected by the Franks. The fact that the Villehardouin princes of Achaea were at loggerheads with the Latin Church and the papacy must also have eased understanding between the Greeks and Franks. Geoffrey II Villehardouin finally came to terms with the papacy in 1223. Some of the provisions of the agreement favoured the Greek Church. Churches and monasteries

were to retain their property, as it had existed at the time of the accession of Alexius I Comnenus. Monks and priests were to be of free status and not reduced to serfdom. Against this, the number of Greek priests per village was carefully limited in a way that must have meant that many priests lost their privileged position.[93]

The relative quiescence of the Greeks under the Frankish princes of the Morea does not mean that there were no contacts with the Orthodox Church at Nicaea. It is well known that from his exile on the island of Keos Michael Choniates, the archbishop of Athens, remained in touch with Nicaea, where his brother the historian Nicetas Choniates eventually found refuge. He received an invitation to go to Nicaea, but declined, preferring to minister as best he could to the needs of his flock. He nevertheless urged his favourite pupil George Bardanes to seek preferment at Nicaea, though nothing came of this.[94]

There were also contacts between the Nicaean patriarch and Monemvasia until it fell to the Franks in 1248. After the Frankish conquest a significant number of Monemvasiots left for Nicaean territory, where they established themselves at Pegai on the Sea of Marmara.[95] Perhaps the patriarch of Nicaea had been able to offer guidance to the Greeks of the Peloponnese before 1248, through the bishop of Monemvasia. Later tradition insisted that he stayed on after the Frankish conquest to minister to the needs of his flock, but that he was soon replaced by a Latin bishop.[96]

What evidence there is points to much stronger connections with the Orthodox Church in Epirus. A spectacular divorce case involving two of the archontic families of Monemvasia found its way to the court of Demetrius Chomatianus, the archbishop of Ochrida, in 1222. We learn among other things not only that there was an Orthodox bishop of Maina still operating, but also that Chomatianus's suffragan, the bishop of Pelagonia, was undertaking some sort of roving commission among the Orthodox of the Peloponnese.[97] Also involved in the Peloponnese was John Apocaucus, metropolitan of Naupactus. The situation of his see just across the Gulf of Corinth from Patras gave him an ideal opportunity to support the Greeks of the Peloponnese. Greek priests came across from Patras seeking his advice and encouragement. It was to him that the Orthodox bishop of Coron, Athanasius, turned with a series of queries about how to act under Latin domination. Coron and its sister city of Modon were under Venetian rule. The Venetians tolerated the continuing existence of Orthodox bishops, though they were not allowed to reside within the city walls. They served the needs not only of local Orthodox communities, but also ministered to the Orthodox of Crete.[98]

The apparent lack of interest shown by the Nicaean patriarchs in the

fate of the Greeks of the Peloponnese may thus be explained by the strong Epirot involvement. In the case of John Apocaucus this intensified his anti-Latin commitment. He warned a priest from Patras that 'none of the Holy Fathers accepts the religion or sacrifice of the Latins'.[99] Such a hard line was scarcely unexpected from a prelate who was horrified by the possibility that Greeks might be subject to the Latin holder of a *pronoia*.[100] Apocaucus was of course the most vociferous opponent of Theodore I Lascaris's plan to hold a unionist council in 1220.[101] It therefore comes as something of a surprise to find his colleague Demetrius Chomatianus adopting a much softer line on relations with the Latins. He was asked whether an Orthodox bishop, if invited, should enter a Latin church and partake of the sacraments. In his opinion this was quite permissible, for apart from the question of the *filioque* there were no serious differences of custom and teaching between the Greeks and the Latins. He then went on to consider the slightly different question raised by Theodore Balsamon as to whether an Orthodox priest should administer the sacraments to a Latin. He bitterly criticized Balsamon's refusal to allow this until the Latin had renounced his errors.[102] How are we to explain Chomatianus's liberal attitude towards the Latins, unique, as far as I know, in the period of exile? In his answer he refers to an Italy teeming with famous churches dedicated to apostles and martyrs, supreme among them being St Peter's at Rome. It is therefore conceivable that his answer was designed for some emissary, such as George Bardanes, sent on a mission to Italy. This remains a possibility, but Chomatianus justified his answer rather differently. He was following the example of Theophylact of Bulgaria's conciliatory attitude towards the Latins and their teachings. Theophylact was Chomatianus's most distinguished recent predecessor in the see of Ochrida.[103] Chomatianus therefore chose to be guided by him and the more liberal outlook prevailing on the eve of the First Crusade. This provides an insight into how attitudes to the Latins might be shaped. In this case, it was not just a matter of the weight of tradition, but also of present concerns, for Chomatianus was locked in a struggle with the patriarchs of Nicaea over the prerogatives of his see. It meant that its traditions and the standing of his predecessors were of paramount importance to him.[104]

NOTES

1. Nicetas Choniates, *Historia*, ed. I.A. Van Dieten (Berlin, 1975), p.594, ll. 75–8.
2. Cited by C.M. Brand, *Byzantium Confronts the West, 1180–1204* (Cambridge, MA, 1968), p.196.
3. Eustathios of Thessaloniki, *The Capture of Thessaloniki*, trans. J.R. Melville Jones, Byzantina Australiensia, 8 (Canberra, 1988), pp.130–33.
4. See C.L. Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria* (Cambridge, 1908), p.1013.
5. S. Runciman, *The Eastern Schism* (Oxford, 1955), pp.166–8.
6. Michael Choniates, *Ta sōzōmena*, ed. Sp. Lampros (Athens, 1879–80), Vol. 2, p.83.
7. Runciman, *Eastern Schism*, pp.140–44.
8. B. Hamilton, *The Latin Church in the Crusader States: The Secular Church* (London, 1980), pp.159–87.
9. *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité*, 8 (Paris, 1974), cols. 641–5.
10. Hamilton, *Latin Church*, pp.175–6.
11. S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, Vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1952), pp.391–2.
12. Ibid., pp.464–5; C.M. Brand, 'The Byzantines and Saladin, 1185–1192: Opponents of the Third Crusade', *Speculum*, 37 (1962), 167–81.
13. See *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité*, 9, Chs. 664–6.
14. I. Troitskij in *Pravoslavnij Palestinskij Sbornik*, 8, 2 (1889), p.xvii, l.31. William of Tyre, *Chronicon*, 2, ed. R.B.C. Huygens, Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio medievalis (Turnholt, 1986), p.993, may also be referring to the end of a drought when he records that Saladin's retreat after his defeat on 25 Nov. 1177 at the battle of Montgiscard, was miraculously accompanied by unseasonable rain and cold.
15. G.A. Rhalles and M. Potles, *Syntagma tōn theiōn kai hierōn kanōnōn*, Vol. 4 (Athens, 1854), p.460.
16. This is the argument of Runciman, *Eastern Schism*, pp.138–40.
17. Nicetas Choniates, ed. Van Dieten, pp.405–7; Brand, *Byzantium Confronts the West*, pp.100–101, 182–4.
18. A. Papadakis and A.M. Talbot, 'John X Camaterus Confronts Innocent III: An Unpublished Correspondence', *Byzantinoslavica*, 33 (1972), 33–41.
19. Ibid., p.28.
20. Brand, *Byzantium Confronts the West*, pp.182–3.
21. J. Darrouzès, 'Les discours d'Euthyme Tornikès (1200–1205)', *Revue des études byzantines*, 26 (1968), 82–3.
22. A. Heisenberg, 'Neue Quellen zur Geschichte des lateinischen Kaisertums und der Kirchenunion. I. Der Epitaphios des Nikolaos Mesarites auf seinen Bruder Johannes', *Sitzungsberichte der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, philos.-philol. und hist. Klasse, 1922, App. 5, p.62, ll. 28–9, repr. in A. Heisenberg, *Quellen und Studien zur spätbyzantinischen Geschichte* (London, 1973), No. 2. See, in general, D.M. Nicol, 'The Papal Scandal', *Studies in Church History*, 13 (1976), 141–67, especially 145–56; J. Gill, *Byzantium and the Papacy* (New Brunswick, 1979), pp.9–47.
23. For the negotiations between the two churches after 1204, see J.M. Hoeck and R.J. Loenertz, *Nikolaos-Nektarios von Otranto, abt von Casole. Beiträge zur Geschichte der ost-westlichen Beziehungen unter Innozenz III. und Friedrich II.* (Ettal, 1965), pp.30–54.
24. J. Darrouzès, 'Le mémoire de Constantin Stilbès contre les Latins', *Revue des études byzantines*, 21 (1963), pp.50–60.
25. Ibid., p.85, l. 403. Darrouzès (p. 57) regards this as an interpolation. Otherwise, it would mean, in his view, that the compilation took place too long after 1204 and the bitterness provoked by the events of that year would have had time to subside. I would submit that Pelagius's mission which caused trepidation in Orthodox circles in exile, was just the occasion for crystallizing Byzantine resentments against the Latins over the sack of Constantinople.
26. Ibid., p.72, *ll.* 182–6.

27. Ibid., p.69, *ll.* 133–42.
28. Ibid., p.62, *ll.* 14–20.
29. Ibid., pp.70–71.
30. Ibid., p.67, *ll.* 106–9.
31. Ibid., p.77, *ll.* 273–5.
32. Ibid., p.72, *ll.* 190–94.
33. Ibid., p.76, *ll.* 251–6.
34. Ibid., p.75, *ll.* 236–44.
35. Ibid., p.76, *ll.* 257–62.
36. Ibid., pp.76–7.
37. Ibid., pp.81–6.
38. Ibid., pp.86–91.
39. N. Oikonomidès, 'Cinq actes inédits du patriarche Michel Autōreianos', *Revue des études byzantines*, 25 (1967), 117–19; V. Laurent, *Les Regestes des actes du Patriarcat de Constantinople*, Vol. 1, fasc. 4; *Les Regestes de 1208 à 1309* (Paris, 1971), No. 1205.
40. A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, 'Theodōros Eirēnikos, patriarchēs oikoumenikos', *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 10 (1901), 187–92; Laurent, *Regestes*, No. 1219.
41. Sp. N. Lagopates, *Germanos ho b' patriarchēs Kōnstantinoupoleōs-Nikaias* (Tripolis, 1913), pp.350–53; Laurent, *Regestes*, No. 1233.
42. Laurent, *Regestes*, No. 1277.
43. J. Gill, 'An Unpublished Letter of Germanus, Patriarch of Constantinople', *Byzantion*, 44 (1974), 142–51, repr. in J. Gill, *Church Union: Rome and Byzantium (1204–1453)* (London, 1979), No. III.
44. Laurent, *Regestes*, No. 1287.
45. R.L. Wolff, 'The Latin Empire and the Franciscans', *Traditio*, 2 (1944), 213–37, repr. in R.L. Wolff, *Studies in the Latin Empire of Constantinople* (London, 1976), No. VII.
46. L.T. White Jr, *Latin Monasticism in Norman Sicily* (Cambridge, MA, 1938), pp.38–46; M. Scaduto, *Il monachismo basiliano nella Sicilia medievale* (Rome, 1947), *passim*.
47. P. Herde, 'Das Papsttum und die griechische Kirche in Süditalien vom ll. bis zum 13.Jh.', *Deutsches Archiv*, 26 (1970), 1–46.
48. Hoeck and Loenertz, *Nikolaos-Nektarios von Otranto*, pp.25–105.
49. Ibid., pp.116–25, 148–235.
50. Ibid., p.194, *ll.* 29–30.
51. Ibid., p.125. I have followed the dating of Hoeck and Loenertz for Bardanes's visit to southern Italy. An alternative date is 1231 (e.g. D.M. Nicol, *The Despotate of Epiros* [Oxford, 1957], pp.115–16). Cf. Gill, *Byzantium and the Papacy*, p.64 and n.63.
52. The text is in P. Roncaglia, *Georges Bardanès métropolite de Corfou et Barthélemy de l'ordre franciscain. Les discussions sur le Purgatoire (15 octobre-17 novembre 1231)* (Rome, 1953). See G. Dagron, 'La perception d'une différence: les débuts de la "Querelle du purgatoire"', *Actes du XV^e congrès international d'études byzantines, Athènes, 1976*, Vol. 4 (Athens, 1980), pp.84–92, repr. in G. Dagron, *La romanité chrétienne en Orient: héritage et mutations* (London, 1984), No. XIII; R. Ombres, 'Latins and Greeks in Debate over Purgatory, 1230–1439', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 35 (1984), 1–6; J. Le Goff, *The Birth of Purgatory* (Chicago, 1986), pp.280–83.
53. M.J. Angold, 'The Problem of the Unity of the Byzantine World after 1204: The Empire of Nicaea and Cyprus (1204–1261)', in *Praktika tou prōtou diethnous Kyprologikou Synedriou*, Vol. 2 (Nicosia, 1972), pp.1–6; J. Gill, 'The Tribulations of the Greek Church in Cyprus, 1196–c.1280', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 5 (1977), 73–93, repr. in J. Gill, *Church Union*, No. IV.
54. Laurent, *Regestes*, No. 1210; K. Khatzēpsaltēs, 'Hē Ekklēsia Kyprou kai to en Nikaia Oikoumenikon Patriarcheion archoumenou tou 13' aiōnos' *Kypriakai Spoudai*, 28 (1964), 141–4, 155–8; V. Laurent, 'La succession épiscopale des

derniers archevêques grecs de Chypre de Jean le Crétois (1152) à Germain Pésimandros (1260)', *Revue des études byzantines*, 7 (1949), 35–6.

55. K.N. Sathas, *Mesaiōnikē Bibliothēkē*, Vol. 2 (Venice, 1873), pp.5–14; Laurent, *Regestes*, No. 1234.
56. Sp. Lampros, 'Kypriaka kai alla eggrafa ek tou palatinou kōdikos 367 tēs bibliothēkēs tou Batikanou', *Neos Ellēnomnēmōn*, 14 (1917), No. 28, 41–3; Khatzēpsaltēs 'Scheseis tēs Kyprou pros to en Nikaia Byzantinon kratos ...', *Kypriakai Spoudai* 15 (1951), pp.75–82.
57. Sathas, *Mesaiōnikē Bibliothēkē*, Vol. 2, pp.14–19; Laurent, *Regestes*, No. 1250.
58. Sathas, *Mesaiōnikē Bibliothēkē*, Vol. 2, pp.20–39.
59. Ibid., pp.44, *ll.* 3–13; Laurent, *Regestes*, No. 1256.
60. His name was Andrew and he is described (Sathas, *Mesaiōnikē Bibliothēkē*, Vol. 2, p.25, *l.* 20) as *kēryx*, i.e. preacher and (ibid., p.30, *l.* 2) as *maistōr*.
61. Ibid., pp.26–7.
62. Ibid., pp.32–4.
63. Khatzēpsaltēs, 'Scheseis', pp.75–82.
64. See Gill 'The Tribulations of the Greek Church', 85–8.
65. Le Goff, *Birth of Purgatory*, pp.283–4.
66. J. Hackett, *A History of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus* (London, 1901), pp.114–23; Gill, 'The Tribulations of the Greek Church', 88–92.
67. C. Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord à l'époque des croisades et la principauté franque d'Antioche* (Paris, 1940), pp.678–87; Hamilton, *Latin Church*, pp.313–22.
68. Hoeck and Loenertz, *Nikolaos-Nektarios von Otranto*, pp.205–6.
69. Ibid., pp.220–23.
70. Hamilton, *Latin Church*, pp.322–5.
71. L. Minio-Paluello, *Opuscula. The Latin Aristotle* (Amsterdam, 1972), pp.57–62.
72. Laurent, *Regestes*, No. 1287.
73. Text in *Patrologiae graecae cursus completus* ..., ed. J.-P. Migne, 221 vols. (Paris, 1857–), Vol. 140, cols. 487–574. See R. Loenertz, 'Autour du traité de Fr. Barthélemy de Constantinople contre les Grecs', *Archivum fratrum praedicatorum*, 6 (1936), 361–71; A. Dondaine, '"Contra Graecos". Premiers écrits polémiques des Dominicains d'Orient', *Archivum fratrum praedicatorum*, 21 (1951), 320–446.
74. *Patrologiae graecae*, Vol. 140, col. 526 A-B.
75. Ibid., col. 493A, 517 A-B.
76. See Dondaine, 'Contra Graecos', pp.362–70.
77. *Patrologiae graecae*, Vol. 140, col. 545C.
78. Ibid., col. 547C.
79. Ibid., col. 548D.
80. Ibid., col. 527–8.
81. Ibid., col. 514D.
82. Ibid., col. 513B.
83. Ibid., col. 513D.
84. H. Golubovich, 'Disputatio Latinorum et Graecorum seu Relatio apocrisariorum Gregorii IX de gestis Nicaeae in Bithynia et Nymphaeae in Lydia 1234', *Archivum franciscanum historicum*, 12 (1919), 451–2.
85. Sathas, *Mesaiōnikē Bibliothēkē*, Vol. 2, pp.41–2; See Gill, *Byzantium and the Papacy*, pp.64–72.
86. Golubovich, 'Disputatio Latinorum et Graecorum', 462, 464; M. Roncaglia, *Les frères mineurs et l'Eglise grecque orthodoxe du XIII^e siècle* (Cairo, 1954), pp.29–84.
87. E. Lempp, *Frère Elie de Cortone. Etude biographique* (Paris, 1901), pp.146–7; J. Moorman, *A History of the Franciscan Order from its Origins to the Year 1517* (Oxford, 1968), p.102.
88. D. Stiernon, 'Le problème de l'union gréco-latine vu de Byzance. De Germain II à Joseph Ier (1232–73)', in *1274. Année charnière: Mutations et continuités* (Lyons and Paris, 1979), Colloques internationaux du CNRS, No. 558 (Paris, 1977),

pp.148–52; A. Franchi, *La svolta politico-ecclesiastica tra Roma e Bisanzio (1249–1254). La legazione di Giovanni da Parma. Il ruolo di Federico II* (Rome, 1981); Gill, *Byzantium and the Papacy*, pp.88–96.

89. George Pachymeres, *De Michaele et Andronico Palaeologis libri tredecim* (Bonn, 1835), Vol. 1, pp.366–7, 374–5.
90. This incident is only known from the writings of John Apocaucus, metropolitan of Naupactus (V. Vasilijevskij, 'Epirotica saeculi XIII. iz perepiski Ioanna Navpaktskago', *Vizantijskij Vremennik*, 3 (1896), 264–7; Laurent, *Regestes* No. 1224, 1230. Cf. D.M. Nicol, 'Despotate of Epiros', 86–7). He seems to have been the main spokesman against the use of a council for political purposes, but he appears to have had support at Nicaea (Cf. Laurent, *Regestes*, No. 1229).
91. See J.A. Munitiz, 'A "Wicked Woman" in the 13th Century', *Jahrbuch der österreichischen Byzantinistik*, 32/2 (1982), 529–37.
92. See M.S. Kordoses, *Southern Greece under the Franks (1204–1262). A Study of the Greek Population and the Orthodox Church under the Frankish Dominion* (Ioannina, 1987), pp.61–91.
93. A. Bon, *La Morée franque* (Paris, 1969), pp.89–102.
94. G. Stadtmüller, *Michael Choniates, Metropolit von Athen* (Rome, 1934), pp.184–212; Kordoses, *Southern Greece under the Franks*, pp.83–7.
95. H. Kalliga, 'Byzantine Monemvasia' Ph.D. thesis (London, 1987), p.174; P. Schreiner, 'Ein Prostagma Andronikos III für die Monemvasioten in Pegai (1328)', *Jahrbuch der österreichischen Byzantinistik*, 27 (1978), 205.
96. Sp. Lampros, 'Duo Anaphorai Metropolitou Monembasias pros ton Patriarchēn', *Neos Ellēnomnēmōn*, 12 (1915), p.290, *ll.* 8–26.
97. J.B. Pitra, *Analecta sacra et classica spicilegio solesmensi parata* (Rome, 1891), Vol. 7 (6), cols. 87–98.
98. Kordoses, *Southern Greece under the Franks*, p.89.
99. N. Bees, 'Unedierte Schriftstücke aus der Kanzlei des Johannes Apokaukos des Metropolitan von Naupaktos', *Byzantinische-neugriechische Jahrbücher*, 21 (1971–74; published in 1976), 112, *ll.* 15–16.
100. Ibid., p.132, *ll.* 66–68 (= A.I. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Noctes Petropolitanae* (Petrograd, 1913), p.278, *ll.* 13–15.
101. See n.90 above.
102. Runciman, *Eastern Schism*, pp.72–4, 138–40.
103. Pitra, *Analecta sacra et classica*, cols. 727–30. On Theophylact see recently D. Obolensky, *Six Byzantine Portraits* (Oxford, 1988), pp.34–82.
104. Nicol, *The Despotate of Epiros*, pp.76–99; A.D. Karpozilos, *The Ecclesiastical Controversy between the Kingdom of Nicaea and the Principality of Epiros (1217–1233)* (Thessalonica, 1973), especially pp.77–86, 92–3.

Between Romaniae: Thessaly and Epirus in the Later Middle Ages

PAUL MAGDALINO

This paper deals with that part of the Aegean world which, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, formed a halfway house between Greek and Latin Romania; between, that is, those areas of the European mainland where the Byzantine empire was effectively restored, and those where a rump of the Latin empire of Constantinople was able to survive. After 1204, the political regime that came to prevail in Epirus and Thessaly was not, as in southern Greece, one of crusader lordships, but that of a Byzantine successor state. This was the so-called despotate of Epirus, which in the second quarter of the thirteenth century enjoyed a brief spell of grandeur as the Empire of Thessalonica, and later, in *circa* 1267, split into two principalities. One, consisting mainly of Epirus, had its capital first at Arta and then at Ioannina. The other, with its capital first at Neopatras and then at Trikkala, was comprised of Thessaly, and, initially, much of the mountainous territory between the Gulf of Lamia and the Gulf of Corinth.[1]

In some important respects, the area under consideration never ceased to be part of the Byzantine world. Its rulers held Byzantine imperial titles and claimed descent from the Byzantine imperial families of Comnenus, Ducas, and Angelus. Its church hierarchy remained Greek and Orthodox, and, apart from a brief assertion of autonomy in the heady days of the Empire of Thessalonica, submitted to the jurisdiction of the ecumenical patriarch. Yet, unlike the regions to their north, Epirus and Thessaly were not fully reintegrated into a restored Byzantine empire, except for a period in the 1330s and 1340s which was too short and too late to have any lasting effect. The founders of the Despotate, Michael and Theodore Comnenoducas, were serious contenders for the Byzantine imperial inheritance. They and their descendants found it hard to be reconciled to the way in which the senior claim and the lion's share in this inheritance were taken by the Lascarid and Palaeologan emperors of Nicaea. Michael II of Epirus (c.1230– c.1267) and his sons Nicephorus and John (otherwise and hereafter known as John the Bastard) in principle acknowledged the unity of all Orthodox Romaioi, and the supreme authority of a single emperor. However, they were determined to yield as little as possible

of the independence and the territory which their family had won. The fall of Constantinople to Michael Palaeologus in 1261 made them all the more defensive of their power, which the former intended to destroy, together with other remaining legacies of the Fourth Crusade.[2] In this, Michael II and his sons naturally found it expedient to make common cause with their Latin neighbours who felt equally threatened or aggrieved by Palaeologan imperialism. They married off their daughters to a series of Latin princes, to whom they gave substantial dowries in return for military aid, and were even prepared, on occasion, to acknowledge the king of Naples as their overlord. To this extent, their regimes conformed more to the Latin than to the Greek model of Romania: but for the proximity of the Latins, they would almost certainly not have retained their independence. At the same time, this independence helped to ensure the continued survival of the Frankish baronies in Athens, Negroponte, the Morea, and the Ionian islands, which might well have fallen to Michael Palaeologus had he been in control of Epirus and Thessaly. The Greeks in these regions thus lived in a state of political symbiosis with Latin Christendom which was without parallel, at least during the thirteenth century. In no other part of the Aegean world did Latins and Greeks collaborate so closely on equal terms, or were Greek princely courts both so close and so open to Latin centres of power.

No survey of Greeks and Latins in the Aegean world after 1204 can therefore afford to ignore the position of Epirus and Thessaly as intermediary zones. Having said this, however, it must be admitted that the fruits of their mediation are disappointing. It is true that the marriage alliances which the Comnenoducas princes contracted with their Frankish neighbours produced a number of hybrid offspring, sometimes with momentous political consequences. In Epirus, notably, the connection which the despot Nicephorus I formed with the Orsini rulers of Cephalonia and Zante (Zacynthus) resulted in three Italian regimes: that of the brothers Nicholas and John Orsini (1318–35); that of Esau Buondelmonti (1384–1411), and that of the Tocco from 1411 to 1479. It is hard, however, to find evidence that this importation of Latin rulers and soldiers produced a truly hybrid culture. The western Greeks did not become more westernized than those of Constantinople and Thessalonica, where the web of dynastic and commercial ties with Italy woven by Palaeologan diplomacy eventually proved at least as binding as anything that existed in Epirus and Thessaly. These regions were precocious only in their degree of political separatism; culturally, they remained Byzantine provinces, and conservative and backward ones at that. They were hardly prominent in negotiations for Church union; indeed, in the aftermath

of the Council of Lyons (1274) they were active centres of opposition to Michael VIII's unionist policy. It is possible that they were more fertile ground for unofficial religious contacts. In 1298, the 'poor hermits of Celestine V', fleeing persecution by Pope Boniface VIII, spent two years in Thessaly. Here, it is suggested, they may have come across the Byzantine *Oracles of Leo the Wise*, the prophecies about Byzantine emperors which they were to transform into prophecies about popes, the *Vaticinia de summis pontificibus*. The leader of the group, Angelico da Clareno, appears to have learned Greek, and it may be significant that this fact is recorded in connection with translations of the *Ladder* of St John Climacus. The friars might even have given as well as taken: if there is anything in the idea of a connection between Joachism and Hesychasm, it is an intriguing thought that this visit may have planted some Spiritual Franciscan seeds in Byzantine monastic minds. Unfortunately, the connection cannot be proved.[3]

The church of the Paregoritissa at Arta, built by the despot Nicephorus I between 1294 and 1296, does show a blending of Greek and Italian traditions that is perhaps unique in the contemporary Byzantine world.[4] If more local court architecture had survived, we might have the impression that court culture was earlier and more heavily latinized here than in Constantinople. The literary sources, however, do not give such an impression. The only work of fiction which can definitely be ascribed to local princely patronage is the paraphrase of the *Iliad* which Constantine Hermoniacus dedicated to the despot John Orsini.[5] This poem is a work of pure Byzantine pedantry, and shows considerably less exposure to western courtly romance than the contemporary or slightly earlier *Kallimachos and Chrysorrhoe*, composed in Constantinople by a member of the imperial family.[6] Of course, it is possible that some of the other surviving late medieval romances were produced in northern Greece. It is tempting, for instance, to relate the *Achilleis* to the homeland of Achilles in southern Thessaly, and specifically to the court of Neopatras, where from 1267 to 1318 the local Comnenoducas princes ruled over a formidable warrior aristocracy, whom a contemporary Byzantine historian equated with 'the ancient Hellenes, whom Achilles led'.[7] But this can only be speculation.

It is true that in non-fiction, Ioannina produced two local chronicles which had no immediate precedent or parallel in the mainstream of Byzantine tradition: the prose *Chronicle of Ioannina*, covering the period 1341–99,[8] and the verse *Chronicle of the Tocco*, chronicling the success story of Carlo Tocco to 1429.[9] These works are closer in scope, language, and technique to the Greek chronicles written in the Peloponnese and Cyprus under Frankish rule than they are to Byzantine

histories of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The *Chronicle of the Tocco* is superficially comparable to the Greek version of the *Chronicle of Morea.*[10] Yet, in the comparison, important differences emerge. Although the Epirot text glorifies its Italian hero and the heroism of his Frankish entourage, it does not, like the *Chronicle of Morea*, denigrate the politically independent Romaioi, but proudly identifies with the Byzantine traditions of the Despotate. Like the *Chronicle of Ioannina*, it judges people according to how well they treat the Church, aristocracy, and people of Ioannina, and the Italians fare well in this respect mainly in comparison with the Serbs and the Albanians. The Byzantine emperor was, by the fifteenth century, a remote and ineffectual figure as far as most Epirots were concerned. It is all the more remarkable, then, that the moment at which Manuel II invests Carlo and Leonardo Tocco with the titles of despot and *megas konostaulos* respectively is one of the high points of the *Chronicle*. From this point, the Tocco brothers are always referred to by these, rather than by their previous titles of duke and count.[11] The poem is notable for its lack of non-Latin loan words, but the number of recent, as opposed to late Roman, Latinisms is not perhaps as great as one might expect. In the final analysis, therefore, what the *Chronicle of the Tocco* reflects is not so much the special role of Epirus as a centre of Latino-Greek acculturation, as the advanced political and regional fragmentation of the Byzantine world in the early fifteenth century.

The same point can be made with regard to political, administrative, and social institutions. The ease with which the Greek princes of Epirus and Thessaly fitted into the scheme of Latin Romania, and with which their Byzantine imperial titles of despot and *sebastokratōr* became the equivalent of feudal titles, carrying hereditary rights of territorial jurisdiction, should not lead us to assume direct western influence.[12] The whole process can be explained in terms of a natural, and perhaps long overdue, devolution of imperial power, in which the relationship between lordship, community, and territory was coming to be a regional closed circuit, defined at the local level rather than from the centre and the top. This was happening not only on the western fringe, but also at the heart, and in the far eastern part of the Byzantine world in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The emperor Andronicus II greatly overstated his case when he declared the kind of imperial appanage system advocated by his Latin wife to be a 'polyarchy' which had no place in the Byzantine tradition of monarchy.[13] If the symptoms of imperial decomposition – partition among heirs, concessions to magnates and towns – were more advanced in northern Greece than they were further east, this was largely inherent in factors which had nothing to do with the Latins: the physical geography of the area, the

loose dynastic structure of the original despotate of Epirus, and the frequency with which frontier areas, especially northern Epirus, changed political masters in the course of the period. Although the western Greek princes may have needed to look to their Latin neighbours for political help in maintaining their independence, they did not need to look outside the Byzantine tradition for their constitutional arrangements, whether in dealing with the emperor, with the Latins, or with their own subjects.

We can appreciate this by looking at the terminology of local institutions. On the one hand, it is clear that these institutions were capable of being described – both for and by Latins – in the language of western feudal government. Michael VIII's ambassador to the pope in 1278 characterized Nicephorus I of Epirus and John the Bastard of Thessaly as 'subjects, servants and bondsmen of the empire who have many times taken the oath of fealty and liege homage to my lord the emperor, swearing to obey his orders and injunctions, from whom they have received the dignities and offices to which they have been nominated.'[14] In 1294–95, the two sons of John the Bastard, together with their sister, the widowed duchess of Athens, submitted to Charles II of Naples. In the words of the letter which he issued to his procurators, 'it was revealed to my majesty that they, wishing to be subject to our majesty, are ready to hold from us and from our heirs the lands, castles, and fiefs (*bona feudalia*) which they hold in Romania.'[15] Charles instructed his procurators to receive 'from the said duchess and her brothers the oath of fealty, the liege homage, and the promise of service due from them, according to the use and custom of that region'.

In 1302–3, the succession in Thessaly passed to John II, the young son of one of these brothers. Because of his tender years, his father had nominated the boy's cousin, the duke of Athens, Guy II de la Roche, to act as regent until he came of age. According to the French *Chronicle of Morea*, the 'barons' of the principality sent an emissary to the duke to offer him the regency. They swore to have him 'pour seignor et gouverneour' until John attained manhood. He reciprocated by swearing to keep and maintain them 'en leurs franchises et raisons'. He appointed as his *maréchal* a Greek known as 'Vucomity'. Soon afterwards he had occasion to lead the Thessalians to war: in addition to 30,000 infantry, the *Chronicle* describes a force of 6,000 cavalry divided into 18 battalions which were led by 18 barons, 'tout grand seignor, gentilzhommes grec de grant affaire'. Truly a society of very perfect, gentle knights, far removed from the pusillanimous *Graeci* of western stereotype.[16]

On the other hand, to read the Greek documentary sources, whether of local or Constantinopolitan issue, is to enter a world of traditional

Byzantine bureaucratic and rhetorical usage, in which concepts like 'liege homage', 'fief', 'baron', 'gentilz hommes', find no echo. There is no mistaking the fact that we are in the later Middle Ages and in the provinces, but there is hardly any evidence that we are on the frontier with Latin Christendom. 'Vucomity' the *Maréchal* has become Boutomites the *kephalē*.[17] The only obvious Latin borrowing known to me is the mention, in two fourteenth-century charters, of a tax called the *preventa*, which seems to have been introduced by the Orsini despots.[18]

I am not saying that there was no Latin influence in Epirus and Thessaly, only that the evidence for it is not as extensive as one might expect from the precocious symbiosis which the local Greek lords enjoyed with their Latin neighbours. The symbiosis remained essentially on the level of dynastic politics. The story of these politics has been well and recently told, and there is no point in merely telling it again. The question of how Epirus and Thessaly fitted into the relationship between Greek and Latin Romania is better pursued by looking at their politics in relation to the underlying human map. The bare bones of this map are now available in the two relevant volumes of the *Tabula Imperii Byzantini*, and Anna Avramea's admirable study of Byzantine Thessaly before 1204 has done much to flesh out one half of the picture.[19] But the dynamics of the picture remain to be charted, especially in those parts where the very meagre sources shed little or no light; the *regional* history of Epirus and Thessaly in the Middle Ages, and especially after 1204, has yet to be written.

The rest of this article offers a modest contribution to the subject, by focusing attention on the Aegean side of the peninsula, that is on Thessaly. Conveniently, the region lends itself to separate discussion as a clearly defined geographical unit, a large lowland ringed by mountains. Moreover, from 1267 to the Ottoman conquest in 1393, much of it formed a distinct political unit. Having said that, Thessaly should not be discussed in isolation from its neighbouring regions, especially Epirus, which is why I have included Epirus in my title. It is important to begin by stressing the factors which unified, not only these two regions, but also the whole area west of the Vardar river that metropolitan Byzantines in the later Middle Ages termed 'the West' (and probably thought of as the 'Wild West').[20] In physical geography, the area belongs to a zone of transition between the continental interior and the Mediterranean fringe of the Balkans. Before 1204 it was very much a frontier zone between the Byzantines and the area of Slav, Vlach, and Albanian settlement that the former continued to call Bulgaria.[21] After 1204 the Latin occupation here was minimal and ephemeral, but the despotate of Epirus put down deep and tenacious

roots which the Lascarids and Palaeologi managed to eradicate only in northern Epirus and western Macedonia. After the division of the Despotate at the death of Michael II in 1267, there was close contact, and, on the whole, co-operation, between his successors at Arta and Neopatras. There were also, as we have already seen, close parallels in development. Both principalities suffered invasion by the Palaeologi; both cultivated the friendship of their Latin neighbours; and both paid for this by ceding fortresses and territories in the south of their dominions: the despot Nicephorus I of Epirus ceded Angelocastron, Vonitsa, Eulochos, and Naupactus to his son-in-law Philip of Taranto; the *sebastokratōr* John the Bastard of Thessaly ceded Siderokastron, Gravia, Zeitounion, and Gardiki to his son-in-law Guy II de la Roche. In the fourteenth century, both branches of the dynasty began to feel oppressed by their Latin connections. The oppression had different causes in each case: in Epirus, it came from the overbearing lordship of the Angevins of Naples, while in Thessaly it came from the aggression of the Catalan Company, both before and after they took over the duchy of Athens in 1311. But the result in each case was the same: a rapprochement with Constantinople.

In both Arta and Neopatras, the male line of Comnenoducas succession died out in 1318–19. At this point, Epirus and Thessaly went their separate political ways, especially with regard to the Latins. While the Orsini of Cephalonia gained control of the Despotate by peaceful negotiation, there was almost total hostility between the Catalans of Athens, who helped themselves to much of southern and eastern Thessaly, including Neopatras, and the Greek lords of the north and west. But from the 1330s, Epirus and Thessaly again became closely linked in their political fortunes. At the death in 1332 of Stephen Gabrielopoulos, the lord of north-western Thessaly, the despot John Orsini seized the fortresses he had held. In the following years, the emperor Andronicus III demanded and eventually received the submission of both Epirus and Thessaly. In this he was greatly assisted by the local connections of the man behind his throne, John Cantacuzenus. It is significant that in the civil war which followed Andronicus' death in 1341, the towns west of the Vardar unanimously sided with Cantacuzenus against the regency government of John V.[22] There followed six years of semi-autonomous rule under Cantacuzenus' cousin John Angelus (who came from Kastoria and was married to a woman descended from the Comnenoducas of Epirus).[23] The two provinces then fell, at roughly the same time, to the conquering armies of Stephen Dušan, the self-styled 'Emperor of the Serbs and Greeks'. For the next seven years, Epirus and Thessaly formed the southernmost limits of Dušan's vast and shaky Balkan empire. When this fell

apart at his death, they came under a succession of more or less mixed Greek and Serbian regimes, whose exact dynastic and ethnic composition is less important for our purposes than the fact that they effectively reunited Thessaly with what was left of the despotate of Epirus. The high point of this reunion was the creation, by Dušan's half Greek half-brother, Symeon Uroš Palaeologus (1359–71), of a local empire with its capital at Trikkala. Since 1318, Trikkala had taken the place of Catalan-occupied Neopatras as the administrative centre of Thessaly. Over the same period, the centre of gravity in Epirus had similarly shifted northwards from Arta to Ioannina. Despite the reversion of Thessaly to Byzantine sovereignty at some point between 1372 and 1381, Trikkala and Ioannina remained in close contact until the Turkish conquest of the former forced it into a different orientation.

The parallel rise and close association of Trikkala and Ioannina are only one example of the ways in which the regions of northern Greece transcended the mountain barriers between them. The same process can be seen in the similar links which evidently existed between Trikkala and Kastoria in the early fourteenth century.[24] In the same context, we may note that Neopatras was cut off by formidable mountain ranges from most of the territory of which it was the administrative capital before 1318, and that the metropolitan of Naupactus in the early thirteenth century looked to Thebes and to Euboea, rather than to Patras, to find an artist to redecorate his cathedral church.[25] We may also note that certain aristocratic family names turn up in different parts of the area, but rarely occur outside it: Taronas in Arta, Naupactus, Avlona, and Thessaly, all in the early thirteenth century;[26] Spinges and Drakontaetes in thirteenth-century Arta and in fourteenth-century Trikkala;[27] Zorianos in eastern Thessaly in the 1270s and in southern Epirus in the 1290s;[28] Signorinos in Epirus in the 1290s and northern Thessaly in the 1320s.[29] Finally, and I think most importantly, the unity of 'the West' is reflected in the presence of two non-Greek ethnic groups who were at home primarily in the mountains that divided the main areas of lowland settlement: the Vlachs and the Albanians. In the twelfth century, we hear of Vlachs robbing and killing in southern Thessaly; in the early thirteenth century, we find them abducting and raping in Epirus.[30] In the fourteenth century, the Albanians migrated all over northern Greece. Their impact seems to have been felt earlier in Thessaly, where they are attested in the 1320s, than in Epirus, where their main influx is recorded in the course and in the wake of the Serbian invasion twenty years later. But already in the early 1330s they ranged freely over the whole Pindus area from southern Epirus to western Macedonia, a fact well illustrated by

the way in which the traitor Syrgiannes Palaeologus escaped from Constantinople to Serbia in 1333. He went, says Cantacuzenus, by way of Euboea, Locris, and Acarnania, 'to the Albanians who dwell as autonomous nomads in the region of Thessaly, trusting in the old friendship which he had formed with them when he had been commander in the West'. They provided him with guides who took him to the court of Stephen Dušan.[31]

With these considerations in mind, let us now look at the map of Thessaly in 1204 that can be drawn on the basis of administrative documents. For ecclesiastical purposes, Thessaly was divided into the provinces of Larissa and Neopatras, of which the former was by far the more important, both because it had a much larger number of suffragans, and because it covered a much greater area, extending as far as Loidoriki near the Gulf of Corinth. It is interesting to note here that in the division of the despotate of Epirus in 1267, the portion claimed by John the Bastard corresponded exactly to the two ecclesiastical provinces, which suggests that the division followed ecclesiastical lines. It is also interesting to observe that most of the suffragan sees of the metropolis of Larissa were in eastern and central Thessaly. But on the whole, the episcopal lists which name the suffragan bishops of each metropolis are of doubtful and limited value for the historical geographer, of Thessaly as of any other part of the empire; they are difficult to date, it is hard to detect interpolations, new and ephemeral sees are not always registered, and, in general, the provincial organization of the Church was intensely conservative and always tended to reflect an ideal rather than an actual situation.[32]

Much more helpful for our purposes are two documents which itemize the secular administrative divisions of the empire at the time of the Fourth Crusade: Alexius III's chrysobull for Venice (1198), and the *Partitio Romaniae* of 1204, by which the conquerors of Constantinople divided up the empire among themselves. The sections which include Thessaly are given in the table at the end of this article.

The units which definitely belonged to Thessaly were the following: the provinces, or *themata*, of Larissa and Vlachia, the town and territory of Trikkala, the *episkepseis* or domains of Demetrias, Halmyros (or the two Halmyroi), Pharsala, Domokos, Vesaina, and Ravennica, and the *episkepsis* of Neopatras. On the northern edge of Thessaly, and possibly including parts of it, were the province of Servia and the *episkepsis* of Platamon. More difficult to locate is the *thema* of Velechative, which from its place in both lists seems to be in the south of the region.

What is immediately striking about the administrative map of Thessaly in 1204 is the large concentration of imperial domains –

a concentration unparalleled outside the Thracian hinterland of Constantinople. Equally striking is the location of these *episkepseis*, as well as the density of administrative centres, in eastern and central Thessaly: the eastern Thessalian highlands (Pelion and Ossa), the Pagasitic Gulf, the east Thessalian plain, and the central Thessalian highlands. The upper or western Thessalian plain, and the mountains to the west of it, correspond to only two, or at the most three, administrative units: Trikkala, the *thema* of Vlachia, and, possibly, the *thema* of Velechative. It is significant that of these units, only one, Trikkala, was named after a town, and one derived its name from a non-Greek people, the Vlachs, whom the sources before the thirteenth century characterize as mountain-based transhumants. The exact location of the *provincia Vlachie* is hard to determine,[33] but by a process of elimination, its centre must be sought somewhere in the largest gap left by the pin-pointing of the known centres of the other circumscriptions. In other words, it must be sought in the general area between Trikkala and Domokos. Such a location is confirmed indirectly by Cecaumenus, who indicates that the Vlachs' main winter pastures in the eleventh century were on either side of the Pleres (Bliouris) river, and more directly by Nicetas Choniates, who states that when Boniface of Montferrat occupied eastern Thessaly in 1204, a certain local magnate held 'the highland parts of Thessaly, which are now called Great Vlachia' – in the context the highlands in question are most likely to be the Pindus.[34] These considerations focus our attention on the *kastron* of Phanari, which was the most important medieval fortress on the western edge of the plain, and the nearby episcopal see of Kappoua or Kapouliana.

The impression of contrast between a densely settled and well-developed eastern Thessaly and a sparsely settled, underdeveloped western Thessaly is confirmed by other sources. We have already mentioned the distribution of episcopal sees. The distribution of buildings datable to the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and the accounts of al-Idrīsī and Benjamin of Tudela suggest the same pattern: a high concentration in the coastal areas; a modest sprinkling in the central highlands and the north and north-west, and a great gap in the west and south-west. As striking as the density is the quality of settlement in the east. The town of Halmyros on the Pagasitic Gulf emerged from obscurity in the course of the twelfth century to become a major port of call for Italian traders, second only to Constantinople itself; it is the remarkable phenomenon of a Byzantine town which owed its existence almost entirely to commerce.[35]

It is not hard to see why the east was the more developed part of Thessaly. Not only was it the more accessible from the sea and from

Thessalonica; its temperate climate and undulating relief made it much better suited to the cultivation of grain, vines, olives, and mulberries than the large west Thessalian plain, which, like other alluvial areas of the Balkans, was too badly drained to be capable of realizing its rich agricultural potential. There is no evidence that rice and cotton were cultivated locally before the Turkish period.[36] By that time, in any case, the regional balance between the two halves of Thessaly had been changed by the course of political events.

The Fourth Crusade immediately gave the contrast between eastern and western Thessaly a political dimension. The part of Thessaly occupied by Boniface of Montferrat and his vassals, and attested in the letters of Innocent III as being subject to both Latin barons and bishops in the early thirteenth century, corresponded to the *thema* of Larissa, the *episkepsis* of Neopatras, and the units collectively characterized in the *Partitio Romaniae* as the domains of the empress (*pertinentia imperatricis*). If, as Oikonomides has plausibly argued, the *Partitio* was drawn up on the basis of the fiscal records of the restored regime of Isaac II and his son Alexius IV, the empress in question would have been Isaac II's wife Maria, whom Boniface married after the conquest of Constantinople. In 1210, Maria, now widowed for the second time, was still in possession of a substantial part of the *pertinentia imperatricis* of 1204.[37]

Western Thessaly, meanwhile, does not seem to have suffered a Latin occupation. As we have seen, Vlachia was initially ruled by an independent local magnate, but before long, both Vlachia and Trikkala fell to the Comnenoducas of Epirus. In 1214 they reunited the whole of Thessaly under their control. Even under their dynastic regime, however, the division between eastern and western Thessaly briefly resurfaced in 1239–41, when Larissa, Demetrias, Pharsala, and Platamon all came under Manuel Comnenoducas, while western Thessaly remained loyal to his nephew Michael II of Arta.[38] The death of Michael II in *circa* 1267 led not only to the administrative separation of Thessaly from Epirus, but also to the administrative division of Thessaly itself into a western part, ruled by John the Bastard from Neopatras, and an eastern section, subject to the emperor Michael Palaeologus and governed by an imperial official entitled the *kephalē* of Great Vlachia. For the next 30 years, the Palaeologi retained control of Demetrias, and for part of that time, at least, they held Halmyros, Pharsala, and Tyrnavos (north of Larissa). In this they were undoubtedly aided by a local magnate family of imperial descent, the Maliasenoi, whose influence in the area of Mount Pelion is documented by the joint cartulary of the monasteries they founded at Makrinitissa and Nea Petra, in 1215 and 1272 respectively. From these

documents it emerges that both Michael II of Epirus and Michael VIII Palaeologus considered the Maliasenoi sufficiently important to form marriage alliances with them, and to grant extensive privileges to their family monasteries. The monasteries are in themselves significant as being the only major monastic foundations recorded in Thessaly between 1200 and 1280. They suggest that, during this period, the coastal areas continued to be the most developed part of the region.[39]

For twenty years or so from *circa* 1297, the whole of Thessaly seems to have been united under the Comnenoducas, apart from the coastal stronghold of Pteleon, which remained in imperial hands. The death of John II in 1318 led to much greater political fragmentation and the confusion that followed is fully described in two letters of 1325 and 1327 by the crusading propagandist Marino Sanudo Torsello.[40] The Catalans of Athens seized control of the south and south-east, including Pharsala and Domokos, but excluding Pteleon, which Andronicus II gave to Venice. The rest came under three Greek lords based in the western, northern and eastern highlands. There was Stephen Gabrielopoulos, who held Kastoria, Trikkala, Stagoi, Phanari, Damasis, and Elasson; there was a certain Signorinos, who seems to have been based in the Ossa-Olympus region; and there was a certain 'Missili' – probably a Maliasenos – who held Kastri and Lechonia. In 1325, Gabrielopoulos and Signorinos sided with the Byzantine emperor, while 'Missili' sided with the Catalans, whose marshal Odo de Novelles had received his daughter in marriage. By 1327, however, all three Greek magnates were united against the Catalans, and it is probable that Gabrielopoulos was the acknowledged leader of the three. At some point in his career the emperor gave him the exalted title of *sebastokratōr*, which suggests that he was regarded as the effective successor to the princes of Neopatras. It was the death of Gabrielopoulos in 1332 which prompted the outside intervention that led to the local restoration of Byzantine imperial rule. Once again, the pattern of this intervention shows the different orientations of eastern and western Thessaly. While the imperial governor of Thessalonica seized Lykostomion, Kastri, and Volos, the despot John Orsini of Epirus seized the strongholds formerly held by Gabrielopoulos, and only when the emperor appeared on the scene in person were these joined to the imperial enclave in the east.

The theme of contrast between eastern and western Thessaly could doubtless be pursued to the end of the fourteenth century if we had evidence for what was happening in the east. We know that Pharsala and Domokos, and possibly other Catalan possessions, were reintegrated with Byzantine Vlachia after 1342, and it is a reasonable guess

that the territorial situation thus established was inherited by all the subsequent Greek and Serbian regimes which succeeded each other in Trikkala. However, direct evidence for eastern Thessaly in this period is almost non-existent. John Cantacuzenus tells us that in 1350 he recovered Lykostomion and Kastri from the Serbs.[41] Antonius, Metropolitan of Larissa, wrote in the 1360s that he, like his predecessor Cyprian, had to reside in Trikkala, because, despite the good intentions of Andronicus III, Larissa remained unfortified and deserted.[42] An inscription, now lost, from the monastery of Hosios Lavrentios on Mount Pelion, apparently recorded that this was built in 1378 with funds provided by the emperor Alexius – namely Alexius III of Trebizond.[43] Beyond that, the history of the area from 1332 to 1393 is a total blank, compared with the history of western Thessaly, which is relatively well recorded in the archives of the Meteora monasteries and in the *Chronicle of Ioannina.*

This very fact is, however, eloquent of a major change that had occurred in the balance between eastern and western Thessaly. Whereas at the beginning of the thirteenth century, the eastern region had been the most developed, and the most Byzantine part of the area, by the end of the fourteenth century, the centre of gravity lay in the west, and was to remain there well into the Ottoman period. Trikkala had become the ecclesiastical as well as the political capital of Thessaly, and a cluster of new monastic foundations had appeared in the neighbourhood of Phanari and Stagoi. When and why did this reversal occur?

In general, the shift to the west can be explained as a defensive retreat to those parts of the region which were both less desired, and less easily controlled, by conquering outsiders – with the significant exceptions of the Serbs and the Turks. The west was quite simply that part of Thessaly which potentates operating from Constantinople, Thessalonica, and Athens did not find worth occupying. The moment when the balance tipped decisively is not hard to identify: it fell during the 'time of troubles' after 1318. This was the time when Trikkala took over from Neopatras as the political centre of Byzantine Thessaly; it was also the time when a vacancy in the bishopric of Trikkala allowed Cyprian, metropolitan of Larissa, to settle there in permanent exile.[44] Trikkala rose to prominence as a refuge from the insecurity of other centres. The same can be said of the Meteora monasteries, which ultimately owed their foundation to saintly refugees from Turkish raids on Mount Athos.[45]

The disruptive effects of invasion were probably less serious in western Thessaly than in the east, where the agricultural economy was more developed. In the early 1320s, according to Sanudo, local grain

production had still not recovered from the ravages of the Catalan Company over ten years earlier.[46]

Within this general framework of explanation, however, it is possible to trace the rise of western Thessaly to deeper and earlier roots. It is surely most significant that in the 1280s the Comnenoducas of Neopatras founded two sizeable monasteries on the edge of the Pindus. In 1283, John the Bastard founded the monastery of Porta Panagia equidistant from Trikkala and Phanari.[47] In 1289, his widow, the nun Hypomone, received from the emperor Andronicus II a chrysobull confirming the rights and possessions of a monastery which she had founded at Lykousada close to Phanari.[48] The area was clearly one where the couple had landed interests and spent time. It was also the area which, as we have seen, is most likely to have formed the centre of the original administrative circumscription of Vlachia: the river Pleres/Blioris, where the Vlachs wintered in Cecaumenus' day, emerges from the mountains exactly half-way between the two monasteries.

Here it becomes relevant to note a semantic shift in the meaning of the expression Vlachia or Megalē Vlachia. In the course of our period, this came to designate not just a part of Thessaly, but Thessaly as a whole. The usage was clearly established by 1267, when the imperial governor appointed to eastern Thessaly was called the *kephalē* of Great Vlachia.[49] Now if, by this time, Thessaly was becoming known by the name of its most backward, least urbanized, and least Byzantinized district, it is clear that the rise of western as compared with eastern Thessaly goes back much earlier than the fourteenth century, and must be traced not to the collapse of the Comnenoducas principality of Neopatras, but to the formation of that principality. This means that we must look closely at the nature of the power wielded by John the Bastard over the territories which formed his share of the Despotate at the death of his father Michael II. His authority, to some extent, derived from simply being a Comnenus, a Ducas, and an Angelus, and in being his father's son. But being the bastard son of a bastard father whose own father had been illegitimate, he could hardly count lineage as his strongest asset. The main source for his career, Pachymeres, makes it clear that he owed his position largely to his marriage. Pachymeres describes how he turned up for the battle of Pelagonia in 1259 at the head of a formidable army, which he had acquired by marrying the daughter of Taronas. In command of these *Megalovlachitai* – whom Pachymeres equates with the ancient Hellenes of Achilles – he had on one occasion managed to check the advance of three enemy commanders with vastly superior forces.[50]

Who was Taronas, who were the *Megalovlachitai*, and what were the ties that bound them to him and his son-in-law? There is nothing to

substantiate the general assumption that he was a Vlach chieftain: the word is *Megalovlachitai*, not *Vlachoi*, and learned Byzantines were aware of the Vlachs' Latin, as opposed to Hellenic, origins.[51] The other contexts in which the name Taronas occurs suggest that the family belonged to the provincial town aristocracy of northern Greece.[52] This suggestion is borne out by indications about the ancestry of John's wife which are given in the imperial chrysobull of 1289 for her monastery of Lykousada. Among the properties which she had made over to the monastery – and which she must have inherited from her parents – was land at Halmyros 'of the Taronátoi and Levachátoi'. The *Taronátoi* are quite clearly dependents of the Taronas family. By analogy, the *Levachátoi* must be dependents of another family from which she was descended, called either Levachás, Leváchēs, or Leváchos. If we adopt the last possibility, we are only a vowel short of the name Leováchos. The Leováchoi are known from earlier sources to have been one of the leading families of Thebes, the capital of the former Byzantine theme of Hellas which had included Thessaly. In one of these sources, a Theodore Leováchos appears as abbot of the monastery of Hosios Loukas, and in this connection it is worth noting that when John the Bastard's daughter Helen became duchess of Athens, the monastery was considered part of her dowry.[53]

All in all, Taronas looks less like a Vlach chieftain than a Greek local dynast of the type that sprang up all over the Byzantine world at the end of the twelfth century. It is indeed tempting to identify him, or a member of his family, with the anonymous toparch of Megalē Vlachia in 1204.[54] One may wonder, too, whether his role did not have old-established Byzantine administrative precedents, like the 'command of the Vlachs of Hellas' which Cecaumenus' grandfather had exercised in the early eleventh century, or the command of a *tagma* of Thessalian cavalry held by Alexander Kabasilas under Alexius I.[55]

However, none of this precludes the distinct possibility that the *Megalovlachitai* in question did include substantial numbers of Vlachs, and that Taronas was their lord in a personal capacity that had patriarchal and tribal, as well as patrimonial and quasi-feudal characteristics. The mention of Levach*atoi* and Taron*atoi* in fact strongly suggests something like a clan system. We may compare a passage in the *Chronicle of the Tocco*, where we are told that when the emperor Manuel II granted court titles to Carlo and Leonardo Tocco, he made them 'Cantacuzenati': effectively, members of the clan of Cantacuzenus. This may not be a true reflection of what happened, but it surely indicates the way people in the Byzantine 'Wild West' perceived political patronage.[56]

What can be safely assumed is that Taronas belonged to a local

aristocracy which, whatever its ancestry, was by the very nature of its wealth closely tied to the more or less pastoral peoples – whether Vlach, Greek, Slav, or Albanian – who lived on the mountainous margins of Byzantine society in northern Greece. This aristocracy would have owned much of the winter pasture, if not also the summer pasture, used by the pastoralists. They were also pastoralists themselves: livestock figure very prominently in late Byzantine descriptions of aristocratic wealth.[57] Either way, they were deeply involved in the transhumant rhythms of the economy of the Pindus area, and this enabled them to direct the loyalties and the predatory energies of the mountain-based communities whom Byzantine society otherwise shunned and feared.[58]

Taronas can therefore be seen as a type of 'link-man' between the government of the state and the least governable elements in local society. Such intermediaries were obviously important before 1204, and would have become even more important under the despotate of Epirus. Whereas, for the coastal-based Byzantine empire, the Pindus mountains were marginal, they were literally central to the existence of the Despotate between 1214 and 1267. The connections across the mountains which held the Despotate together, and which, as we have seen, continued to work even after it was divided, are explicable only in terms of a close and positive symbiosis between plain and mountain. In marrying his son John to the daughter of Taronas, Michael II of Epirus contributed decisively to this symbiosis, by directly involving the Comnenian nobility. John's case, however, was not entirely unique. By the mid-thirteenth century, branches of other families of Comnenian descent had put down roots in the Byzantine Wild West to an extent that makes them difficult to distinguish from the purely provincial aristocracy. The Palaeologi, in their efforts to dominate the area, relied very heavily on such families, and sought to draw them into the imperial court.[59] The result was that by the fourteenth century, the Palaeologan nobility included several figures with one foot in Constantinople and the other in northern Greece. John Cantacuzenus is only the most obvious example.

The rise of western Thessaly was thus, I suggest, part of a wider process in which the Byzantine society of northern Greece, under the long-term impact of the Fourth Crusade, progressively turned its face towards the mountains and their inhabitants. The problem with this thesis is that although it seems to work quite well for the thirteenth century and for the Vlachs, it does not work so well for the fourteenth century and the Albanians. The Albanian migration is described by Sanudo in his letter of 1325 as a major factor in the instability of Thessaly after 1318. He likens the Albanians to a plague that ravaged everything outside the fortified strongholds, so much so that the

Greeks and Catalans for a time united against them.[60] Here we would seem to have a classic case of a sedentary society on the defensive against intrusive, alien nomads.

The full story is, however, a complicated one, and we cannot hope to comprehend it without understanding the causes of the Albanian migrations, for which neither the sources nor modern discussions offer a satisfactory explanation. This is hardly the place in which to attempt such an explanation, but it is at least worth posing the problem, and suggesting where the solution may lie. A better solution is needed than the one put forward by Alain Ducellier, that the Albanians were sedentary folk forced into nomadism by the growth of aristocratic estates in their homeland.[61] We have to start from the fact that the Albanians first appear in history in the eleventh century, and then reappear in the thirteenth century, in the context of power struggles for the possession of the triangle between Durrazo, Ochrida, and Corfu. This area acquired extreme strategic significance in the late thirteenth century, when it became a frontier zone between four powers: the kingdom of Naples, the restored Byzantine empire, the declining but still influential despotate of Epirus, and the expanding kingdom of Serbia. Most importantly, this was the main point of confrontation between the Angevins and the Palaeologi. The situation was one in which the Albanians suddenly found themselves in great and unprecedented demand as allies and mercenaries. Rather than viewing them as a displaced people, it makes more sense to see them as expanding, increasingly able to impose themselves outside their original mountain habitat, and to demand improved terms of access to lowland society and its benefits.[62] It was, I suggest, an extension of some such process that brought them to Thessaly in the fourteenth century. One possibility is that they were recruited to fight in the wars involving the Catalans. Sanudo, in 1325, distinguished three groups of local Albanians: besides those who were acting by and for themselves, there were those who sided with the Greeks, and those who sided with the Catalans. It is also worth recalling that, according to Sanudo, Stephen Gabrielopoulos, the most senior of the Greek potentates, was lord of Kastoria – a city which lay half-way between Thessaly and the Albanon.[63]

What is certain is that every ruler of Thessaly from this point had Albanians in his service. By the 1330s, they were being given military holdings in the neighbourhood of Phanari.[64] In 1366 Symeon Uroš styled himself 'emperor of the Greeks and Serbs and of all Albania'.[65] By the time of Bayezid's conquest of Thessaly in 1393, the Albanians were so integral to the political establishment of Vlachia that two of their leaders, the so-called Epikernaioi Peter and John Sebastopoulos,

held Pharsala and Domokos.[66] The autonomous groups of Albanians were more of a problem. But in Thessaly, at least, a *modus vivendi* seems to have been worked out by 1341, when, so Cantacuzenus informs us, a mere warning from himself was enough to make them desist from raiding the local towns.[67] Things were admittedly worse in Epirus, where the Albanians of the Pindus were able to take over Arta and other towns after defeating the despot Nicephorus II in 1358 at the battle of Acheloos. But it is clear that Nicephorus could have avoided this confrontation if he had not put aside his wife Maria, the daughter of Cantacuzenus.[68] Nicephorus had, as it were, betrayed the honour of the Cantacuzenati, among whom the Albanians counted themselves. Cantacuzenus may have wishfully exaggerated their affection for himself and his daughter. He surely did not exaggerate the power of honour, family, and patronage to make or break the relationships that constituted 'Byzance malgré Byzance' in late medieval Epirus and Thessaly.

TABLE 1

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS OF THESSALY AND OUTLYING REGIONS, 1198–1204

Thessalian units in bold type.
Units of marginal or uncertain location in italics.

CHRYSOBULL OF 1198[a]	PARTITIO ROMANIAE[b]
Provincia Velechative.	Provintia Vardarii
Provincia Valachie.	Provintia Verie, cum chartularatis tam Dobrochubista quam et Sthlaniça.
Episkepsis Dimitriados.	Pertinentia Girocomion.
Duo Almeri.	Pertinentia Platamōnos.
Episkepsis Crevenicon et Fersalon.	Provintia Moliscu et Moglenon
Episkepsis Domocu et Vesenis.	Provintia Prilapi et Pelagonie cum Stano.
Chartularata Ezeros, Dobrochuysta et que sub ipsa sunt ville.	Provintia Prespe et Dodecanisos
Tricala.	**Orium Larisse et provintia Blachie, cum personalibus et et monasterialibus in eis existentibus.**
Provincia Larisse.	*Provintia Servion.*
Episkepsis Platamonos.	Provintia Castorie et provintia Deavoleos.
	Pertinentia imperatricis, scilicet Vessena, Fersala, Domocos, Revenica, Duó Almiri cum Demetriada.
	Pertinentia Neopatron.
	Provintia Velechative.
	Pertinentia Petrion videlicet[c] *Dipotamon, Talantum, Paçima et Radovisd‹i›um.*
	et Orium Athenarum cum pertinentia Megaron.

NOTES TO TABLE 1

(a) See G.L.Fr. Tafel and G.M. Thomas (eds.), *Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig* (Vienna, 1856–57), I, pp.265.

(b) A. Carile (ed.), 'Partitio Terrarum Imperii Romaniae', *Studi Veneziani*, 7 (1965), 125–305.

(c) The text published by Carile gives '+vicls+'. The resolution I propose is based on a different identification of the 'Pertinentia Petrion' from that previously proposed by scholars. Koder and Hild (p.236) follow Carile (p.286) and Avramea (p.179) in regarding this as a local toponym, which Avramea places in eastern Thessaly on the basis of a reference by John Tzetzes (*Chiliads*, ed. Leone, p.250) to a bishopric called Petra in the Pelion area. Quite apart from the fact that no such bishopric appears in any of the episcopal lists for the metropolis of Larissa, it is more plausible to see 'Petrion' as the genitive form of the name of the *owner* of the *pertinentia episkepseis*, namely the Constantinopolitan religious house known as *ta Petria* (genitive *tōn Petriōn*): cf. R. Janin, *La géographie ecclésiastique de l'empire byzantin, I. Le siège de Constantinople et le patriarcat oecuménique, 3: Les églises et les monastères*, 2nd edn. (Paris, 1969), pp. 127ff, 397 (see also N. Oikonomides, 'L'évolution de l'organisation administrative de l'empire byzantin au XI^{e} siècle (1025–1118)' *Travaux et mémoires*, 6 [1976], p.139); cf. also, by analogy, the *Pertinentia Girocomion* (gērokomeîa=old-age homes) and the *Pertinentia imperatricis*. It follows from this identification that the places listed under the 'domains of tá Petría' need not necessarily be sought in Thessaly; two of them (Dipotamon and Talantum, or Atalante) were definitely to the south-east, on the coast of Phocis.

NOTES

1. See in general, and for all historical information not noted below, the following: D.M. Nicol, *The Despotate of Epiros* (Oxford, 1957); id., *The Despotate of Epiros, 1267–1479* (Cambridge, 1984) (hereafter Nicol, *Despotate* 2); B. Ferjančič, *Tesalija u XIII i XIV veku* (Belgrade, 1974). This article is based largely on my own unpublished Oxford D. Phil. thesis: 'The History of Thessaly, 1266–1393' (1975).
2. The ideology of imperial restoration under the Palaeologoi deserves more systematic study than it has received. For Thessaly and Epirus, the sources are F. Miklosich and J. Müller, *Acta et diplomata graeca medii aevi sacra et profana* (Vienna, 1860–90) (hereafter MM), Vol. 4, p.346; Vol. 5, pp.254–5; George Pachymeres, ed. A. Failler, trans. V. Laurent, *Relations historiques*, Vol. 1 (Paris, 1984), p.275; Ioannes Cantacuzenus, *Historiarum libri IV*, ed. L. Schopen, Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae, Vol. 1 (Bonn, 1828), pp.520–21.
3. See H. Denifle and F. Ehrle, *Archiv für Literatur und Kulturgeschichte des Mittelalters* (Berlin and Freiburg im Breisgau, 1885–1900; repr. Graz, 1955–56), Vol. 1, pp.527–8; Vol. 2, pp.312, 317. Cf. D.L. Douie, *The Nature and the Effect of the Heresy of the Fraticelli* (Manchester, 1932), p.58, n.1; P. Alexander, 'The Diffusion of Byzantine Apocalypses in the Medieval West and the Beginnings of Joachimism', in *Prophecy and Millenarianism: Essays in Honour of Marjorie Reeves*, ed. A. Williams (London, 1980), pp.79–80; L. Clucas, 'Eschatological Theory in Byzantine Hesychasm: A Parallel to Joachim da Fiore', *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 70 (1977), 324–46, especially 340ff.
4. A.K. Orlandos, *Hē Parēgoritissa tēs Artas* (Athens, 1963); D.M. Nicol, 'Thomas Despot of Epiros and the Foundation Date of the Paregoritissa at Arta', *Byzantina*, 13 (1985) (*Dorēmēa ston I. Karayannopoulo*), 753–8.
5. H.-G. Beck, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Volksliteratur* (Munich, 1971), pp.167–9.

FIGURE 1
THESSALY IN THE THIRTEENTH AND FOURTEENTH CENTURIES

6. Ibid., p.124.
7. Ibid., pp.129–32; cf. Pachymeres, ed. Failler, I, pp.117, 119.
8. L.I. Vranouses (ed.), 'To Chronikon tōn Ioanninōn kat' anekdoton epitomēn', *Epetēris tou Mesaionikou Archeiou*, 12 (1962), 57–115; cf. Nicol, *Despotate* 2, p.131, n.32.
9. G. Schirò (ed.), *Cronaca dei Tocco di Cefalonia di anonimo* (Rome, 1975); cf. Nicol, *Despotate* 2, p.165.
10. Beck, *Byzantinische Volksliteratur*, pp.157–60.
11. Schirò (ed.), *Cronaca dei Tocco*, ll. 2108–78.
12. B. Ferjančič, *Despoti u Vizantiji i južnoslovenskim zemljama* (Belgrade, 1960); id., 'Sevastokratori u Vizantiji', *Zbornik radova vizantološkog instituta*, 11 (1968), 141–92.
13. Nicephorus Gregoras, *Byzantina historia*, ed. L. Schopen, Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae (Bonn, 1829), Vol. 1, 233–5.
14. R.-J. Loenertz, 'Mémoire d'Ogier, protonotaire, pour Marco et Marchetto nonces de Michel VIII Paléologue auprès du pape Nicolas III. 1278, printemps-été', *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, 31 (1965), 392, repr. in id., *Byzantina et franco-graeca* (Rome, 1970).
15. Ch. Perrat and J. Longnon, *Actes relatifs à la Principauté de Morée, 1289–1300*, Bibliothèque Nationale, Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de France, Vol. 6 (Paris, 1967), pp.136–7.
16. Ed. J. Longnon, *Livre de la Conqueste de la Princée de l'Amorée. Chronique de Morée (1204–1305)* (Paris, 1911), pp.347–8, 354–5; cf. D.M. Nicol, 'The End of the *Livre de la Conqueste:* A Chronological Note', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 12 (1987), 211–20.
17. N.A. Bees, 'Serbika kai Byzantiaka grammata Meteōrōn', *Byzantis*, 2 (1911), 65.
18. G. Ostrogorsky, 'Das Chrysobull des Despoten Johannes Orsini für das Kloster von Lykousada', *Zbornik Radova*, 11 (1968), 213.
19. J. Koder and F. Hild, *Hellas und Thessalia*, Tabula Imperii Byzantini, Vol. 1 (Vienna, 1976); the parts of the topographical gazetteer relevant to Thessaly have been published in a Greek translation by G. Paraskeuas, with supplements by K. Spanos and D. Agraphiotes, 'Hē Byzantinē Thessalia', *Thessaliko Hēmerologio*, 12 [Larissa, 1987], 111–12); P. Soustal and J. Koder, *Nikopolis und Kephallēnia*, Tabula Imperii Byzantini, Vol. 3 (Vienna, 1981); A.P. Avramea, *Hē Byzantinē Thessalia mechri tou 1204* (Athens, 1974). These works should be consulted for all topographical information and historico-geographical discussion for which further reference is not given below.
20. Nicol, *Despotate* 2, p.220.
21. Guillaume de Tyre, *Chronique*, 2.4, ed. R.B.C. Huygens, Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio medievalis, Vol. 63A (Turnhout, 1986), p.166; John Tzetzes, *Chiliads*, ed. P.A.M. Leone (Naples, 1968), No. 10, *ll.* 185ff.
22. Cantacuzenus, Vol. 2, p.297.
23. *Prosopographisches Lexicon der Palaiologenzeit*, ed. E. Trapp, *et al.*, Vol. 1/1 (Vienna, 1976), No. 204.
24. John II of Neopatras and Stephen Gabrielopoulos were lords of Kastoria in 1318 and 1325 respectively: *Acta Albaniae Veneta saeculorum XIV et XV*, ed. J. Valentini, Vol. 1/1 (Palermo, 1967), pp.12–13; G.L.Fr. Tafel and G.M. Thomas, *Urkunden zur älteren Handels-und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig*, (hereafter T Th) (Vienna, 1856–57), Vol. 1, p.499.
25. N.A. Bees, 'Unedierte Schriftstücke aus der Kanzlei des Johannes Apokaukos des Metropoliten von Naupaktos', in E. Vei-Seferli, 'Aus dem Nachlass von N.A. Bees', *Byzantinisch-neugriechische Jahrbücher*, 21 (1975), 115, 153 (separate pagination).
26. Ibid., pp.58–9; S. Petrides (ed.), 'Jean Apokaukos. Lettres et autres inédits', *Izvestija Russkago Arkheologicheskago Instituta v Konstantinopole*, 14 (1907), 32; A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, 'Synodika grammata Iōannou tou Apokaukou', *Byzantis*, 1 (1909), 28; Demetrios Chomatenos, ed. J.B. Pitra, *Analecta sacra et*

classica, Vol. 7 (Paris and Rome, 1891), cols. 343–4.

27. Papadopoulous-Kerameus, 'Synodika grammata Iōannou tou Apokaukou', 1, 10ff, 28–30; Bees, 'Serbika kai Byzantika grammata Meteōrōn', 66–7, 83.
28. *Prosopographisches Lexicon der Palaiologenzeit*, Vol. 1/3 (Vienna, 1978), Nos. 6665–6.
29. Perrat and Longnon, *Actes relatifs à la Principauté de Morée*, pp.103–4; T Th, Vol. 1, p.499; A. Cerlini, 'Nuove lettere di Marin Sanudo il Vecchio', *La Bibliofilia*, 42 (1940), 350.
30. *The Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela*, ed. and trans. M.N. Adler (London, 1907), p.11; John Apocaucus, ed. Bees and Seferli-Vei (see n.25 above), pp.60–62. Cf. P.S. Nasturel, 'Les Valaques balcaniques aux X^{e}-XIII^{e} siècles', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 7 (1979), 89–112; T.J. Winnifrith, *The Vlachs: The History of a Balkan People* (London, 1987). See also the reference to the 'terrible and outlandish barbarians inhabiting the rough and precipitous parts of Hellas', who until the governorship of Alexius Contostephanus (c. 1160) were 'footpads and bandits and hostile to the tax officials': funeral oration by Euthymius Malakes, ed. A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Noctes Petropolitanae* (St Petersburg, 1913; repr. Leipzig, 1976), p.145.
31. Cantacuzenus, Vol. 2, p.450. On the Albanian migrations in Greece, the most useful general survey is still K. Mpirēs, *Arvanites. Hoi Dōrieis tou neōterou Hellenismou. Historia tōn Hellēnōn Arvanitōn* (Athens, 1960).
32. See in general, J. Darrouzès, *Notitiae Episcopatuum Ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae* (Paris, 1981); id., 'Sur les variations numériques des évêchés byzantins', *Revue des études byzantines*, 44 (1986), 6–44.
33. G.C. Soulis, 'Vlachia-Megalē Vlachia-hē en Helladi Vlachia. Symbolē eis tēn historikēn gēographian tēs mesaiōnikēs Thessalias', *Geras A. Kerampoullou* (Athens, 1953), pp.489–97; id., 'The Thessalian Vlachia', *Zbornik radova*, 8 (1963), 271–3.
34. Cecaumenus, *Sovety i rasskazy Kekavmena* (Counsels and Tales of Kekaumenos), ed. G. Litavrin (Moscow, 1972), p.260 and cf. p.533; Niketas Choniates, *Historia*, ed. J.L. Van Dieten (Berlin and New York, 1975), p.637.
35. Avramea, *Hē Byzantinē Thessalia mechri tou 1204*, pp.166ff; N. Nikonanos, *Byzantinoi naoi tēs Thessalias* (Athens, 1979); G. Hourmouziadis *et al.*, *Magnesia* (Athens, 1982), pp.132ff. The only monastic foundation in western Thessaly which can be reliably dated before 1204 is that of Vitouma (1161): A. Avramea and D. Feissel, 'Inventaires en vue d'un recueil des inscriptions historiques de Byzance, IV. Inscriptions de Thessalie (à l'exception des Météores)', *Travaux et mémoires*, 10 (1987), No. 16, pp.372–4.
36. See, in general, R.I. Lawless, 'The Economy and Landscapes of Thessaly during Ottoman Rule', *An Historical Geography of the Balkans*, ed. F.W. Carter (London, 1977), pp.501–33. For the first mention of cotton production, see N. Beldiceanu and P.S. Nasturel, 'La Thessalie entre 1454/5 et 1506', *Byzantion*, 53 (1983), 104–56.
37. Letter of Innocent III, J.-P. Migne (ed.), *Patrologiae Latinae cursus completus ...* 161 vols. (Paris, 1857–), Vol. 206, col. 226; MM, Vol. 4, p.346; Ferjančič, *Tesalija*, pp.11–33; N. Oikonomides, 'La décomposition de l'empire byzantin à la veille de 1204 et les origines de l'empire de Nicée: à propos de la *Partitio Romaniae*', *XV^{e} congrès international d'études byzantines. Rapports et co-rapports*, I/1 (Athens, 1976), pp.1–28.
38. George Acropolites, *Opera*, ed. A. Heisenberg (Leipzig, 1903), Vol. 1, p.62.
39. Text: MM, Vol. 4, pp.330–430; for imperial control of Pharsala, see Pachymeres, ed. Failler, p.527.
40. For the 1325 letter, see Marino Sanudo Torsello, *Secreta fidelium crucis*, lib. 2, p.4, cap. 13, ed. J. Bongars, *Gesta Dei per Francos, sive orientalium expeditionum historia, 1095–1420* (Hanoviae, 1611), 2, p.68; and, more accessibly, in T Th, Vol. 1, pp.495–501; for the 1327 letter, see Cerlini, 'Nuove lettere', pp.349–54; cf. D. Jacoby, 'Catalans, Turcs et Vénitiens en Romanie (1305–1332): un nouveau

témoignage de Marino Sanudo Torsello', *Studi medievali*, 3rd ser., 15 (1974), 217–61.

41. Cantacuzenus, Vol. 3, p.129.
42. Oxford, Christ Church, Greek MS, No. 66, fol. 302.
43. Avramea and Feissel, 'Inscriptions de Thessalie', No. 25, pp.385–6.
44. Antonios of Larissa, ms. cit., fols. 299–302; see also H. Hunger and O. Kresten, *Das Register des Patriarcats von Konstantinopel, I: Edition und Übersetzung aus den Jahren 1315–1331* (Vienna, 1981), Nos. 54, 60, pp.354–7, 378ff.
45. See the *Life of Athanasios of the Meteora*, ed. N.A. Bees, *Byzantis*, Vol. 1 (1909), pp.208–60; D.M. Nicol, *Meteora: The Rock Monasteries of Thessaly* (London, 1963), pp.88ff. Athanasius had already been a refugee from the Catalan conquest of Neopatras.
46. T Th, Vol. 1, p.501.
47. Avramea and Feissel, 'Inscriptions de Thessalie', No. 21, pp.380–81.
48. MM, Vol. 5, pp.253–6; cf. A. Carile and G. Cavallo, 'L'inedito crisobollo di Andronico III Paleologo per il monastero di Licusada', *Atti della Accademia delle Scienze dell'Istituto di Bologna, Classe di Scienze Morali*, Anno 69o, *Rendiconti*, 63 (1974–75), 81–126.
49. MM, Vol. 4, p.420.
50. Pachymeres, ed. Failler, 1, pp.117, 119.
51. Cf. Nasturel, 'Les Valaques balcaniques', 94ff.
52. See n.26 above.
53. MM, Vol. 5, p.255; N. Svoronos, 'Recherches sur le cadastre byzantin et la fiscalité aux XI^{e} et XII^{e} siècles: le cadastre de Thèbes', *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*, 83 (1959), 15, 17; J. Nesbitt and J. Wiita, 'A Confraternity of the Comnenian Era', *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 68 (1975), 365, 369; Perrat and Longnon, *Actes relatifs à la Principauté de Morée*, p.191; R.-J. Loenertz, 'Hosios Lukas de Stiris dans quelques documents latins', *Thēsaurismata*, 11 (1974), 21–35.
54. See p.96 and n.37 above.
55. Cecaumenus, ed. Litavrin, p.282; Anna Comnena, *Alexiad*, 4.1, ed. B. Leib, 1, p.151.
56. Ed. Schirò, p.382, ll. 2172–4. However, the perception was perhaps not confined to the western provinces: cf. the properties of 'Raulati' (Raoulatoi), 'Contostephanati' (Kontostephanatoi), and 'Camicati' (Kamytzatoi) in the *Partitio Romaniae*, ed. Carile, pp.218, 219.
57. Cantacuzenus, Vol. 1, p.275; Vol. 2, pp.184–5; Gregoras, Vol. 1, p.497.
58. Cf. John Apocaucus, ed. Bees, Seferli-Vei, p.150, for rapacious garrison troops from the mountains.
59. See also, for example, Pachymeres, ed. Failler, p.155; Cantacuzenus, Vol. 1, p.37 and cf. the reputation of Berat in northern Epirus as a breeding-ground of nobles: I. Tsabarē (ed.), *Ho Poulologos* (Athens, 1987), 270, *l.* 277.
60. See n.43 above.
61. A. Ducellier, 'Les Albanais du XI^{e} au XIII^{e} siècle: nomades ou sédentaires?', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 7 (1979), 23–56, repr. in id., *L'Albanie entre Byzance et Venise, X^{e}–XV^{e} siècles* (London, 1987), No. VI
62. See, for example, Charles I's grant of lowland properties to 'sevasto Paulo Gropa' (1273): *Acta et Diplomata res Albaniae mediae aetatis illustrantia*, ed. L. de Thallóczy, *et al.* (Vienna, 1913), No. 300, p.86. A contemporary Greek imperial panegyric contains a neglected reference to the Albanians which suggests that the Byzantines already thought of them primarily as inhabitants of inaccessible mountain areas: L. Previale (ed.), 'Un panegirico inedito per Michele VIII Paleologo', *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 24 (1943), 37.
63. See n.40 above.
64. MM, Vol. 5, p.260.
65. Or 'of every Albanian', see *Byzantis*, 2, p.84.
66. L. Chalkokondyles, *Historiarum demonstrationes*, ed. E. Darko, (Budapest, 1922), Vol. 1, pp.61–2; for their correct identity, which has eluded previous

historians of Thessaly, combine the *Chronicle of the Tocco*, ed. Schirò, p.246, *ll.* 349–51, with L. Heuzey, 'Jugement synodal en faveur du couvent de la Panaghia des
Grandes Portes. Texte byzantin inédit', *Revue des études grecques*, 32 (1919), 308.

67. Cantacuzenus, Vol. 2, p.15.
68. Ibid., Vol. 3, p.318.

Western Attitudes to Frankish Greece in the Thirteenth Century

MALCOLM BARBER

> Then indeed you might have seen that the Queen of Cities was a vast field of desolation, full of rubbish and heaps of stones: some buildings were destroyed and little remained of others gutted by the great fire. For the violence of the flames had often consumed its beauty and its most potent decoration since the time that it had first been menaced with the slavery of the Latins. They had taken so little care in imposing that subjugation that they destroyed it in every way, day and night. For it was as if the Latins despaired of the possibility that they could keep possession of it forever; God, I believe, in secret words told them what the future would be. ... The first and special occupation of the emperor was therefore that he should at once cleanse it and restore order to the confusion that had prevailed by propping up the churches which had not completely collapsed and filling the empty houses with inhabitants.[1]

This extract from the fourteenth-century Greek historian Nicephorus Gregoras, describes how Michael Palaeologus was supposed to have found Constantinople when he entered it in July 1261, after its fifty-seven years of Latin occupation. It provides a striking contrast to two letters written by Innocent III in May 1205, a year after the Fourth Crusade, for to read these is to be left with the impression that, even after such a short time, the Latins in Romania and Greece were close to the culmination of a great triumph in Byzantium. It needed only the help of those Westerners appropriately qualified for the task to be complete. Writing to the prelates of France, Innocent exulted that 'a great part of the eastern Church, namely almost all of Greece' had been brought to the proper obedience of its mother, the Roman Church. The emperor Baldwin was now labouring to ensure 'that the edifice, already largely built, should not fall down' and, to this end, requested that the pope send 'religious and prudent men from the orders of the Cistercians, Cluniacs, canons regular, and other religious' to the region of Constantinople. He asked too that 'missals, breviaries and other books in which is contained the ecclesiastical office in accordance with

that instituted by the Holy Roman Church ... should be sent to these parts.'[2] In a second letter to the masters and scholars of the University of Paris the pope spoke alluringly of 'a land crammed with silver and gold and gems, founded upon grain, wine, and oil, and overflowing with supplies of all good things.' Moreover, if they settled in these lands they would receive 'apart from temporal riches and honours, the rewards of eternal glory'. The emperor Baldwin, he said, had humbly asked us 'that we might think fit to induce and admonish you through apostolic letters to go to Greece, where you might strive to reform the study of letters in the place where it is known to have had its beginning.'[3]

This apparent reference to Athens, which had been captured by Boniface of Montferrat in 1204, became explicit in 1209. By this time Innocent's vision had become even more grandiose, for he placed the Latin conquest within the Christian scheme for the destiny of mankind, claiming that the Athens of the antique world was simply a foreshadowing of this new and glorious epoch. In a privilege placing the church of Athens under the protection of St Peter, Innocent declared that the three pagan divinities of Athens were 'like a figure of modern religion' in a city which now worshipped the three persons of the Trinity. Having changed 'from the study of profane science to the desire for divine wisdom', this city of 'famous name and perfect beauty' now gave its trust to 'the most glorious mother of the true God', rather than to the most famous Pallas. Previously learned in the philosophical art, it was now instructed in the apostolic faith.[4] In the papal rhetoric of the years immediately following 1204, the capture of Constantinople and the creation of the Latin empire of Constantinople, together with the consequent establishment of the Latin states in Thessalonica, Negroponte, and the Morea, constituted a triumph comparable to the capture of Jerusalem in 1099. William of Tyre, while profoundly pessimistic about the future of the crusader states in his own time, nevertheless offered the following retrospective on the arrival of the 'pilgrims' of the First Crusade before Jerusalem: 'There seemed to be fulfilled the prophetic word of the Lord delivered in sacred history, which had been sent through the prophet: Lift up your eyes, Jerusalem, and see the power of the Lord: Behold, your Saviour comes to release you from your chains ...'[5]

But just as the fervour which made the First Crusade the most fully-chronicled event in the Christian world since the fourth century gave way to a growing realization of the practical difficulties, so too did Innocent III's glowing images of Constantinople and Athens begin to fade as western Christians became aware that another new burden had been added to those already carried in provisioning and defending the crusader states. Indeed, as early as 1211, Innocent was writing to the

emperor Henry, despite his military prowess, complaining that 'since you and other crusaders have striven to capture and keep the empire of Romania principally in order that by this means you may bring help more easily to the Holy Land, you have not only failed to provide any assistance for this, but have also brought trouble and damage to the brothers of the Temple, who are labouring with all their strength for the defence of this land ...' Threats that assistance would cease unless Henry mended his ways reinforced papal indignation.[6]

The fact was that, throughout the thirteenth century, the parties of western Christendom chiefly interested in these lands were those who sought the extension of their own religious, economic or political power: the papacy, actuated by its desire to dominate the Greek Church and to protect communications with Syria; the Venetians, whose wealth had been founded upon their entrenchment within the eastern empire; the Angevin kings of Sicily, heirs to the Norman lust for Byzantine possessions. For most other western Christians attitudes were far more likely to be shaped by the sight of the pathetic and incompetent emperor Baldwin II trundling the begging bowl around the courts of Europe than by papal dreams of prophecies fulfilled. There was, in fact, some limited monastic settlement in Romania and Latin Greece – Cistercian houses, for instance, eventually reached 12 in number, while the Franciscans took the conquest sufficiently seriously to act both as papal envoys to the Greeks and to advise the emperors John and Baldwin II.[7] However, it is clear that the academics of Paris did not see much prospect of furthering their careers in such places, nor do they seem to have been at all convinced that it was Athens and not Paris which, in Innocent's words, was 'the mother of the arts and the city of letters'.[8]

Innocent III's successors, however, were in no position to adopt the detached attitude of the Parisian masters. After the emperor Henry died in 1216, the papacy found itself in constant need of men and money to activate new crusades, for neither Constantinople nor Athens provided an emotional focus comparable to Jerusalem. The size of the problem can be seen by the labour put in by Honorius III between 1217 and 1225 to organize the crusade to Thessalonica under William VIII of Montferrat, and to provide support for the Latin emperor Robert of Courtenay who ascended the throne of Constantinople in 1219. Different emphases were placed on the appeals made. Three letters sent in 1224, for instance, illustrate this approach. Honorius told the prelates of northern and central Italy to exhort their subjects to cross over to help William in the kingdom of Thessalonica because by this means there would be great profit to both 'the emperor of Constantinople and the affair of the Holy Land'. This appeal had

echoes of the regular papal claim, increasingly less credible, that help for Latin Greece was a preliminary stage in the crusade to the Holy Land, and may perhaps be seen as an attempt to generate enthusiasm among groups with no vested interest in Latin Greece as such. To Geoffrey I of Villehardouin, Prince of Achaea, Honorius wrote that he hoped that, when the marquis arrived, the conjunction of their two strong forces would 'with divine help, abase the schismatics of Romania to such an extent that, in the future, they would not presume to erect a barrier against the Roman Church and the Latins', concentrating here on the prospect of direct military help rather than on any vague benefits to the Holy Land. Finally, he asked Blanche of Castile that she persuade Louis VIII to bring aid to Robert of Courtenay, both as a relative of the French royal house and because, unless help was brought quickly, he feared irreparable damage would be done to the empire which, in the time of his father, had been acquired by the great valour of the Frankish people. In this case he played on Capetian pride in their role as the most Christian kings ruling over a chosen race.[9] In fact, only the rulers of the principality of Achaea managed to maintain any coherent military activity. Thessalonica was lost to Theodore of Epirus in 1224, and by 1228 all the principal proponents of these plans – Pope Honorius III, William of Montferrat, and Robert of Courtenay – had died, having achieved nothing.[10]

Pope Gregory IX, however, had no alternative but to follow his predecessors in publicizing the importance of the Latin empire. When, in 1234, an attempt to reach a negotiated settlement over church union with the Greeks under John Vatatzes, the ruler of Nicaea, broke down,[11] he too turned to Crusader rhetoric, reinforcing his appeals for men by offers of indulgences and by heavy imposts on the Latin hierarchy in Greece. He seems, too, to have tried to add an extra dimension to the appeal by accusing the Greeks not only of being schismatics, but also of infecting the land with heresy, an accusation which accords with this pope's general policy of severity towards what he regarded as deviations from the faith and which provided added justification for the use of force.[12]

Several potential crusader leaders did emerge, but none made much real progress. Gregory IX nevertheless adopted an aggressive stance. In 1237 he wrote to warn John Vatatzes, now the most dangerous enemy of the Latins, not to impede the Latin emperor John of Brienne. He should take especial care, it was implied, because 'by the inspiration of divine grace, so many *nobiles* and *potentes* and so many vigorous *bellatores* have taken the sign of the cross, that the number of them is almost uncountable.'[13] Indeed, the anonymous author of the *Annals of Erfurt* thought that he could count them, claiming that 2,000 French

crusaders had had their vow to travel to the Holy Land commuted, so they could aid the Latin empire instead.[14] One such French crusader was Peter of Dreux who, according to the pope, was intending to furnish 2,000 *milites* and 10,000 foot-soldiers in aid of the Latin empire. However, by January 1238 Gregory was urging him to lead a majority of these, amounting to 1,500 *milites* and 6,000 foot-soldiers, to Constantinople as soon as possible, apparently fearing that the intended date of departure, the Feast of St John the Baptist, would be too late.[15]

A letter to the upper clergy of the Morea, written a week after the appeal to Peter of Dreux, shows why the pope was so concerned. 'We have heard sad reports concerning the city of Constantinople, from which, having suffered not a little grief, we have rushed to apply an opportune remedy for these reported dangers'. Apart from the many problems for the city created by Vatatzes, 'enemy of God and the Church', it was oppressed by such a lack of food that, making a comparison with the situation of the Israelites in Judges, chapter 7, the pope said that 'it mourned and grieved to pass over to the enemy'. The sting was that the pope wanted to levy a tax of a third on clerical moveable goods. To those who brought help to the city he conceded a pardon of their sins equivalent to that 'which was conceded in the general council to those aiding the Holy Land'.[16] Within a year he was asking for another third on account of 'the wretched necessity and state of the empire of Romania'.[17] But the cause seemed to absorb resources like a sponge. By 1241 he was levying a tithe on the clergy, Latin and Greek, of the Morea, Negroponte and the other islands subject to the patriarchate of Constantinople, for the city was now on the brink of destitution, 'neither did anyone wish nor was able to stretch forth his hand to it with subsidies'.[18] It is not altogether surprising to find that John Vatatzes, in replying to the pope's letter of 1237, had purported to believe that it could not have come from the pope but from 'a man suffering from extreme madness'.[19]

Gregory IX's efforts illustrate problems common to all the thirteenth-century pontificates. Nevertheless, after his death in 1241, some of the urgency seems to have disappeared from papal directives because once more the seductive prospect of Church union was being canvassed, especially by the rulers of Nicaea who had most to gain by undermining papal loyalty to Latin Constantinople.[20] This policy was to be used to considerable effect by Michael Palaeologus after 1261, but for a brief period after the loss of the city papal indignation overrode any such prospects. Urban IV became pope just over a month after the fall of Constantinople and at once began a vigorous campaign to rouse the West, in particular pinning his hopes on the French monarchy by

appealing to those Frankish sensibilities which the popes of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries cultivated with such success. If France, 'which is the mirror and examplar of all the Christian kingdoms', was to take the lead, then, argued Urban, others would be inspired to undertake the work as well.[21]

In his letter ordering the provincial ministers of the Franciscans in France to organize the preaching of a crusade, probably in 1262, Urban compared the impact of the news from Romania upon him to that of spears piercing 'the innermost parts of our heart', and followed this up with a lament which would not have been out of place on the lips of late eleventh-century preachers calling upon the faithful to recover Jerusalem from the Muslims:

> In that region the sword of the schismatics has arisen against the population of the faithful; on all sides the storm of persecution breaks out to overturn the position of the Catholics of Greece, as a result of which the devotees of the Orthodox faith there are suffering the insults of enemies and the Christian religion is being attacked by various and diverse adversaries. ...

The Church had shed bitter tears when news had come of the loss of Constantinople, but there was a further danger that Michael Palaeologus, 'who calls himself emperor of the Greeks', was aiming to seize the Frankish lands in Achaea as well. The Franciscan preachers were therefore to tell their audiences that the doge of Venice would provide all Crusaders with a naval passage 'without fare', a material concession which the pope matched with an indulgence equivalent to that granted to those going to the Holy Land. The preachers themselves were given discretion as to how to gather crowds to hear this message, and were permitted to offer an indulgence of between 40 and 100 days 'to all those, being truly penitent and having made confession, who come to assemblies and preaching of this kind'.[22] There is a note of desperation here. The offer of a free passage and the grant of indulgences simply to gather a crowd make an interesting comparison with the conditions before the Fourth Crusade, when the Venetians insisted upon the commercial price for their services and Fulk of Neuilly was able to gather large numbers of people in quite spontaneous demonstrations of enthusiasm.

Although there are isolated signs of support for the papal call – the poet Rutebeuf, for instance, repeated the pope's words almost exactly when he warned that Achaea and Morea would be next[23] – the fall of Constantinople of 1261 was not the battle of Hattin. The following entries in the register of Eudes Rigaud, archbishop of Rouen, under the

year 1262, may serve to put in context the words of a pope afflicted to the very depths of his being:

> 30 August. This is the Wednesday on the morrow of [the Feast] of the decapitation of John the Baptist, at Paris, and we celebrated a mass of the Holy Spirit in our chapel. Afterwards we went to the Holy Council of the venerable father, the bishop of Agen, legate of the lord pope. This same father firstly expounded a sermon in which he laid out the need which the Roman Church had for a subvention, both to remedy the dangers which already threatened it, namely to recover the land of Constantinople which had already been lost, and to avoid dangers it feared would happen, namely to preserve the land of Achaea, which was in danger of being lost, and if it happened that it was lost, Christians would not have any means of going to the Holy Land, so the same father said. When these things had been proposed and explained, the said father concluded that on account of this he was deputed by the Holy See in order that, having assembled in one place all the prelates of the kingdom of France, he should ask from them an appropriate subvention to remedy or avoid the dangers mentioned above. Also he showed apostolic letters, through which he said that he had the power to do and ask such things; but with the consent of the legate, the reply of the prelates was put off until the next day.
>
> The next day, namely 31 August, at Paris, we assembled with the other bishops in the episcopal *aula*, in order to give a response to the legate, where, having deliberated among ourselves and with the procurators of the chapters, we made our reply through the reverend Father G., archbishop of Tours. He, however, showing the heavy burdens which for a long time had oppressed the Gallican Church because of the subventions which it had granted at other times at the request of the lord pope for the relief of the Holy Land, namely the tenths and the twelfths which it had granted for a long period, and on account of other special subventions which at other times the pope had made, and also others for the land of Constantinople, with the general assent of all, replied that at the present time we could not help that land.[24]

Two years later the pope was still trying to persuade the faithful by telling the world that the schismatic Greeks, inflated with pride because of their capture of Constantinople, were reaching into Achaea, which was being denuded of its faithful population as a result, a population in which 'scarcely any security or hope was present, as it was without help from others of Christ's faithful'.[25] In fact, the only real

participant was William II of Achaea, recently released from prison by Michael Palaeologus. By 1266 he had gravitated towards Charles of Anjou, whom he saw as the one power likely to intervene effectively. From this time on there was an underlying tension between a papacy increasingly inclined to listen to Byzantine overtures on union, especially after the lukewarm response to the events of 1261, culminating in the agreement at Lyons in 1274, and Charles of Anjou, more and more consumed with a desire to conquer the eastern empire. Not until the accession of the pro-Angevin Martin IV in 1281 did Charles have a real opportunity to put his plans into action, only for the whole venture to be indefinitely postponed by the Sicilian Vespers of Easter 1282. Thereafter, both popes and Angevins were largely occupied with the seemingly endless campaigns and tortuous diplomacy which, it seemed to them, the recovery of Sicily merited.[26] By the mid-1280s even the papacy had abandoned the Latins of Greece. In the light of Innocent III's initiative of 1205, it is perhaps symptomatic that by 1276 only three of the Cistercian houses established still remained, and only one of these – at Daphne – was on the mainland.[27]

While the attitudes of the papacy had some claim to represent the higher aspirations of Christian society as a whole, there was no such dimension to the Venetian view. The capture of Constantinople in 1204 had re-established Venetian commercial dominance and had given her shipping direct access to the Black Sea. Despite papal opposition the Venetians had forced their candidate into the patriarchate. During the next three years these successes were consolidated by the acquisition of vital intermediate ports and islands, including Modon and Coron in the Morea, Crete, and Naxos, together with the overlordship of Cephalonia in the west and Negroponte in the east. It may, however, be true to say, as Thiriet has suggested, that the Latin conquest was not as obviously beneficial to Venice as has often been thought, for the new lands brought heavy administrative and defensive responsibilities, while the subject populations did not always prove amenable to Venetian government, where inexperience in dealing with rural societies, especially in Crete, led to instability. Although Venice had established itself quite firmly by *circa* 1220, these circumstances seem nevertheless to have led to a 'romaniot' policy by the doges, especially from the time of Giacomo Tiepolo, doge from 1224, a policy which meant naval help for the Latin states and enthusiasm, real or feigned, for the papacy's crusading plans.[28]

Matters came to a head after the victory of Michael Palaeologus at Pelagonia in 1259, a victory which made the Venetians sufficiently uneasy to try and organize a common defence policy with the Latin barons of the Morea, Negroponte, and the islands. The idea, which

apparently appealed to no-one else since it was never implemented, was that 'a thousand men should be placed in Constantinople and retained there continuously', paid for communally.[29] Indeed, the contemporary author of the chronicle of the Marches of Treviso and Lombardy, probably from Verona, alleged that, after the imprisonment of William II of Villehardouin, 'only the Catholic people of the Venetians with infinite expenses and dangers and with the very greatest labour were defending [Constantinople]'.[30]

The Venetians were particularly concerned about the consolidation of the links between Michael Palaeologus and the Genoese, especially as demonstrated by the Treaty of Nymphaeum of March 1261. According to the Venetian chronicler Martino da Canal, the Genoese were motivated entirely by their rivalry with Venice:

> ... the Genoese held a council, and in the council decided that in no way, neither by promise of peace nor by an agreed pact, would they forbear from revenging themselves on the Venetians ... They sent messengers into Romania to a clever man, called Michael Palaeologus, who had not long ago had the lordship of Anatolia. That man was an enemy of the Venetians, and the Genoese promised to furnish galleys and men against the Venetians; and messer Palaeologo promised to give them all payment; and just as was promised on both sides so it was done.[31]

Venetian fears were realized when Michael Palaeologus recovered the city in July 1261, even though this was achieved without Genoese help. Not surprisingly, Venice became particularly enthusiastic about the crusading cause from this time on. By 1264 the doge Ranieri Zeno seems actually to have been promoting the crusade to the pope, declaring 'how great, how honourable and how excellent the Empire of Romania was and is to the strength of the Christian faith, and with what great labour and cost, and loss of people, it was acquired in favour of the Roman Church, and afterwards defended. ...' Although at this time of tribulation Venice, 'almost alone, as is recognized, remains for its maintenance and defence', the doge had heard that the Holy See had offered a full indulgence to those who would set out in its defence. A key element in that defence, he alleged, was the island of Crete which is 'the power and strength of that part of the empire at present possessed by the Latins, concerning which, if, God forbid, anything adverse should happen, there would be no hope for the remainder. ...' Help in the form of men and money must be sent at once, since, without it, the faithful who live on the island have said very forcefully that they have no hope of recovery in the face of the growing strength of Michael Palaeologus.[32] Crete was indeed important to crusaders taking the sea

route to the Holy Land, and in that sense the doge's letter was calculated to appeal to a papacy which had always argued that Latin Greece was vital to the crusading effort, but in practice the Venetian attitude was determined largely by self-interest, for the island was even more vital to the Republic.[33] Indeed, the Republic's envoys were negotiating with the Byzantines even as the letter to Urban IV was being dispatched, a policy which eventually led to a ten-year truce with Andronicus II, Michael Palaeologus's successor, in 1285.[34]

However, before this apparent acceptance that western Christians could not or would not help Frankish Greece, Venice had investigated the possible value of an alliance with Charles of Anjou, the one ruler who seemed to be both serious and effective in his determination to drive out the Byzantines. With the defeat and death of Manfred in 1266, Charles had been able to secure his hold on the kingdom of Sicily. To the beleaguered William of Achaea and the dispossessed emperor Baldwin, Charles offered the best prospect of salvation and, in May 1267, at Viterbo, they both signed treaties with him which, in the extent of the rights conceded, illustrate their lack of viable alternatives. The essence of the terms was contained in the marriages arranged between the children of William and Charles on the one hand and those of Baldwin and Charles on the other. By these means both the Morea and the empire would ultimately devolve upon either Charles or his heirs. In the preamble to the first treaty William II explained that, threatened with grave danger by the schismatic Michael Palaeologus, he had tried unsuccessfully to find a remedy 'by various ways and means, and we also asked among the princes and magnates of the world, at length having recourse to you, most serene prince, lord Charles ... both on account of the prerogative of strength conceded to you by God and on account of the power and position of your kingdom, not only to help us and our land, but to attain the recovery and defence of the orthodox faith and the Holy Land ...' Charles, for his part, borrowing the papal imagery of the unified body of Christendom, committed himself to the re-creation of the Latin empire. According to the second Viterbo treaty, made with Baldwin II, 'We, therefore, considering that the aforesaid empire, which is a noble member of the holy Roman Church, has been separated from its body by schismatics, and wishing that this member might be restored to its body through our office, taking on a labour both pious and useful, promise to recover the empire. ...'[35]

From this point, Charles set about preparations for the reconquest with a commitment shown by no other western ruler, either before or after. The oppressive fiscality of his government in the kingdom of Sicily, and his policy of raising loans from Florentine bankers in return for allowing them access to the valuable raw materials of Apulia and the

island of Sicily, owe much to the cost of these invasion plans.[36] The Angevin registers, despite the fact that we have only a fraction of the total numbers of documents produced, still provide ample evidence of the export of food, horses, arms, precious metals, and cash, as well as payments for mercenaries and the dispatch of specialist personnel like doctors and engineers. Under license, others, like Hugh of Brienne, were allowed to export needed materials to the Morea through these ports.[37]

Nevertheless, even for a man of Charles's energy and resources the obstacles were formidable. Acts of God like the destruction of his fleet in a storm off Trapani in November 1270, were compounded by the efforts of God's representative on earth, Gregory X, to secure the union of the Churches at Lyons in 1274, the success of which blocked any overt attack upon Constantinople. Moreover, when William II died in 1278, the Morea came directly under Charles's rule, but his absentee administration was not a success, and it has been argued that this persuaded him to think in terms of a land attack via Albania, Epirus, and Thessalonica, rather than a naval expedition.[38] Marino Sanudo writes that King Charles, 'intending to acquire the empire of Romania, sent messer Rosso de Solino (Hugh of Sully) ... with more than 2,000 men-at-arms and about 6,000 foot-soldiers, among whom were many Saracens, and caused them to go Avlona and Durazzo'.[39] However, the defeat and capture of Sully at Berat in 1281 effectively undermined this strategy and probably encouraged Charles's alliance with the Venetians shortly after.

In retrospect it can be seen that any realistic chance that the Angevins would be the saviours of the Latin empire ended with the Vespers in 1282. Inevitably, the focus of Charles II's attention was the recovery of Sicily and, in practice, the Morea was restored to the Villehardouin line through the person of William II's daughter Isabelle. Charles II, nevertheless, seems to have been ready to grant licenses to others to export via the Adriatic ports, especially Brindisi and Otranto, to both the Morea and the Holy Land. The scale of these exports can be quite surprising. There was, for instance, a very brisk trade in horses and pack-animals. To take three examples from the mid-1290s: in 1293 and 1295 Hugh of Brienne was allowed to send 82 and 160 animals respectively, while in the intervening year, Florent of Hainault, Isabelle's husband, was given permission to export 200 animals. These included the whole range of beasts from war-horses to mules.[40]

The papacy, the Venetians, and the Angevins all had specific reasons for their policies towards Frankish Greece, but it is clear that for western Christendom as a whole their fate failed to fire the popular

imagination. As early as 1212 the Emperor Henry, having defeated Theodore Lascaris – the ruler of Nicaea – the previous year, wrote that 'nothing is lacking for the achievement of complete victory and for the possession of the empire, except an abundance of Latins ... since, as you know, there is little use in acquiring [land], unless there are those who can conserve it'.[41] Henry's problem was not dissimilar to that described by Fulcher of Chartres in the kingdom of Jerusalem over a century earlier. Following the crusade of 1101, he wrote that 'then some remained in the Holy Land, others however returned to their own countries. As a result, the land of Jerusalem remained empty of people, nor was there anyone who could defend it from the Saracens if only they dared to attack us'.[42] However, except for the dire emergency caused by the events of 1261, even the popes saw help to the Latins in Greece as essentially less important than recovering the Holy Land and, increasingly, than their problems within Italy itself. Most often they presented this conquest of a large part of the lands of fellow Christians as a means of giving greater help to the Holy Land. Only William II of Villehardouin, in his enthusiastic participation in Louis IX's crusade to Egypt in 1249–50, ever came near to justifying this pious hope.

Henry, at least, presented the image of a vigorous and clear-sighted ruler, but his successors as emperors did little to enhance a failing cause by their personal demeanour and character. His immediate successor, Peter of Courtenay, never reached Constantinople, dying in the prison of Theodore of Epirus, but his son, Robert did receive the crown in 1221. Alberic of Trois Fontaines dismissed him as the emperor 'in whose time many of the acquisitions of the Latins in Greece were lost, since that man was ignorant and almost simple'.[43] John of Brienne, ejected from the regency of Jerusalem by Frederick II, became co-emperor with Baldwin II in 1229, although he did not arrive in Constantinople until 1231. He was, despite his age, recognized as a more formidable figure, both by the western chroniclers and by John Vatatzes. The Franciscan, Salimbene, picking up the propaganda in favour of the empire put out by Pope Gregory IX, described him as follows:

> No one dared to face this King John when he entered the fray and was roused to battle, but avoided him, seeing that he was a valiant and strong fighter. It is appropriate to quote about him what was written about Judas Maccabeus: *He was like a lion in his works, and as the young of the lion roaring in the chase.*[44]

Nevertheless, whatever some may have thought of John's personal qualities, an account of the state of the empire given by a group of Franciscans in 1233–34 shows why Michael Palaeologus found Constantinople in such a sorry state in 1261:

> The land of Constantinople was almost entirely destitute of all protection: the lord Emperor John was a pauper. All the mercenary soldiers had left. The ships of the Venetians, Pisans, Anconitans, and other nations were preparing to leave and some had already done so. Considering therefore the desolation of the land, we feared danger since the land is situated in the midst of its enemies.[45]

Not surprisingly, when war with Vatatzes recommenced the following year, in the words of Martino da Canal it was

> ... hard and bitter. And messer Vatatzes, the lord of the Greeks, who was always thinking as to how he could have possession of Constantinople, put together a great army, both by sea and land, and directed it with all his arms towards Constantinople. And to tell the truth messer Baldwin, the noble emperor, was then so lacking in knights that he did not dare confront messer Vatatzes in the field. ...[46]

Baldwin II had married John's daughter and became sole emperor on John's death in 1237. Heavily in debt and desperate for manpower, he came to France between 1236 and 1239 and again from 1244 to 1248. In 1245 he appeared at the courts of Louis IX and Henry III and at the Council of Lyons. Contemporary observers were not impressed. The anonymous writer known as the Minstrel of Reims, whose work can be dated to *circa* 1260, has justly been described as a writer of historical romance, but the very fact that he was aiming at a popular audience suggests that he knew something of that audience's susceptibilities. Moreover, his wilder stories date from the twelfth century and not from his own time. Here is the relevant passage:

> And the emperor Baldwin was young and childish; he spent liberally, and did not keep a watch on his affairs; he was poor and in debt, and was not able to give anything to his knights and sergeants. As a result, the majority of them left him and returned to their own *pays*. And when the emperor realized what a state he was in, he decided that he would come to France, to the pope who was at Lyons, and to the queen [Blanche], who was his wife's aunt, and ask help from them. And he took ship as soon as he could, for Vatatzes was making war on him, and was pressing him closely; and he desired to conquer Constantinople and the empire. And Baldwin came to Marseilles, and went down to La Roche, and came as quickly as he could to Lyons, where he found the pope; and he demonstrated to him his need. And the pope was very moved and gave him the clerical tithe for three years. And he went

> to the queen who saw him very readily; and he told her his problems. And the queen said that she would gladly give it some thought; and kept him with her for a long time, and she found that he spoke in a childish fashion; and he displeased her greatly, for to retain an empire requires a man who is wise and vigorous.[47]

Both his visits to England were recorded by Matthew Paris, who used them as a vehicle to express his anti-papal and anti-French prejudices. According to Matthew, in 1238, when he first came to England he was not well-received, for the king recalled how many benefits and honours had been bestowed on King John when he had visited, only for him to return to France and plot against the kingdom. However, when Baldwin recognized that this had happened, Henry III relented and the emperor was honourably received. He left 'enriched with many and precious gifts, reported to be worth 700 marks'. Under the year 1247 Matthew included a letter from the clergy and people of Canterbury to the cardinals, complaining about papal taxation, and claiming that the province could not afford to pay. Part of this money 'is for the use of the French, who persecute us and our people, for the conquest of the empire of the Greeks', a sour aside which belies Urban IV's claim that France was the exemplar for all the Christian kingdoms, and suggests that the association of the Latin empire with Frenchmen and Italians did its cause no good in England. In such an atmosphere it is not altogether surprising to find the following mordant comment on Baldwin himself when he arrived the following year:

> Also there came into England at this time certain foreign magnates, worthless and hungry, gaping with open mouths for the king's treasure, namely Baldwin, emperor of Constantinople, with certain of his accomplices, who had been violently ejected from the territories of the Greeks. This man, having, a few years before, sold all the sacred relics he could find and raised loans from wherever he could, had fled from there most ignominiously, a pauper, an exile, and despoiled of all his goods, although the lord pope had begun to favour him and had helped as far as possible, promoting most effectively wars against Vatatzes, the son-in-law of Frederick. Certainly, he began to be in need, and to ask for monetary aid from the lord king, whose munificence he had enjoyed before; and in order to obtain greater favour he asserted that he was his relative.[48]

Again, Matthew Paris is a prejudiced observer, but his view does perhaps reflect attitudes in a way that differs from a court chronicler.

In 1261 Baldwin was forced to flee again, but this time his departure

was final. He spent the next six years looking for a sponsor, which he finally found in the person of Charles of Anjou. The following passage from Marino Sanudo, although not entirely accurate, conveys a strong sense of his wanderings:

> The emperor, going from there [Negroponte], went to Apulia and found there King Manfred, who, with his barons, received him with great honour and gave him great presents. From there the emperor left and went to France, to his own country, which was in Hainault, where he was with the King of France and the other princes and barons of that kingdom, and finally he was given for a wife the daughter of Charles I, King of Jerusalem and Sicily, and to his son Philip was given as wife Charles's daughter.[49]

Martino da Canal describes a similar perambulation, although he adds the additional detail that Baldwin sent a letter to the doge of Venice, 'imploring him to send messengers to the pope and to the king of France and to the other kings of the West'.[50] The contact with Manfred was a mistake, serving only to irritate Urban IV as heir to the papacy's long antipathy towards the Hohenstaufen, but he did manage to extract money from other courts, not mentioned by Sanudo, when he made agreements with Theobald of Champagne in 1269 and with Ferrante Sancho, a son of James of Aragon, in 1270.[51]

The only real interest incited in the West beyond those directly involved in the politics of Romania and Greece seems to have been in the Villehardouin court in the Morea, for the Villehardouin princes were quite evidently the most competent Latin leaders. David Jacoby has shown that the French chivalric values displayed in the Morea served as an attraction to French knights, encouraging them at least to visit, if not to settle in, Latin Greece. Honorius III's optimistic description of the empire of Romania as a place where 'almost a new Francia had been created'[52] might more appropriately have been applied here, where a much stronger sense of affinity with a mother country shows through.[53] The Greek version of the *Chronicle of Morea*, although produced in the second half of the fourteenth century, derived ultimately from an earlier original in French, and provides some justification for what might at first sight be taken as Matthew Paris's xenophobia. Prince William, having heard of the victory of Charles of Anjou at Benevento in 1266 and the death of Manfred, is presented as approving of it highly, 'because the Frankish race, to which he, too, belonged, had come closer to Morea, his own land'.[54]

The history of western attitudes towards the Frankish settlements in Romania and Greece needs to be placed within the wider context of thirteenth-century crusader history. The relative indifference or even

hostility of westerners to the appeals for men and money for Latin Greece suggests that this region had a low priority in the minds of most western Christians. The pattern of response is much more like the rather specific crusades of the fourteenth century, where the parties involved had close connections with the region concerned, rather than the more universalist appeal of the twelfth century. It shows too that thirteenth-century Latins did have in their own minds a hierarchy of crusading priorities, which meant that they by no means viewed every 'expedition of the cross' in the same light. From almost the beginning of the Latin empire the popes found it difficult to promote Constantinople; their frequent linking of aid to Romania and Greece with the ultimate goal of the Holy Land was a tacit recognition of which held the greater attraction.

NOTES

1. Nicephorus Gregoras, *Byzantina historia*, Vol. 1, ed. L. Schopen, Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae, Vol. 4 (Bonn, 1829), pp.87–8.
2. *Patrologia Latina cursus completus* ..., ed. J.-P. Migne, 221 vols. (Paris, 1844–) (hereafter *PL*), 215, cols. 636–7.
3. *Chartularium universitatis parisiensis*, Vol. 1, ed. H. Denifle and E. Chatelain (Paris, 1889), pp.62–3.
4. *PL*, 215, cols. 1559–60: to the Archbishop of Athens and chapter.
5. Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, ed. R.B.C. Huygens, Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio mediaevalis, Vol. 63A (Turnhout, 1986), p.378.
6. *PL*, 216, col. 470.
7. E.A.R. Brown, 'The Cistercians in the Latin Empire of Constantinople and Greece, 1204–1276', *Traditio*, 14 (1958), 78; R.L. Wolff, 'The Latin Empire of Constantinople and the Franciscans', *Traditio*, 2 (1944), 213–37.
8. *PL*, 215, col. 1560.
9. *Regesta Honorii Papae III*, Vol. 2, ed. P. Pressutti (Rome, 1895), Nos. 4753, 4758, 5006; *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France* (hereafter *RHG*), Vol. 19 (Paris, 1879), pp.754–5.
10. See D. Nicol, *The Despotate of Epirus* (Oxford, 1957), pp.60–64, for this crusade, and K.M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571)*, Vol. 1 (Philadelphia, 1976), Chs. 1–8, for papal policy towards the Latins in Greece in the thirteenth century.
11. See Wolff, 'Latin Empire', 224–7.
12. See R. Spence, 'Gregory IX's Attempted Expeditions to the Latin Empire of Constantinople: The Crusade for the Union of the Latin and Greek Churches', *Journal of Medieval History*, 5 (1979), 163–76.
13. *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, Vol. 2, ed. L. Auvray, Bibliothèque des Ecoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 2nd. ser., Vol. 9 (Paris, 1907), No. 3693.
14. *Annales Erphordenses*, ed. G.H. Pertz, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores (hereafter MGH SS), Vol. 16 (Hanover, 1859), p.33.
15. *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, No. 4027.
16. Ibid., No. 4035.
17. Ibid., No. 4711.
18. Ibid., No. 6035.
19. On this letter, see V. Grumel, 'L'authenticité de la lettre de Jean Vatatzès, empereur de Nicée, au Pape Grégoire IX', *Echos d'Orient 29* (1930), 452–6, and F.

Dölger, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches* (Munich, 1925), Pt. 3, p.16, No. 1757.

20. See M. Angold, *A Byzantine Government in Exile: Government and Society under the Laskarids of Nicaea (1204–1261)* (Oxford, 1975), pp.14–16.
21. O. Raynaldus, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, Vol. 14 (Cologne, 1694), ann. 1262, pp.79–80.
22. *Les Registres d'Urbain IV (1261–64)*, Vol. 2, ed. J. Guiraud, Bibliothèque des Ecoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 2nd ser., Vol. 13 (Paris, 1901), No. 131.
23. 'La complainte de Constantinople', in J. Bastin and E. Faral (eds.), *Onze poèmes de Rutebeuf concernant la croisade*, Documents relatifs à l'histoire des croisades, Vol. 1 (Paris, 1946), v.13–20, p.36.
24. *Registrum visitationum archiepiscopi rothomagensis*, ed. T. Bonnin (Rouen, 1852), p.440.
25. *Les Registres d'Urbain IV*, No. 577.
26. See N. Housley, *The Italian Crusades* (Oxford, 1982), pp.75–97, for the various attempts to force the papacy to focus on the problems of the Holy Land and Latin Greece rather than on Italian affairs.
27. Brown, 'The Cistercians in the Latin Empire', 116–17.
28. See F. Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne au Moyen Age* (Paris, 1959), pp.64, 96, 122–39.
29. W. Norden, *Das Papsttum und Byzanz* (Berlin, 1903), App. No. 13, pp.759–60.
30. *Chronicon Marchiae Tarvisinae et Lombardiae*, ed. L.A. Botteghi, in Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, new edn. (hereafter RIS), Vol. 8 (Città di Castello, 1916), p.47.
31. Martin da Canal, *Les Estoires de Venise, Cronica veneziana in lingua francese della origini al 1275*, ed. A. Limentani, Civiltà Veneziana, Fonti e Testi, Vol. 3 (Florence, 1972), pp.180–81.
32. Andrea Dandolo, *Chronica Brevis*, ed. E. Pastorello, in RIS, 12/1 (Bologna, 1938), App. I, p.392.
33. On the importance of Crete, see L.B. Robbert, 'Venice and the Crusades', in K.M. Setton (ed.), *A History of the Crusades*, Vol. 5, *The Impact of the Crusades on the Near East*, ed. N.P. Zacour and H.W. Hazard (Madison, WI, 1985), pp.422–4.
34. See Thiriet, *Romanie vénitienne*, p.148.
35. *Actes relatifs à la Principauté de Morée 1289–1300*, ed. C. Perrat and J. Longnon, Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de France, Vol. 6 (Paris, 1967), App., pp.207–11; *I Registri della Cancellaria Angioina*, Vol. 1, ed. R. Filangieri (Naples, 1950), pp.94–6, No.3.
36. See D.H.S. Abulafia, 'Southern Italy and the Florentine Economy, 1265–1370', *Economic History Review*, 2nd ser., 33 (1981), 377–88.
37. For examples, among others, see *I Registri*, 3, p.182; 10, p.240; 12, p.515; 15, p.81; 20, pp.199–200; 21, p.314; 24, p.79.
38. See D.J. Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 1258–1282* (Hamden, CT, 1973), pp.325–6.
39. Marino Sanudo Torsello, *Istoria del Regno di Romania*, Chroniques greco-romanes, ed. C. Hopf (Paris, 1873), p.129.
40. *Actes relatifs à la Principauté de Morée*, Nos. 58, 114, 132.
41. *RHG*, Vol. 18 (Paris, 1879), p.533.
42. Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolymitani*, Recueil des Historiens des Croisades, Historiens occidentaux, Vol. 3 (Paris, 1866), Bk. 2.6, p.383.
43. *Chronica Albrici Monachi Trium Fontium*, ed. P. Scheffer-Boichorst, MGH SS, 23 (Leipzig, 1925), p.910.
44. Salimbene de Adam, *Chronica*, Vol. 1, ed. G. Scalia, Scrittori d'Italia, Vol. 232 (Bari, 1966), p.60.
45. H. Golubovich, 'Disputatio Latinorum et Graecorum', *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, 12 (1919), 446.
46. Martin da Canal, *Les Estoires de Venise*, pp.84–5.
47. *Récits d'un ménestrel de Reims au treizième siècle*, ed. N. de Wailly (Paris, 1876), pp.224–5.

48. Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, Vol. 4, ed. H.R. Luard, Rolls series, Rerum britannicarum medii aevi scriptores..., 244 vols. (London, 1858–96), Vol. 57 (1877), pp.480–81, 597, 625–6.
49. Sanudo, *Istoria*, p.115.
50. Martin da Canal, *Les Estoires de Venise*, pp.196–7.
51. See Geanakoplos, *Michael Palaeologus*, pp.219–20.
52. *RHG*, Vol. 19, 754; *Regesta Honorii Papae III*, No. 5006.
53. See D. Jacoby, 'Knightly Values and Class Consciousness in the Crusader States of the Eastern Mediterranean', *Mediterranean Historical Review*, 1 (1986), 158–86.
54. *Crusaders as Conquerors: The Chronicle of the Morea*, trans. H.E. Lurier (London, 1964), pp.250–52.

The Medieval Towers of Greece: A Problem in Chronology and Function

PETER LOCK

Towers – classical, medieval, and post-medieval – abound in the eastern Mediterranean area. While they may be photographed and drawn to scale for posterity, the problems of their precise dating and function remain. This paper will explore these two questions with reference to selected tower sites of presumed medieval date in Greece. These problems must be addressed before the towers can be studied in their regional, social, and economic context.

It might be thought that the study of medieval towers within a feudal framework would be an endeavour in which archaeology, architecture, and the documentary sources would complement and supplement each other to provide coherent and rational evidence for their dates. This is far from the case. The random survival of a certain amount of documentary evidence, in the form of estate accounts, the anonymous *Chronicle of Morea*, Venetian registers, and Turkish *defters*, along with literary references such as Boccaccio's *Thesiad* and Chaucer's *Knight's Tale*, raise hopes only to be dashed and provide pointers that tantalize rather than inform. How can it be otherwise when their prime concern is either fiscal accuracy or literary entertainment? Indeed, it is virtually impossible to relate their statements to the tower sites or to the individuals who once built or occupied them.

Medieval archaeology, for its part, has far to go in Greece. The growing expense of excavation, coming at a time when there is heightened awareness of post-classical archaeology, has paradoxically led to the concentration of resources on classical and prehistoric sites as well as diverting part of them to multi-period surveys. Regrettably, none of this has improved or extended current knowledge of post-Byzantine ceramics. Frequently, pottery found by survey techniques has to be classified as Late Byzantine or even Turkish-Byzantine rather than being more accurately dated; and as yet there is no clear distinction between Byzantine and Frankish fabrics and styles. The excavation of a well-stratified Frankish site, such as one of the many castles in central or southern Greece, is essential as the only sure way of obtaining information on Frankish ceramic sequences and, *pari passu*, on Frankish structures such as the towers.

An architectural study of the surviving towers is currently the only economic and viable way of obtaining information. Yet when this comes to be analysed, what can be said of structures that consist of classical masonry in secondary use for quoins, doorways, and window surrounds, and walls of roughly-dressed stones which were taken from the fields, with the courses bonded and levelled by mortar with a high admixture of tile slips? This is a rule-of-thumb building technique found all over Europe from the Tyne to the Taygetus and extending chronologically from the late Roman to modern times. Few definite conclusions can be drawn from such a masonry style, other than that it does not actually conflict with the possibility of the towers being of Frankish construction. Currently, then, with just one tower in Greece excavated[1] and the historical sources patchy, an architectural survey would still seem all that remains as the basis for an analysis. What can be done with this, and how can it be used to provide a date for the towers?

First one should consider the case of the medieval towers of central Greece – namely the area that was once the duchy of Athens and Thebes and is now included in the nomes (districts) of Attica, Boeotia, Phocis, and Phthiotis.[2] These towers have been assigned to the Frankish period on grounds of style and local tradition enshrined in the accounts of early nineteenth-century travellers, most notably William Leake,[3] which seem to be borne out by circumstantial evidence from odd scraps of information in accounts and grants from the principality of Achaia. Whilst this general dating is almost certainly correct it lacks refinement. Were the towers all of one phase of construction? Are they the tangible sign of the area being brought under Burgundian control and thus dateable to the beginning of the Frankish occupation in the early thirteenth century? It is tempting to assume this, since it would fit neatly into a feudal parcelling out of the newly-conquered territory, very much after the model of the Normans in England after 1066. It is clearly too simple; the model may or may not be correct, but do monuments such as towers so precisely mirror political events?

The political history of the area during the three centuries of western hegemony is complex. In the first century the Burgundians, vassals of the de la Roche lords, would appear to have predominated. At a stroke they were replaced in 1311 by the Catalans who, at the battle of Halmyros,[4] annihilated the Frankish ruling element and took not only the lands and the wives of the deceased but presumably their towers as well. By 1388, the Catalans in turn were replaced as the politically dominant group by a member of the Florentine banking family of the Acciaiuoli, who were to last on until deposed by the Turkish sultan in 1451.[5] Do these political changes show up in the structure and distribution of the towers?

The current state of knowledge will allow only an equivocal answer to this question other than that the vast majority of towers were not built in response to any particular military or political crisis. Furthermore, the Frankish towers do not seem to lend themselves to categorization into sub-periods since no distinctive Burgundian, Catalan, or north Italian masonry style or ornamentation has been detected in any of the towers of the area. Indeed in all the towers the masonry style is remarkably uniform and ornamentation is entirely absent.[6] William Miller was merely airing a 'reverse invasion hypothesis' and possibly creating a red herring when, in 1907, he asserted that '... the row of towers near Moulki [modern Haliartos], are all, in part at least, of Catalan workmanship'.[7] Rather than explain a perceived change in construction by reference to political events, Miller clearly felt that political change must be mirrored in the monuments. This, however, was just not the case. None of the three towers in question – Haliartos, Thurion, and Hypsilanti – have any trace of adaptation or repair. They all appear to belong to one phase of building. Whether that phase was Catalan or not remains unproven. Indeed, the three towers in question are remarkably similar to the other 27 towers of the area, all of which fit into a general Frankish context.[8] There is, perhaps, an important point to be drawn from this depressing lack of diagnostic features, and it is a point which may well have analogies with the absence, to date, of any recognizable Frankish ceramic sequence, which is just not there to be identified. The towers are properly labelled Frankish in that they were built for and at the behest of Frankish lords, but they were built by local Greek masons working within local traditions which might be termed Aegean, Byzantine, or whatever.[9] In truth, on the basis of simple stylistic analysis towers cannot be specifically categorized, and thus monuments and crises cannot be closely linked.

Out of the thirty known towers of the duchy, some five have been distinguished by their relative height, over 14–15 m.[10] One of these, the tower which formerly stood at the south-west corner of the Athenian acropolis, is traditionally assigned to 1388 and the advent of the Acciaiuoli duke of Athens. Some substance is given to this tradition by the mention of a tower in Athens in the writings of the poet Boccaccio, a fellow citizen of Nerio Acciaiuoli and presumably in a position to gain some knowledge of Athenian topography from Athens' closer ties with Florence.[11] Whether the other towers of great height are also of Florentine inspiration is possible but unprovable. Circumstantial evidence bedevils such a convenient assumption. The tower at Haliartos is high, but, as we have seen, it might just be Catalan. The same is true for another high tower, that at Livadostro in the north-

east corner of the Gulf of Corinth. Despite its desolate state today, Livadostro was the principal port connecting the duchy with the West; a port to which the Venetians were eager to confine Catalan mercantile and piratical activities, leaving Venetian supremacy in the Aegean unchallenged. It is because the Catalans were aggressive and posed a threat that we read about them in the Venetian archives, and therefore know that the port of Livadostro was Catalan as, quite possibly, was the tower that overlooked it. Presumably it had been a port at the time of the Burgundian dukes, although nowhere is this specifically mentioned. In the case of the Catalan affinities of the last two towers the most sanguine verdict must be one of not proven. If toponymy is to be trusted, a fourth tall tower, that at Hypsilanti – also known as Petra – has been identified with the fief of Patricio,[12] once held by a certain Jean le Flamenc, the only vassal of the Burgundian dukes of Athens whose name has come down to us. There are, then, possible Burgundian and Catalan links with these high towers. None the less, this need not rule out the Florentines. Petra may have become a ducal estate by the end of the fourteenth century and may have been subject to rebuilding. Far less speculatively, Livadostro remained an important port after 1388, and contacts with northern Italy were as important for the Acciaiuoli as were links with Sicily and Spain for the Catalans.

All this apart, the one tower that had definite Florentine associations was the tower on the acropolis at Athens; it also had a number of unusual features. Although in 1874 a regrettable act of official vandalism led to the demolition of the tower, a few photographs together with a considerable number of paintings survive to show what it looked like. In materials and form it differed from the vast majority of the other towers of the duchy. Stillman's photographs of 1869 show that it was constructed of re-used classical ashlar throughout and crenellated, and, although it possessed a first-floor entrance at its east side, it had a ground-floor entrance on the west immediately facing the Temple of Nike. It is debatable whether this entrance belongs to the original construction, since the surviving photographs do not enable a conclusive judgement. Analogy with the other towers of the area would make it more convenient if it were a later insertion. However, convenience is not proof, and if the doorway is original, might this be a distinctive feature of Florentine towers in the duchy?

Some 25 km. to the north-east of Athens, near the settlement of Markopoulo and just north of the road leading from that village to the coastal resort of Brauron, is the so-called Markopuolo tower. Not ony is it the nearest surviving tower to Athens but it is also the only extant tower of mainland central Greece to survive with its crenellation intact and, most important, the only tower with an original ground-floor

entrance. Externally it measures 8.20 by 5.40 m. with a wall thickness of 1.20 m. The roof of the ground floor is vaulted and there appears to have been a cellar (cistern?) under what was presumably a wooden floor. The door surround is made up of re-used classical blocks, the lintel of which may have been hammered away to form a pointed arch: a veritable Gothic entrance. The estimated height of the tower is 18–20 m., and so in this as well as in terms of the placing of its entrance it has the diagnostic features of a putative Florentine build.[13]

In territorial terms the Florentine duchy was contracting. Thebes and Athens had been the twin centres of the Burgundians. The Catalans spread their influence further north, raising Daulia, Levadia, and Lamia to the level of important urban centres. By contrast Florentine influence was more limited, being restricted to the hinterland of the Saronic Gulf. Not only the sites at Athens and Markopoulo but also the tower at Eleusis fit this pattern. Situated some 18 km. west of Athens, this was once the tower site nearest to the capital of the Florentine dukes. No information survives regarding this tower which, like that on the acropolis – with which it might have had many other affinities – also succumbed to regrettable vandalism in the late 1950s. This time mineral extractors and not the well-meaning classical archaeologist were responsible and so no record whatsoever was kept of its dimensions and lay-out.[14]

As we shall see below, whilst the bulk of the evidence is circumstantial, all of it points to the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries as the period in which the towers were constructed, and to the Franks as the commissioners for their building. None the less, the tower as a form is not unique to the Franks in the eastern Mediterranean. The Turks, too, were tower-builders, and we should examine the towers of what, after 1451, became part of the *sanjak* of Attica, Boeotia, and Euboea to see if there is any evidence of Turkish work. Certainly in Anatolia and in north Syria, towers built for the Ottoman postal and customs services were in evidence and, indeed, still in use in the early years of the twentieth century. In terms of siting they were more widely dispersed than the medieval towers of central Greece and, of course, were situated with reference to trade routes and especially to natural features like mountain passes and river crossings. The Turkish word for such a guard-house was *derbent* which originally meant pass or defile. However, there is nothing distinctly Ottoman about the 30 surviving towers in mainland central Greece. As mentioned above, masonry types and styles are uniform and remarkably non-diagnostic throughout. Only at Markopoulo has any crenellation survived at all, so that there are no distinctive Ottoman crenels or angle-turrets, such as on the Markelon tower in Aegina, to settle the point.

In the past there were some Turkish towers in the area. They were not the structures of the state but very much belonged to an agricultural context, as the farm and home of a *sipahi*. On 30 December 1805, Colonel Leake noted two exceptionally large *Spahiliks* close to the Thebes-Megara road. These settlements were Bubuka and Katzula, which consisted of ten houses each with a *pyrgos* for the *Sipahi*.[15] We can retrace Leake's route across the Asopus and on to Thebes, but no sign of these settlements, let alone the towers, is to be seen today; not a good survival rate in comparison with the Frankish towers! Presumably they were of mud-brick and have since reverted to earth. It is clear, however, that height both conferred and reflected status, which was one of the functions of a tower in an agricultural setting.

Of the surviving towers of the area that at Palaiopyrgos is unique, since it contains a fire-place and a flue in the thickness of the south wall, foundations for the north wall, and a buttress of sorts in the south-west corner.[16] Each one of these features is in itself unique, let alone in combination. Is this just an unusual Frankish tower or might these be diagnostic Turkish features? Of course, there is no answer at present; but interestingly, while passing through the area in 1676 Jacob Spon and George Wheler noted at Panagia [modern Palaiopyrgos] '... an old ruined tower with the remains of a town about it'.[17] Again, while circumstantial evidence most certainly does not rule out the tower as Frankish, the ruins perhaps mirror the state of the Ottoman empire in the late seventeenth century and point to a possible Turkish structure. Whilst the tower dominates the ruins of the village, it does not fulfil any of the criteria for a *derbent*. It is far from any major route and would have been both inappropriate as a posting-house and inefficient as a guard-post.

Palaiopyrgos remains an oddity, and with it the problem of the Turks and their relationship with the towers which survived on into and throughout the Turkish domination, as discreet sites rather than as quarries for stone. Presumably, for this to have happened, the towers continued to have a useful and active role. We must then postulate a secondary use for them. The evidence currently available is disappointing, except perhaps to show that it was during the nineteenth century that the towers ceased to have a role in the rural community. The excavations of the tower near Daphne Nigritsa showed that that tower was occupied in some way into the eighteenth century, whilst in the nineteenth century, art and literature associated towers with klephts and owls.[18] During this century many towers have been used as occasional military strong-points, resulting in deliberate destruction as at Schematari in 1944 and at Skounderi in 1946,[19] or, more usually, as animal folds, with consequent damage to the lower sections of walls to

afford access. It is interesting to note that it is only latter-day secondary usage that has caused any structural change to the towers, and that it has been destructive!

FIGURE 1
THE TOWER AT SKOUNDERI FROM THE SOUTH-WEST

It is difficult to believe that all the other occupants through history – Catalans, Albanians, and Turks – were so conservative in their tastes and so complacent in their domestic requirements as to effect no repairs or adaptations. From a structural analysis this would seem to be the

case, yet, if this secondary occupation is so nugatory architecturally, is it safe to postulate it at all? Archaeological excavation is the only recourse here. However, there has only been one tower excavation with anything like acceptable modern standards, namely that of the tower of Mara Brankowic, known as 'Pyrgos tēs Kyra-Maros' at Daphne, near Serres in Macedonia, undertaken in 1978 as a result of earthquake damage to the site.[20]

The tower is similar in structure and size to those of central Greece. It measures 12.41 m. by 12.41 m. externally and 7.65 by 7.41 m. internally. Its surviving height is an estimated 14.30 m. and it is constructed with the usual roughly dressed stones held together by mortar mixed with tile slips. The excavation clearly revealed secondary usage. A hoard of 48 Austrian and Ottoman silver coins dates the third and last phase to the middle of the eighteenth century. Finds of early post-Byzantine pottery in the previous layers allow a rough dating of the second phase to the sixteenth/seventeenth centuries, whereas finds from the stratum immediately above the first floor of the tower do not seem sufficient to suggest a date for the first and earliest phase of occupation other than the vague late Palaeologan period.[21] Several phases of occupation are thus clearly demonstrated, as is the current lamentable state of knowledge of late medieval ceramics in the Aegean. Only more such excavations of tower sites can add to this picture. However, a casual glance at the tower in the centre of the village of Pissonas on Euboea reveals its current use as a dwelling; interestingly, with no structural additions other than some small windows on the ground floor.

A late medieval date comes up time and again for these free-standing tetragonal towers in Greece. The written sources are patchy but they do occasionally mention towers. A systematic search of the relevant archives would doubtless fill many gaps, but it is a daunting task financially, geographically, and linguistically. With this in mind, the earliest reference known to the author records a tower in use in 1307 which was presumably built sometime in the preceding century. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries there are occasional references to towers being repaired, given away, and even captured. Currently the latest date known for the construction of new towers is the early sixteenth century.[22]

A few examples of the written sources must suffice. The Serbian chronicler Daniel reported an attack by Catalan pirates on the Russian monastery of St Panteleimon on Athos in 1307.[23] Here the tower was the final place of refuge for the monks, a sort of monastic acropolis, that just survived assault by fire because the monks stored wine in the basement and used it to extinguish the fire which the Catalans had lit

around the base of the tower in order to roast them into submission. The Catalans lost interest and retired with their plunder, incidently showing us how such towers might be captured without inflicting too much damage on the fabric. More mundanely, the tower of Christiania (modern Krestena) formed part of a feudal grant to Niccolò Acciaiuoli in 1334, and some twenty years later was the subject of substantial repairs.[24] The tower at Vasiliko on Euboea was occupied by the Turks in June 1470 as part of their siege operations against Negroponte.[25]

The Genoese, who ruled the island of Chios until 1566, were building towers well into the early sixteenth century. The contracts for the construction of towers in the villages of Pyrama and Fita in the north of the island survive and date to 1515 and 1516 respectively.[26] The Genoese built these towers as places of final refuge for the settlements concerned. As such they relate to settlements and are usually centrally placed, often right in the centre of the continuous row of houses that served as the outer defensive wall of the village. In general the towers are tetragonal as at Siderounda and Viki, but very occasionally they are more sophisticated, being circular and with a talus, as in the group of small towers in the north-east corner of the village of Mesta.[27]

To summarize: it is impossible to fix the date of the towers of post-Byzantine Greece definitely. The random survival of documentary evidence, the lack of diagnostic stylistic features, and the current state of medieval archaeological research in the eastern Mediterranean just do not permit this. The towers do appear to have been well-established features by the second half of the fourteenth century and, as a type, to have continued to be built and used well on into the two succeeding centuries. Clearly they fulfilled a diversity of secondary functions long after their original builders and occupiers had passed on; a fact to which their remarkable survival into this century may be attributed.

It is difficult to postulate the primary function of these free-standing towers.[28] Clearly a tower may have been intended to serve a number of functions and equally clearly not all towers shared the same role. Yet they are remarkably homogenous in terms of their dimensions, their masonry, and their general lack of ornamentation. Given this uniformity, just how can it be determined which towers should be seen primarily in an agricultural, domestic, or fiscal context, and which should be seen as fulfilling a strategic military role either as watch-towers or, like the monastic towers of Athos, as final places of refuge from pirates and other raiders?

Siting and distribution would seem to be the only guide-lines here. However, they are guides which must be used with great caution and always with reference to the monument itself: most notably to the presence or absence of a circuit wall.

As a whole the towers are distinctly limited in military terms. This is certainly true of defence. There were seldom more than two loopholes/windows in each wall-face and so it was from the parapet that any defensive fire had to be directed. This posed problems for the defence of the base of the tower, a problem exacerbated by the general absence of machicolation and the apparent absence of hoardings. This weakness was exploited by the Catalan raiders of St Panteleimon in 1307, as we have already seen. However, with no internal water-supply, towers were not designed to withstand a determined and prolonged assault. The tower-builders appreciated the psychology of raiders, who were much more concerned to escape unscathed with their booty rather than risk injury at the hands of a desperate victim.

In general, it seems possible to distinguish the function of free-standing towers on a geographical basis with, of course, certain distinctions and exceptions within the broad categories outlined. The medieval towers of the mainland primarily fit an agricultural and domestic setting. It is generally held that those on the islands fit a military context of defence against sea-borne aggressors. The dominant powers in the late medieval Aegean were the maritime states of Genoa and Venice. The rulers of these states assessed the threat from endemic Aegean pirates and the expansion of the Turks in terms of their own commercial and territorial interests. Their concerns and conclusions are certainly reflected in the strategic position of some of the towers in two of their prime possessions, Chios and Euboea. However, we must be aware that not all the towers on these islands reflected the grand strategy of these mercantile empires. Indeed, of the fifty-five towers of Euboea, the majority fit an agricultural rather than a strategic context. The problem here is to decide which were which.

The towers of central Greece and the Peloponnese are agricultural and domestic in inspiration. They are not sited with reference to administrative centres, to roads, or even to each other. None are intervisible. Much more important was siting with reference to amenities: water, building materials, fertile lands, and access to the hinterland.[29] Within its immediate setting, height conferred status both on the structure and its owner, whilst its mass and simplicity further enhanced this effect. The towers presumably formed part of a farm complex comprising out-buildings, ovens, and presses with the whole surrounded by some sort of wall. There is documentary evidence for such a complex at Krestena in the Peloponnese,[30] but in the archaeological record in central Greece – as incidentally at modern Krestena too – such features await identification. Possibly they were constructed of impermanent materials that have left no trace on the ground surface. Only the tower at Hypsilanti has revealed traces of a circuit wall with

perhaps a small apsidal chapel related to the tower. At the other tower sites of mainland central Greece there is not even the sign of circuit walls, and where the towers relate closely to a settlement, as they often do, it is impossible by surface examination alone to distinguish the buildings that once related to the tower from those related to the village.

Domestic arrangements within the towers seem less than comfortable from a modern stand-point. Certainly the rooms were reasonably large (on average some 5–7 sq. m.) but light was sacrificed to security, access to the building and between its various floors was inconvenient, sanitation was rudimentary, and water-supply, although always near at hand, was outside the tower. Whilst not satisfying our curiosity in these matters, it does appear from the repairs carried out at Krestena in 1354 that a tower could be made reasonably habitable. Indeed, not even the widow of Sultan Murad II (died 1451) spurned a tower as a place for her retirement from the Ottoman court.[31] How much more appropriate then, that we should adjust our twentieth-century perspectives on space and amenities to the less exacting late medieval standards when assessing the tower as a dwelling of a former age? Even today the tower at Pissonas on Euboea is occupied as a dwelling, while the nearby monastic tower at Limni is made available to the guests of Moni Galataki.

The exceptions to this general pattern would seem to be towers built in harbours and those built within an urban context. The Venetian registers for the 21 February 1361 record the usefulness of an unnamed tower in overseeing the collection of the *commercium* or customs dues.[32] Equally, the towers at Kirra, Antikirra, and Livadostro may well have served such a fiscal purpose, situated as they were by the water's edge. If there was once a tower in Piraeus no trace or record of it has survived today. In Daulia (medieval La Dablia), the sparse remains of an urban tower of the sort still visible in the walled town of San Gimignano in Tuscany have been noted.[33] These towers, representing the status and rivalries of the families that built them, were in general less massive than their rural counterparts, often having a narrow ground-floor entrance. Views of Chalcis (medieval Negroponte) executed in the early nineteenth century show a townscape with towers. Today only one survives, situated in Balalaiou Street. Finally, the tower on the Athenian acropolis is unusual in forming part of a larger ducal dwelling. In fourteenth-century fiction and in nineteenth-century fact, it seems to have been a place of incarceration.[34]

On Euboea the picture is complex. At first sight we seem to be dealing with military towers sited by the rulers of Venice to suit their own strategic needs.[35] The importance of the harbour of Negroponte to

Venetian control of its Aegean sea-lanes gives weight to this assumption, as does a cursory examination of some of the tower sites. In marked contrast to the feudal agrarian towers across the Euripos, the Euboean towers seem to have been sited in many cases without regard to either ancient or medieval settlement, as if some over-riding strategic purpose lay behind their construction. Certainly strategic groups of towers can be distinguished, such as the towers of Lefkandi, Vasiliko, and the two at Mytika which ring the city fields to the south of Negroponte,[36] and those towers which surround the castles at Klissura, Holorita, and Rizokastro. For the rest, an examination of the distribution map of the towers of Euboea shows that they are almost as randomly sited as those on the mainland. It is difficult to discern just what strategic function they might have served let alone to descry any chains of towers protecting an exposed coast-line. Probably not all the towers of Euboea were of Venetian inspiration, but rather should be seen in the feudal agrarian context of the Lombard triarchies of Oreus, Chalcis, and Carystus. Perhaps some of these towers may have been incorporated later into a strategic group by the Venetians – a possible example is Beza Pyrgos near Drazi. Of the so-called military towers some of them have traces of circuit walls like those at Agia Triada, Psachna, and Vouni. Possibly this walled enclosure is a diagnostic feature, since it appears in a group of well-documented Venetian towers in Messenia, namely Palaeokastro, Cosmina, and Castro Franco, which were specifically constructed between 1390 and 1420 to protect the lands of Coron from the depredations of Greeks and Turks.[37]

The defensive limitations of the towers have already been noted, yet the military towers were conceived defensively. In an age and in an area where piratical raids were the order of the day and armies lived off the land without reliance on supply-lines it is impossible that they could be conceived in any other way. Defence, however, can be active or passive. The towers of Venetian Euboea and those of Genoese Chios reflect these two totally different approaches.

The Euboean strategic towers played a wide territorial role in the observation and passing on of information and alerts. For this role their vaulted stone roofs were ideal since they provided a safe platform from which fire signals might be sent. Equally they were fire-proof with regard to most conventional forms of attack and thus some of them might well have been intended as an active but limited defence cordon – limited because they could often be easily by passed and, with their lack of an internal water-supply, they could only hold out for a short time in the face of a determined assailant. The analysis of these Euboean towers may seen relatively straightforward but there are

many anomalies. The proximity of the two towers near Mytika built within 200 m. of each other is a case in point. Do they relate to the castle of Phylla to the south, with which they are in visual contact, or to Chalcis to the north, on the edge of whose city fields they stand? If one is the replacement of the other why was not the earlier tower used as a quarry for its successor? The lack of a satisfactory answer would indicate that the towers were contemporary and built to be used together. It cannot be that they represent the strengthening of a particularly vulnerable spot since local topography ensures that they could easily be by-passed, particularly to the north and west. Their military function and chronological relationship is still under consideration, and this should prove a fruitful field for close and detailed stylistic anlaysis of their construction.

On Chios, as we have seen, the Genoese built towers rather as a last place of refuge, suitable to fend off the mere raider bent on the enjoyment of his booty but virtually useless in the face of a determined or prolonged assault. They stand alone, without reference to one another, and by contrast with the towers of Euboea represent a more passive approach to the problem of security.

It would be premature to draw any firm conclusions regarding the date and function of the towers of post-Byzantine Greece. What has been written above must remain provisional until more towers in diverse areas are recorded; until a number of tower sites have been carefully excavated and the results compared, and, above all, until the Burgundian, Catalan, Venetian, Florentine, and Turkish archives have been investigated. All this is a long-term programme. In the meantime the towers must be found and recorded before they disappear from the landscape; as the condition of Greece has undergone a metamorphosis in post-Ottoman times, so, too, has that ambience which permitted the towers to survive unthreatened for centuries. The prize is worthy of the game, since although the towers may be recondite in reflecting the political and military events of Frankish Greece, they do have much to contribute to our knowledge of the post-Byzantine Greek economy and society.

NOTES

1. Ch. Bakirtzis, 'The Tower of Kyra-Maros, Daphne Nigritsa', *Archaiologikon Deltion*, 33 (1978), 316–18 (in Greek).
2. P.W. Lock, 'The Frankish Towers of Central Greece', *Annual of the British School at Athens* (hereafter *BSA*), 81 (1986), 101–23.
3. William Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, Vol. 2 (London, 1835), p. 144.
4. Traditionally this battle was thought to have been fought near Thurion in Boeotia and has been dubbed the battle of Cephissus; see W. Miller, *The Latins in the Levant*

(London, 1908), p. 227, followed by N. Cheetham, *Medieval Greece* (New Haven and London, 1981), pp. 140–41. However, David Jacoby has advanced convincing evidence that the battle was fought not in Boeotia but at Halmyros in Thessaly, see 'Catalans, Turcs et Vénitiens en Roumanie (1305–1332): un nouveau témoignage de Marino Sanudo Torsello', *Studi medievali*, 3rd ser., 15 (1974), 223–30 (repr. in D. Jacoby, *Recherches sur la Méditerranée orientale du XII^e au XV^e siècle* (London, 1979), No. V.

5. Miller, *Latins in the Levant*, pp. 211–464.
6. Lock, 'The Frankish Towers of Central Greece', 106.
7. W. Miller, *'The Princes of Achaia and the Chronicle of the Morea* by Rennell Rodd: A Review', *English Historical Review*, 22 (1907), 572.
8. Lock, 'The Frankish Towers of Central Greece', 105.
9. See Ph. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese and their Administration of the Island, 1346–1566*, Vol. 3 (Cambridge, 1958), pp. 111–12, for Latin employment of Greek masons; S. Casson, 'The Modern Pottery Trade in the Aegean', *Antiquity*, 12 (1938), 464–73, for comments on an Aegean style. I would like to thank Dr. Anthony Luttrell for his interest and comments on this question.
10. Lock, 'The Frankish Towers of Central Greece', 105.
11. P.W. Lock, 'The Frankish Tower on the Acropolis at Athens', *BSA*, 82 (1987), 131–3.
12. A. Bon, 'Forteresses médiévales de la Grèce centrale', *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*, 61 (1937), 136–208.
13. Lock, 'The Frankish Towers of Central Greece', 105.
14. G.E. Mylonas, *Eleusis and the Eleusinian Mysteries* (Princeton, 1961), pp. 151–2; Figs. 32 and 53.
15. Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, 327–8.
16. Lock, 'The Frankish Towers of Central Greece', 118.
17. George Wheler, *A Journey into Greece* ... (London, 1682), p. 476.
18. Bakirtzis, 'The Tower of Kyra-Maros'; Lock, 'The Frankish Tower on the Acropolis at Athens', 131–3; A.J.B. Wace, *Greece Untrodden* (Athens, 1964), pp. 26–35.
19. Lock, 'The Frankish Towers of Central Greece', 120; Th. Skoura, 'Fortifications on Euboea', *Archäologisch-epigraphische Mitteilungen aus Oesterreich (-Ungarn)*, 20 (1975), 378. (in Greek).
20. Bakirtzis, 'The Tower of Kyra-Maros', 316–18; A.E. Vacalopoulos, *History of Macedonia, 1354–1833* (Thessalonica, 1973), p.120.
21. Bakirtzis, 'The Tower of Kyra–Maros', 316–18.
22. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*; id., *The Architecture of Chios* (ed. A. Smith) (London, 1962), p. 113; Lock, 'The Frankish Towers of Central Greece', 109–10.
23. Lock, 'The Frankish Towers of Central Greece', 106.
24. Ibid., 110.
25. William Miller, *Latins in the Levant*, p. 471.
26. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, pp. 111–12.
27. C. Bouras, *Greek Traditional Architecture: Chios* (Athens, 1984), pp. 34–8 and 44; see also n. 22 above.
28. Lock, 'The Frankish Towers of Central Greece', 108.
29. Ibid., 102–3.
30. Ibid., 110.
31. M. Ursinus, 'An Ottoman Census Register for the Area of Serres of 859AH (1454–1455)? A Reconsideration of the Date of Composition of Tahrir Defteri TT3', *Südost-Forschungen*, 45 (1986), 32–3.
32. Lock, 'The Frankish Towers of Central Greece', 109.
33. Ibid., 123.
34. Lock, 'The Frankish Tower on the Acropolis at Athens', 131–3.
35. J. Koder, *Negroponte* (Vienna, 1973); Skoura, 'Fortifications on Euboea'; P.W. Lock, 'The Medieval Towers of Euboea', in P.W. Lock and Guy Sanders, eds.,

Essays on the Medieval Archaeology of Greece, British Archaeological Reports (Oxford, forthcoming).

36. F. Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne au Moyen Age* (Paris, 1959), p. 313.
37. C. Hodgetts, 'The Colonies of Coron and Modon under the Venetian Administration, 1204–1400' (unpublished London Ph.D. thesis, 1974), 464–75. Some of the Venetian sites in Messenia were surveyed in August 1988 and reports will be published in due course.

FIGURE 2
OUTLINE MAP OF GREECE WITH TOWER LOCATIONS





FIGURE 3
THE TOWERS OF BOEOTIA

FIGURE 4
THE TOWER-SITES OF EUBOEA
(Only those mentioned in the text are named)



The Latins and Life on the Smaller Aegean Islands, 1204–1453

ANTHONY T. LUTTRELL

The quality of life on small islands evidently differs from that on large islands or on the mainland.[1] The limited population is isolated, resources and necessities are frequently lacking, and communications repeatedly break down. Such administration as exists must be a matter of local government, while most islanders know each other so well that politics often degenerates into family quarrels. The larger Aegean islands such as Crete, Rhodes, and Chios were 'miniature continents'[2] with mountains, rivers, roads, ports, cosmopolitan populations, and comparatively complex economies. The smaller islands were more backward and seldom attracted the attention of the great powers intent on dynastic conquests, strategic bases, or commercial advantages. Latins only rarely settled on or visited the lesser islands after 1204 and their knowledge of them and attitudes towards them were seldom recorded.

An island enjoys limited external contacts. Winds, currents, storms, distance, and time create an environment of isolation, though many small Aegean islands are close to the mainland or clustered around a larger island. A row of medium-sized isles along the Anatolian shore came largely under Genoese control while many others, strung out southwards from Negroponte, lay within a Venetian sphere of influence. There are hundreds of rocks and islets, though in the northern Aegean, and particularly in the sea between Chios and Negroponte, there are practically no islands at all. Many Aegean isles are mountainous and arid with limited pasture and arable land. Over a hundred islands in the Cyclades cover a total of just over 2,000 square kilometres, but only about 15 per cent of that area is arable, and by the year 1400 only some 20 of these islands were inhabited. Naxos with an area of 429 sq. km., Andros with 379 sq. km., and Amorgos with 122 sq. km. were populated, but tiny Kimolos with only 36 sq. km. was not.[3]

Population figures varied considerably. In 1395 Chios had perhaps 10,000 Greeks[4] and fewer than 1,000 Latins,[5] while in the same year Negroponte was said to have 14,000 hearths, perhaps 50,000 inhabitants, and Castellorizzo, east of Rhodes, to have 200 hearths, possibly 700 persons.[6] A list of 1470 gave round, and probably exag-

gerated, numbers of souls or *anime*: Naxos was estimated at 5,000, Andros at 2,000 and Tenos and Myconos jointly at 3,000, but smaller islands had minimal populations with 300 each for Keos and Santorin and 200 each for Siphnos, Amorgos, and Syros.[7] This gave the larger islands a density per square kilometre of between 8 and 15 persons, but no island with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants had a density of more than 4 per sq. km., and those with fewer than 500 people had only 3 or 2 per sq. km.[8] An island as large as Samos seems to have been entirely depopulated by Turkish raids by about 1380.[9] Ethnic proportions also varied. The Latins formed less than 10 per cent of the total population of Chios in 1395. About 20 per cent of the islanders in the Cyclades followed the Latin rite in about 1500, but some of them were converted Greeks; on the smaller islands the percentage was less than ten. Those following the Greek rite were not all indigenous islanders; some, for example, were Albanians,[10] while there were also Armenians and others.[11]

In 1204 the Aegean islands were comparatively prosperous, though Latin and other raiders had tended to drive their populations away from the coasts to safer hilltop areas. A growing Italian commercial presence brought prosperity to some major islands which had harbours along the new trade routes. Before 1204 large estates and a Byzantine aristocracy had developed, and with the decline of central power some islands rose in revolt or passed to Norman or Genoese protectors, while elsewhere the new Greek elite set up independent rule, as did Leon Gabalas on Rhodes in 1202 or 1203. Smaller islands prospered only for some special reason. Patmos, for example, is very small and in 1088 only about 8 per cent of the island was pasture and 2 per cent arable, while no more than about 0.5 per cent was actually ploughable; exceptionally, the activities of the monastic community ensured it a small fleet to provision the island and activate a minor round of commerce.[12]

After the Latin conquest of Constantinople in 1204, the Venetians occupied Crete but for long avoided costly military and administrative entanglements elsewhere. The French conquerors of mainland Greece lacked the seapower needed to penetrate the islands and many of those off the Anatolian coast remained Greek: Chios until 1304, Rhodes until 1306, Cos until about 1337, and Lesbos until 1355. Individuals from Venice and elsewhere in northern Italy occupied Naxos and the Cyclades, mostly with Venetian support, but many islands were too poor to attract Latin conquest. Pirates, bad weather, or the need for food or water might drive westerners to even the smallest islands, but Latin merchants, mercenaries, bureaucrats, and churchmen normally did business and settled only on the larger islands. Places such as

Nisyros[13] and Amorgos[14] had Italian rulers and a minor western presence, but on many islands there were apparently no Latins at all.

Island life was precarious. The weather and the primitive nature of sea charts and navigational instruments made travel dangerous; drinking water was often lacking; sea damp could be extreme and, in the absence of wood or other fuels, stone houses built to exclude heat could be dismally cold; if crops failed, alternative supplies were not always available. Population moved in all directions – from the mainland to the islands in the face of Turkish overland advances,[15] from one island to another, inland from the coast to the hills, from the islands to the mainland. Cumans were settled on Lemnos, Thasos, and Lesbos;[16] Cypriots, Maronites, and mainland Greeks on Rhodes.[17] Early in the fifteenth century Giovanni Querini was moving families from Tenos and Myconos to Stampalia, and the Gozzadini were repopulating Cythnos.[18] In 1358 *villani* were fleeing from the Cyclades to Crete.[19] In 1361 other *villani* were being transferred to Crete from Amorgos because the latter was in dispute between the Ghisi and the Sanudo, and the Venetians subsequently advised against their return because they would be unable to resist Turkish raids and might flee to Anatolia; in 1400 some inhabitants of Crete were fleeing to the mainland and even joining Turkish fleets in raids on the Latins.[20] On the other hand, in 1402 mainland Turks, who had fled to Samos after Timur's victory near Ankara, thought of moving to Crete, and by 1416 the Cretan authorities were worried that they had too many Turkish slaves and their wives on their island.[21] Turks and Latins took slaves from the islands.[22] Rhodians were being exported as slaves before 1306, but thereafter Rhodes was repopulated with Greek and other slaves.[23] Slaves were taken from Samos, Leros, Santorin, and Patmos, for example, and Naxos and the larger islands were centres of the traffic.[24] Abandonments were not due only to raiders. Heavy taxation was depopulating Chios in about 1400,[25] and men left Rhodes because they could not find wives who were not burdened by hereditary obligations to marine service which would be passed on to the children.[26] Depopulation and repopulation could totally alter the human stock, producing variations between one island and another, and destroying ancient continuities and customs which might otherwise have survived in isolation for many centuries.

Outside Cyprus and Rhodes, most of the island Latins were Italians. The vast majority of them resided, often temporarily, in the harbour towns but there were Latin peasants in the Cyclades and elsewhere. On Tenos, for example, such men owed service as soldiers or galley oarsmen serving at their own expense, and some lost their lands when unable to afford the necessary arms and equipment.[27] Attempts to

settle westerners in the Rhodian countryside had little success. The free man from Provence, who was a *sargentus* on a Rhodian *casale* and married a Greek *serva*, was probably a rare exception; his children were baptized as Romans but were absorbed into the Rhodian peasantry, and in 1366 they had difficulty in establishing their free status.[28] Other Latins visited the islands occasionally. The future Duke of Burgundy and other survivors of the crusade to Nicopolis were received on Lesbos and Rhodes in 1397.[29] In the fifteenth century the Aegean became a standard literary setting for chivalric exploits such as those of the Valencian romance of *Tirant lo Blanch*.[30] Pilgrims occasionally passed by, or were wrecked on, Aegean islands, and the Castilian Ruy Gonçalez de Clavijo, on a diplomatic mission to Samarkand, briefly described certain islands he visited *en route* in 1403. Many Latin merchants, mercenaries, and others lived in the Aegean area but did not settle there permanently.

Italian interest in ancient manuscripts and classical sculptures to be found on the islands were extremely important for learning, literature, and art.[31] Many Latin intellectual responses to the islands derived directly from humanist developments in Florence, where Giovanni Boccaccio and Domenico Bandini collected numerous classical sources concerning Aegean history and mythology, where Domenico Silvestri extended the island cult with his purely philological compilation entitled *De Insulis et earum Proprietatibus* – which was not limited to the Aegean[32] – and where Coluccio Salutati fostered Hellenic studies and Manuel Chrysoloras taught Greek and imported Ptolemy's geography. The Florentine priest Cristoforo Buondelmonti, born in about 1380 and connected to the Buondelmonti despots of Epirus, was apparently a student of Salutati, and he made extensive use of the works of Bandini and Silvestri. Buondelmonti later went to Rhodes to study Greek, and he travelled for a number of years in the Aegean; he visited many islands and described them in his *Liber Insularum Archipelagi*, apparently first written just before 1420. The work survived in numerous variant manuscripts, many of which lacked certain original passages or had heavy abbreviations or extensive later interpolations probably not added by Buondelmonti himself; some copies contained coloured maps of individual islands, which may have been based on actual visits, but these also varied extensively and in some cases the ruins and castles depicted were simply stylized or even fantastic. One copy was written aboard a galley at Chios in 1429; others were made in the West by scribes with little or no notion of island conditions.[33]

While westerners had long shown some awareness of the classical past of Aegean sites, Buondelmonti did much more than merely

assemble ancient connections and quotations. He set off on an extended Hellenic cruise, noting the remains which he linked to the ancient texts, adding the inevitable canon of bogus etymological interpretations of the place-names, and writing of storms and pirates, of mountains, nymphs, and fountains, of goats on arid rocks, and of harbours, beaches, and endless seas. He made a number of large-sized maps and wrote a description of Crete, where he found an ancient mosaic. At Santorin he described how its lord, Jacomo Crispi, let a cord down into the sea to measure the depth of the crater, paying out a thousand paces of rope until it was so heavy that those who held it let it go. On Delos he used ropes and tackle in an attempt to raise a colosal fallen statue of Apollo. At Rhodes he wrote of opinions concerning the Colossus which he had found in a Greek book and of a recent find of sculptures.[34] Yet there was also much contemporary observation, of the great stone bridge by the castle on Andros for example,[35] and of hills, forests, churches, ruins, springs, and other features.

The *Liber Insularum*, which must have existed in many more than 60 copies, with translations in Italian, Greek, and even English, was extremely influential for many centuries and was extensively plagiarized in Bartolomeo delli Sonetti's *Isolario* of 1478 and in numerous subsequent publications and maps.[36] Much more precise and scientific was the work of Buondelmonti's successor Ciriaco de Ancona who, just a decade later, visited the islands, copying inscriptions and drawing sculptures. Yet Ciriaco travelled with a version of Buondelmonti's *Liber* from which he copied, sometimes without understanding it;[37] such are the dangers of using guide books as historical sources. Ciriaco himself provided useful contemporary information; thus he mentioned the marble statues excavated on Paros by its Latin lord Crusino Summaripa, his own visit to the quarries there, and the ship ready to sail for Chios with a load of local stone.[38]

Aegean travellers faced many dangers. Niccolò da Martoni described a storm off southern Greece which terrified the sailors while the pilgrims huddled in a corner, being sick and reciting prayers.[39] Buondelmonti was himself wrecked on a small island near Samos; after seven days and the death of various fellow castaways, he scratched on a rock 'Here the priest Cristophorus died of terrible hunger', but then he was saved by a passing vessel. He also told of five Venetian galleys wrecked at Santorin; of a wreck off Tenos when the horses swam ashore and multiplied; of a man who survived eight days on a plank and a year on a rock eating roots and plants; of Turks wrecked at Psara near Chios, who killed goats and donkeys to build an escape raft with their skins; and of the Christians who rescued some shipwrecked Turks who then overpowered their rescuers and took them as slaves to Turkey.[40]

Piracy probably increased as the imperial Byzantine fleet was reduced. The Aegean was a kind of no-man's-land, though the Turks almost never controlled or settled on its islands before 1453. Piracy – Greek, Latin, Turkish, or mixed – became institutionalized. The Navigaiosi rulers of Lemnos apparently had nine pirate galleys before 1279.[41] A text of 1278 listed more than 90 pirates,[42] and Marino Sanudo claimed that the emperor Michael VIII, who died in 1282, eliminated over 2,000 pirates on the islands.[43] Many pirates had official protection. Naxos was a base for Catalan and Basque corsairs in 1410,[44] and Niccolò da Martoni could not enter Rhodes because of Catalan pirates there in 1395.[45] By 1413 the Hospitallers at Rhodes had their own official *corso* system for a form of licensed corsairing, with agreed shares in investments and booty.[46] Systematic Turkish raiding, sometimes with considerable fleets, was something different. It became a major threat in about 1300, and the knowledgeable Marino Sanudo considered that this was part of a policy designed to create a frontier zone of deserted islands. The Latins, in reply, moved on to the offshore islands of Rhodes and Chios. The larger islands had their own galley or galleys and their land militias to defend them, though the costs were borne by their inhabitants who, on Crete at least, repeatedly revolted in protest. The Venetians made commercial treaties with the Anatolian emirates of Aydin and Menteşe, by which they paid tribute in return for immunity from attack; some of the smaller islands in the Venetian sphere of control and interest, such as Carpathos, Cerigo, Seriphos, Santorin, Stampalia, and Amorgos, were sometimes included in these arrangements.[47]

Many smaller islands, and the remoter parts of larger ones, had only small towers to defend them. Islanders often retreated to inland towers or fortified villages at night; on Ios they sent out old women to scout the land at dawn.[48] If seaborne attackers were able to surprise the local militias they could do considerable damage, but they seldom risked leaving their ships on the beach in order to attack fortified hilltop positions inland. Even a small tower was valuable as a look-out station or temporary defence. Thus in 1366 the government on Rhodes conceded the small island of Limnia on condition that a tower of specified size, to be manned by six men, was constructed there together with a cistern, presumably for rain-water.[49] Niccolò da Martoni's ship was threatened at Cythnos by Catalan pirates in 1395, but he was able to flee by difficult paths at night across the mountain with his essential luggage, taking refuge in a hilltop town governed by a certain Giovanni da Bologna, and after some days he could board another ship to Athens.[50] Buondelmonti noted a signal station at Diadromoi near Skopelos about 1420, and about 1340 Ludolph of Sudheim mentioned

the system of fire signals operating between Castellorizzo, Rhodes, and Cos.[51] Pirates also had their problems. Buondelmonti told of pirates repairing their ship at Ios whence it was carried away by a wave, how Cythnos was saved when two Cretan galleys arrived to slaughter the attacking Turks, and how Turks at Carpathos had their ships burnt while they were ravaging the island, with the result that over one hundred of them died of hunger in the hills.[52]

Conditions on very small islands were especially miserable. To whom they belonged and what governmental arrangements there were must often have been obscure. Buondelmonti mentioned islands with only a few monks or a hermit, in one case a monk who farmed a nearby island, and he wrote of uninhabited islands used only for pasture or where the Turks came to capture goats.[53] In 1395 Martoni found that Castellorizzo had many vines on the mainland and a truce with the Turks there.[54] Buondelmonti reported that houses on Telos were fit for goats and that the islanders lived in misery; the inhabitants of Carpathos produced pine-pitch and lived on milk; on Seriphos they ate goat meat and lived like brutes, in perpetual fear of the Turks even though that island was mentioned in all seven of the surviving Venetian tribute treaties agreed with the Turks between 1331 and 1407; on Syros they ate carobs and goat meat, but stayed despite the Turkish threat; and on Naxos he wrote that the women were celibate for lack of men.[55] In 1403 Ruy Gonçalez de Clavijo noted the grain production on Calymnos, the Latin garrison of 100 men on Cos, and Turkish devastations on Leros. He reported that the ruler of Ikaria was a woman and remarked on the extensive cultivation there.[56] Other stories seem less reliable. Leaving aside Sir John de Mandeville's dragon on Cos,[57] the pilgrim Anselme Adorno claimed in 1470 that the men of Simi were so ferocious and ill-natured that the Turks would not buy them as slaves, and were such good swimmers that they could escape from the mainland by swimming home.[58]

The lesser islands sometimes imported grain or exported and exchanged foodstuffs and other products with neighbouring islands. Carpathos was receiving grain from Crete in 1356.[59] Local products included millstones on Melos,[60] silk at Tenos[61] and Cythnos,[62] and cotton on Siphnos and Santorin.[63] The smaller islands north of Rhodes sent their exports there, Cos being especially fertile. Simi had its own ship which transported wines, melons, and grapes both to Rhodes and to the mainland Turks.[64] The sulphur at Nisyros was sold to visiting merchants,[65] and the island was farmed out at 600 florins a year in 1433.[66] Nisyros also grew barley rather than wheat and it exported wine and large quantities of figs; when Niccolò da Martoni's ship was two miles from Nisyros six Greeks, who came out in a small boat to ask for

news, promised fresh meat, grapes, and melons, but never returned with them.[67]

Other activities were connected with the sea. There was naval construction, at Rhodes[68] and Siphnos[69] for example, while small boats must have been built on many islands. There was local fishing which was presumably important for the islanders' diet.[70] Niccolò da Martoni sailed on a small fishing boat from Sykaminon to Negroponte, where he was glad to find a clean room and a fresh bed.[71] The celibate women reported on Naxos and Siphnos may have been abandoned by menfolk who became galley oarsmen; in 1402, for example, a Genoese galley crew included twelve sailors from Rhodes.[72] This was a permanent occupation, unlike the periodic obligations to military or naval service in times of crisis owed by Latins and Greeks on Crete, Rhodes, Tenos, and elsewhere.[73] There was a class of local businessmen and a round of cabotage, with Greek and Latin ships under Greek and Latin captains tramping around the islands.[74] When the Lord of Anglure was wrecked on an obscure isle off the Turkish coast in 1396 he was saved by a small vessel carrying salt produced on Castellorizzo to the mainland; from Castellorizzo, where he found a Hospitaller castellan in the castle and 60 Greeks working salt there, he went in the same small boat to Rhodes, and there he hired a ship captained by a Greek.[75]

The Latins and the richer Greeks lived mainly on the larger islands, in towns and ports but seldom in the countryside. On the small islands the population tended to retreat inland to the hills, where there was often a castle and sometimes a small Latin garrison, with a suburb for Greeks and others. The villages were fortified to protect the Greeks rather than to subjugate them. Sometimes houses were built so that their backs formed a continuous protective outer wall.[76] Small islands might have a number of fortified habitats; Niccolò da Martoni mentioned three *castra* and several *casalia*, the latter presumably unfortified, on Nisyros.[77]

Except in the larger islands and apart from a few garrison chapels, the Latins must have used Greek priests and Greek churches, some of which probably had separate altars for the Greek and Latin rites. The great monastery on Patmos was a special case, but many smaller monastic houses were to be found on the islands. Buondelmonti reported a single hermit on Sanctus Helias near Skopelos; another in a grotto on Myconos; a church on Kaloyeros in which two monks were captured by Turks disguised as monks; and a female recluse at Polikandros near Kilamos smoked to death in her grotto by Turks. Most of these holy men were presumably Greeks, though Buondelmonti wrote that the inhabitants of Siphnos, mainly women, followed the Roman rite while knowing no Latin.[78] At Rhodes, Niccolò da Martoni noticed

the Greek priests' hats, beards, and long hair as well as their married state.[79] The Greek priests were often servile in status and, technically at least, under Latin control, but they retained some properties and incomes together with a degree of local independence.

Not all the smaller islands of the Aegean were under Latin rule, and Rhodes after 1306 and Chios in 1347 were occupied after agreements ensured certain rights for their Greek inhabitants. Lesbos and Lemnos were closer to the imperial capital and remained more Greek in spirit. The Genoese Francesco Gattilusio secured Lesbos by imperial grant in 1355, and he and successive generations of his family married into the Byzantine imperial house; the Gattilusio retained their Genoese connections but were not inclined to repress their Greek clergy. They spoke Greek and depended on their Byzantine alliance, acquiring the lesser islands of Samothrace, Thassos, and Imbros.[80] Lemnos actually reversed the usual process of Latinization, since it was controlled by the Navigaioso family from 1207 to 1276 but was thereafter Byzantine, much land on the island forming imperial or monastic estates.

Distant colonial powers, operating through paper contacts with local officials, a system which could produce serious misunderstandings, had interests which differed from those of the petty island dynasties, of a military order such as that at Rhodes, or of a commercial regime of the type which controlled Chios. The smaller islands seldom interested the Latins, and their classical remains attracted only a limited group of visitors. Some isles could provide produce and act as a defensive shield for a larger island, as in the case of Rhodes. Many Aegean Latins moved in a world of notaries, tax obligations, militia duties, and other institutions much like those of their Italian homelands, while accepting local conditions, absorbing existing Byzantine practices, and tolerating Greek religious rites. Niccolò da Martoni and Cristoforo Buondelmonti evidently found island life poor and brutal, the food appalling, and the beds dirty. Many Aegean Latins must have shared the sentiments of the homesick chancery scribe at Naxos who wrote in a copy of the Assizes of Romania: 'O, quando andar nella tiera di Venexia'.[81]

NOTES

1. There has been little general consideration of the tone of life on the smaller Aegean islands or of Latin attitudes towards them. This essay uses only a limited selection of sources and indicates only certain themes; no comprehensive bibliography is included.
2. Cf. F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, Vol. 1, trans. S. Reynolds (London, 1972), pp.148–60.
3. B. Slot, *Archipelagus Turbatus: les Cyclades entre colonisation latine et occupation ottomane, c. 1500–1718*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1982), Vol. 1, pp.13, 24–34; the statistics for arable land date from 1961.

4. M. Balard, 'Les Grecs de Chio sous la domination génoise au XIV^e siècle', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 5 (1977), 9.
5. M. Balard, *La Romanie génoise (XII^e–début du XV^e siècle)*, 2 vols. (Genoa and Rome, 1978), Vol. 1, p.253.
6. 'Relation du pèlerinage à Jérusalem de Nicolas de Martoni', ed. L. Legrand, *Revue de l'Orient latin*, 3 (1895), 638, 655.
7. Text in J. Koder, 'Topographie und Bevölkerung des Ägaïs-Inseln in spätbyzantinischer Zeit: Probleme der Quellen', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 5 (1977), 231, n.20; analysed in Slot, *Archipelagus Turbatus*, Vol. 2, pp.284–9.
8. Koder, 'Topographie', 232–3; cf. id., 'Überlegungen zur Bevölkerungsdichte des byzantinischen Raumes in Spätmittelalter und Frühneuzeit', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 12 (1987), 291–305.
9. E. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade: Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin (1300–1415)* (Venice, 1983), pp.81–2, n.357.
10. Slot, *Archipelagus Turbatus*, Vol. 1, pp.13–15.
11. P. Topping, 'Armenian and Greek Refugees in Crete and the Aegean World', *Pepragmena tou Diethnoūs Krētologikou Synedriou*, Vol. 2 (Heraklion, 1986), pp.364–74.
12. See E. Malamut, 'Les îles de la mer Egée de la fin du XI^e siècle à 1204', *Byzantion*, 52 (1982), 310–50, who makes interesting use of archaeological and architectural data.
13. A. Luttrell, 'Feudal Tenure and Latin Colonization at Rhodes: 1306–1415', *English Historical Review*, 85 (1970), repr. in id., *The Hospitallers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Greece and the West: 1291–1440* (London, 1978), No. III, pp.759–61.
14. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp.97–8.
15. Malamut, 'Les îles de la mer Egée', 326, which documents Slavs moving to the Cyclades before 1204; cf. A. Vacalopoulos, 'The Flight of Inhabitants of Greece to the Aegean Islands, Crete, and Mane during the Turkish Invasions (Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries)', *Charanis Studies: Essays in Honor of Peter Charanis* (New Brunswick, 1980), pp.272–83.
16. J. Haldon, 'Limnos, Monastic Holdings and the Byzantine State: ca. 1261–1453', in *Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society*, ed. A. Bryer and H. Lowry (Birmingham and Washington, 1986), p.182.
17. A. Luttrell, 'The *Servitudo Marina* at Rhodes: 1306–1462', *Serta Neograeca*, ed. K. Dimaras and P. Wirth (Amsterdam, 1975), repr. in id., *The Hospitallers*, No. IV, pp.57–62.
18. W. Miller, *The Latins in the Levant* (London, 1908), pp.599–600.
19. F. Thiriet, *Régestes des délibérations du Sénat de Venise concernant la Romanie*, 3 vols. (Paris and The Hague, 1958–1961), Vol. 1, p.88.
20. E. Zachariadou, 'Notes sur la population de l'Asie Mineure turque au XIV^e siècle', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 12 (1987), 230–31.
21. M. Balivet, 'Derviches turcs en Romanie latine: quelques remarques sur la circulation des idées au XV^e siècle', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 11 (1987), 251, 253.
22. M.-M. Alexandrescu-Dersca, 'Le rôle des esclaves en Romanie turque au XV^e siècle', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 11 (1987), 15–28.
23. A. Luttrell, 'Slavery at Rhodes: 1306–1440', *Bulletin de l'Institut historique belge de Rome, 46–7* (1976–77), repr. in id., *Latin Greece, the Hospitallers and the Crusade: 1291–1400* (London, 1982), No. VI, pp.81–2.
24. C. Verlinden, *L'Esclavage dans l'Europe médiévale*, Vol. 2 (Ghent, 1977), pp.558, 563–4, 818, 820, 822–4, 827.
25. Balard, 'Les Grecs', 13.
26. Luttrell, 'The *Servitudo Marina*', in id., *The Hospitallers*, No. IV, pp.64–5.
27. D. Jacoby, *La Féodalité en Grèce médiévale: les 'Assises de Romanie' – sources, application et diffusion* (Paris and The Hague, 1971), pp.242–6.
28. A. Luttrell, 'Greeks, Latins and Turks on Late-Medieval Rhodes', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 11 (1987), 361 (an article which was published without proofs and with various uncorrected errors and omissions).

29. *Oeuvres de Froissart: Chroniques*, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, Vol. 16 (Brussels, 1872), pp.48–50.
30. C. Marinescu, 'Du nouveau sur *Tirant lo Blanch*', *Estudis Romànics*, 4 (1953–54), 137–203.
31. Most recently, L. Beschi, 'La scoperta dell'arte greca', in *Memoria dell'antico nell'arte italiana*, ed. S. Settis, Vol. 3 (Turin, 1986), pp.304–35.
32. Domenico Silvestri, *De insulis et earum proprietatibus*, ed. C. Pecoraro, in *Atti della Accademia di Scienze Lettere e Arti di Palermo*, 4th ser., 24, fasc. 2 (1954), 5–319.
33. The best survey and bibliography is by R. Weiss, 'Buondelmonti, Cristoforo', *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, 15 (Rome, 1972), pp.198–200, with additional material in A. Luttrell, *The Later History of the Maussolleion and its Utilization in the Hospitaller Castle at Bodrum = The Maussolleion at Halikarnassos*, Vol. 2, Pt. 2 (Aarhus, 1986), pp.189–94, 210–11, which also lists 60 surviving manuscripts. The extremely complex connections between these manuscripts is being studied by Hilary-Louise Turner; cf. H.-L. Turner, 'Cristoforo Buondelmonti and the *Isolario*', *Terrae Incognitae*, 19 (1987) A new edition is highly desirable; for present purposes use is made of *Christoph. Buondelmontii, Florentini, Librum insularum archipelagi*, ed. G. de Sinner (Leipzig and Berlin, 1824), though some of the material may refer to c.1450 rather than, as often assumed, c.1420.
34. Buondelmonti, *Liber*, pp.52, 67–9, 72–3, 78, 92–3, *passim*.
35. Ibid., p.36; H. Eberhard, 'Byzantinische Burgen auf den Kykladen: ihre Rolle und Bedeuten', *Jahrbuch der österreichischen Byzantinistik*, 36 (1986), 174.
36. Slot, *Archipelagus Turbatus*, Vol. 1, pp.7–8.
37. Luttrell, *The Maussolleion*, p.211, n.64.
38. As cited in Miller, *The Latins*, p.605; see also E. Bodnar and C. Mitchell, *Cyriacus of Ancona's Journeys in the Propontis and the Northern Aegean: 1444–1445* (Philadelphia, 1976).
39. Legrand (ed.), 'Nicolas de Martoni', 581.
40. Buondelmonti, *Liber*, pp.66, 79, 88–9, 110–11.
41. P. Topping, 'Latins on Lemnos before and after 1453', in Bryer and Lowry (eds.), *Continuity and Change*, p.219.
42. Balard, *La Romanie génoise*, Vol. 2, p.591, n.215.
43. *Chroniques gréco-romanes inédites ou peu connues*, ed. C. Hopf (Berlin, 1873), p.146.
44. N. Sathas, *Documents inédits relatifs à l'histoire de la Grèce au Moyen Age*, Vol. 2 (Paris, 1881), pp.255–6.
45. Legrand (ed.), 'Nicolas de Martoni', 639.
46. Valletta, National Library of Malta, Archives of the Order of St John, Cod. 339, fol. 213v, 289.
47. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp.6–7, 103, *passim*.
48. Buondelmonti, *Liber*, p.99.
49. Luttrell, 'Feudal Tenure', in id., *The Hospitallers*, No. III, p.761 and n.3.
50. Legrand (ed.), 'Nicolas de Martoni', 646–8.
51. Buondelmonti, *Liber*, pp.129–30, Ludolphus de Suchen, *De itinere Terrae Sanctae*, ed. F. Deycks (Stuttgart, 1851), p.28.
52. Buondelmonti, *Liber*, pp.71, 85, 99.
53. Buondelmonti, *Liber*, pp.80, 95–6, 100; on islands used only for pasture, see also Slot, *Archipelagus Turbatus*, Vol. 1, p.32.
54. Legrand (ed.), 'Nicolas de Martoni', 639.
55. Buondelmonti, *Liber*, pp.71, 76, 83–4, 93, 97.
56. *Embajada a Tamorlán*, ed. F. López Estrada (Madrid, 1943), pp.18–19, 22–4.
57. *Mandeville's Travels*, ed. M. Seymour (Oxford, 1975), pp.16–18.
58. *Itinéraire d'Anselme Adorno en Terre Sainte: 1470–1471*, ed. J. Heers and G. de Groer (Paris, 1978), p.370.
59. Thiriet, *Régestes*, Vol. 1, p.80.
60. Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, *La pratica della mercatura*, ed. A. Evans (Cambridge, MA, 1936), pp.367, 397.

61. Slot, *Archipelagus Turbatus*, Vol. 1, pp.18–19; Vol. 2, p.331, n.24.
62. Buondelmonti, *Liber*, p.85.
63. Slot, *Archipelagus Turbatus*, Vol. 1, pp.54, 63.
64. Buondelmonti, *Liber*, pp.74–5; Legrand (ed.), Nicholas de Martoni, 583, 639.
65. Ibid., p.76.
66. Luttrell, 'Feudal Tenure', in id., *The Hospitallers*, No. III, p.765.
67. Legrand (ed.), 'Nicolas de Martoni', 582–3.
68. A. Luttrell and V. von Falkenhausen, 'Lindos and the Defence of Rhodes: 1306–1522', *Rivista di studi bizantini e neoellenici*, 32–3 (1985–86), 323, n.32.
69. Slot, *Archipelagus Turbatus*, Vol. 1, p.63; Vol. 2, p.331, n.29.
70. Balard, *La Romanie génoise*, Vol. 2, pp.705–8; *Hellas und Thessalia = Tabula Imperii Bizantini*, Vol. 1, ed. J. Koder and F. Hild (Vienna, 1976), pp.103–4; K.-P. Matschke, 'Situation, Organisation und Aktion der Fischer von Konstantinopel und Umgebung in der byzantinischen Spätzeit', *Byzantinobulgarica*, 6 (1980), 281–98.
71. Legrand (ed.), 'Nicolas de Martoni', 653–4.
72. G. Musso, *Navigazione e commercio genovese con il Levante nei documenti dell'Archivio di Stato di Genova (Secc. XIV–XV)* (Rome, 1975), pp.189–90, n.1.
73. Jacoby, *La féodalité, passim*; Luttrell, 'The *Servitudo Marina*', in id., *The Hospitallers*, No. IV *passim*.
74. For example, A. Luttrell, 'Crete and Rhodes: 1340–1360', *Pepragmena tou Diethnous Krētologikou Synedriou*, Vol. 2 (Athens, 1974); repr. in id., *The Hospitallers*, No. VI, pp.168–9; A. Lombardo, 'Cittadini di Creta e commercio cretese a Cipro nella seconda metà del sec. XIV da un cartolare notarile rogato a Famagosta: 1360–1362', *Pepragmena tou B' Diethnous Krētologikou Synedriou*, Vol. 3 (Athens, 1968), pp.102–50. Extensive information on local shipping awaits study.
75. *Le saint voyage de Jhérusalem du Seigneur d'Anglure*, ed. F. Bonnardot and A. Longnon (Paris, 1878), pp.89–91.
76. For example, plans of a village on Santorin and of a castle on Antiparos in J. Koder, *Der Lebensraum der Byzantiner* (Graz-Vienna-Cologne, 1984), pp.125, 127. Much of the published material on the 'habitat' is rather vague and superficial; precise survey work is needed. J. Poutiers, 'Première esquisse d'une étude du *Kastro* des Cyclades au XV^{e} siècle', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 11 (1987), 381–98, advances interesting hypotheses.
77. Legrand (ed.), 'Nicolas de Martoni', 582.
78. Buondelmonti, *Liber*, pp.80, 83, 90, 101, 106, 130–31.
79. Legrand (ed.), 'Nicolas de Martoni', 584.
80. A. Luttrell, 'John V's Daughters: A Palaiologan Puzzle', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 40 (1986), 103–12.
81. Cited in Slot, *Archipelagus Turbatus*, Vol. 1, p.64.

The Genoese in the Aegean (1204–1566)

MICHEL BALARD

'Death to the Genoese; let them be killed!' With these rather unpleasant words, the Greeks of Chios rejected the offer of protection presented to them by Simone Vignoso's envoys in June 1346.[1] In return, around the year 1480, Laonicus Chalcocondylas, son of an Athenian patriot who had strongly opposed western domination,[2] expressed his satisfaction with the *mahonesi* of Chios, stating that they had governed the island 'with the greatest of moderation'.[3] These completely contradictory assessments provide a fitting framework for the problem of Genoese-Greek relations in the Aegean world. What brought about the shift from ultra-violent hatred of the western invaders to resigned and even willing acceptance of their power? Before examining this evolution, we must determine which parts of the Aegean held interest for the Genoese between 1204 and 1566.

The capture of Constantinople and the division of the Byzantine empire came as a considerable blow to Genoa. The quarter of the capital originally ceded to the Genoese by the *basileis* fell into the hands of the conquerors. The *Partitio Romaniae* gave Venice control of the sea routes – amounting nearly to domination of the Aegean – thanks to the occupation of Crete and the establishment of the Duchy of Naxos, awarded to a Venetian family. In 1204, Genoa was effectively ousted from the Romaniot area and barred from its most fruitful trade routes.

The initial Genoese response to this situation was an attempt to reopen the question of Venetian supremacy. Genoa favoured privateering warfare against its rivals: attacks on Corfu by Leo Vetrano,[4] raids on Venetian merchant ships by the count of Malta, Enrico Pescatore,[5] and primarily the occupation of Crete by the same Pescatore. More or less effectively backed by Genoese funds guaranteed by income from the island of Malta, as well as by ships placed at his disposal by his protectors, Pescatore succeeded in maintaining the occupation for nearly five years.[6] Eventually, beaten off the coast of Rhodes, he was forced to abandon his position in exchange for financial advantages; nevertheless, his comrade-in-arms Alamano Costa, count of Syracuse, more or less assisted by the native population, led the Cretan resistance movement until 1217.[7] The failure of the naval warfare and the surrender of the Cretan rebels forced Genoa to negotiate. In principle, the convention of 11 May 1218 restored most of

the Genoese rights in the empire of Constantinople; yet, in practice, Venetian hegemony brought Genoese commercial activity almost to a standstill.

The first diplomatic negotiations with the Nicaean empire and the despotate of Epirus achieved no concrete results, nor did the operation launched in 1249 against John Gabalas, lord of Rhodes. The Aegean squadron dispatched by John Vatatzes routed the Genoese, who, by taking over Rhodes, sought to obtain an essential port of call in the eastern Mediterranean, as well as a possible base of action against the Venetian possessions.[8] As we know, the rivalry among the communes within the kingdom of Jerusalem again called the existing state of affairs into question, and gave Genoa the opportunity to form a decisive alliance with the Nicaean empire.

This article will not attempt any lengthy review of the treaty of Nymphaeum, nor of the consequences of that treaty.[9] Did Genoa take advantage of the Byzantine reconquest to re-establish its foothold in the Aegean world, while at the same time resuming its former eminent position in Constantinople itself? The concessions made to the Genoese by Michael VIII did, in fact, include the promise of sole ownership of trading posts: not only in Ania, Smyrna, and Adramyttium (cities already under the sovereignty of the *basileus*), but also in Constantinople, Cassandria, Mytilene, Chios, Crete, and Negroponte (cities and territories which the Greeks would be able to retake as a result of the alliance with the Genoese).[10]

In reality, however, the Byzantine reconquest of Constantinople certainly did not enable the fulfilment of all the promises made to the Genoese. Very few trading posts were actually set up in accordance with the terms of the treaty, which specified a *loggia*, a church, a warehouse, and a consular administration for each post. Some scholars have even asked whether Michael VIII did not intend to cede only the revenues of the stipulated locations, rather than the locations themselves.[11] Does this mean that the clauses of the treaty of Nymphaeum regarding the Aegean world were never implemented? In fact, they were applied unevenly and with considerable delay.

In his discussion of the so-called Genoese colony of Thessalonica,[12] I. Ševčenko first notes that the trading post granted to the Genoese by the treaty of Nymphaeum was not in Thessalonica itself, but in Cassandria, a small *emporium* in the theme of Thessalonica. While admitting that the Genoese might have established intermittent commercial contacts with the second largest city of the empire, he denies that they could ever have set up a permanent colony there. His final point is that the supposed Genoese influence on the revolt of the zealots is actually in the order of a historical myth. In view of the

Genoese documents which I have been able to assemble, all but the last of these conclusions appear somewhat excessive to me. Ševčenko, in his article, mentions the complaints lodged with the Byzantine authorities by the Commune in 1294; some of these concerned the harassment of nationals by imperial officers in Thessalonica itself.[13] A notarial act of 1289 concerns the sailing of a *tarida* owned by Fulco and Nicoleta d'Albenga from Caffa or La Tana to Chios and Thessalonica.[14] The latter city was the site of several specific commercial investments, spaced over the years from 1277 to 1317. Undoubtedly the most important document is the one stating that, in May 1305, a certain Sestino Codino bore the title of Genoese consul in Thessalonica, this indicating the permanent establishment of a small community of businessmen.[15] We must conclude that Genoa sought to gain a foothold in the zone of Venetian influence, by supporting the activity of its nationals on the western shores of the Aegean Sea. None the less, the small number of documents, as well as the fact that Thessalonica is not mentioned in any Genoese deed after 1317, show that the results of its efforts were ephemeral. The Genoese did not succeed for any length of time in competing with the Venetians, whose position in Thessaly and Macedonia was older and stronger than their own.

The last attempts to launch a Genoese bridgehead in the western Aegean took place during the years 1345–50. In June 1346, Simone Vignoso's fleet made a stop at Negroponte, where it encountered vessels of the Pontifical League, under the command of Humbert, Dauphin of Viennois. The Genoese admiral refused the offers of co-operation; by virtue of his naval superiority, he robbed the dauphin's crews and quickly set sail for Chios, in order to get there before the League forces, which had hoped to use the island as a base for operations against Smyrna.[16] Five years later, Paganino Doria's fleet laid siege to Negroponte, where the Venetian admiral Niccolo Pisani was firmly entrenched. The operation, hastily launched, had to be suspended, due to both the resistance of the defenders and the news that the Venetian-Catalan fleet was shortly to arrive.[17] On 1 October 1351, Paganino Doria lifted the siege and sought refuge on Chios. The attempt to conquer a base in the western Aegean proved a definitive failure.

Thus, around the year 1350, the antagonism between Venice and Genoa culminated in the division of the Aegean into zones of influence. The Venetian zone encompassed the west, the south, and the centre, so that, by controlling the Dalmatian coasts and the Ionian islands, Venice dominated the route to Constantinople as far as the Straits. The Genoese zone included the eastern coasts and islands – another access route to Constantinople, but also to the eastern Mediterranean. It was

actually at this date that the Genoese occupation of the eastern Aegean became permanent.

Let us recall that the first stage in this process was the concession of the alum factories of Phocaea to the brothers Benedetto and Manuele Zaccaria, which undoubtedly took place in 1267. In order to protect the fruitful alum trade against Turkish piracy, the Zaccarias installed a garrison at Adramyttium, occupied the port of Smyrna, and gained a foothold on Chios in 1304; in this manner, under the theoretical sovereignty of Byzantium, they ensured the defence of the island threatened by the Turks, and acquired a second monopoly – of mastic – in addition to their alum monopoly. The brothers' heirs sought to expand those conquests: Domenico Cattaneo seized Mytilene, while Martino Zaccaria wished to unite all of those territories into a vast Aegean lordship, independent of the imperial power. His ambition, however, clashed with the nationalism of his subjects, who appealed to the *basileus*. In 1329, Andronicus III restored Byzantine sovereignty to Chios, and in 1336 to Mytilene. Genoa was unable to accept such a loss of territory, and, in 1346, took advantage of the power struggle in Byzantium to support the dispatch of a private fleet, under the command of Simone Vignoso, to the Orient. The reconquest of Chios and the two Phocaeas by the Genoese was far from fortuitous. In fact, it was part of a systematic plan for re-establishing a network of ports of call on the main sea route to Constantinople and the Black Sea.[18] The exhaustion of Vignoso's crews prevented the recapture of Mytilene on that occasion. However, in 1355, a Genoese named Francesco Gattilusio was fortunate enough to marry the *basileus*' sister, and received the island as a dowry; he established a dynasty there which was to remain in power until the Ottoman conquest of 1462.[19] His brother Niccolo annexed the city of Aenos in 1384; his grandson Palamede was given the islands of Imbros and Samothrace in fief by the *basileus*.[20] Following the war of Chioggia, Genoa succeeded in obtaining the demilitarization of Tenedos, which the Venetians had occupied in order to thwart their powerful rivals in the region of the Straits.

The majority of these conquests, starting from that of Chios and Phocaea, resulted from private initiatives; nevertheless, this is not to say that they did not affect the commune of Genoa. That organization was no more than an agglomeration of interests geared towards commercial profit, which gave its recognition and support to initiatives developed by private individuals or groups. The Commune had no plans for direct territorial domination; it concerned itself solely with the possession or control of trading posts, warehouses, and bases for an extension of the commercial network constructed by the Genoese.[21] To maintain those trading posts, it only had to involve the local elites

(whose privileges had, for the most part, been preserved) in its business affairs, and to impose upon the peasants and lower classes the same order which had prevailed under the former Byzantine domination. Flexibility, a fair administration, numerous local initiatives, and the absence of religious proselytism were among the principles which dictated Genoese policy on relations with the Greek population in the Aegean. Unfortunately, we can only examine the implementation of that policy in the restricted domain of the island of Chios, as sources concerning the other Aegean territories are scant or nearly non-existent.[22]

Genoese politics during the period under discussion passed through several stages. The rule of the Zaccaria brothers, Benedetto and Manuele, seems to have been accepted by the native population, resulting as it did from a temporary, renewable concession made by the *basileus* Andronicus II, who desired to associate the Genoese with the defence of the empire against the Turks. As soon as their heirs, Benedetto II and Martino, attempted – with the support of the papacy – to turn the island into a citadel of faith against the Turks and to escape from Byzantine dominion, they ran up against the legitimacy of the Greek population, which remained loyal to the *basileus* and to the Orthodox Church, guarantor of the imperial powers. To no avail did Martino Zaccaria maintain a standing army of a thousand infantrymen, a hundred cavalrymen, and two armed galleys;[23] to no avail did he forbid the Chians to bear arms, on pain of death – being, as Cantacuzenus notes,[24] well aware that Chian public opinion was far from supporting him, and suspecting that they favoured the emperor. In point of fact, Andronicus II had only to send a message to the people of Chios and a letter ordering Martino to submit; the Greeks of the island immediately rallied in support of the Byzantine reconquest in 1329 and expelled the Genoese.[25]

Up to 1346, authority on the island was, in fact, exercised by the Greek *archontes*, major landowners, imperial dignitaries – in a word, by those 'powerful ones' among whom Cantacuzenus singles out Leon Calothetos. But there were also those who concluded a treaty with Simone Vignoso, commandant of the Genoese fleet, on 12 September 1346: the master-falconer Argenti, Costa Tzybos, the great *sacellarius* Michali Coressi, Sevasto Coressi and George Agelasto, representatives of Caloianni Tzybos, master of the citadel of Chios.[26] That elite of landowners and officers held power in the name of the emperor; their circumstances became even more comfortable in 1329 when, in return for their assistance, Andronicus III exempted them from any personal tax (*kapnikon*).[27]

We should not be surprised that the memory of Martino Zaccaria's

oppressive domination incited the Chians to a rude rejection of the offer of protection presented to them in June 1346 by Simone Vignoso's envoys. 'Death to the Genoese!' they cried from the high walls of the citadel, which they believed a strong enough fortress to resist the forces of the Pontifical League and the Genoese themselves.[28] Nevertheless, Simone Vignoso's troops occupied the island and laid siege to the citadel. On 12 September 1346, Caloianni Tzybos was forced to surrender. The terms of the treaty of capitulation are so moderate as to be astonishing. The vanquished leader retained all of his rights and possessions, provided that he transfer his loyalty from the *basileus* to the commune of Genoa. He was allotted the sum of 7,000 *hyperpyra* in three years, out of the income of the island, and, along with his family, was exempted from any taxation instituted by the Genoese.[29] Several weeks later, he was even named governor of Old Phocaea in the name of the Commune.

The conquerors exhibited the same restraint in the treaty concluded with the Greek nobility on 12 September 1346. Simone Vignoso subjected the 'powerful ones' to an oath of loyalty to the Commune, leaving the Greeks in charge of all of their property, churches, monasteries, and clergy, and with total freedom of movement. He confirmed the privileges formerly accorded by the *basileus*, undertook to refrain from imposing extraordinary loans, and granted an amnesty. The obligations stipulated for the vanquished were limited: they had to submit to the Commune, which was to maintain complete jurisdiction over them in future; and to repair 200 houses inside the citadel of Chios, to facilitate the housing of the Latin forces, but at a price fixed by a mixed commission. The text of these two treaties – undoubtedly prepared far in advance of Chios' surrender – illustrates the Genoese eagerness to win the local elite to their cause, by refraining from any change in their possessions and privileges, provided only that they recognize the sovereignty of the Commune in future. In short, these treaties comprised a gentle substitution of one master for another. By contrast, the terms of capitulation were stricter concerning Phocaea, where the Genoese imposed legislation of their own, applying it to their fellow-citizens called upon to reside there as well as to the Greeks.[30]

The prudence, moderation, desire to forget the past, and offers of collaboration extended by the Genoese were not repaid in kind. Among the Greek elite, the feeling of belonging to the empire and the Orthodox Church overcame any possibility of passive acceptance of the offered peace. The conquerors, after all, were still heretics and despoilers. The case of the Nea Moni, which has come down to us from a later account drawn up by the *didaskalos* Nicephorus, based on traditions which prevailed in monastic circles, illustrates this phenom-

enon in an exemplary manner.[31] As soon as Simone Vignoso's forces had landed, the monks of Nea Moni rushed to abandon their monastery; in their panic, they lost some of the sacred objects and gifts presented to them by the *basileis*. One of them, a native of Pyrgi (a small town at the southern end of the island), took the icon of the Theotokos away with him and hid it in his village. Upon his death, the local *papas* returned the holy image to the monastery and entered it as a monk, accompanied by his two sons. Although the alleged acts included in the collection *Ta Neamonēsia* are unverifiable, these accounts express the violent hostility of the popular and Orthodox clerical circles towards the conquerors. Fear and hatred of the Latins prompted many to flee, and others to appeal to the *basileus* of Constantinople, as had been the case under the Martino Zaccaria government.

In 1346–47, however, such appeals had small chance of being heard. The rule of Byzantium was then bitterly disputed by John VI Cantacuzenus and Anne of Savoy, regent for her son John V. The naval resources at the disposal of the latter were far from equal to those of Andronicus III in 1329; a few triremes, armed by Phakeolatos, set sail to assist the defenders. However, having learned of his compatriots' surrender, the Byzantine admiral hastily turned tail and fled.[32]

Having lost all hope of rescue from without, the Greeks of the island had no other solution than to get rid of Vignoso's companions, by means of a plot headed by the metropolitan. A later source[33] informs us that this was intended to restore the island to the empire by assassinating the Genoese chiefs, who had assembled to celebrate Easter. As the first confiscations of property from those who had participated in the rebellion are noted in a document dated 20 February 1348,[34] the revolt itself must have taken place on 1 April 1347, Easter Day. The conspirators met in the Church of St George of Varvassi, in the Kampos. Denounced to the *mahonesi* by an unknown traitor, they were arrested, summarily tried, and hanged at the gate of the citadel, with the exception of the metropolitan. The latter was exiled and replaced by a *dichaios*, whose appointment in future would have to be confirmed by the *mahonesi*, rather than by the patriarchate of Constantinople. The property of the condemned, titled *xelimata* in Greek and *chisilima* in official notary parlance,[35] was confiscated and distributed among the accusers, the *mahonesi*, and the Latin colonists who had been attracted to the island. The notary deeds drawn up to formalize the transfer of property have given us the names of some of the participants in the plot: Michali Coressi and his brother, Ianis of Carestino, Nicheta Corsolora Ogeros, Mavrogano Vassili Argenti, Savasto Gallatulla, Cristostomi, Chisomeniti, George Agabito, Mavrogordato, Stefano Petrici, Sidero, Dimitri Ducas, Achastani, George de Boto, Tucala-

resti, Nicola Carlonuco, Nichetas Anichesaros, Evigenos Coperiati, Theodore Filadelfino scolaros, Marglaviti.[36] The list includes several of those who had concluded the treaty of capitulation of September 1346 – *inter alia*, Michali Coressi, who appears to have had a vital role in the revolt – and members of more or less illustrious families, including those of several *archontes*.

The role of Caloianni Tzybos, whose property was also confiscated, appears less clear. We know from an account by Cantacuzenus[37] that the former governor of Chios, no doubt imprudently appointed by the Genoese to head Old Phocaea, assembled a number of mercenaries without waiting for the *basileus*' support. He disembarked at Chios and forced the Genoese garrison to shut itself up in the citadel. The besieged forces were rescued by compatriots, and Tzybos was killed in the course of a battle, in which the Latins rapidly gained the upper hand.

There may well have been some concomitance between the metropolitan's plot and Tzybos' expedition. According to testimony given by Giovanni de Gayado de Chiavari, Tzybos was still governor of Old Phocaea in October 1347. A month later, he – like Michali Coressi and his associates – rebelled against the Commune, seizing the light galley armed by the Genoese for the defence of Chios.[38] Accordingly, we must admit the possibility that the *archontes* of Chios joined forces with Tzybos, one of their own, in an effort to overthrow the power of the *mahonesi* – not in April 1347, but seven months later, in a series of events of which we know but little.

How, then, did the Greeks shift out of this paroxysm of hatred and hostility, and into a more peaceful coexistence, a passive and at times even willing acceptance of Genoese domination? This development appears to have resulted from several factors. The Chian *archontes* rapidly understood that they could not look forward to any assistance from Constantinople. The 'Latin War', followed by the battle of the Bosporus, occupied Cantacuzenus' meagre forces. When John V resumed his throne in 1355, thanks to the assistance of Francesco Gattilusio, he had nothing left to do but legalize the *fait accompli*. Simultaneously with his presentation of Mytilene to Francesco Gattilusio as a dowry, he published a chrysobull in favour of the *mahonesi*. Saving the appearances of the imperial sovereignty, he ceded the island of Chios to three members of the *Mahona*, Giovanni de Oliverio, Raffaele de Furneto, and Pietro Recanella; the latter were obligated to pay an annual tribute of 500 *hyperpyra* in recognition of his generosity. On 14 June 1367, a second chrysobull confirmed the concession in favour of Tommaso Giustiniani and his associates. Abandoned by Constantinople, the Greeks were forced to submit.[39]

The second factor in the Greek–Genoese *rapprochement* was the obvious community of interests which arose progressively between the *archontes* and the *mahonesi*. Not all of the 'powerful ones' participated in the plot directed by the metropolitan. Vassili Argenti's property was certainly confiscated; however, other members of the same family – Leonidas, Baptista, and Julianus – were in business relations with the Genoese. The Schilizzis, the Coressis, and the Agelastoi preserved their rank and kept their lands on the island. The Schilizzis owned possessions in the Engremos and at Koukounaria in the Kampos; the Coressis had a fortified tower – a *pyrgos* – at Lithi and lands at Spiladi in the Kampos; the Agelastoi were established in the village of Koini, at Serba-Frangovouni, and at Ghiazo. As for the Argentis, they possessed extensive property near the citadel, in the Vlataria quarter, as well as in the Kampos, at Ghiazo, and at Talaros.[40] The *Mahona* and the Genoese government maintained a scrupulous respect of the privileges and franchises enjoyed by the *archontes*. As late as 1529, the Genoese governors of the *Mahona* granted an appeal by George Schilizzi, who protested a decision reached by the *podestà* of Chios, in violation of the franchises granted by John V to his family more than a century and a half before.[41] Confirmed in their property and their rights, contingent only on their recognizing the domination of the Commune, the *archontes* gradually came around to collaborating with the new masters.

Once the time of revolt had passed, the *mahonesi* began to seek the collaboration of the local elite. In fact, they had to take into account a substantial demographic disequilibrium. Despite having supported the immigration of their compatriots, as witnessed by several deeds of concession of lands and houses, the Latin element, clearly remained a minority, of a size difficult to determine. A report by the *podestà* Niccolò Fatinanti, drawn up in 1395, enumerates 2,142 heads of families of Greek origin, including the sailors of the *mahonesi* galley and 130 persons over the age of 70 or infirm, but excluding workmen dealing with mastic trees (*lentiscus*) or the production of mastic.[42] In total, the number of households was hardly more than 2,200 – meaning that hardly more than 10,000 Greeks inhabited the island at the end of the fourteenth century. If we admit that the ratio between the number of Latins and Greeks examined by the *podestà* in drawing up his report – 33 of the former, 150 of the latter – reflects the relative numerical importance of the two ethnic groups, Chios could not have housed more than 400 heads of families of western origin, or about 2,000 persons in all.

The distribution of inhabitants was completely uneven: while the Kampos, the eastern side, and the south of Chios were well enough

settled, the extremely mountainous central and western regions were practically uninhabited, with the exception of several large, isolated villages.[43] The westerners did not work the land directly, with the exception of a few domains, such as those of Sklavia (Stous Hephta) or Kamenos Pyrgos; in most cases, they were content to live in the city of Chios and enjoy the incomes from lands cultivated by the *paroikoi*.[44] Under those conditions, the *mahonesi* stood to gain a great deal from *rapprochement* with the *archontes*, who themselves were also great landowners, supported by the productive efforts of their dependents.

The word 'coexistence', first and foremost, means 'living in the same space'. It is not quite true to believe, as Argenti put it, that the allocation to the Genoese of 200 houses inside the citadel emptied the latter of its Greek population. In fact, Latins and Greeks shared the *castrum* from 1346 into the fifteenth century. In 1394, a *papas* owned a house in the *contrada* of St Anthony, and his estate bordered on that of two westerners. In the same year, the widow of Giovanni di Luna lived next door to Goardatus Tisplasmisas in the main street of the citadel, the *carrubeus rectus*.[45] In 1381, Greeks and Latins lived together in the *contrada* S. Remuli.[46] In 1408, Georgius Pipera owned a house near those of Vassili Corsochus and the *papas* Costa Camoli.[47] Fifty years later, Georgius Coressi owned a shop in the *contrada* S. Georgii, next door to that of Paolo Giustiniani de Furneto.[48] In 1461, the widow of Iohannes Ducas Petrocochini possessed a house inside the citadel. Outside the walls of the *castrum*, the ethnic commingling was even more extensive – for example, in the Vlataria, Parrichia, and Neocorio neighbourhoods, where the houses of the Latins and the Greeks adjoined each other.[49] Finally, in the rich plain of the Kampos, the *mahonesi* settled vast domains taken from the *chisilima* property of the condemned conspirators and adjoining the large holdings of the Argentis, the Schilizzis, and the Agelastoi.[50] By contrast, in other areas of the island, day-to-day relationships between the ethnic groups were quite limited. The Genoese established several fortresses at Volissos, Armolia, Chora, and Sklavia, and some towers of refuge; minimal contingents of two or three armed men ensured a Genoese presence in the larger villages. Nevertheless, aside from the few properties of *mahonesi* mentioned above, there is no evidence of a permanent western presence in the small towns of the island.

'Coexistence' also implies linguistic exchanges. The *Mahona* maintained several official interpreters, including a Greek known as the 'Greek scribe of Chios'.[51] Yet there were also many occasional dragomen, as well as Greeks who knew the rudiments of Latin and Genoese. A number of notarial acts were drawn up between members of the two communities without the necessity of recourse to an inter-

preter. In 1394, a *papas* sold his house to a Genoese notary; he was assisted by two compatriots, Sergi Vestarchi and Iane Magenendi, who acted as witnesses to the sale, along with two Latins. Three Greeks and two Latins took part in concluding the deed of sale of a house owned by Nicola Prasimo.[52] In 1381, a Genoese of Phocaea 'translated from Latin into Greek' the will of Maria de Lixa, wife of Michali Carvogni Sergi; in the same year, the Greek Costa Gordatus declared that he knew Latin, and was accordingly released from the requirement for an interpreter.[53] The Greek notary Iohannes Coressi was frequently used as a witness by his Genoese colleagues, undoubtedly due to the linguistic assistance which he rendered to his compatriots.[54] Did these linguistic contacts result in the propagation of a *lingua franca*? It is difficult to say, owing to the rarity of texts preserved in the vernacular.

The constitution of a genuine Graeco-Genoese society implied intermarriage. Were mixed marriages numerous on the island? Despite the poverty of our sources, we have been able to locate examples at different levels of insular society. *Mahonesi* married Greeks, or gave their daughters in marriage to members of the native local elite. In 1408, Giovanni Giustiniani de Furneto left a widow, Angelina, daughter of Master Sidero; his daughter, Angelina, was herself the widow of a Greek of Andros, Iohannes de Lo Gramatichi.[55] In 1450, Benedetta, daughter of Cristoforo Giustiniani de Garibaldo, married Lazaro Argenti; twenty-two years later, another Argenti, Pantaleo, married Pietra, daughter of Pietro Giustiniani, while Iane Argenti was brother-in-law to two Giustinianis.[56] Lower down the social ladder, other mixed marriages are to be found. Generally speaking, these linked Greek women to Latin men; by contrast, there were no cases in which the daughters of western immigrants married Greek men. This probably resulted from the high proportion of males among the insular Genoese population, which was periodically augmented by young bachelors. Did these establish permanent residences? To set up families, they could not but select wives from among the middle strata of the Chian bourgeoisie. In 1381, Angelus de Siena left a widow, Calogrea Evedochia, daughter of a *papas*; Niccolò de Passano married Therana Gomarina in 1404; a certain Paolo Dante married Vedochia maistra, daughter of a Greek notary in Phocaea; and, in 1466, Giovanni de Moncelis became the husband of a Greek woman from Volisos.[57] These weddings were themselves attempts at *rapprochement*, and appear to have been more fruitful at the level of the *archontes* and the *mahonesi* than at the lower social levels.

In the area of religion, the Greek community jealously preserved its traditions, and the amount of contact between the two churches was, understandably, insignificant – Orthodoxy having been the main

support of Hellenic nationalism. Following the failure of the 1347 plot, the *mahonesi* had the prudence to respect the customs of the local residents. The oath used for those bearing witness in court, for example, was not sworn on the Gospels, as was customary in the western world, but on icons, 'more Graecorum'.[58] The Genoese also promised the Greeks total freedom of religious practice, as symbolically illustrated by the return of the icon of the Theotokos to Nea Moni and the repopulation of that famous monastery.[59] The development of the Latin Church, limited to the capital of the island and several villages near the lands of the *mahonesi* in the Kampos, did not bring about the conversion of many Greek subjects; our notary sources, in any event, have not preserved a single example of such conversion. The two Churches, Roman and Orthodox, remained separate; one represented the victors, the other the vanquished.

The means most easily used to draw the Greeks into collaboration with the Latins was to associate the former with the latter's business dealings and assign them some areas of responsibility. The Greeks had their own notaries – Iane Coressi is often mentioned at the end of the fourteenth century, but we also know of Nicola Plasini Cavanucii, Michali maistro, Cripti Corelli, as well as a certain George of Phocaea[60] – and their own bankers, such as Theodore Sirichari, Criti Sepsi, Costa Mismilandi.[61] In large-scale commerce, a certain number of Chian merchants were associated with Latins in chartering ships, maritime insurance, ownership of boats, or simply in commercial investments: the transport of grain, wine, oil, and cloth to Famagusta, Pera, and Theologo was jointly implemented by Latin and Greek businessmen.[62] Nevertheless, this commonality of interests had its limits. The boats operated by mixed companies were *gripariae*, medium or small in size, but never large round-ships or galleys. On the other hand, no Greeks are known to have participated in commercial operations involving products over which the *Mahona* held a monopoly – mastic, alum, salt, and pitch; these were handled exclusively by the Genoese. In small trade and craftsmanship, the Greeks fulfilled a considerable role, especially in food-related professions and distribution, but also as caulkers, carpenters, and woodcutters, protected by the *Mahona*. Two blacksmiths – one Latin, the other Greek – went into partnership together; a third blacksmith, originally from Constantinople, became the debtor of two Latin colleagues living in Chios.[63] The impetus provided by the Genoese to economic life in the area could only have a positive effect on the standard of living of those closely or even distantly involved in business.

Exclusive wielders of political power, the *mahonesi* were not much inclined to associate the native elite with that power. Nevertheless,

certain Greeks were given administrative responsibilities. In 1394, Costa Meistro Mismilangi (a banker) and Michali Meistro Spano, along with two Latins and a Jew, became *officiales provisionis grani* of Chios; they borrowed the funds necessary to assure the provisioning of the island. Ten years later, they were replaced by Sergi Avafisto and Criti Sepsi; the latter, also a banker, was re-appointed in 1408, this time along with George Agelastro.[64] These offices were far from honorary, as the members of the *officium provisionis* served as guarantors for the drawing up of contracts with shipowners. The *Mahona* also attempted to involve representatives of all of these ethnic groups in the solution of the major problem affecting public order: the proper supply of grain to the island. It is even more astonishing to see that Greeks were authorized to participate in auctions for the farming out of taxes: one of them, in 1404, was in charge of the oil auction; the other, in 1413, shared the responsibility for the *comerchium angariae* with a Latin.[65] These, however, were exceptions of a kind not often agreed to, as a regulation of 1428 forbade the inscription of Greeks in the chancellery registers.[66]

Were these Chians protected by the Commune, as was the case in certain other eastern trading posts? The question is not easy to resolve, given the special status of Chios, where the Commune acted as sovereign with *merum et mixtum imperium*, while the *Mahona* enjoyed the rights of usufruct, *proprietas et dominium utile et directum*. In the name of the latter, only shareholders of the *Mahona* enjoyed all fiscal rights and could exercise administrative functions. The Genoese permanent residents, or *burgenses*, at times saw their franchise on indirect taxes contested by the tax farmers; they protested against this, citing the conventions originally concluded in 1347, and periodically renewed, between the Commune and the *Mahona*. They had no right to participate in the council of the *podestà*, as the *Mahona* reminded them in 1409.

The Greeks, like the Jews, were subject to a direct tax (*angaria* or *cotumum*), a head tax (*kapnikon*), and certainly various indirect taxes, as well as a brokerage tax or *censaria*.[67] A few hand-picked Greeks received exemption from the *angaria*, as a privilege granted by the doge; these were protected subjects like those capable of showing an imperial chrysobull. The *Mahona* undertook to respect the franchises obtained from the *basileus*; in cases of violation, an appeal to Genoa sufficed to guarantee the revocation of decisions to the contrary.[68] All in all, however, individual privileges and the small-scale participation of some of the elite in public life could not compensate for the heavy burden laid on the masses – that is, the *paroikoi*.

The majority of the native population undoubtedly earned their living from agriculture and cattle-raising. Aside from the extensive

land belonging to the *mahonesi* and the more modest property allocated to or acquired by Latin immigrants, the land remained in the hands of the *archontes* and ecclesiastical establishments; the most famous of the latter, the Nea Moni, is believed to have possessed almost one-third of the area of the island.[69] As far as the peasantry was concerned, the conquest hardly affected their fate; they changed masters, but retained their obligations as *paroikoi*, which passed from generation to generation. These obligations could and sometimes did become even heavier, especially in the areas of taxation and monopolies. A report by the *podestà* Niccolò Fatinanti, in 1395, mentions the burden of the poll tax, unbearable for the peasants, who were abandoning their villages and deserting the island. The *kapnikon* was abolished in 1396, and replaced by a hearth-tax of two *hyperpyra* payable by all Greeks, except for those working in mastic, wood, and pitch.[70] The villagers periodically complained of being harassed by local officials, who demanded services or presents from them; the *Mahona* had to remind those officials that they were only empowered to collect the taxes instituted by the government of the island.[71] We must ask, however, whether these arbitrary extortions were only practised by minor Genoese functionaries. It is probable that, also under Byzantine rule, the agents of the imperial administration had not always withstood the temptation to abuse their power. By contrast, the maintaining of monopolies turned out to be extremely wearing. The mastic workers were constrained to make obligatory deliveries; those who did not meet their obligations were beset by stiff fines.[72] Pitch, too, became the object of compulsory deliveries.[73] The exemption from the hearth-tax, granted in 1396, hardly compensated for the finicky constraints imposed upon the producers of monopoly commodities.

In all, the policy of the *Mahona* regarding the Hellenic population demonstrated an overwhelming logic: few changes in fiscal matters, no large-scale transfers of funds or property, a light-handed administrative and military superstructure. It was sufficient to allow the *archontes* and several selected members of the urban bourgeoisie to keep their former rights and privileges, to assure them a relatively higher standard of living, thanks to the spin-offs of the economic expansion boosted by the Genoese. It was sufficient to let them live in their own faith, and to ensure peace from without, in order to obtain the loyalty of the elite, especially after 1453, to guide them to cooperation with the *mahonesi*, and share with them the income obtained from the labour of the *paroikoi*.

However, as a result of this interplay, it was the *mahonesi* who let themselves be gradually taken over by the insular traditions; they adopted the behaviour of *archontes* and became easternized. The links

with the distant metropolis became loose and were frequently broken at a moment's notice. In the sixteenth century, when large-scale Genoese commerce between the eastern and western Mediterranean died down and Genoa became part of the Spanish sphere of influence, it was hardly interested in paying a prohibitive price to maintain its Aegean trading post, at the edge of the Ottoman empire. The *mahonesi* who governed with such moderation, according to Laonicus Chalcocondylas, were soon assimilated among their subjects, and became like foreigners to the Genoese of Genoa. Despite initial appearances, the continuity from Byzantine Chios to the sixteenth-century Chian *Mahona* by far exceeded any change occasioned by this evolution.

NOTES

This article was translated from French by Sharon Neeman.

1. G. Stella, *Annales genuenses*, in *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, 2nd edn., ed. G. Petti Balbi (Bologne, 1975), p.148: *Moriantur et occidantur Ianuenses.*
2. G. Moravcsik, *Byzantinoturcica 1: Die byzantinischen Quellen der Geschichte der Türkvölker* (Budapest, 1942), p.231.
3. Laonicus Chalcocondylas, *Historiarum libri decem*, ed. I. Bekker, Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae (Bonn, 1843), p.521.
4. F. Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne au Moyen Age* (Paris, 1959), p.86.
5. L.T. Belgrano and C. Imperiale di Sant'Angelo, *Annali genovesi di Caffaro e de' suoi continuatori*, 5 vols. (Rome 1890–1929), Vol. 2, pp.98–9.
6. Ibid., pp.104, 109, 111–15; Nicetas Choniates, *Historia*, Bonn edn., p.639; cf. G. Gerola, 'La dominazione genovese in Creta', *Atti dell' I.R. Accademia di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti degli Agiati in Rovereto*, 3rd ser., Vol. 8, fasc. 2, 1902, 1–44; Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, pp.87–8; M. Balard, 'Les Génois en Romanie entre 1204 et 1261. Recherches dans les minutiers notariaux génois', *Mélanges de l'Ecole française de Rome*, 78 (1966), pp.473–4.
7. Gerola, 'La dominazione', pp.22–3; Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, pp.87–8.
8. H. Ahrweiler, *Byzance et la mer. La marine de guerre, la politique et les institutions maritimes de Byzance aux VII^e–XV^e siècles* (Paris, 1966), p.322 and n.2; E. Merendino, 'Federico II e Giovanni II Vatatzes', in *Byzantino-Sicula II. Miscellanea di scritti in memoria di G. Rossi Taibbi* (Palermo 1975), p.377; M. Angold, *A Byzantine Government in Exile. Government and Society under the Laskarids of Nicaea, 1204–1261* (Oxford, 1975), p.115.
9. See our *Romanie génoise (XII^e–début du XV^e siècle)*, 2 vols. (Rome and Genoa, 1978), Vol. 1, pp.42–5 and bibliography cited.
10. C. Manfroni, 'Le relazioni fra Genova, l'impero bizantino e i Turchi', in *Atti della Società ligure di Storia patria* (hereafter *ASLi*), Vol. 28 (Genoa, 1898), p.793.
11. P. Lemerle, *L'Emirat d'Aydin, Byzance et l'Occident. Recherches sur 'La Geste d'Umur Pacha'* (Paris, 1957), pp.45–6; H. Ahrweiler, 'L'histoire et la géographie de la région de Smyrne entre les deux occupations turques (1081–1317), in *Travaux et mémoires du Centre de Recherche d'Histoire et Civilisation Byzantines*, 1 (1965), 40–41.
12. I. Ševčenko, 'The Zealot Revolution and the Supposed Genoese Colony in Thessalonica', in *Phosphoria eis St. Kyriakidēn* (Thessalonica, 1953), pp.603–17.
13. G. Bertolotto, 'Nuova serie di documenti sulle relazioni di Genova con l'Impero bizantino', in *ASLi*, Vol. 28, pp.512, 514, 531; Ševčenko, 'The Zealot Revolution', pp.605–6.

14. G.I. Brătianu, *Actes des notaires génois de Péra et de Caffa de la fin du XIII^e siècle* (Bucharest, 1927), p.182; M. Balard, *Gênes et Outre-Mer, 1: Les actes de Caffa du notaire Lamberto di Sambuceto, 1289–1290* (Paris and The Hague, 1973), p.72, n.28.
15. Balard, *La Romanie génoise*, Vol. 1, p.164 (with references to the documents).
16. Ph.P. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese and their Administration of the Island (1346–1566)*, 3 Vols. (Cambridge, 1958), Vol. 1, pp.92–4; *id.*, 'The Mahona of the Giustiniani: Genoese Colonialism and the Genoese Relationship with Chios', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 6 (1979), 2–3; Balard, *La Romanie génoise*, Vol. 1, p.123.
17. M. Balard, 'A propos de la bataille du Bosphore. L'expédition génoise de Paganino Doria à Constantinople (1351–1352)', in *Travaux et mémoires du Centre de Recherche d'Histoire et Civilisation Byzantines*, 4 (1970), 438–9.
18. G. Pistarino, 'Chio dei Genovesi', *Studi medievali*, Vol. 10 (1969), 3–68.
19. A. Luttrell, 'John V's Daughters: a Palaiologan Puzzle', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 40 (1986), 103–12.
20. For the dating, cf. M. Balard, 'Gattilusio', *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, Vol. 4/6, 1988.
21. Pistarino, 'Chio dei Genovesi', 10–12.
22. An exception is the series of the 66 notarial acts of Mytilene, published by A. Roccatagliata, *Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Pera e Mitilene*, Vol. 2: *Mitilene 1454–1460* (Genoa, 1982). A few contracts for the purchase or sale of properties or attestations of mixed marriages provide rather scant information on the relations between Latins and Greeks in the domain of the Gattilusio.
23. Guillaume Adam, 'De modo Sarracenos extirpandi', in *Recueil des historiens des croisades. Documents arméniens*, Vol. 2 (Paris, 1906), p.533.
24. Joannes Cantacuzenus, *Historiarum libri IV*, Vol. 1, ed. L. Schopen, Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae (Bonn, 1828), p.572.
25. Ibid., p.573.
26. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, Vol. 1, pp.28–9. On these families, see id., *Libro d'Oro de la noblesse de Chio*, Vol. 1: *Notices historiques* (London, 1955).
27. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, Vol. 1, p.65.
28. See n.1 above.
29. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, Vol. 2, pp.26–8.
30. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp.28–38.
31. *Ta Neamonēsia* (anonymous) (Chios, 1865), pp.102–3.
32. Cantacuzenus, Vol. 2, p.583; cf. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, Vol. 1, pp.91–5.
33. Genoa, Biblioteca Berio, ms. m.r. I, 1–21: *Istoria dell'Isola di Scio*, pp.28–30; the manuscript was compiled in 1586, 20 years after the loss of the island.
34. Archivio di Stato di Genova, sezione notarile (hereafter ASG Not.), cart. 359, fol. 171r–v.
35. On the meaning of this word, cf. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, Vol. 1, p.653, n.2.
36. ASG Not. cart. 359, fol. 171r–172v; Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, Vol. 3, pp.493–4, 512–13, 528–31, 886–94.
37. Cantacuzenus, Vol. 3, p.83.
38. ASG Not. cart. 359, fol. 172v.
39. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, Vol. 2, pp.173–7.
40. Argenti, *Libro d'Oro*, pp.49–50, 51–6, 73–4, 118–22.
41. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, Vol. 2, pp.473–5.
42. Ibid., Vol. 2, p.148.
43. On the topography of Chios, cf. G.I. Zolotas, *Historia tēs Chiou* (Athens 1921), pp.5–281. According to A. Philippson, *Die Griechischen Landschaften* (Frankfurt 1959), Vol. 4, pp.245–57, the surface area of the island is 858 sq. km.; however, Ch. Bouras, *Chios* (Athens 1974), p.7, notes that the cultivated land represents only 20.7 per cent of the total surface area. This figure was certainly not very different at the end of the Middle Ages.

44. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, Vol. 3, pp.518–19.
45. M. Balard, *Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chio da Donato di Chiavari 1394* (Genoa, 1988), docs. 42, 46.
46. ASG Not. Antonio Fellone, fols. 144r–145.
47. ASG Not. Giovanni Balbi, doc. 362 (12 Sept. 1408).
48. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, Vol. 3, p.657.
49. ASG Not. Antonio Fellone III, ff. 144r, 149v.
50. A. Smith, *The Architecture of Chios* (London, 1962), pp.48–50, 117; Argenti, *Libro d'Oro*, pp.49–50, 51–6, 73–4, 118–22.
51. ASG Not. Antonio Fellone III, fols. 114r-v, 140r, 141r, 142r–143r, 145v, 151r; Not. Gregorio Panissaro, docs. 62, 120, 122; Not. Giovanni Balbi, docs. 360, 434, 508; Not. Cart. 418, fol. 8v.
52. Balard, *Notai genovesi*, docs. 42, 57.
53. ASG Not. Antonio Fellone III, fols. 142v–143r, 152r–v.
54. Balard, *Notai genovesi*, doc. 53; Not. Antonio Fellone III, fols. 140v–141r; Not. Gregorio Panissaro, docs. 21, 134; Not. Giovanni Balbi, doc. 336.
55. ASG Not. Giovanni Balbi, docs. 336–7, 430.
56. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, Vol. 3, pp.628, 814, 827.
57. ASG Not. Antonio Fellone III, fols. 144r–145r; Not. Gregorio Panissaro, doc. 119; Not. Giovanni Balbi, doc. 446; Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, Vol. 3, p.777.
58. Balard, *Notai genovesi*, docs. 42, 57; Not. Giovanni Balbi, doc. 371; Not. Gregorio Panissaro, doc. 37.
59. *Ta Neamonēsia*, p.114.
60. Balard, *Notai genovesi*, doc. 53; Not. Antonio Fellone III, fol. 108v; Not. Gregorio Panissaro, docs. 21, 134; Not. Giovanni Balbi, docs. 336, 363, 422, 446.
61. Balard, *Notai genovesi*, docs. 42, 55; Not. Antonio Fellone III, fol. 148r.
62. Balard, *Notai genovesi*, docs. 24, 89; Not. Gregorio Panissaro, 18 March 1400 and 25 Oct. 1403; Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, Vol. 3, pp.539–40, 542, 789, 804, 826–7.
63. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, Vol. 3, pp.797, 809.
64. M. Balard, *Notai genovesi*, docs. 61, 96; Not. Gregorio Panissaro, docs. 112, 116; Not. Giovanni Balbi, doc. 511.
65. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, Vol. 2, p.173; Not. Giovanni Balbi, deed of 12 June 1413.
66. A. Rovere, 'Documenti della Maona di Chio (secc. XIV–XVI)', *ASLi*, n.s., Vol. 19/2 (Genoa, 1979), pp.352–3, doc. 112.
67. Argenti, 'The Maona of the Giustiniani', pp.23–6.
68. Rovere, 'Documenti della Maona', pp.485–6, doc. 11; Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, Vol. 2, pp.473–5.
69. *Ta Neamonēsia*, p.114.
70. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, Vol. 2, pp.141–7.
71. Argenti, 'The Maona of the Giustiniani', p.20.
72. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, Vol. 2, pp.192–4.
73. Rovere, 'Documenti della Maona', pp.492–8, doc. 14.

The Cypriot Nobility from the Fourteenth to the Sixteenth Century: A New Interpretation

BENJAMIN ARBEL

During the four decades or so which have elapsed since the publication of George Hill's monumental *History of Cyprus*, there has been considerable advance in the study of medieval and early modern Cyprus. Sources which were hitherto unknown, and others whose previous publication was not sufficiently rigorous have appeared in print, and new ventures into the great archival collections have been attempted. A number of original and important studies have greatly improved our understanding of the 400 years of Latin rule in the island.[1] There remain, however, a number of problems, some of which can be regarded as essential for an understanding of Cypriot history, which have not yet been clarified. One of these concerns the structure and composition of the Cypriot nobility, especially during the last century of Lusignan rule and the period of Venetian domination.

In dealing with a social group such as the nobility, it is necessary to define, as well as possible, its social and legal boundaries, and to identify the modes of joining this group. During the first century and a half after the founding of the Cypriot kingdom at the close of the twelfth century, a clear-cut division between the newly established Frankish elite and the indigenous Cypriot subjects was successfully maintained. Adherence to the Latin Church and Latin culture was considered as the sole criterion which divided society between the free and the servile. Latin society in Cyprus was made up of knights and their noble kinsfolk, as well as burghers. The legal status of these groups was extensively treated in the *assizes* of the realm. On the other hand, the indigenous Cypriots, both peasants and townsmen, were subjected to personal dues which emphasized their servile status. As far as we know, social mobility during this early phase did not transcend the main ethnic divisions.[2]

When this ethnic dichotomy started to break up during the second half of the fourteenth century, the social boundaries of the Frankish nobility became less clear-cut, and its ethnic composition more heterogenous. Since this continuing process was associated with a

wider phenomenon, the massive enfranchisement of other social groups,[3] modern observers sometimes encounter difficulties in trying to assess these developments. In particular, historians have often been too hasty in attributing noble status to various Cypriots. Thus, for instance, in a recent study on the redemption of slaves from Ottoman captivity after the War of Cyprus (1570–71), Rudt de Collenberg, who has discovered a mine of information on Cypriot families in the Vatican Archives, arranges the names of Cypriot captives under different headings.[4] Under the first, he mentions those who were described in the sources as noble, but the second grouping includes 41 names of 'noble families or [families] described as Cypriots but not as noblemen'. This vague definition is a typical example of the ambiguity of many references to the social status of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Cypriots. In fact, as we shall see, the noble status of most of the above-mentioned 41 families is open to doubt, to say the least.

Another point which has also created some confusion is the upward mobility of Greeks into the nobility. Here, the failure to identify those Greek Cypriot families who really acquired noble status, and consequently to form a clear idea of the dimension of this phenomenon, is to a great extent a result of the failure to define the boundaries of the Cypriot nobility in general. This has led scholars to attribute noble status to Greek Cypriot families which cannot be considered as noble, and so present the general phenomenon as having been far wider than it actually was. Thus, Nicolas Iorga concluded his *France de Chypre* with a chapter entitled 'The Advent of the Greeks'.[5] Several of Rudt de Collenberg's recent studies on the Cypriot nobility illustrate the persistence of such an approach.[6]

This paper will, therefore, focus on two points: the nature and boundaries of noble status as conceived in Cyprus during the last century of Lusignan rule and during the period of Venetian domination; and the penetration by Greek Cypriots of the Cypriot nobility during the same period, with special emphasis on the extent of this phenomenon. Besides the published sources which have served other historians who studied the Cypriot nobility,[7] our re-examination makes use of unpublished documents from the Venetian archives, which until now have only been marginally examined for this purpose. Beyond their obvious importance for the study of Cypriot society under Venetian rule, these documents are often quite helpful in elucidating aspects of earlier phases of Cypriot history.[8]

Though never constituting a hermetically closed caste, Cypriot noblemen enjoyed hereditary legal status which provided them with significant political, judicial, and fiscal privileges. The noble status of a family

was associated in principle with the tenure of a fief, usually a landed estate. The holding of a feudal estate was normally coupled with knighthood. All holders of feudal estates were considered liegemen of the king and, at least in theory, belonged to the *Haute Cour*, the feudal assembly of the kingdom. It was among these noble feudatories that the king recruited the holders of the great offices of the Crown.[9]

Inheritance of feudal estates was governed by primogeniture, and so excluded the younger descendants of noble families from the ranks of feudatories and knights; nevertheless, younger sons and daughters were still considered as belonging to the nobility, and were seen as potential heirs to fiefs and beneficiaries of royal munificence, or potential brides and bridegrooms for noble marriage.[10] It should therefore be borne in mind that although knighthood and feudal tenure were the main characteristics of nobility, and all noble families on the island had some share in them in one way or another, not all members of noble families were feudatories or knights.

However, the rigid demarcation line between noblemen and commoners was somewhat blurred by some degree of social mobility. Individuals from various social groups who succeeded in gaining status and capital considered land a natural instrument of further social and economic advancement. The early fourteenth century was a period of great economic prosperity in Cyprus, and noblemen were certainly not the only ones to enjoy its fruits.[11] During the last century of Lusignan rule, Cypriots who were not considered noblemen succeeded in acquiring land and revenues from the Crown.[12] Since most landed estates preserved their seigneurial status and structure, landlords who were not of noble descent attained a certain degree of respectability and constituted a kind of gentry, although officially never recognized as such.

This continuing process, however, did not altogether undermine the main social divisions. As a matter of fact, too many interests were involved in preserving the nobility as a relatively well-defined social group. Fifteenth-century Cyprus, like other contemporary societies, was dominated by social privileges which noblemen were the first to enjoy. Participation in the *Haute Cour*, even as a right which was not always exercized, the privilege to be judged only by peers, or fiscal exemptions, were important not only for the noblemen themselves, but also for the rulers of the island, as a system of symbols and rewards tying the aristocracy to the Lusignan regime, and later to Venice. Under Venetian rule, the *Haute Cour* ceased to exist, but the judicial and fiscal privileges of the nobility were maintained;[13] and naturally, one should never underestimate the social prestige attached to the nobility, especially in a society where the feudal heritage was still alive. It is

therefore my belief that at any given moment until the end of Latin rule in Cyprus, contemporaries could quite easily distinguish a nobleman from a Cypriot of elevated social status who had not yet acquired all the necessary requisites for nobility. Unfortunately, modern historians have failed to distinguish between these two categories.

One specific source which has been misinterpreted by historians of late medieval and early modern Cyprus is a section of the chronicle of Florio Bustron, listing the grants of offices, estates, houses, pensions, and provisions in kind made by King James II to about 200 individuals.[14] Several scholars have regarded this list as an enumeration of enfeoffments. Consequently, all the names which appear on it have been taken to represent members of the nobility, and all persons bearing oriental or Greek names have been assumed to be noblemen of Greek or oriental descent.[15] Considering that the list included numerous Greek names, the conclusions based on such an interpretation with regard to the scope of a Greek presence amongst the nobility are obvious. It seems, however, that this interpretation is unfounded. First of all it should be noted that the chronicler does not specify the social status of the beneficiaries, nor does he have anything to say about their ethnic origin or religious affiliation. Therefore, with regard to names not associated with the old Latin noble families, the modern historian can in many cases only hazard a guess about the social status or ethnic identification of the persons involved. In fact, other documents indicate that King James granted similar revenues and provisions to persons who can hardly be regarded as noblemen, like, for instance, Nicolin Calamanioti, former servant of the king's household, who received a pension and provision in 1468.[16] Secondly, the chronicler does not specify the status of land or estates granted to each of the individuals listed. The inclusion of provisions in kind and houses in the list may indicate that not all the grants mentioned by Bustron may be regarded as fiefs. Moreover, as in the West, seigneurial estates could be granted or sold on the basis of various forms of tenure to non-noble holders. Thus, master Barteleme Estive, a surgeon, is mentioned in 1468 as landlord of Catalionda, and Anthony Garcia, a tailor, received the village of Epicho from King James II, who also married him to a widow of rank. Garcia was knighted after the king's death by Queen Catherine, which also indicates that he had not been considered previously as noble.[17] Under Venetian rule, the Republic sold seigneurial estates either in full ownership, or even *in feudo*, a term which referred only to the condition of tenure and succession, and had nothing to do with feudal homage or military service.[18] Therefore, holding property 'in fief' is not in itself proof of noble status. In short,

this list should not be considered merely as a list of enfeoffments to individuals of noble status: it is rather an enumeration of different kinds of royal grant.

Similar use has been made of the undated list of revenues of various individuals published by Mas Latrie, which may be attributed to the second decade of the sixteenth century.[19] This document, which was probably intended for fiscal purposes, bears the title 'Incomes of knights, feudatories and other owners of estates ...' At that period noblemen were not exempt from direct taxation on their revenues from landed estates;[20] consequently, the anonymous compiler did not bother to distinguish between noblemen and non-noble individuals included in his list. Some of the names are preceded by the title *magnifico*, which clearly indicates noble status,[21] but many other names are simply preceded by *messer, ser*, or by no title at all. It is not certain whether the use of *messer* or *ser* or the absence of any title in this document has any relevance at all with regard to the social status of the respective persons to whom they are attached. Since the possession of landed estates is not sufficient proof of noble status, especially in the Venetian period, this document should not be regarded as a list of Cypriot noblemen.

The most influential sources of confusion to later scholars were the two versions of Etienne de Lusignan's historical description of Cyprus.[22] It should be emphasized in the first place that Lusignan, who is repeatedly quoted and used as one of the main sources for Cypriot history, is a distinctly unreliable authority. It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal with his writings as historical sources, and we shall only dwell on a few passages which are relevant to our present discussion.[23] In the French *Description*, published in 1580 but probably written earlier, Lusignan states that the Venetian Senate promised that all Venetian subjects who would settle on the island for a period of five years and lead a respectable life would be considered as noblemen. According to him, this led a great number of people from the Venetian territories on the Italian mainland to settle in Cyprus and thus acquire the status of noblemen.[24] Lusignan links this process of ennoblement with membership of what he calls the Cypriot 'royal council' (*conseil du Roy*),[25] or the 'Great Council' (*grand conseil*).[26] The use of these terms in this context raises serious doubts as to Lusignan's familiarity with Cypriot legal and constitutional terminology. It is to be assumed that Lusignan refers to the urban council of Nicosia, which developed gradually under Venetian rule. However, this institution, although dominated by the prominent Cypriot noblemen, also included foreigners, Venetian patricians, subjects of other Venetian dominions (not necessarily noblemen), and Cypriot burghers.[27] Moreover, Lusignan included in this chapter a list of names, which should actually

be regarded as a list of families represented in the urban council of Nicosia. This list is preceded by the misleading title, 'The noble lineages or families of Cyprus' (*Les races ou maisons nobles de Cypre*), and is followed by the phrase 'here, then, are all the noble families, old and new, who entered during our times the great council, except two, the names of which I cannot remember.'[28] However, contrary to Lusignan's assertions, there was never any promise to confer nobility on settlers in the Venetian colony, and membership of this urban council did not entail the acquisition of this status.

The Italian version of Lusignan's book, the *Chorografia* (published in 1573), though not containing the misleading title at the head of the same list, is still rather confusing. Concluding his discussion of the composition of the feudal *Haute Cour*, Lusignan states that after the inclusion of the island in her empire, Venice arranged for all Venetian noblemen, as well as for all the noblemen and burghers (*cittadini*) of its other dominions who were not engaged in *arti mechaniche*, to become members of 'the said council' after five years of residence.[29] Thus, although correctly presenting the social composition of Nicosia's council, and omitting the explicit reference to ennoblement, Lusignan again confuses the old, exclusively noble feudal *Haute Cour*, which was officially abolished by the Venetians in 1489, with the urban council of Nicosia existing during his lifetime. Moreover, following his discussion of the urban council of Nicosia and the enumeration of the families belonging to it, the author inserts a short passage in which he mentions the names of the four families which were, according to him, the most distinguished ones among the Cypriot nobility (the Lusignan, the Lases, the Lodron and the De Nores families). Then he continues as follows: 'We shall mention the rest of the families, together with the above-mentioned four most prominent ones, in alphabetical order, if I can remember all of them.'[30]

In short, here too, according to the context, one could easily conclude that the list in question includes the names of the other noble families, which, as stated above, is quite inaccurate. Thus, families such as the Agapito, Audet, Calepio, Loara (Logara), Mastagha, and Salaga (Salacha) as well as several others mentioned in Lusignan's lists were most likely not considered as noble. It was only after the kingdom fell into Ottoman hands, and outside the context of a living social structure, that non-noble Cypriots of elevated social standing (most probably members of the urban council of Nicosia) could claim to be *nobili* or *patricii* (a term unknown in Cypriot legal and social terminology before 1571).[31] But this was simply an attempt to acquire an archaic social status, since by then the social order established by the Latins in Cyprus already belonged to the past. Unfortunately, all the

modern historians who have written about this period have failed to make such a distinction, preferring to adopt Lusignan's version which identified membership of the urban council with noble status.[32]

The treatment of the ethnic or cultural classification of Cypriot noblemen has also suffered from serious flaws. W. Rudt de Collenberg, who has recently published several studies on the Cypriot nobility, prefers to refer to 'autochthons' or 'indigenous' Cypriots, not always caring to distinguish between Greeks, Syrians, Armenians, or other ethnic groups.[33] Certain families have been described as being of Levantine origin without any positive evidence to this effect. Thus, the Gonem family, whose first member to appear in our sources is John, commander of a galley in 1364,[34] has been described as either a Greek family which had been Latinized since the fourteenth century,[35] or as being of Syrian descent.[36] Neither attribution is substantiated by any positive testimony. The fact that one can find a Greek churchman bearing this name in the sixteenth century[37] cannot be adduced as conclusive evidence, considering that even Fr. Lusignan, himself a scion of the royal family, had a brother who became a Basilian monk and a sister who entered the same order.[38] It has also been suggested that the Flatro family was of Greek origin, either on the basis of etymological speculations[39] or of a certain similarity between the careers of some of its members and those of other Greek families.[40] A similar argument has been applied to the Mistachiel family, in spite of the fact that one of its members is mentioned as a Dominican friar as early as 1367.[41]

Is it at all possible to find a reliable criterion for the identification of Cypriot noblemen? While sharing some of the trends which characterized western nobilities during the later Middle Ages and early modern period, the Cypriot nobility maintained a few particular features. Some of the western nobilities were in a constant state of renewal during the same period, and the definition of their social boundaries is rather difficult. In particular, pressure from below often created a process of ennoblement by usurpation, including the acquisition of a seigneurial estate, marriage into a noble family, and the adoption of a 'noble' style of life, a process which was not always crowned by formal recognition. Thus a *de facto* nobility could exist side by side with a *de jure* nobility.[42] Cyprus, on the other hand, was a small realm, with a relatively small nobility which was mainly concentrated in one town. Presumably, usurpation of noble status was therefore much more difficult than in larger countries. However, like other feudal nobilities, the Cypriot one seems to have felt threatened by the social transformation of the later Middle Ages. In Cyprus, feudal tenure,

including the military service attached to it, was preserved, but Cypriot monarchs were increasingly relying on mercenaries or foreign contingents in times of crisis.[43] In the Cypriot towns, non-noble burghers gained riches and influence and, especially by the acquisition of seigneurial estates, assimilated certain aristocratic traits.[44] During the fifteenth century, the violent struggle over the crown was ended by the establishment of the autocratic rule of King James II.[45] After the inclusion of Cyprus in the Venetian empire, Venice officially abolished the High Court, membership of which had constituted one of the most important expressions of noble status. Subsequently, Cypriot noblemen had to accept the participation of other social elements in the new urban councils.[46]

Cypriot noblemen reacted to these developments by trying to close their ranks to newcomers, by clinging to old privileges, by displaying their aristocratic style of life, and by accentuating symbols of exclusive hereditary rights which newcomers to the higher echelons of the insular society were still unable to acquire. Thus, members of noble families tended to marry only within the nobility or, exceptionally, with foreign noblemen, and especially with Venetian patricians after 1473.[47] The jousts, in which, according to Florio Bustron, only 'knights and feudatories [who are] descendants of feudatories and noble ladies' could participate, as well as the extravagant feasts held by Cypriot noblemen towards the end of Latin rule also express the same tendencies.[48]

More interesting for our purpose is the function of knighthood as a device to preserve the social privileges of noble families. By wearing the symbols of knighthood – the golden cloths, spurs, girdle, and sword,[49] – by participating in the military arrays, jousts, and tournaments, the status of a knight could be displayed in public, and was therefore an ideal instrument proclaiming social ascendency in relation to non-nobles. The chronicler Florio Bustron, who served in the Cypriot chancery under Venice, devoted a special chapter at the end of his chronicle to the 'Rights and Duties of Knights', in which he described in detail the features of this institution.[50] The first phrase of this chapter proclaims that 'nobody can be admitted to this order (*consortio*) unless he has been born in lawful wedlock to noble parents.' Considering what has been said above about the exclusion of non-noble spouses from marriages with Cypriot noble families, the social importance of knighthood is clear. The fact that a secretary of the Cypriot colonial chancery considered it necessary to add a special appendix to his chronicle, in order to expound the principles governing chivalry and knighthood, emphasizes the renewed social importance attributed in Cyprus to this institution during the last phases of Latin rule.

But there was more. Knighthood was associated in principle with the holding of a fief and military service. Heirs to fiefs were knighted after reaching the age of 15, and consequently were required to take part in the feudal levies. Minors and women had to pay the *defatto* or scutage, a custom which was not abandoned under the republican colonial regime.[51] Although losing some of its relative importance during the last phases of Lusignan rule, the feudal host still remained a central component of the military organization of the realm. Under Venetian domination, the traditional military function of the feudal nobility was maintained, and during the Ottoman invasion of 1570–71, Cypriot knights played a central role in defending the last bastion of Latin rule in the Levant.[52]

Other public functions associated with knighthood maintained their exclusive character. During the last century or so of Lusignan rule, two knights were considered as sufficient to make up the *Haute Cour*, a formality which was strictly adhered to until the abolition of the monarchy. Since the approval of the *Haute Cour* was necessary for every feudal grant, the two *chevaliers courch* played an important role in the government of the realm.[53] This privilege was lost with the abolition of the *Haute Cour* by Venice, but other knightly prerogatives were left intact by the Republic: only knights could be appointed as Viscounts of Nicosia, a highly influential and remunerative magistracy, both under the Lusignan regime and under the rule of Venice, when Cypriot noblemen were ready to pay great sums of money in order to be appointed to this office;[54] knights also had the privilege or duty of conducting inquiries regarding land or division of estates, a function which further enhanced their influence and power, even if they were not always eager to perform it.[55]

Finally, what makes knighthood particularly important from our point of view is the fact that it constituted most probably the only formal way for a non-noble to join the nobility. Thus, the tailor Anthony Garcia, although married to a respectable wife and in possession of a seigneurial estate, was not fully recognized as a nobleman before he was knighted by Queen Catherine in 1474.[56] In a similar manner, the one or two cases of ennoblement which are known to have occurred during the Venetian period were also associated with the ceremony of dubbing to knighthood. It is obvious that, as in many other fields, the Venetians perpetuated a custom dating from the Lusignan regime. The two persons concerned were Cypriot burghers who served in the colonial administration.[57] Only after being knighted were they officially recognized as noble feudatories.[58]

The role of knighthood in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Cyprus thus suggests that it is a decisive criterion for identifying noblemen

during that period. Admittedly, knighthood was not the sole characteristic of nobility, since primogeniture meant that in any generation a noble family might have a number of younger offspring who were regarded as noblemen but who did not inherit a fief. Moreover, knighthood can scarcely be used to help us identify noble women. However, we may assume that during the period under consideration, every noble family (including noblemen of Greek descent) could claim to have descendants who were knights, and that by discovering knights belonging to a certain family we may assume that at least one branch bearing that name really belonged to the insular aristocracy. As a matter of fact, if there were noble families without any knight among their members for more than one generation, then they must have constituted a distinct group among the feudatories. However, such an eventuality is not substantiated by our sources. It should also be noted that, during the period under consideration, there was no feudal hierarchy in Cyprus, and that all feudatories were considered liege vassals of the crown. The institution of rear-vassals was practically non-existent, except for rare cases in which it was used as a legal device in order to circumvent the laws of inheritance.[59] In principle, all liege vassals must have been knights and, therefore, knighthood should be employed as the main criterion for noble status. The limitations of the available sources would not enable us to identify all the noble families during the period under study. Nevertheless, the use of knighthood as a main criterion has the great advantage of excluding those 'respectable' families which belonged to the upper echelons of Cypriot society without enjoying the status of nobility.

Four lists of names will serve as a framework for our inquiry. The two earlier lists are taken from Cypriot chronicles referring to events of the 1370s, one of them being the first enumeration of Cypriot knights including noblemen of Greek origin. They may therefore serve as a *terminus a quo* for our investigation.[60] The other two lists belong to the end of the Venetian period, which is our *terminus ad quem*. This method has of course the disadvantage of leaving out a long period during which other Greek families may have attained noble status and disappeared again. We shall therefore try to fill in this gap with the help of additional documentary evidence.

Our starting-point consists of two lists provided by the chronicles of Leontios Makhairas and Diomedes Strambaldi, enumerating on the one hand those Cypriot knights who were exiled by the Genoese or who left the island of their own free will in 1374, and on the other hand the knights who remained in Cyprus with King Peter II.[61] The first of these lists includes 61 names (although Makhairas refers to 65), whereas

the second has 49 names. As both chronicles refer to 'knights' (*kavallarides*), it is plausible that the two lists mention only those members of the Cypriot nobility who actually enjoyed the knightly status. These two lists presumably represent the entire Cypriot nobility in the 1370s, if we assume that each of the noble families had at least one knight among its members, and that new recruits by royal grant were generally dubbed to knighthood. The first list does not include names of individuals other than Latins. The second one comprises a few names of Greeks. Thus, Thomas Barech is later explicitly referred to by Makhairas as 'a Greek burgher who became a Latin and a knight'.[62] John Laskaris was a Byzantine dignitary in exile, who established himself on the island.[63] And there is also the steward (*praktoras*), Sir Nicholas Bili, who was related to Leontios Makhairas.[64] Thus, out of 110 knights mentioned in both lists only three may be identified for certain as Greek, one of whom was not even of Cypriot origin.

Let us now examine the sources at the other end of our chronological span. The first document, dated 1557, is still unpublished. It is a list of Cypriots who were obliged to present different items symbolizing their recognition of Venice's lordship over the property they held.[65] The document explicitly declares that the list had been compiled according to order of precedence, first mentioning the counts and then the noble knights (*cavallieri nobili*), and taking into consideration the age of each.[66] Luckily enough, the compiler divided the list under several headings. The first group includes 'feudatories' who were obliged to present a couple of spurs to the representatives of the Signory on the eve of the feast of the nativity as a symbol of Venice's lordship.[67] It appears, both from the order of precedence explained in the preamble and from the symbolic nature of the item presented, that the persons included in this first group were knights. The second group in the list includes a few individuals, also described as 'feudatories', who were under the obligation to present capons to the Signory on the same occasion.[68] The distinction between the two groups would seem to imply that the persons included in the second were of different status. It should also be noted that the term 'feudatories' (*feudatarii*), like other terms related to feudal tenure, underwent a process of depreciation during the later Middle Ages, both in the West and in the Latin East. In fact, the term 'fief' came increasingly to denote any tenure held in return for services, while the term 'feudatories' was increasingly used to designate the holders of these fiefs, without much regard for their social status.[69] Thus, an undated list of Cypriot feudatories from the Venetian period includes a number of persons, mostly Greeks, who held fiefs (probably money fiefs) in return for various services (*hanno feudi de diversi servitii*): Thomaso Sguro was superviser (*matassipo*) of

Famagusta's market; Andrea Sanson, pilot (*nochiere*) of 'the great ship'; Francesco Jafuni, a druggist; Marco Carioti, *cancelier in lingua arabica*; Caterin Tinto, an interpreter; Thomas Catela, salt vendor in Nicosia; and the late Zorzi Lauder who taught the lute.[70] A similar list includes, among others, a certain Gioan Glaugia (or Glangia), who had to serve as cook.[71] Judging by their occupations, these 'feudatories' were certainly not considered by their contemporaries as noblemen.[72] They most probably held sergeanties, similar to those held by native-born tenants – dragomans, carpenters, butlers, cooks, et cetera – in the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem.[73] The latter, it should be borne in mind, served in many respects as a model for the constitution of the Cypriot kingdom. As a matter of fact, Venetian documents attest that the republican authorities also distinguished between military fiefs, which were held by noblemen, and fiefs held 'for some service'. The services attached to the latter generally ceased to be performed after the Venetian take-over. However, the Republic, always inclined to perpetuate practices of the former regime, especially when supplying income, transformed them into money payments.[74] Since these 'fiefs' were subject to the same laws of possession and inheritance as other fiefs, it is quite understandable that their holders were included in the lists of fief holders. Likewise, those *lisii (ligii) del Carpasso*, who were exempt from personal impositions (*gravezze*) normally incumbent upon the peasantry, and were sometimes described as 'poor feudatories', should also not be considered as noblemen.[75] Finally, as stated above, Venice also ceded state land *in feudo*. These transactions had nothing to do with ennoblement, feudal homage, or military service, but simply related to the inheritance customs of feudal lands.[76] I am therefore inclined to conclude that the inclusion of so-called feudatories under the second heading in the list of 1557 is not sufficient proof of noble status.

The other groups of names included in the same list present fewer difficulties. They include individuals and institutions holding state land by lease, and being under the obligation to present capons or candles to the representatives of the Signory on the feast of Saint Mark.[77] Among these one finds persons of different social standing: noblemen, burghers, priests, free tenants, and even serfs, as well as monasteries. In short, only the persons included in the first group can be regarded with certainty as noblemen.

A second source, dating roughly from the same period, is a report on a military array (*mostra*) organized by the Venetian governor in 1560, a document which has been published recently by Gilles Grivaud and Aspasia Papadaki.[78] This list includes two groups of individuals; the first comprises what the document defines as 'feudatories', namely

those holders of feudal estates who had the obligation to contribute to the feudal host a certain contingent, the proportions of which depended exclusively on the fief, and not on the personal status of its holder. The second group includes the *provisionati a cavallo*, who were younger members of noble families or burghers lacking sufficient income, who received a yearly pension from the Signory and were obliged to serve, when necessary, as cavalrymen in the army.[79] Here again we encounter different titles attached to the names in the list. Those bearing the title *magnifico* were no doubt noblemen.[80] But what about the others whose name is preceded by *misser, ser*, or even *domino? Domino* is also the title attached to all the *provisionati a cavallo*, without distinction between noblemen and others. These different titles cannot be regarded as reflecting a feudal hierarchy, which, as already explained above, did not exist at this stage. We shall therefore regard as noblemen only those individuals who are explicitly described as knights or whose name is preceded by the title *magnifico*.

What can these two lists tell us about the proportion of Greeks in the Cypriot nobility? Firstly, none of the few Greek families encountered in Makhairas's and Strambaldi's lists of the 1370s survived until the end of the Venetian period.[81] This fact is not at all surprising, considering the high rate of extinction of noble lineages which has already been observed with respect to other countries.[82] Secondly, the number of other families in these lists which may be identified with a reasonable amount of certainty as both noble and Greek is limited to four: Podocataro, Sōzomenos, Singritico (Singlitico), and Contestefanos (Kōntostefanos).[83]

A scrutiny of those Cypriots who served as viscounts of Nicosia, a magistracy which was reserved for knights, provides us with another name: Bustron.[84] As for the Strambali (or Strambaldi) family – there is no conclusive proof for its Greek origin.[85] The number of Greek noble families which can be traced towards the end of Venetian rule is therefore five or probably six, out of a total of about sixty noble families which are encountered in documents belonging to the same period. There may of course be a few more names that have escaped our scrutiny, but, on the whole, it seems that the Greek presence in the Cypriot nobility did not significantly exceed these limits.

There remains, of course, the question whether our treatment of the subject has not led us to omit a great number of Greek families which succeeded in joining the nobility in the intermediate period, but disappeared before the end of the fifteenth century or even in the course of Venetian domination. A quick glance at various documents and sources from the fifteenth century, such as the chronicle of George Boustronios, the documents which have been published by Jean

Richard, or the data derived from Rudt de Collenberg's scrutiny of the Vatican Archives reveals that this is not the case.[86] If there are any families which escaped our notice, their number cannot possibly be high. One could probably add, for instance, George Capadocius, described as *domicellus Nicosiae* and royal councillor in a papal document of 1411.[87] The Cappadocas, two of whom can be found among the adherents of Queen Charlotte, survived until the Venetian period, and should probably be added to our list.[88] The Palaeologi, who appear in our documents only in the 1490s and were not originally Cypriots, should most likely be taken into consideration as well.[89] But on the whole, since very few acts of ennoblement are to be found under Venetian rule, the great majority of the nobles appearing in the Venetian documents must have been the descendants of noble families which existed in Cyprus at the end of the Lusignan period.

Two main subjects have been investigated in this study. The first is the question of noble identity in Cyprus during the last century of Lusignan rule and under Venetian domination. We have seen that those scholars who presented the Cypriot nobility of that period as widely penetrated by new social and ethnic elements, Greek Cypriots among them, have based their interpretation on the assumption that whoever held a seigneurial estate or participated in the urban council established by Venice should be regarded as a nobleman. We have demonstrated that the holding of a landed estate or the participation in the urban councils were certainly not sufficient by themselves for somebody to be considered a nobleman. Moreover, we have seen that Etienne de Lusignan's testimony, on which the historians of the Cypriot nobility have so heavily relied, cannot be accepted, unless corroborated by more reliable sources. New families were ennobled, particularly during the last decades of Lusignan rule. However, Cypriot society during that period was imbued with strong aristocratic values and traditions. It was a highly hierarchical society, where social mobility, though important, did not succeed in undermining the well-established barriers separating the different social groups. The importance and significance of noble status, and of the privileges and social symbols attached to it could naturally vary from one period to another; but the Cypriot noblemen were certainly not eager to let anybody who could afford to acquire a landed estate, or any burgher who participated in the urban council join their exclusive coterie. Moreover, the rulers of the island too, be it the Lusignan kings or the Venetian republic, considered the existing social order a guarantee for political stability, and had no interest in its destruction. Therefore, in spite of the dramatic and violent events during the last decades of Lusignan rule

and of the constitutional changes which were introduced after the Venetian take-over, the legal and social basis of noble status remained intact. As long as the Cypriot kingdom continued to exist and be ruled by Latins, either as an independent state or as a Venetian colony, noble identity does not seem to have presented any particular ambiguity for the Cypriots. In fact, it seems that for them there was little doubt as to who belonged to this relatively small and traditional social elite.

The second problem discussed above, which could only be adequately dealt with after resolving the former one, is that of the degree to which Greek Cypriots succeeded in penetrating the insular nobility between the end of the fourteenth century and the Ottoman conquest of 1571. The data discussed above strongly suggest that the rise of Greek individuals to noble status and the subsequent establishment of Greek Cypriot noble lineages during the last century of Lusignan rule was a rather limited phenomenon. Contrary to what has been suggested by a number of scholars, only a handful of Greek families can be unequivocally considered as belonging to the feudal nobility towards the end of the fifteenth century and during the Venetian domination.

The limited number of ennobled Greek families can be explained in various ways. In the first place, the Greeks were not the only group from which new noblemen could be recruited. There were the Latin burghers, occasional new settlers from the West, especially the 'Catalans' (a denomination comprising people originating from the various Aragonese dominions), and finally, those Cypriots belonging to different oriental sects, the so-called Syrians.[90] Greeks had to compete with the other groups. Unlike the Latin burghers or western immigrants, but like the Syrians, they had to surmount a cultural and religious barrier. Admittedly, on the basis of both the *Constitutio Cypria* (1260) and of the decrees of the Council of Florence (1439), Cypriot Greeks were considered as being under the jurisdiction and authority of Rome, and thus they could hardly be regarded as schismatic.[91] A social division based upon religious affiliation could therefore scarcely be justified. However, a few examples indicate that the social rise of Greeks was often accompanied by Latinization. The earliest example is that of Thomas Barech, at the end of the fourteenth century, followed by other Greeks who appear already during the fifteenth century as members of the Latin community. Thus, one member of the Podocataro family became a cardinal and two others became archbishops of Nicosia. More members of the same family held different Latin ecclesiastical benefices.[92] A few members of the Bustron and Sōzomenos families can also be encountered among the Latin clerics serving on the island.[93]

It has been suggested that Latinization of Cypriot Greeks was

motivated by the need to acquire higher education in western universities.[94] This may partly be true, but Latinization implied a certain disposition to cross the religious and cultural boundaries, and the continual adherence to the new culture one generation after another also indicates that conversions were not only a matter of convenience. It should also be noted that not all Latinized Greeks studied abroad. In fact, the necessity, dictated by the political and social situation, to undergo some degree of Latinization, or the belief that being part of the nobility implied in one way or another the crossing of certain boundaries, may have limited the number of Greeks who were willing to undergo such a transformation as a price for social mobility. This hypothesis is supported by the social background of those few Greeks who succeeded in attaining noble status: they were often officials of the royal administration, court physicians, and merchants who served the crown in various ways, in other words people who came into close contact not only with the centre of power but also with the dominant culture.[95]

The composition of the Cypriot nobility at the end of Venetian rule was not a result of Venetian repression of Greek ascendancy, as suggested by Hill,[96] but rather a consequence of the situation inherited by Venice from Lusignan rule. It should be borne in mind that the Cypriot nobility, which had never been very numerous, became an even smaller group during the last phase of Latin rule on the island. Rudt de Collenberg estimated the number of noble families on the eve of the Turkish conquest at about two hundred.[97] The actual number of noble families at this stage must have been considerably smaller, presumably less than half that size. The number of very large families which could be defined as clans was rather limited in Cyprus. Under Venetian rule, noble lineages which had died out were not supplemented by newcomers, and the republic of Saint Mark let this natural process proceed without hindrance. As the old Frankish nobility gradually disappeared from the scene, the relative weight of the more recent recruits increased. In this process, a number of Cypriots of Greek origin succeeded in attaining the highest honours and riches, in close collaboration with the Venetian regime. The Podocataro have already been mentioned, and one could add the example of the Counts of Roucha, who belonged to the Singlitico family.[98] Thus, a combination of Venice's social conservatism and its liberal stand towards the Greek elites enabled the descendants of those few Greek families which had gained entry to the nobility under the Lusignan kings to attain unprecedented influence and power.

NOTES

1. See G. Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, 4 vols. (Cambridge, 1949–52). Most important among the recent studies are Jean Richard's two publications of Cypriot sources from the Vatican archives: J. Richard, *Chypre sous les Lusignan. Documents chypriotes des Archives du Vatican* (Paris, 1962); and (in collaboration with Th. Papadopoullos), *Le livre des remembrances de la secrète du royaume de Chypre (1468–1469)* (Nicosia, 1983). Many of Richard's studies on Cypriot history have been reprinted in three collections of articles: *Orient et Occident au Moyen Age: contacts et relations* (London, 1976); *Les relations entre l'Orient et l'Occident au Moyen Age* (London, 1977); *Croisés, missionnaires et voyageurs: les perspectives orientales du monde latin mediéval* (London, 1983). Among other interesting contributions, one should mention W.H. Rudt de Collenberg's numerous publications (many of which are cited below), A. Aristidou's studies on the Cypriot economy (Dr. Aristidou is about to publish an important collection of Venetian documents regarding Cyprus), and Peter Edbury's articles on the political history of the Frankish kingdom.
2. Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol. 2, Chs. 1–5; J. Richard, 'Le droit et les institutions franques dans le royaume de Chypre', in *XV^e congrès international d'études byzantines. Rapports et co-rapports* (Athens, 1976).
3. Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol. 2, pp.318, 355, 368–9, 488.
4. W.H. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les *litterae hortatoriae* accordées par les papes en faveur de la redemption des Chypriotes captifs des Turcs (1570–1597) d'après les fonds de l'*Archivio Segreto Vaticano*', *Epetēris tou Kentrou Epistēminikōn Erevnōn*, 11 (1981–82), 43–5. These lists also appear in W.N. Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons des chrétiens en Méditerranée* (1570–1600) (Paris, 1987), pp.56–7.
5. N. Iorga, *France de Chypre* (Paris, 1931), pp.195–214.
6. For example, see n.4 above.
7. The published sources which will be re-examined are the Cypriot chronicles composed during the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries: Leontios Makhairas, *Recital Concerning the Sweet Land of Cyprus Entitled 'Chronicle'*, ed. and trans. R.M. Dawkins, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1932); *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi*, ed. R. de Mas Latrie, 2 vols. (Paris, 1891–93) (Strambaldi's chronicle being basically an Italian translation of Makhairas's work); *The Chronicle of George Boustronios 1456–1489*, trans. and ed. R.M. Dawkins (Melbourne, 1964); and Florio Bustron, 'Historia overo commentarii de Cipro', ed. R. de Mas Latrie, in *Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de France. Mélanges historiques*, 5 (Paris, 1886), pp.1–531. The two historical descriptions of the island written by Fr. Etienne de Lusignan, and published after the conquest of Cyprus by the Ottomans (see n.22 below), have also often been used by historians and will be re-evaluated here. The documents published by Mas Latrie over a century ago (n. 10 below) are still indispensable, and J. Richard's two volumes of documents (n. 1 above) are also of great value for the study of the Cypriot nobility.
8. The unpublished sources used here are mainly the letters from the Venetian governors of Cyprus to the Senate and the Heads of the Council of Ten in Venice, their reports (*relazioni*) presented to the Senate after the conclusion of their service in the colony, and the deliberations of the Senate and the Council of Ten regarding Cyprus, all of them in the Venetian State Archives. Of great value are also several unpublished sources from the library of the Civico Museo Correr (hereafter MCC) in Venice, especially the two lists of Cypriots which are cited in nn. 58 and 65 below; another list, based on a dispatch from Cyprus preserved in the Venetian State Archives has recently been published by G. Grivaud and A. Papadaki, see n.52 below.
9. Richard, 'Le droit et les institutions', pp.9–11, 16–18; id., 'Pairie de l'orient latin: les quatre baronnies des royaumes de Jerusalem et de Chypre', *Revue historique de droit français et étranger*, 28 (1950), repr. in *Orient et Occident au Moyen Age*, No.

15, pp.67–87.

10. For example, L. de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1852–61), Vol. 3, p.533 (order of succession of fiefs); id., 'Documents nouveaux servant de preuves à l'histoire de Chypre', in *Mélanges historiques*, Vol. 4 (Paris, 1882), p.532 (description of royal patronage to younger offspring of noblemen); id., 'Les comtes du Carpas', *Bibliothéque de l'Ecole des Chartes*, 41 (1880), 379–80 (Charlotte Perez succeeded her elder brother to the county of Carpas).
11. E. Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1983), pp.39–42; see n.44 below.
12. Bustron, 'Historia', pp.417–24.
13. B. Arbel, 'Cypriot Society under Venetian Rule', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem (in Hebrew), 1982, Vol. 1, pp.66–77.
14. See n.12 above.
15. Rudt de Collenberg, 'The Fate of the Frankish Noble Families Settled in Cyprus', in P.W. Edbury, ed., *Crusade and Settlement* (Cardiff, 1985), p.269; id., 'Le déclin de la société franque de Chypre entre 1350 et 1450', *Kypriakai Spoudai*, 46 (1986), 71; id., 'L'héraldique de Chypre', in *Cahiers d'héraldique*, Vol. 3 (Paris, 1977), pp.123–4; Richard, *Le livre des remembrances*, p.xxvi.
16. Richard, *Le livre des remembrances*, No. 81. Cf. also ibid., Nos. 25, 38.
17. On Estive, see ibid., No. 86; on Garcia, see G. Boustronios, *Recital*, paras. 188, 205.
18. Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Venice, Ms. It.VII 875(8651), fol. 322; MCC, Ms. Cicogna 3596/30, fol. 10v (*feudati c'hanno comprato feudi dalla Illustrissima real, liquali sono tenuti presentar candelloti il dì de la festa di S. Marco, et non hanno hommagio, né sono tenuti a servitio alcuno*); MCC, DR 215, fol. 172 (1557). For the acquisition of seigneurial lands by non-nobles in the West, *cf.* Y. Bezard, *La vie rurale dans le sud de la région parisienne de 1450 à 1560* (Paris, 1929), pp.75–6, cited in M. Venard, *Bourgeois et paysans au XVII^e siècle* (Paris, 1957), p.26; H. Kamen, *European Society 1500–1700* (London, 1986), p.127.
19. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, Vol. 3, pp.498–501. For the dating of this list, see Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol. 3, p.765. For references to this document as a list of noblemen or feudatories, see Rudt de Collenberg, 'The Fate of the Frankish Noble Families', p.269; id., 'L'héraldique de Chypre', pp.123–4; Richard, *Le livre des remembrances*, p.xxi.
20. The direct tax on revenues from landed estates had been established in 1385 by King James I. It was redoubled in 1466 by King James II, and was maintained under Venice: Makhairas, *Recital*, paras. 621–2 and nn; F. Bustron, 'Historia', pp.352–3, 424–5; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol. 3, p.645; Archivio di Stato, Venice (hereafter ASV), Consiglio dei Dieci (hereafter X), Comuni, reg. 10, fol. 55 (1534). According to Richard, the original imposition dated from 1388: Richard, *Chypre sous les Lusignan*, p.130. Earlier attempts to tax landed incomes did not last for more than a few years.
21. See, for instance, the dubbing of Zuan Zamberlan in 1546, where the Doge, conferring the symbols of knighthood on Zuan, states that from then on he would be called 'Magnificus Joannes': ASV, X, Codici, No. 107, fol. 8. On the function of this ceremony as an initiation to nobility, see p.183 below.
22. E. de Lusignan, *Chorografia et breve historia universale dell'isola di Cipro* (Bologne, 1573); id., *Description de toute l'isle de Cypre* ... (Paris, 1580). On these writings, see Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol. 3, p.1147.
23. For a few references to Lusignan's inaccuracies, see Richard, 'Pairie d'Orient latin', p.87, n.1; id., 'Culture franque et culture grecque: le royaume de Chypre au XV^e siècle', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 11 (1987), pp.401–2.
24. Lusignan, *Description*, pp.78r–78v, 81v–82r.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., p.83v.
27. B. Arbel, 'Urban Assemblies and Town Councils in Frankish and Venetian

Cyprus', *Praktika tou Deuterou Diethnous Kypriologikou Synedriou (1982)* (Nicosia, 1986), Vol. 2, pp.203–13.

28. Lusignan, *Description*, pp.82v–83v.
29. Lusignan, *Chorografia*, p.82v.
30. Ibid.
31. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les *litterae hortatoriae*', pp.58–9 (Galeatio Jafuni *nobilis et patricius*; Rubertus Jaffuni, *nobilis et feudatarius et patricius*), 138 (Johannes de Santa Maura *nobilis et patricius Nicosiensis)*. See also n.70 below.
32. For example, Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, Vol. 3, p.195, n.6; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol. 2, p.8; Vol. 3, p.769; Rudt de Collenberg, 'The Fate of the Frankish Noble Families', p.268–9; id., 'L'héraldique de Chypre', pp.123–4; J. Richard, 'Culture franque et culture grecque', p.404; C.P. Kyrris, 'The Noble Family of Logaras of Lapethos, Cyprus: Some New Information about their Careers, Activities and Landed Properties', *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Neoellenici*, NS, 4 (1967), 107–49. The Logara family, however, is also described as noble in the *litterae hortatoriae* in 1576: Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les *litterae hortatoriae*', 128.
33. W.H. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Etudes de prosopographie genéalogique des Chypriotes mentionnés dans les registres du Vatican, 1378–1471', *Meletai kai Ypomnēmata*, 1 (1984), 547–8, 552–3; id., 'The Fate of the Frankish Noble Families', p.269.
34. Makhairas, *Recital*, para. 150.
35. L. de Mas Latrie, *Histoire des archevêques latins de l'île de Chypre* (Genoa, 1882), p.89; Rudt de Collenberg, 'L'héraldique de Chypre', p.121.
36. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Etudes de prosopographie', 639.
37. Two members of this family, Daniel and Zuan Antonio, were candidates for the Greek bishopric of Lefkara in 1567: ASV, Senato Mar, filza 38.
38. Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol. 3, p.1100.
39. Kyrris, 'The Noble Family of Logaras', 116, n.3.
40. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Etudes de prosopographie', 648; id., 'Recherches sur quelques familles chypriotes apparentées au pape Clement VIII Aldobrandini (1592–1605)', *Epetēris tou Kentrou Epistēmonikōn Ereunōn*, 12 (Nicosia, 1983), pp.9–11. One member of this family is referred to in Florence in 1473 as 'Greek', but this could merely be a general, though rather vague term referring to the geographical region from which he had originated.
41. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Etudes de prosopographie', p.658.
42. Compare R. Mandrou, *Introduction to Modern France, 1500–1640*, (London, 1975), p.108.
43. Richard, 'Droit et institutions', p.10.
44. For example, Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol. 2, pp.369, 527, n.2; F. Bustron, 'Historia', p.360; J. Richard, 'Le peuplement latin et syrien en Chypre au XIII^{e} siècle', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 7 (1979), 168–9: id., 'Une famille de "Vénetiens blancs" dans le royaume de Chypre au milieu du XV^{e} siècle: les Audeth et la seigneurie du Marethasse', *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi*, 1 (1981), 90–129.
45. On the reign of James II, see Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol. 3, pp.621–56.
46. Arbel, 'Urban Assemblies and Town Councils', pp.207–13.
47. W.H. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les Lusignan de Chypre', *Epetēris Kentron Epistēmonikōn Ereunōn*, 10 (1979–80), 85–319; id., 'Familles chypriotes apparentées au pape Clement VIII', pp.5–68; A. Mercati, 'Documenti pontifici su persone e cose de Mar Egeo e di Cipro', *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, 20 (1954), 132; E. Brayer, *et al.*, 'Le Vaticanus latinus 4789. Histoire et alliances des Cantacuzènes aux XIV^{e} et XV^{e} siècle', *Revue des études byzantines*, 9 (1951), pp.45–105. It is interesting to note the continuation of aristocratic endogamy in exile, after the fall of Cyprus to the Turks: E. Cicogna, *Delle iscrizioni veneziane*, 6 vols. (Venice, 1824–53), Vol. 3, p.225. For marriages between Cypriot noblemen and Venetian patricians, see Arbel, 'Cypriot Society', Vol. 2, Appendix 3, pp.360–62.
48. F. Bustron, 'Historia', pp.469–70; for a reference to *zostre* arranged under

Venetian rule, see the letter from Nicosia sent by Daniel de Mazi in Jan. 1506: ASV, Miscellanea Gregolin, busta 11. See also the description of the aristocratic lifestyle by the traveller Fürer von Haimendorf, who passed through Cyprus in 1566: C.D. Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria* (Cambridge, 1908), pp.79. At the request of the Venetian governor Zaccaria Barbaro, who criticized the lavishness of the Cypriot noblemen, the urban council of Nicosia enacted sumptuary laws restricting expenditure on clothing and private feasts: ASV, Dispaci al senato, filza 2 (Zaccaria's letter of 18 March 1561).

49. Bustron, 'Historia', pp.469–73.
50. Ibid.
51. On the military obligations of the knights, see P.W. Edbury, 'Feudal Obligations in the Latin East', *Byzantion*, 47 (1977), 328–56. See, for instance, the exceptional grant of a fief to Harion de Lusignan in 1468, in spite of the fact that he had not yet been knighted, most probably because he was too young: Richard, *Le livre des remembrances*, No. 169. For the continuation of feudal customs under Venetian rule, see Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, Vol. 3, pp.531–2, MCC, Ms. Donà dalle Rose (hereafter DR) 46, fol. 129 (1490).
52. On the military arrays under Venice, see G. Grivaud and A. Papadaki, 'L'institution de la *mostra generale* de la cavalerie féodale en Crète et en Chypre vénitiennes durant le XVI[e] siècle', *Studi veneziani*, 12 (1986), 165–99.
53. Richard, *Livre des remembrances*, p.xxvi, and, for example, ibid., Nos. 145–85.
54. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, Vol. 3, pp.528–30; Lusignan, *Chorografia*, p.80v; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol. 2, p.54; Arbel, 'Cypriot Society', p.91; C. Maltezou, 'Neai eidēseis peri Eugeniou Synglētikou ek tōn Kratikōn Archeiōn tēs Benetias', in *Praktika tou Prōtou Diethnous Kyprologikou Synedriou (1969)*, Vol. 3a (Nicosia, 1973), p.232. The Venetians later instituted a more orderly procedure for the appointment to this magistracy: Arbel, 'Cypriot Society', p.108.
55. F. Bustron, '*Historia*', p.470; MCC, DR, 45, fol. 97v; ASV, X, Codici, No. 107, fol. 8v (1549).
56. See text to n.17, p.178 above.
57. For the ennoblement and knighting of Zuan Zamberlan, see ASV, X, Codici 107, 8 (1546); *cf.*, also Lusignan, *Description*, p.81v. The second case is that of Marco Zaccaria, who was probably knighted sometime between 1553 and 1560. In 1553 he is mentioned as *avocato fiscal* in the Cypriot *camera*, see ASV, Collegio, Relazioni, busta 84 (rel. Da Ponte), fol. 2; an official letter from 11 May 1560 still refers to him merely as 'fidel domino', see ASV, X, Lettere, busta 290, No. 112; however, he is mentioned as holding 'a new fief' in a document dated 26 April 1560, and is already described as a knight in Feb. 1562: ASV, Dispaci al senato, filza 5 (blu) (1560); ibid., X, Lettere, busta 290, No. 151 (1562). Zacharia's case is, however, somewhat ambiguous since the same document from 1560 also mentions the fief which 'came into his possession after his father's death'.
58. An undated list of fiefholders, which probably belongs to the 1550s, mentions only two 'feudati creati della real' – Marco Zacharia and Zuan Zamberlan; see MCC, Ms. Cicogna 3596/30, fol. 9v.
59. For example, Richard, *Chypre sous les Lusignan*, pp.155–6 (1457). See also Arbel, 'Cypriot Society', pp.69–71. For the *assises* governing subinfeudation, see Edbury, 'Feudal Obligations', pp.342–3.
60. For earlier lists, see, for instance, *Chronique d'Amadi*, in *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi*, Vol. 1, pp.264–6 (1308), 386, 388 (1310), 391–2 (1311); Makhairas, *Recital*, para. 59 (1306), 119 (1361), 163 (1365), 190 (1366), 200 (1367). The list dated 1366 includes one 'Philip Doukizes', but since the reading of this name is uncertain we shall not consider its bearer to have been a Greek knight. See Dawkins's note, ibid., Vol. 2, para. 190, n.3. The list of 1367 includes Sir John Laskaris, who was a Byzantine dignitary in exile, ibid., para. 167, n.6. On the latter, see D. Jacoby, 'Jean Lascaris Calophéros, Chypre et la Morée', *Revue des études byzantines*, 26 (1968), 189–228; and A.K. Eszer, *Das abenteuerliche Leben des Johannes Laskaris Kalopheros* (Wiesbaden, 1969).

61. For the first list, see Makhairas, *Recital*, para. 542, and *Chronique de Strambaldi*, pp.229–30; for the second, see Makhairas, *Recital*, para. 563, and *Chronique de Strambaldi*, in *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi*, Vol. 2, p.238. *Cf.* also L. de Mas Latrie, 'Nouvelles preuves de l'histoire de Chypre', *Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartes*, 34 (1873), 80–84.
62. Makhairas, *Recital*, para. 599.
63. See n.60 above.
64. George Bili, Nicholas Bili's son, was Makhairas's nephew; see Dawkins's note in Makhairas, *Recital*, para. 567, n.7. Makhairas also mentions N. Bili's wife, 'the sister of Sir John Sōzomenos'. Was Sōzomenos also considered noble, or does the title 'sir' merely imply burgess status?
65. MCC, DR 215, fols. 163–8.
66. Ibid., fol. 165.
67. Ibid., fols. 165–6.
68. Ibid., fol. 166v.
69. D. Jacoby, 'Les archontes grecs et la féodalité en Morée franque', *Travaux et mémoires du Centre de Recherche d'histoire et Civilisation Byzantines*, 2 (1967), 463–4.
70. MCC, Ms. Cicogna 3596/30, fol. 10. Is it the same Tomaso Sguro included in a list of incomes from the second decade of the sixteenth century? *Cf.* Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, Vol. 3, p.501. Marco Carioti is probably either identical with or a descendant of a person bearing this name, who is mentioned by Florio Bustron among the beneficiaries of King James II's grants: F. Bustron, *Historia*, p.423. Sguro, Sanson, Carioti, and Jafuni are names encountered in other documents of the same period. A certain Yafouni (Gr. Giafounē), shopkeeper in Nicosia, is mentioned by Makhairas in 1369, see *Recital*, para. 275. For other members of these families, see F. Bustron, *Historia*, p.421 (Nicolo Sguro receives estates from King James II); Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, pp.500–501 (the late Angelo Sanson, Janus, Zaco, and Zuan Jafuni); Richard, *Le livre des remembrances*, doc. 195 and n.11 (Dame Anes Yafouny, who had been married to Jorge Guonem, receives a pension in 1468, and John Japhoun, elected bishop of Lefkara, in 1445); Rudt de Collenberg, 'Etudes de prosopographie', p.543 (Antonius Cariote confirmed in 1469 as archdeacon of Famagusta); id., 'L'héraldique de Chypre', p.99 (arms of the Kariotis family at Kyrenia); id., 'The *litterae hortatoriqe*, pp.43, 58, 89 (Alexander and Galeatio Jafuni and Albertus [or Robertus] Cariotus). In the *litterae hortatoriae*, Alexander Jafuni and Albertus, *alias* Rubertus Cariotus are described as *nobilis et patricius* in 1589 and 1576 respectively. These late attributions of noble status, especially when coupled with the term *patricius*, should be taken *cum grano salis* (*cf.* text to n.31 above). The Glangia, Sanson, and Iafunis families are included in Lusignan's lists of families represented in Nicosia's council; the Carioti and Sguro are not. *Chorografia*, pp.82–4, and *Description*, pp.82v–83v.
71. MCC, DR 215, fol. 183v. Gioan Glaugia (or Glangia) is also included in the former list, but without mention of his services.
72. In his list of casualties at Kherokitia (1426), Makhairas explicitly includes Primikyris the druggist and Nicholas the cook among 'the common folk': Makhairas, *Recital*, para. 685.
73. J. Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem* (London, 1973), pp.4–5.
74. MCC, Ms. DR 46, fol. 130 (1544).
75. MCC, DR 45, fol. 166; MCC, Ms Cicogna 3596/30, fol. 10v (mentioning three *lisii* families: Masotti, Cattroventi, and Marcopulli); Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Venice, Ms. It. VII 877, fol. 326v. It should be mentioned that, according to the Cicogna manuscript, the three *lisii* families were obliged to perform military service (*servitio de turcopulli*) with the feudal host. See also Grivaud and Papadaki, 'L'institution de la *mostra generale*, p.196 (*'4denti'*).
76. See n.18 above.
77. MCC, Ms. DR 215, fols. 167–167v.

78. Grivaud and Papadaki, 'L'institution de la *mostra generale*', pp.189–99.
79. L. de Mas Latrie, 'Documents nouveaux', pp.532–3, 550–52.
80. See n.21 above.
81. The names of these families are also not recorded in a list of landowners' incomes dating from the second decade of the sixteenth century; see Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, pp.498–501; see n.19 above.
82. *Cf.* K.B. McFarlane, *The Nobility of Later Medieval England* (Oxford, 1973), pp.146–7; E. Perroy, 'Social Mobility Among the French Noblesse in the Later Middle Ages', *Past and Present*, 21 (1962), 31.
83. For references to members of the Podocataro family, see also Dawkins, in Makhairas, *Recital*, Vol. 2, para. 661, n.2; Richard, *Le livre des remembrances*, doc. 155, n.2, and doc. 197, n.5; Mas Latrie, *Histoire des archevêques latins*, pp.116–20; Rudt de Collenberg, 'Etudes de prosopographie chypriote', pp.650–53. For the Sōzomenos, see Rudt de Collenberg, 'Recherches sur quelques familles chypriotes', pp.32–7; Richard, *Le livre des remembrances*, doc. 123 and n.5. For the Singlitico: Arbel, 'Cypriot Society', pp.86–95; Rudt de Collenberg, 'Etudes de prosopographie chypriote', pp.667–8. For the Contestefanos family, see also F. Bustron, *Historia*, p.421; Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, Vol. 3, p.501; Richard, *Chypre sous les Lusignan*, p.12 and n.2.
84. Hieronimo Bustron served as viscount of Nicosia in 1549–50, and again in 1559: ASV, Senator Mar, reg. 30, ff. 69r–69v; ibid., filze 7, 20. On this family, see also Rudt de Collenberg, 'Etudes de prosopographie chypriote', pp.654–55.
85. Diomedes Strambali, probably the author of the chronicle bearing his name (which is actually a translation from Greek to Italian of Makhairas' chronicle), was nominated as viscount in 1554, ibid., reg. 33, fol. 44v. For information on some other members of this family, see Richard, *Le livre des remembrances*, doc. 196, n.8.
86. *The Chronicle of George Boustronios*, ed. Dawkins; Richard, *Chypre sous les Lusignan*; id., *Le livre des remembrances*; Rudt de Collenberg, 'Etudes de prosopographie'; id., 'Les litterae hortatoriae',
87. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Etudes de prosopographie', p.528.
88. Ibid., pp.541–2, 627–8; George Capadoca is mentioned in the undated list of feudatories from the Venetian period, with the obligation to serve as *huomo d'arme* with two horses 'for his wife': MCC, Ms. Cicogna 3596/30, fol. 8. In 1318, a scribe named George Capadoca copied the accounts of the village of Psimolofo: see J. Richard, 'Le casal de Psimolofo et la vie rurale en Chypre au XIV^{e} siècle', *Ecole française de Rome. Mélanges d'archeologie et d'histoire*, 59 (1947), p.140, repr. in *Les relations entre l'Orient et l'Occident au Moyen Age*, art. 4. See also J. Darrouzès, 'Notes pour servir à l'histoire de chypre (deuxième article)', *Kypriakai Spoudai*, 20 (1956), p.48, and Rudt de Collenberg, 'Etudes de prosopographie chypriote', pp.627–9.
89. F. Mavroidi, 'Appalti e produzione a Cipro nel '500. Il caso della famiglia dei Paleologi', *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi*, 2 (1982), 219–32 (regrettably without full references to the archival sources).
90. D. Jacoby, 'Citoyens, sujets et protégés de Venise et de Gênes en Chypre du XIII^{e} au XV^{e} siècle', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 5 (1977), 159–88, repr. in *Recherches sur la Méditerranée orientale du XII^{e} au XV^{e} siècle* (London, 1979), No. 6; Richard, 'Le peuplement latin et syrien'; id., 'Une famille de "Vénitiens blancs"'.
91. Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol. 3, pp.1059–60, 108–90.
92. Mas Latrie, *Histoire des archevêques latins*, pp.116–20. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Etudes de prosopographie', pp.534, 537, 540, 542, 650–51; ASV, Sant'Ufficio, Processi, busta 16 (Prospero Podocataro, canon at Concordia, 1559).
93. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Etudes de prosopographie', pp.535, 541, 654–5; id., 'Recherches sur quelques familles chypriotes', p.32.
94. Th. Papadopoullos, 'Chypre; frontière ethnique et socio-culturelle du monde byzantin', in *XV^{e} congrès international d'études byzantines. Rapports et co-rapports* (Athens, 1976), p.35.

95. For example, Zuan Podocataro, described by Makhairas as a merchant, who sold his property in order to redeem King Janus from Mamluk captivity, and subsequently served this king in various capacities: Makhairas, *Recital*, para. 661; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol. 2, p.489. Hill describes him as a nobleman. Dawkins claims that the Podocataro were of Venetian origin: Makhairas, *Recital*, Vol. 2, para. 661, n.2. Another loyal servant of King Janus was the physician Zuan Singritico: F. Bustron 'Historia', p.860; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol. 3, p.527, n.2. Nicolo Singritico served in the royal *secrète* in 1468; see Richard, *Le livre des remembrances*, Nos. 14, 175, 221, 231.
96. Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol. 3, p.755.
97. Rudt de Collenberg, 'The Fate of the Frankish Noble Families', p.269; id., 'Le déclin de la société franque', p.83.
98. Compare Maltezou, 'Neai eidiseis peri Eugeniou Synglitikou', pp.227–44; B. Arbel, 'Résistance ou collaboration? Les chypriotes sous la domination vénitienne', in M. Balard (ed.), *Etat et colonisation au Moyen Age et à la Renaissance* (Lyons, 1989), pp.134–5. A '*domino Constancio Singritico*' is mentioned in the accounts of Psimolofo in 1318: Richard, 'Le casal de Psimolofo', p.151. However, there is no proof for Richard's claim that this person was already a nobleman by then (*cf.* ibid., p.129). The family must have attained noble status during the fifteenth century (*cf.* n.95 above).

The Mongols and the Eastern Mediterranean

DAVID O. MORGAN

There is a sense in which my title contains a contradiction. A.A.M. Bryer has spoken of 'what might be termed Mongol hydrophobia',[1] and it is certainly the case that the Mongols, on the whole, showed very little interest in becoming a maritime power. Perhaps they remained conscious that it was their skills as cavalry archers, above all else, that had won them their empire. This is true at least as far as the western end of the Mongol empire is concerned. In the Far East it was a rather different story. The Mongols took to naval warfare with considerable success during their campaigns of conquest in the Sung empire of south China in the 1260s and 1270s, and on two occasions, in 1274 and 1281, even attempted, though disastrously, to mount seaborne invasions of Japan.

But in the west the Mongols do not seem to have wished to control the major ports or the seaboard of the eastern Mediterranean directly. The Mongols of the Golden Horde were the masters of the Crimea; but they were happy to allow the Genoese to establish themselves there. The Mongols of the Ilkhanate in Persia and Iraq were, after the battle of Köse Dağ in 1243, the overlords, and eventually the direct rulers, of the Seljuk sultanate of Rūm; but their control was felt principally in the interior of Anatolia. It was much less apparent around the coastal periphery. They had failed to add Syria to the Ilkhanid realm in 1260; and while they continued for several decades to mount periodic invasions, it is perhaps doubtful whether they were any longer concerned with conquest and occupation so much as with plunder and with weakening their great Mamluk adversary. Certainly they did not attempt to take over the ports of the Syrian coastline.

In this sense, then, the Mongols were not a Mediterranean power. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to try to understand the history of the region in the second half of the thirteenth century and the first half of the fourteenth without taking them into account. As Donald Nicol has said, 'the Mongol invasions of the Near East and eastern Europe in the thirteenth century were on a scale which must make the battles and rivalries of Greeks and Latins over the possession of Constantinople seem like the squabbles of naughty children.'[2] The Mongol empire was,

at least in theory, by far the greatest power in the region, and one which the lesser powers had always to consider. It would have been a brave man who would have predicted, around the year 1250, that the whole of the Middle East and perhaps Europe too would not before long become provinces of the most extensive land empire ever to have existed.

Why did this not in fact happen? The answer lies not in the efficacy of the Christian and Muslim responses to the Mongol menace so much as in the internal conflicts that beset the Chinggisid imperial family after 1260. Let us therefore review the history of Mongol expansion in the west – while bearing in mind that the Middle East and Europe were, in the Mongol world view, peripheral areas of very secondary importance compared with, above everywhere else, China.

The first contact between Mongols and Europeans was made by a military unit commanded by the generals Jebei and Sübödei. This had gone in pursuit of the Khwārazm-shāh 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad when he had fled from Chinggis Khan's invasion of his kingdom in Persia and Central Asia in 1219–23. Failing to catch up with the Khwārazm-shāh, the unit had eventually returned to Mongolia the long way round, riding north through the Caucasus and then east across the steppes. En route it encountered and defeated a Russian-Qipchaq force at the battle of the River Kalka, which gave rise to a celebrated entry in the *Novgorod Chronicle* for 1224: 'The same year, for our sins', wrote the puzzled author, 'unknown tribes came, whom no one exactly knows, who they are, nor whence they came out, nor what their language is, nor of what race they are, nor what their faith is; but they call them Tatars.'[3]

This puzzlement and incomprehension are worthy of note. More than twenty years were to elapse before Europe had access to really reliable information about these fearsome invaders from the East. This information came with the return of John of Plano Carpini, emissary of Pope Innocent IV, from the enthronement of the Great Khan Güyük in Mongolia in 1246. In the meantime there was ample scope for rumour and tall stories to spread and flourish. As is well known, the crusaders encamped at Damietta in 1221 heard a confused account of Chinggis Khan's invasion of the Khwārazm-shāh's empire, and this was tied in with the enduring legend of Prester John. Chinggis was deemed to be a Christian king of the Prester's family, called David, and was of course hastening to the aid of the Christian cause. It has recently been argued that this story, when coupled with the effect of prophetic works which were circulating in the crusader camp, played a part in determining that the Ayyubid sultan al-Kāmil's offer of peace should be rejected, with regrettable results from the crusader point of view.[4]

It was, presumably, inevitable that the Prester John legend should have been laid under contribution when it came to accounting for this

mysterious incursion from the utterly unknown East. Indeed, if the latest (and perhaps the most eccentric) book to appear in English on the origins of the Mongol empire, L.N. Gumilev's *Searches for an Imaginary Kingdom: The Legend of the Kingdom of Prester John*,[5] is to be believed, what might be called the Nestorian factor in Mongol history was in reality of much greater importance than has previously been recognized.

It is in my opinion doubtful that the Mongols originally believed that they had some sort of divine commission to conquer the world: I know of no contemporary or near-contemporary evidence that Chinggis Khan held such a view. It seems more likely that they came round to the idea when they found that they were, in fact, conquering the world. The letters sent by the Mongols to the European powers from the 1240s leave no doubt that they had come to regard the world and the Mongol empire as, at least potentially, co-extensive.[6] Hence, perhaps, Batu's great invasion of Russia and eastern Europe in 1237–42. This resulted in the setting up of a Mongol khanate, known to westerners as the Golden Horde, on the Pontic steppes, and the subjection of the Russian principalities to Mongol rule. For Europe proper the consequences were less momentous. The battles of Liegnitz, in Silesia, and Mohi, in Hungary, both in April 1241, might have seemed to herald a major Mongol offensive against central and even western Europe; and these events did provoke the rather ineffective preaching of a crusade against this new variety of infidel enemy.[7] But in early 1242 the Mongols withdrew, perhaps because news had reached them of the death in Mongolia of the Great Khan Ögedei, perhaps because they had discovered that the Hungarian plain was not after all suitable terrain for the permanent maintenance of a Mongol army.[8] The shock caused by the invasion was considerable, as we can see, above all, from the evidence in Matthew Paris's *Chronica Majora*; and it provoked the dispatch of a series of emissaries to the Mongols, of whom the most significant was Carpini.

In fact the Mongols were never to return to Europe in full force, though no one, whether on the Mongol or the European side, can have known this at the time. And although there were no more full-scale invasions, the Mongols long remained a looming menace on Europe's eastern frontier; a menace which at times did find expression in incursions into eastern Europe and the Balkans. On the other Mongol borders, however, expansion had by no means ceased. The very year of the withdrawal from Europe saw a massive Mongol intervention in Anatolia.

The previous three decades had seen the apogee of the Seljuk sultanate of Rūm. The accession of Kay Ke'ūs I in 1211 had inaugurated

something of a Golden Age, which reached its height in the reign, between 1220 and 1237, of Kay Ke'ūs's son Kay Qubād. During these years the Seljuks dominated Anatolia as never before in the history of the sultanate. It is a curious fact, and one which has not been explained wholly satisfactorily, that these were also years of peace between the Seljuks and the Byzantines. One might have expected that a determined and perhaps successful attempt would have been made at this time to bring the Byzantine territories, or at least that part of them represented by the empire of Nicaea, under Seljuk rule. But the sultans concentrated their efforts on their eastern frontiers.[9]

It is probably the case that the activities of the Mongols were the main reason for this. The empire of Nicaea, concerned as it was principally with the Latins and the despotate of Epirus, did not constitute a threat to the sultanate. But from 1219 the Mongols were on the Middle Eastern scene, and even where they were not present in person they set off a chain reaction of major proportions. Their campaigns between 1219 and 1223 effectively destroyed the empire of the Khwārazm-shāh in Persia and Central Asia, without putting anything very coherent in its place. Among the most troublesome inhabitants of this political semi-vacuum were the Khwarazmians, initially the followers of Jalāl al-Dīn, son and successor of the Khwārazm-shāh who had been defeated by Chinggis Khan. Jalāl al-Dīn was presumably concerned, before his ignominious death in 1231, to carve out a realm for himself in western Asia; though he went about this in a curiously random fashion. Nevertheless, in the late 1220s he posed a real threat to the eastern frontier of the sultanate of Rūm, until his defeat in 1231 at the hands of a combined Seljuk, Ayyubid, and Franco-Armenian army.[10]

Kay Qubād died, in the fullness of his power, in 1237. He had united most of Anatolia, apart from the empire of Nicaea, under his rule, and he was remembered as the greatest prince of his dynasty. But he was also the last to die with his independence intact. Initially his successor Kay Khusraw must have seemed hardly less formidable. But his military strength was sapped by the effort to cope with and suppress the Turkoman rebellion of Bābā Isḥāq from 1240. In these circumstances it was unfortunate that the Mongols chose such a moment to intervene in full force, for the first time, in the affairs of Anatolia.

The Mongol general Baiju besieged and took Erzurum in the winter of 1242–43. In the following spring he marched west, and defeated the Seljuk forces at Köse Dağ in June. Kay Khusraw fled to Ankara; but his vizier Muhadhdhab al-Dīn sought out Baiju and made terms. The Seljuk dynasty survived, but its days of glory were over. The territory of Rūm increasingly became no more than a Mongol protectorate. Later in the century it came under some kind of direct Mongol rule; and the

dynasty was finally extinguished early in the fourteenth century. If the Seljuk sultanate had for a century and a half presented a significant potential threat to the survival of Byzantium, the Byzantines had the Mongols to thank for the elimination of that threat.

It was not until the accession of the Great Khan Möngke in 1251 that the Mongol empire embarked on another major phase of expansion. Möngke despatched his brother Qubilai to complete the conquest of the Sung empire in south China, a process which was not completed before 1279. Another brother, Hülegü, was sent to western Asia, initially to destroy the Assassins of the Alburz mountains in north Persia and to bring the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad to submission. There remains considerable doubt, as Peter Jackson has shown, about precisely what Hülegü was expected to achieve as a result of his campaigns.[11] It is possible that his original status was not very different from that which generals like Baiju had enjoyed, and that on completion of his assigned task he was under orders to return to Mongolia. However that may be, such considerations were rendered academic by the death of Möngke in 1259 and the civil war which broke out over the succession to the Great Khanate between Qubilai and another brother, Arigh-Böke. By the time Qubilai had emerged victorious in 1264, Hülegü was firmly established as a near-independent ruler in Persia and Iraq. He had also become the *de facto* overlord of the Seljuk sultanate of Rūm.

But while Hülegü may have enjoyed considerable dynastic success in his own account, the events around the year 1260 brought about a severe diminution of overall Mongol power. The most striking manifestation of this was the battle of 'Ayn Jālūt and its aftermath. Having in 1258 put the Abbasid caliph to death in a fashion which, though honourable in Mongol eyes, was in all probability not much appreciated by the victim, he marched on into Syria. He took Aleppo and Damascus, and the Mongol forces seemed set fair to ride on to Egypt. At this point Hülegü withdrew with the bulk of his forces. This was no doubt due largely to the political crisis caused by the death of Möngke; though I have argued elsewhere, on the evidence of the letter of 1262 from Hülegü to St Louis discovered and published by Paul Meyvaert, that as in the similar case of the Mongol withdrawal from Hungary in 1242, lack of adequate pasture in Syria may have had something to do with it.[12] The force which Hülegü left behind, under his general Kit-buqa, was defeated by the Mamluk sultan Qutuz at 'Ayn Jālūt in September 1260.[13] A further defeat followed later in the year at Ḥimṣ. As it turned out, Mongol expansion had reached its limit in the West. The authorities of the crusader states, with the exception of Antioch, opted for a neutrality favourable to the Mamluks. This,

as Jean Richard and Peter Jackson have argued, was perfectly comprehensible in the circumstances of the time: the Mongols must have seemed, on the then available evidence, by far the greater danger.[14] But by allowing the Mamluks their victory, the Christian states signed their own delayed death warrant.

Hülegü's campaign was the last to be undertaken by something approaching a united Mongol empire. He was under the orders of a recognized Great Khan, and his army included contingents levied from the various constituent parts of the empire. Among these were troops from the Golden Horde, whose ruler was, from 1257, the first khan Batu's brother, Berke. Berke, being a Muslim, was less than enthusiastic about the fate of the caliph, and instructed his forces to leave Hülegü's army, and if necessary to join the Mamluk (but Muslim) enemy. This marked conspicuously a significant breach between two of the Mongol khanates, though it should not be supposed that Berke's religious scruples were the main point at issue. His immediate successors as khans of the Golden Horde were not Muslim, but there was no slackening of enmity, which was based essentially on a dispute over possession of territories in the Caucasus, claimed by the Golden Horde, which were occupied by the Ilkhanate. It was on this front that war broke out in 1261 or 1262.

The consequences of the breach between Hülegü and Berke were far-reaching. Europe was saved from an invasion apparently being planned by Berke. He had invaded Poland in 1259, had sent an ultimatum to Bela IV of Hungary, and had in 1261 demanded the submission of St Louis.[15] The invasion never materialized, and there can be little doubt that Berke was deterred from such an involvement by his problems with Hülegü. But this was in a sense incidental compared with the major reorientation of the political map of the Middle East which now came about.

The Mamluk sultan Baybars seized the opportunity to keep the only temporarily defeated Mongols of Persia at bay permanently. He indicated his intentions by the tactful gesture, in 1263, of having Berke's name included after his own in the *khuṭba*, the address at Friday prayer mention during which is among the prerogatives of Muslim sovereignty. In the previous year he had sent an embassy to Berke. Baybars's biographer, Ibn 'Abd al-Ẓāhir, says of this that:

> The Sultan ordered that a letter, which I wrote on his behalf, should be sent to Berke, the supreme king of the kings of the Tatars [the Arabic perhaps carries the implication 'senior Tatar king': Berke was now regarded as *aqa*, senior member of the Chinggisid family, a position of some potential importance], inciting him against Hülegü, stirring up enmity and hatred

> between them, and demonstrating that it was his duty to wage a Holy War (jihād) against the Tatars. The reason for this was that news had been repeatedly received of his adoption of Islam; and this [of course] entailed the duty of waging Holy War against infidels, even if they were of his family.[16]

What is especially interesting is that Ibn 'Abd al-Ẓāhir's account is immediately preceded by the information that Baybars had received a letter promising help from Michael VIII Palaeologus (hidden under the title al-Ashkurī or al-Yashkurī, that is, Lascaris), and that Baybars had sent presents to the emperor, including a giraffe and a group of captured Tatars, presumably Ilkhanid troops taken prisoner during the 'Ayn Jālūt campaign. Baybars's embassy to Berke passed through Constantinople on its way, and there indeed it met an embassy from Berke to Baybars, which arrived in Egypt in 1263.

The important point here is that it was possible for these embassies to travel by way of Constantinople. The fate of the Latin empire was intimately bound up with the formation of the Mamluk–Golden Horde alliance. It has been argued[17] that but for Michael VIII's recovery of Constantinople in July 1261 it is hard to see how that alliance could have been effectively implemented. It was a question simply of communication between Baybars and Berke. The Latin empire was no friend to Baybars; and all the feasible Asian land routes between Egypt and southern Russia were controlled by Hülegü. Only a change to a favourably disposed regime in Constantinople would make communication possible. This was not only of strategic importance. The Mamluk regime, at this point still only a decade old and looking far from secure, could hardly hope to survive without a continual infusion of new mamluk slave soldiers; and the principal sources of recruits were the Qipchaq tribes of the Pontic steppe, from where indeed Baybars himself had come. Regular contact through the straits was essential.

This put Michael VIII in a perplexing position: he was caught between mutually antagonistic Mongol rulers, Berke and Hülegü, neither of whom it would be wise to offend, and both of whom were immeasurably more powerful than he was himself. He had only just transferred his capital from Nicaea, and he could not ignore his eastern neighbour, the sultanate of Rūm, now under the dominance of Hülegü. The Mongols had divided the sultanate between two members of the Seljuk family, Kay Ke'ūs II and Qilij Arslan IV; but Kay Ke'ūs had fallen out with Hülegü, and in 1262 fled, to take refuge with Michael. The emperor opted for prudence: he offered one of his daughters in marriage to Hülegü, and imprisoned his uninvited guest in Thrace (from where in 1264 he was rescued by force at the instigation of Berke). In the end, however, Michael chose the Golden Horde's side,

and transferred the offer of his daughter to the powerful Golden Horde general Noghai. He may have supposed that a hostile Golden Horde would be more of a menace in the Balkans than the Ilkhanids were on his Asian frontier; and in any case Hülegü died in 1265.

There was also the consideration, which had to be borne in mind, of the links between the patriarchate of Constantinople and the Orthodox Church in Russia. The dependence of the Russian Church on Byzantium made it essential that reasonable relations be maintained between Constantinople and the paramount rulers of Russia, the khans of the Golden Horde. It was not, therefore, a matter of chance that all of the first three Palaeologan emperors married daughters to Mongols of the Golden Horde.[18] Nevertheless a very delicate balancing act was required, and it should also be remembered that Michael VIII married his daughter Maria, known to the Mongols as Despina Khatun, to Hülegü's son and successor Abaqa.

From the early 1260s, then, the European powers, most fortunately, were no longer faced with a monolithic Mongol enemy. The Mongol empire was now divided into what, at the risk of oversimplification, we may call four effectively independent khanates. The house of Chinggis Khan's youngest son, Tolui, held the Great Khanate in China and Mongolia in the person of Qubilai and his descendants, and its junior branch, the Ilkhanids, controlled Persia, Iraq, and much of Anatolia. The house of Chinggis's eldest son, Jochi, ruled the Golden Horde. The descendants of the second son ruled the Chaghatai Khanate in Central Asia, though the most powerful figure in this region, until his death in 1303, was Qaidu, a descendant of Chinggis's third son and first successor, Ögedei.

It was no doubt inevitable that the empire should in some way break up. Even in twentieth-century conditions no state rules so vast an area as any kind of administrative unit. In the thirteenth century it was clearly impossible. The Mongols showed themselves to be highly skilled in the development of a long-distance network of communications, but it was still a long way from Hungary to Korea. But administrative subdivision need not necessarily have carried with it enmity between the constituent parts of the empire. As it was, there was a close alliance between the Īlkhāns and their relatives in China, while the Chaghatais and the Golden Horde were antagonistic to both. In 1251 Batu had been the Mongol empire's kingmaker: he had promoted and ensured the election of Möngke to the Great Khanate, his price being, perhaps, his own virtual autonomy in the Golden Horde. But on Möngke's death in 1259 Berke had backed the ultimately unsuccessful candidate, Arigh-Böke, against Qubilai. Hülegü's own initial attitude is by no means clear: he may have inclined in the same direction. But

ultimately he swung his support behind Qubilai, thus creating another source of discord between Berke and himself in addition to the execution of the caliph and the Ilkhanid occupation of the Caucasus.

All this meant an unavoidable diminution of Mongol power. If an Īlkhān proposed to attack the Mamluk territories in Syria, he had to remember the risk of a possible Chaghataid invasion from Central Asia, or an attack in the Caucasus by the forces of the Golden Horde: he might well find himself fighting simultaneously on two, even, potentially, three, widely separated fronts. This is precisely what happened during Ghazan's expedition to Syria in 1299–1300. The invasion, initially, was strikingly successful: even more so than Hülegü's had been in 1260. Syria was in Mongol hands, and all the Mamluk forces had been driven back to Egypt. But Ghazan withdrew; and while there were probably, once again, logistical factors involved in the decision,[19] he was indeed distracted by an attack on his eastern frontier. Similarly the rulers of the Golden Horde were not in a position to devote their attention exclusively to the expansion of their territory in eastern Europe or the Balkans for fear of trouble on their Caucasian frontier. Even had this not been so, there could be no further attempts to expand the Mongol empire as a whole, with military contingents contributed by all parts of the empire, as had been the norm until the 1250s. Military operations were now the concern of the individual Mongol khanates, which inevitably did not dispose of resources on the scale which had been possible for the united empire.

The situation, from the Mongol point of view, was indeed even worse than this. Not only were different branches of the Chinggisid family at daggers drawn: in the case of the Golden Horde, it was now thought reasonable for a Mongol khanate to involve itself in a permanent alliance with a non-Mongol power, the Mamluk regime, against fellow Mongols. The principal credit for this turning upside down of Near Eastern politics must belong to Baybars, who had lost little time in making the most of his opportunity. But the part played by the restored Byzantine empire was, as we have seen, not negligible. And Michael VIII's agreement with the Genoese in 1261, just before the recapture of Constantinople, made it possible for them to establish themselves in Golden Horde territory, at Kaffa in the Crimea, from where they were able to contribute to the maintenance of the Golden Horde–Mamluk slave trade. The Byzantine emperors had to tread very carefully between the Mongols of Russia and those of Persia; and on the whole they achieved a remarkable degree of success. There were no invasions of the Asian territories subject to Byzantium on the part of the affronted Īlkhāns.

None the less, the period of Ilkhanid supremacy in Anatolia saw a

severe erosion of the Byzantine lands on the Asian side of the straits. No doubt this was partly the result of the comparative neglect suffered by the former lands of the empire of Nicaea by the government in Constantinople, once the capital had been recovered. But something needs also to be said about the nature of Ilkhanid rule in Rūm. During Hülegü's time and most of the reign of Abaqa, the Seljuk sultanate was in the firm hands of the celebrated minister Mu'īn al-Dīn Sulaymān the Parvāna, who, like his father before him, exercised on behalf of the Mongol overlords far more effective power in the sultanate than did the sultans themselves, who were generally little more than ciphers. The rule of the Parvāna came to an end when Baybars invaded Anatolia in 1277, inflicting a severe defeat on the Mongols at Albistān.[20] While the invasion did not lead, as Baybars seems to have expected, to a Turkish rising against the Mongols, it did bring severe reprisals at the hands of the Īlkhān Abaqa. The Parvāna was blamed for the defeat at Albistān, and was thought, rightly or wrongly, to have been in treasonable contact with the Mamluks; hence the episode also precipitated his fall and execution (after which he may have been eaten: not standard Mongol practice when dealing with a defeated enemy. They must presumably have been very annoyed with him).

For another two decades or so, the Mongols continued to appoint members of the Seljuk house to the sultanate; but these individuals were of no account whatever, and the sultanate, as mentioned earlier, expired obscurely at the beginning of the fourteenth century. In any case the character of Mongol government in Rūm was now very different from what it had been in the days of the Parvāna. There was little more pretence of indirect rule: Rūm gradually became a fully fledged, directly ruled province of the Ilkhanate, with Mongol institutions being introduced. But Mongol Anatolia was not co-extensive with Seljuk Rūm at its height. The Īlkhāns were concerned principally with the eastern part, that nearest to their Persian territories. They held the cities of the plateau, but showed little interest in the periphery, or in close control of the Turkomans of western Anatolia. In these circumstances it was possible for the Turkoman emirates which had already begun to form to prosper without the need to take much account of the Mongols – though apparently there are some early Ottoman coins in the name of the Īlkhān Ghazan, who reigned from 1295 to 1304.[21]

Since it was one of these western Anatolian emirates which eventually destroyed the Byzantine empire, it might, then, be possible to argue that even the events of 29 May 1453 can be laid indirectly at the Mongols' door. Had the Mongols chosen, or been able, to exercise effective power in western Anatolia, the Osmanli emirate might have been strangled at birth. But this is a fairly fruitless speculation, built in

any case on the presupposition that the Turkoman emirates were indeed able to ignore their nominal Ilkhanid masters. The early Ottoman coins mentioned above might conceivably point to a different conclusion.

To answer this question, would, however, require a knowledge of early Ottoman history which I, no Ottomanist, certainly do not have; but which I suspect that no one else has either. It is at present difficult to say anything very definite about Ottoman origins, due to the collapse of the Wittekian consensus, about which it may be worth saying a word or two.

The formidable Paul Wittek argued that the early Ottomans were not organized tribally, as is alleged by their own historical, or pseudo-historical, traditions. His own view is to be found encapsulated in his celebrated lectures, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*,[22] published 50 years ago. Wittek held that the early Ottomans were an *ad hoc* assemblage of *ghāzīs*, fighters for the faith of Islam against the Byzantine Christian infidel. This hypothesis, which he put forward with undeniable persuasiveness and elegance, in due course became historical orthodoxy, and eventually, though only very gradually, it found its way even into textbooks of European history.

Five years ago, however, Rudi Lindner published his *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia*,[23] in which he demonstrated clearly that Wittek's '*ghāzī* state' rested on only two pieces of evidence, neither of them especially satisfactory: the verse chronicle of Ahmedi, written in the 1390s, and an inscription in Bursa, allegedly dating from 1337. Many others – even I myself – had noticed this curious fact; but no one had previously dared to point it out in print, still less to suggest that Wittek was simply wrong. The extent to which Ottoman historians lived and worked in the shade of Wittek has to be heard in conversation with them to be believed; and personally I suspect that the Ottomanists' notorious reluctance to chance their arms in print, other than in minute and reasonably safe studies of individual documents and the like, is something of an indication of Wittek's continuing and pervasive influence over them. There is a ghost here which has yet to be fully exorcized, though a good start has certainly been made in articles by Colin Heywood and Colin Imber.[24]

There is, I think, little doubt that the hypothesis that the central ideology of the early Ottomans was such as to warrant the term '*ghāzī* state' is now on its way out.[25] We can safely say at least that on the existing evidence it cannot be demonstrated; although the Ottoman polity may nevertheless have been a *ghāzī* state in actual fact, for all we know (though one might have expected the Byzantines to have taken more notice of this). No one, of course, would deny that *ghāzī* claims

were made for the Ottomans: it would have been odd had they not been. Lindner sees these as evidence not for the nature of early Ottoman political activity, but for slightly later Ottoman intellectual developments. He argues that the 'ulamā' portrayed the early Ottomans as *ghāzīs* so as to provide them, retrospectively, with a reputably Islamic origin.

So where do we go from here? Lindner did not by any means confine himself to destruction: he put forward an alternative hypothesis. This is that the early Ottomans were in fact a tribe, and indeed a nomadic one; but they were a tribe which was assembled from very disparate elements, not necessarily from individuals or families who had a blood relationship. He based this view on twentieth-century anthropological work on nomadic tribal organization, and suggested that one reason why Wittek had failed to see the flaws in his argument is that the relevant anthropological research was not available in the 1930s. This may be so, though it should be remarked that something very like both Wittek's '*ghāzī* state' and Lindner's conception of the nature of the nomadic tribe can be found clearly expressed in *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, which was published some considerable time before the 1930s.[26] Lindner may turn out to be right; the difficulty is that if we discount his anthropological material, the actual historical support he has for his thesis is not perhaps so very much more substantial than Wittek's evidence for the *ghāzī* state. I conclude, therefore, unsatisfactorily, that so far as I can see there will be little chance of saying much, with any degree of certitude, about the early Ottomans until the experts have done a good deal more work, and have indeed been persuaded to publish it.

To return, after this lengthy excursus, to the Mongols: when Berke of the Golden Horde made his alliance with the Mamluks against the Īlkhāns, they in their turn were obliged to have recourse to non-Mongol allies. Their chief support in the Mongol world, as we have seen, was the Great Khan in China. But China was far away, and the allies were separated by hostile powers in Central Asia. Communication between China and Persia, as in the case of Marco Polo's return to Europe, frequently had to be by sea. So little practical help could be expected from China if the Ilkhanate found itself confronted by an invasion from north, east, or west.

The most readily available potential allies, at least against the Mamluks, were the crusader states and the European powers. Hence, commencing perhaps with Hülegü's letter of 1262 to St Louis referred to earlier, a long series of attempts to organize united Mongol-Christian action against the Mamluks in Syria ensued. The story of

these contacts has often been recounted,[27] and I shall not repeat it here. In terms of practical results, they came to virtually nothing. The crusader states in Syria were extinguished, and Mongol incursions remained no more than that. Historians are grateful for the survival of so much of the correspondence between Mongol Persia and Europe; and it does reveal a significant change of attitude from the haughty demands for submission which had characterized Mongol letters to Europe in the 1240s and 1250s. The Īlkhāns now addressed the westerners, their potential allies, as something approaching equals: yet another indication of how Mongol stock had slumped since 1260.

Yet fascinating and valuable as these letters indeed are, it is perhaps pertinent to ask whether the prospect of a Mongol-western link-up was really seen as a matter of very great importance by the Īlkhāns. No doubt they would have been glad to take advantage of combined operations with the westerners, had the opportunity ever been realized. But it is interesting, and perhaps significant, that these links with the West receive almost no mention in the Ilkhanid, mainly Persian, sources – not even in the great *Jāmi' al-tawārīkh* of Rashīd al-Dīn who, as he was the Ilkhanate's leading minister for twenty years, must certainly have known about the negotiations. It has sometimes been suggested[28] that the fact that the Persian historians ignore Europe is simply evidence that they shared the traditional medieval Muslim contempt for the remote and barbarous West. This is certainly plausible; but the alternative explanation remains: that these negotiations, in the context of Ilkhanid policy as a whole, were not in fact considered to be of much moment.

However this may be, in 1322 the Īlkhān Abū Sa'īd at last made peace with the Mamluks; and on his death in 1335 the Ilkhanate collapsed. The Mongols of Persia ceased to be a factor in the affairs of the eastern Mediterranean, though the Golden Horde remained on the scene for much longer. The Mongols had indeed made an impact. But, compared with so much of the rest of the world, the West had been remarkably fortunate. It could all, so easily, have been a great deal worse.[29]

NOTES

1. A.A.M. Bryer, 'The Fate of George Komnenos, Ruler of Trebizond (1266–1280)', *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 66 (1973), 347.
2. D.M. Nicol, *The Last Centuries of Byzantium 1261–1453* (London, 1972), p.26.
3. R. Michell and N. Forbes (trans.), *The Chronicle of Novgorod 1016–1471*, Camden Society (London, 1914), p.64.
4. J.M. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade 1213–1221* (Philadelphia, 1986), pp.178–9.
5. L.N. Gumilev, *Searches for an Imaginary Kingdom: The Legend of the Kingdom of Prester John*, Past and Present Publications (Cambridge, 1987).

6. E. Voegelin, 'The Mongol Orders of Submission to European Powers, 1245–1255', *Byzantion*, 15 (1940–41), 378–413.
7. P. Jackson, 'The Crusade against the Mongols', unpublished paper read at the conference of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East (Jerusalem, 1987).
8. D. Sinor, 'Horse and Pasture in Inner Asian History', *Oriens Extremus*, 19 (1972), 181–2.
9. C. Cahen, *Pre–Ottoman Turkey* (London, 1968), pp.121ff.
10. Ibid., pp.129–30.
11. P. Jackson, 'The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire', *Central Asiatic Journal*, 22 (1978), 186–244.
12. D.O. Morgan, 'The Mongols in Syria, 1260–1300', in P.W. Edbury (ed.), *Crusade and Settlement* (Cardiff, 1985), pp.231–5; P. Meyvaert, 'An Unknown Letter of Hulagu, Il–Khan of Persia, to King Louis IX of France', *Viator*, 11 (1980), 245–59.
13. J.M. Smith, Jr., ''Ayn Jālūt: Mamlūk Success or Mongol Failure?', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 44 (1984), 307–45; P. Thorau, 'The Battle of 'Ayn Jālūt: A Re–examination', in Edbury (ed.), *Crusade and Settlement*, pp.236–41; R. Amitai, 'Mongol Raids into Palestine (A.D. 1260 and 1300)', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1987), 236–55.
14. J. Richard, 'The Mongols and the Franks', *Journal of Asian History*, 3 (1969), 45–57; P. Jackson, 'The Crisis in the Holy Land in 1260', *English Historical Review*, 376 (1980), 481–513.
15. Jackson, 'The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire', p.236.
16. *Al–rawḍ al–ẓāhir fī sīrat al–Malik al–Ẓāhir*, ed. A.A. al–Khowayter (Riyad, 1976), p.88: translation from al–Khowayter, 'A Critical Edition of an Unknown Arabic Source for the Life of al–Malik al–Ẓāhir Baibars', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 3 vols (London, 1960), Vol. 2, p.369.
17. J.J. Saunders, 'The Mongol Defeat at Ain Jalut and the Restoration of the Greek Empire', in Saunders, *Muslims and Mongols: Essays on Medieval Asia* (Christchurch, NZ, 1977), pp.67–76.
18. J. Meyendorff, *Byzantium and the Rise of Russia* (Cambridge, 1981), p.70.
19. Morgan, 'The Mongols in Syria', p.233.
20. Cahen, *Pre–Ottoman Turkey*, pp.288–9.
21. Personal communication from Professor Rudi Lindner.
22. P. Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1938).
23. R.P. Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia* (Bloomington, IN, 1983). See my review in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 48 (1985), 365–7.
24. C.J. Heywood, 'Wittek and the Austrian Tradition', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1988), 7–25; C.H. Imber, 'Paul Wittek's "De la défaite d'Ankara à la prise de Constantinople"', *Osmanlı Araştırmaları, The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, 5 (1986), 65–81; id., 'The Ottoman Dynastic Myth', *Turcica*, 19 (1987), 7–27.
25. For a different view, see Professor Zachariadou's paper in this volume.
26. E. Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. J.B. Bury, 7 vols. (London, 1905–6), Vol. 3, p.77; Vol. 7, pp.23, 24, 26.
27. See, for example, in addition to works already cited, J.A. Boyle, 'The Il–Khans of Persia and the Princes of Europe', *Central Asiatic Journal*, 20 (1976), 25–40; D.O. Morgan, *The Mongols* (Oxford, 1986), pp.183–95.
28. For example, Morgan, *The Mongols*, pp.192–5.
29. I am indebted to Dr Peter Jackson for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

Holy War in the Aegean during the Fourteenth Century

ELIZABETH ZACHARIADOU

The Turks did not exercise any direct influence in the Aegean before the early fourteenth century, though they had been present in Asia Minor since the end of the eleventh century. In the early years of the Seljuk Sultanate of Rūm, Ebülkasim, who was a subordinate of Süleyman, the Seljuk commander of Anatolia, seized the western shores of Anatolia along the Aegean, where he built up a fleet and carried out some naval raids. A little later a semi-independent emir, Caka, established in the region of İzmir (Smyrna), invaded Chios, Lesbos, and Samos and threatened Constantinople with his fleet (1090–91). At first sight the naval achievements of Ebülkasim and Caka seem puzzling, because the Turks had recently come from Central Asia and they had no maritime experience. However, Anna Comnena reports that Caka was helped with the construction of his fleet and the recruitment of the crews by a native of Smyrna who was a naval expert; and we can guess that Ebülkasim also enjoyed the collaboration of the experienced native population.[1] In any case, the efforts of the Seljuks ceased when, in 1097, the crusaders drove them back from the coastal districts to the Anatolian plateau.

After the arrival of the crusaders, it took approximately one century for the Seljuk state of Asia Minor to gain access to the sea. During the twelfth century the Turks of Asia Minor were divided into several states, often fighting each other, and only in the early thirteenth century were they again united under the Seljuk dynasty.[2] This unification coincided with the unfortunate Fourth Crusade, the occupation of Constantinople by the Latins, the foundation of a Byzantine empire in exile, the Empire of Nicaea, and the emergence of the Trapezuntine empire. In southern Asia Minor a third Christian state was established, the Kingdom of Cilician Armenia.

The problem of the Seljuk state was that it did not have access to the sea. The Byzantines of Nicaea, the Trapezuntines, and the Cilician Armenians were the masters of the shores including the important harbours. Despite this serious handicap, the Seljuk state acquired power by focusing its attention on the eastern frontier. This orientation of Seljuk policy is shown by the conquest of the caravan city of

Erzerum (*circa* 1202), by the strengthening of its influence on the other important caravan city, Erzinjan, and especially by the hostile relations with the state of Jalāl al-Dīn Khwārazmshāh in Iran and that of the Ayyubids in northern Syria.[3] Nevertheless, the need for an outlet to the sea was strong. The Seljuk state strove to acquire a harbour which would possibly attract the passing caravans from Erzerum and Erzinjan. First Samsun on the Black Sea was invaded (*circa* 1194), but its occupation was short-lived because the Seljuks were soon expelled by the Trapezuntines. The next target was Antalya, a port mainly oriented towards Egypt and Syria, which the Seljuks seized in 1207; once established there, they began to extend their hold on the southern shore of Asia Minor. However, their greatest success was the conquest of the harbour of Sinope (1215). Using the Pontic region as their base, the Seljuks tried to control the entire Black Sea, and they ventured a campaign in the Crimea resulting in the occupation of Sudak (1223–24).[4] This campaign also reflects their eastern policy, as the Black Sea ports were the termini for the caravans coming from the inner regions and following roads under Seljuk control. At all events, there is no recorded attempt by the Seljuks to penetrate to the Aegean sea.

This situation was reversed shortly after the year 1300, when, after the break-up of the old Seljuk state of Rūm, several Turkish emirates emerged in western Anatolia, which soon expelled the Byzantines from the coastal regions and took possession of the Aegean littoral.[5] The Turkish emirates were inspired by the principle of the Islamic Holy War, or Jihad, which was accomplished by the organization of campaigns or mere raids against the Christian territories. The ideology of the Holy War prevailed in the early years of Seljuk Anatolia.[6] Thereafter it was neglected as a result of the eastern policy of the Seljuks, but emerged with full force when the Turkish emirates were founded. The Turkish emirs, under population pressure, began to organize raids aiming at the acquisition of booty seized from the Christians: captives, to be sold as slaves or to be ransomed, made the warriors of Islam richer. Pillaging was necessary for the survival of the invaders, who had become masters of repeatedly devastated territories which at first yielded no revenue. Therefore the need for further raids was imperative. As long as the Byzantines occupied a long strip on the western littoral of Asia Minor the emirates could attack their Christian neighbours and pillage them. When the warriors of Islam expelled the Byzantines and reached the seashore most of the emirates no longer had Christian neighbours. Muslims now had common frontiers with other Muslims while to the west was the Aegean. The emirate of Osman near the Sangarios river, the nucleus of the Ottoman empire, which possessed a long frontier with the Byzantines in Bithynia, was a striking

exception. However, the lords of the emirates were obliged to continue the war, firstly because their subjects needed the booty, and secondly because the organization of raids against the Christians was a way to attract the most enthusiastic warriors. Conflicts among the emirates were not unknown,[7] but apparently the emirs avoided them as far as possible because a war against coreligionists would damage their prestige. The situation was still unstable in Anatolia and many an emir ambitiously intended to unite the Turks under his own rule. Furthermore, in the early years a war against another emirate would not have been lucrative, because the emirates were founded on territories which had been ruined by the repeated earlier raids.

It was exactly at that time, during the years 1302 and 1303, that the Turks built a number of vessels and began to attack the neighbouring islands: Chios, Samos, Carpathos, Rhodes, and many others.[8] The Holy War was transferred to the sea. I shall return to this point later. The West responded by founding two Latin states in the Aegean, that of Chios under the Genoese family of the Zaccaria and that of Rhodes under the Knights Hospitallers. These two sea-oriented states forced the Turks to interrupt their naval activity. However, the Turks soon organized their newly-founded emirates and, after making an alliance with another Christian state, that of the Catalans of Athens, they launched raids which now reached the western littoral of the Aegean, namely Negroponte and the Morea. Their pressure caused significant changes, and in the 1330s the lords of the Aegean islands and the coastal districts were forced to become tributaries of the emirs[9] (*illik kafirleri*)[10] and were obliged to pay them an annual tribute.[11] Possibly they also had to offer certain services, but nothing is known about such services in the early period. However, from the second half of the fourteenth century onwards we know that the inhabitants of some islands (for example, Lesbos and Naxos) were obliged to inform the Turks if they learned that a Christian armada was sailing against them or that pirates were approaching.[12]

The new Latin response to this vexing situation was the crusade. Two crusades were organized, one in 1334 and another in 1344 which was known as the Crusade of Smyrna, but the results were not long lasting. The maritime emirates which imposed their thalassocracy in the Aegean were Karası in the region of Pergamos, Saruhan in the region of Manisa (Magnesia), Menteşe in the region of Miletus and, above all, Aydın in the region of İzmir, and Ephesus. This emirate produced a great Muslim hero, Umur Paşa, the terror of the Aegean districts, who extracted considerable annual tributes from the inhabitants of the islands, of Negroponte, the Morea, the entire coast of Thessaly, Macedonia, and Thrace as far as the Byzantine capital.[13] Umur later

became the faithful ally of John Cantacuzenus during the Byzantine civil war of the 1340s.

One Turkish source which describes the Turkish raids in the Aegean during the first half of the fourteenth century is the fairly well-known *Düsturname* of Enveri, which, although composed in the second half of the fifteenth century, contains a chapter certainly written in the mid-fourteenth century by an anonymous contemporary author.[14] This chapter is devoted to the military activity of Umur Paşa, but occasionally it also provides information about the emirs of Saruhan and Karası. This very important source reports the events accurately on the whole, and it reflects the spirit of the time.

At the end of the fourteenth century, the Ottoman Turks extended their rule over western Asia Minor by annexing or conquering the Aegean districts. Timurlenk's invasion restored the emirates for a while, but soon they were again subjugated by the Ottomans who began to use both the vessels of the former emirs and the newly conquered ports, to launch a series of raids against the Christians. The Ottomans inherited the territories and tributaries of the emirs. It was they who now exercised the right to extract annual tribute from the Christian lords of the Aegean region. Furthermore, the Ottomans controlled the straits of the Dardanelles, including the strategically important fortress of Gallipoli with its harbour, which they used as one of the bases for their fleet. Thereafter the Ottoman Turks continued the raids, with only a few interruptions, until the 1570s when nominally they became the masters of the Aegean.

According to Greek and Latin sources some of the Turkish emirs had fleets consisting of 200 or 300 boats;[15] there is also mention of a united fleet of the emirs amounting to 800 boats.[16] These were mainly light vessels: *ligna, naviglia, barche*, et cetera.[17] Bigger boats (*legni grossi*),[18] were rare. Only Umur Paşa Aydınoğlu constructed war galleys, which impressed the Moroccan traveller Ibn Baṭṭūṭa and which, when reported to Venice, caused deep anxiety.[19]

The Turkish emirs used their light vessels successfully to transport warriors in huge numbers together with their horses and sometimes with their war machines. They carried out devastating raids and piracy by attacking small commercial craft. However, they were unable to confront galleys. Many a source describes the inferiority of a Turkish fleet faced with a Byzantine, Venetian, or Genoese force. Two galleys and two *fuste* of the Hospitallers were enough to destroy 30 Turkish vessels near Chios in 1319.[20] Ten Genoese and Rhodian galleys accompanied by 20 small boats annihilated a fleet of 80 Turkish vessels (which possibly included galleys) in 1320.[21] In 1334, near Adramyttium, the 40 galleys of the crusaders burned to ashes a united Turkish fleet

consisting of more than 200 boats.[22] According to the life of St Niphon, the Ottomans, encouraged by their victory in Marica (1371), sailed with a large fleet against Mount Athos; three Venetian galleys and a small patrolling fleet from Christoupolis were sufficient to reduce their plans to nothing.[23] It should be noted that the Turks ventured their first raids on territories which were relatively distant from Asia Minor only after they had secured some protection from their allies the Catalans.[24]

Some eloquent verses in Enveri confirm the situation described by the Christian sources. It is a passage full of amusingly simple admiration for five ships belonging to infidels which Umur, sailing with seven light vessels (*caiques*), met near the island of Tenedos. According to Enveri each one of these five ships looked like a huge mountain; even if one hundred boats attacked them, it would not be a safe operation; their top decks were strong like castles, stacked with stones and weapons. Umur, in a dramatically difficult position, knelt and prayed with his face on the ground because only with Allah's help could he confront this terrifying armada; he emerged victorious from the fray.[25] Apart from this piece of information combining poetry, history, and Muslim faith we have the realistic remark of the Byzantine emperor John Cantacuzenus, an attentive observer of Umur's power, that the Turks were excellent in battles fought on land and it was hard to confront them, but they were most uncertain at sea due to their lack of experience, and were easily defeated.[26]

The inferiority of the Turkish navy cannot simply be explained by the fact that the Turks originated from Central Asia, a vast region very remote from the sea, where caravans and not flotillas were organized. The case of Caka, who enjoyed the collaboration of the population of İzmir for his naval activities, was not unique. There is ample evidence that a considerable number of the crews in the service of the Turks were Greek. The Byzantine scholar Gregoras reports with bitterness that, when the emperor Andronicus II dismantled the navy, the unemployed mariners ran away and joined the Turks. According to the Venetian nobleman, Marino Sanudo Torsello, more than 300 Christians, or *perfidi Christiani*, sailed with a Turkish armada of 70 vessels against the Christian territories in 1332. In *circa* 1400, many impoverished Cretans, unable to survive on their island, took refuge with the Turks and participated in raids against Venetian territories.[27] When the Ottoman fleet was defeated by the Venetians near Gallipoli in 1416 and the crews of the ships were captured, many Greeks were among the prisoners; they were not just sailors but also *timar*-holders.[28] Finally the land-register of the Ottoman maritime province (*sancak*) of Callipolis, studied by Halil İnalcık, shows the huge participation of the Greeks in the Ottoman navy.[29] If the Greeks served as sailors we can assume that

they also offered their services to the Turkish emirs as ship-builders. Furthermore, Asia Minor produced timber which was good for ship construction in general, both for light commercial craft and for large galleys. The production was evidently fairly important, since timber was often exported to Egypt.[30]

Although the navy of the Turks was inferior to that of the various European states, their naval attacks were victorious. If confrontation was avoided at sea and the military operations began on land the Christians were usually defeated, due to the huge numbers of soldiers transported by the numerous Turkish boats. The troops included the marine corps of the *azab*, distinguished by their red caps (*kızıl börk*).[31] Christian and Muslim sources unanimously report that the Turkish emirs had unlimited military forces at their disposal. This was the result of many causes, the main one being the flow of smaller or larger population groups from the eastern regions to Anatolia, which resulted from the Mongol advance and conquest.[32] The Egyptian author al-'Umarī, writing in the 1330s, gives some impressive numbers for the Turkish armies. Cantacuzenus confirms al-'Umarī's account when he reports that once Umur came to his help leading 29,000 men transported by 380 boats.[33] However, one must keep in mind that the Turkish armies and fleets which fought against the Christians were made up of soldiers or vessels from various emirates. The Holy War was usually carried out under the leadership of one emir but his forces included warriors from the whole of Islamic Anatolia.[34] Enveri reports that whenever Umur planned a large scale campaign he sent messengers inviting warriors to come to İzmir and join his troops.[35] Cantacuzenus states that it was a Turkish custom that Turks from other emirates should join pillaging expeditions if they wanted to, and they were never prevented but were welcomed as friends and allies.[36] Actually this was not just a custom; it was a religious principle, related to the Jihad which is discussed below.

The Turkish presence in the Aegean had serious demographic effects. The sources show that some Turkish raids resulted in the complete desolation of the islands and of the coastal regions. According to Marino Sanudo Torsello, the Turks took 25,000 captives during their raids of the early 1330s, while Cantacuzenus reports that they captured almost the whole population of the islands approximately one decade later.[37] As a result serfs, or *paroikoi*, became precious. Early in the fourteenth century the monastery of Patmos transferred 38 of its *paroikoi* to a property (*metochion*), which it possessed on the island of Crete, well protected by the Venetians.[38] The *villani* of Amorgos were also transferred to Crete a few decades later.[39] Furthermore, the insecurity caused by the continuous Turkish attacks provoked several

population movements, including a lesser one from the Christian to the Turkish territories in Anatolia from the second half of the fourteenth century onwards.[40] This migration can be traced especially in the Aegean districts. It is clear that people preferred to survive as a protected non-Muslim community (*dhimmīs*) under Turkish rule instead of being continuously harassed. At least if one was a *dhimmī* one could not be sold as a slave. Unfortunately, no precise numbers can be found in the sources concerning the movements of the Christian population.

Violence and general agitation only disturbed trade up to a point, and commercial relations between Latins and Turks were soon established: Turkish Asia Minor was almost continuously visited by western European merchants, and mercantile interests thrived. I would like to mention two aspects. First is the slave trade, closely related to the question of captives taken by the Turks. This trade was intensively developed in the Aegean region after the Turkish conquest of Asia Minor. Actually, from the beginning of the fourteenth century onwards the slave trade was established, conducted from the harbour cities of Asia Minor for the islands under Latin rule, Naxos, Genoese Chios, Rhodes of the Hospitallers, and especially Venetian Crete. Greek Orthodox slaves could be sold by Latin merchants, and this constituted a grave problem in the relations between the Byzantines and the Latin world.[41]

A second point connected with trade and the Turkish presence in the Aegean is the export of corn. The harbour cities of Asia Minor, especially those of Aydın and Menteşe, were of vital importance as export centres of cereals to the islands, including Crete which depended on the wheat, barley, and dried vegetables it received from there. When the export of corn from those districts was discontinued, there was a spectacular increase in its price in the Aegean regions. The Turks, once masters of the ports, repeatedly prohibited or restricted the export of corn as a means of exercising pressure on the Christians of the area.[42]

With respect to the character of the war carried out by the Turks against the Christians, I use the term Jihad, Holy War, which, according to the Koran, is a collective religious obligation of the Muslims. The Jihad was, according to Paul Wittek, the *raison d'être* of the Turkish emirates of the frontier zones and eventually of the Ottoman state.[43] In recent years Wittek's theory has been challenged by scholars.[44] On the other hand, İnalcık, in his recent study of the maritime emirates, repeatedly stresses the religious context of the Turkish naval struggle using, among other material, the chapter of the *Düsturname* concerning the activities of the emirate of Aydın.[45] This chapter, the testimony of a contemporary witness, perhaps of a person in Umur Paşa's service,

throws light on aspects of the wars of the Turks, at least during the fourteenth century.

The Christian sources describe the naval attacks of the Turks as operations of pirates who aimed at pillaging property and taking captives to sell in slave-markets. Latins and Byzantines expressed much indignation at the spectacle of emirs who were proud only because they were able to lead their ferocious soldiers in predatory raids. The earliest source narrating the wars carried out by the Turks in the Byzantine frontier zones during the collapse of the Seljuk state is the work of George Pachymeres; he describes the Turkish warriors as people earning their living by the knife.[46] Nevertheless, what the Christians used to call piracy or brigandage was for the Muslim Turks a Holy War, a praiseworthy and legitimate occupation leading directly to Paradise. In 1354 the Metropolitan of Thessalonica, Gregory Palamas, living among the Turks as a prisoner, realized with surprise that the Turks attributed their victories over the Byzantines to their love for God:

> For these impious people, hated by God and infamous, boast of having got the better of the Romans by their love of God ... they live by the bow, the sword, and debauchery, finding pleasure in taking slaves, devoting themselves to murder, pillage, spoil ... and not only do they commit these crimes, but even – what an aberration – they believe that God approves of them. This is what I think of them, now that I know more precisely about their way of life.[47]

From the Muslim viewpoint, an incident reported by Eflaki, who composed the biographies of the Mevlevi dervishes (*Menakib ül-Arifin*) between 1318 and 1353, is very significant. According to Eflaki, the holy man *çelebi* Arif, the grandson of the Mevlana Celalüddin Rumi, was captured by bandits while travelling with a caravan in the region of Kastamonu. However, when they learned that he was the grandson of the Mevlana, they were very ashamed. They returned the pillaged goods to their owners and they humbly implored the holy man's pardon. The unfortunate incident was brought to the attention of the lord of the emirate, the fairly well-known Süleyman Paşa Isfendiyaroğlu, and subsequently the bandits renounced their sinful past and joined the army of Islam to perpetrate raids against the infidel.[48]

Enveri sheds much light on the character of the Turkish wars in the Aegean. To begin with his terminology, the wars of Umur against the Christians are jihad or *gāza*, while Umur and his soldiers are warriors of the faith, *gāzīs*. Most explicitly Enveri states that, night and day,

Umur's duty is the Holy War.[49] The flag of Islam is flown during the battles.[50] Umur often has the Koran read to him and his soldiers while sailing against the infidels[51] who, when defeated, are forced to pay taxes imposed by the Koran.[52] Booty is distributed according to the Koran: Umur keeps one fifth (the *pencüyek*) for himself, and the rest is given to his soldiers; poor Muslims get rich by acquiring the property of the infidels.[53] An assaulted church is pillaged but not abandoned before being converted into a mosque, a transition which is accomplished by reading the Koran in the church.[54] When once Umur's father concluded a treaty with the Byzantine emperor, he tried to prevent one of his son's usual raids. On this occasion Enveri puts into Umur's mouth the following words: 'It is a sin to forbid the holy war; father should favour our campaign; Muhammad the prophet carried out the Holy War to punish the infidels'.[55] It is therefore understood that pillaging the property of the infidels and taking them into captivity were punishments inflicted for their crime of not accepting Islam.

Umur is also described as a very pious Muslim by another source, composed by Eflaki, his contemporary. According to him, Umur, when in a difficult situation in the Aegean, was often saved by the holy man, Mevlana Celalüddin Rumi, who used to walk on the surface of the sea, approaching Umur's boat to hold the prow firmly against the force of the tempest. The grandson of Mevlana, the holy man *çelebi* Arif, helped Umur in a different way: not against the tempest but in battles fought on land. The *çelebi* Arif, engaged in battles on Umur's side, fell upon the infidels and forced them to flee. Therefore, Eflaki concluded, Umur was inspired by his deep faith and continued fighting against the infidels to his last day. When he found a martyr's death, he became a *şehid* and was included among the chosen ones.[56]

I now come to the question of Umur's alliance with Cantacuzenus, which seems ill-matched with the strongly religious character of his Holy War. A careful reading of the *Düsturname* shows that actually there was no inconsistency in Umur's role. Enveri gives us the Turkish aspect of the relations between Byzantium and the emirate of Aydin. According to him, when the emperor Andronicus III met Umur near Karaburnu, he paid homage, vowing that the land and movables belonged to Umur, and that his own land and state also belonged to Umur.[57] This most probably means that, according to Enveri, the Byzantines recognized the overlordship of the emirs of Aydın, a fact which is true up to a point, since it is known that some Byzantine territories paid an annual tribute to the Turks of Aydın during those years.[58] Furthermore, Enveri adds that at Karaburnu the emperor gave the island of Chios to Umur as a present to win his favour.[59] Then the

two lords took an oath to abide by the agreement and they became 'brothers'.[60]

Enveri describes developments as follows: when Andronicus III died, Cantacuzenus, according to the late emperor's last wish, undertook the tutorship of his young son. All the Byzantine notables approved of this arrangement. Nevertheless, the *parakoimomenos* Apokaukos stirred up dissension and rebelled.[61] This piece of information constitutes Cantacuzenus' version of the reasons for the civil war, a version which was naturally adopted by his ally Umur and repeated by Enveri.[62] However, the latter gives us a noteworthy explanation with respect to the reason for Umur's interference in Byzantine internal affairs, and a fairly long account of the embassy sent by Cantacuzenus to Aydın to implore for help. The ambassadors came with a letter from Cantacuzenus which, among other matters, stated that after the death of Andronicus it was Umur who was left as the sultan of the earth and that all the land belonged to Umur.[63] We must not forget that, according to Enveri, Andronicus III had recognized the overlordship of Umur. Thus Enveri suggests fairly clearly that Umur was invited by Cantacuzenus as the lord responsible for pacifying the country, which was in turmoil after the death of his vassal. In other words, Umur enters the war as an overlord who wishes to impose order upon his quarrelling vassals and he takes the side of the one whom he favours.

Some other passages confirm this interpretation. When Umur attacks the enemies of Cantacuzenus in Thessalonica, the latter try to win him over to their side, first denouncing Cantacuzenus' attitude towards the legitimate heir and then proposing to recognize him as the monarch of the entire country; but Umur answers that they must render the country of the late emperor to him, and the rest is none of their business.[64] Still more significant is the fact that Enveri emphasizes the tax, the *haraç* or the *cizye* and sometimes the *bac*, paid to Umur by the Christians. Accompanied by Cantacuzenus, Umur collects the *haraç* in Serres, Zihna, Egrican (Gratianoupolis), and elsewhere.[65] On the other hand, districts which do not surrender are taken by force and pillaged. Finally Umur returned to his country after declaring to the Byzantine lord that he had reinstated him in his territory; he had offered his protection to his vassal as was his duty. It is implied, on the other hand, that his vassal's duty was to pay him taxes and especially the taxes paid by the infidels, the *cizye* and the *haraç*. As clearly analysed by Inalcık, the Muslims considered the payment of the taxes imposed upon the infidels as equivalent to submission; a vassal territory was considered as part of the land of Islam.[66]

This Muslim principle concerning the tribute-paying vassals was well

known to the Byzantines. Byzantine authors sometimes attributed speeches to the sultans or their officials. It is not always certain that such speeches were really given or that they are accurately cited. However, these speeches reveal the Byzantine perception of the Turkish religious and political ideals and attitudes of the time. According to the Byzantine historian Ducas, the vizir Bayezid, addressing the public after Mehmet I's death, praised the sultans, notably because they had turned the Byzantine and the Serbian states into vassals and tributaries (*hypotelē kai hypophora*).[67] According to Critobulus, in his speech given shortly before the capture of Constantinople, Mehmet II paid homage to his ancestors, who had reduced the peoples living between the mouth of the Danube and the Ionian Sea to the status of tribute-paying vassals.[68]

To conclude: Enveri does not present Umur just simply as an ally of Cantacuzenus but as a Muslim lord intervening in a quarrel among his vassals. This was an obligation in full agreement with the principles of Islam. After all, intervention in favour of a vassal well disposed towards the Turks at the expense of another who was less dependable was a standard principle of Ottoman policy throughout the fifteenth century.[69] The ideal of the Holy War which resulted in the Turkish thalassocracy in the fourteenth century was not impaired by the author of the *Düsturname*.

Certainly some other facts are concealed in this description. The news about the comparatively easy victories won by the Turks over the collapsing Byzantines circulated in the Muslim world and many warriors swarmed to Muslim Asia Minor, which was a land of opportunity. Good soldiers could become rich there, make a brilliant career; they could even establish their own emirates. The Muslim lords of the country were obliged to keep these turbulent elements under control by leading them in lucrative military operations against the infidel enemy. When enemies were not around, new reasons for war had to be found and an alliance with a Christian against another Christian, which would involve pillaging, was a solution. However this could not merely be cynically declared, and some justification which would conform with religion had to be invented. To find this justification was among an emir's duties, and Enveri's narrative illustrates the process.

NOTES

1. Cl. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey, A General Survey of the Material and Spiritual Culture and History, c. 1071–1330*, trans. J. Jones-Williams (London, 1968), pp.80–81; Sp. Vryonis Jr., *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century* (Berkeley-

Los Angeles-London, 1971), pp.115–16, 211, 481.
2. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, pp.96–110; I. Mélikoff, Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edn., *s.v.* Danishmendides; Vryonis, *The Decline*, pp.130–33; N.A. Oikonomidès, 'Les Danishmendides entre Byzance, Bagdad et le Sultanat d'Iconium', *Revue numismatique*, 6th ser., 25 (1983), 189–207.
3. M.F. Köprülü, *Les origines de l'Empire ottoman* (Paris, 1935), p.38.
4. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, pp.117–26.
5. See H. İnalcık, 'The Rise of the Turcoman Maritime Principalities in Anatolia: Byzantium and the Crusades', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 11 (1986), 182–3, who writes that the Menteşe Turks achieved control of the entire coastal area of Caria by 1269 and that at Ania, in the Ephesus bay, Turkish corsairs were firmly settled by 1278. However, the occupation of Caria was temporary because the Turks were expelled, first in 1269 by the troops of the *despotes* Ioannes and then, in 1293–95, by those of Alexios Philanthropenos: P. Wittek, *Das Fürstentum Mentesche*, Istanbuler Mitteilungen 2, (Istanbul, 1934), pp.41–2, 45; cf. E.A. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade; Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin (1300–1415)* (Venice, 1983), pp.6–7. Ania remained Byzantine at least up to 1281, when Michael VIII died, and it was governed by the Cretan family of Chortatzi: id., 'Cortazzi e non Corsari' (in Greek with an Italian summary), *Thesaurismata*, 15 (1978), 62–5, 343.
6. P. Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1938), pp.20–21.
7. On the conflict between the emir Sasa and the Aydınoğlus, see P. Lemerle, *L'Emirat d'Aydin, Byzance et l'Occident, recherches sur 'La geste d'Umur Pacha'*, Bibliothèque byzantine, *Etudes*, 2 (Paris, 1957), pp.19–26; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp.24–9.
8. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p.6.
9. Ibid., pp.7–16, 21–4.
10. İnalcık, 'The Rise of the Turcoman Maritime Principalities', 189–91; the term '*illik kafirleri*' occurs in a document of 1465 regarding the monks of Patmos who had recognized the Ottoman overlordship. See E.A. Zachariadou, 'Contribution à l'histoire du sud-est de la mer Egée' (in Greek with a French summary), *Symmeikta*, 1 (1966), 211–12.
11. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp.21–4.
12. Ducae Michaelis Ducae Nepotis, *Historia Byzantina*, ed. Im. Bekker, Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae (Bonn, 1834) (hereafter Ducas), p.332; cf. the clause regarding the Duke of Naxos in the treaty of Mehmet II with Venice: F. Babinger and F. Dölger, 'Mehmeds II's frühester Staatsvertrag (1446)', in F. Dölger, *Byzantinische Diplomatik* (Ettal, 1956), p.274; cf. I. Beldiceanu-Steinherr, 'Un acte concernant la surveillance des Dardanelles', *Institut français de Damas, Bulletin d'études orientales*, 24 (1977), 17–24.
13. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p.42.
14. I. Mélikoff-Sayar, *Le Destan d'Umur pacha (Düsturname-i Enveri)*, Bibliothèque byzantine (Paris, 1954), pp.31–8.
15. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p.43; İnalcık, 'The Rise of the Ottoman Maritime Principalities', 205; F. Kunstmann, 'Studien über Marino Sanudo den Aelteren', *Abhandlungen des Hist. Cl. der Kön. Bayer. Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Vol. 7 (Munich, 1855), p.811.
16. Giovanni Villani, *Cronica*, in Muratori, *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, Vol. 13 (Milan, 1729), col. 694.
17. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p.64; on the Turkish fleets, see İnalcık, 'The Rise of the Maritime Principalities', 205–8; cf. also G.B. Pellegrini, 'Terminologia marinara di origine araba in italiano e nelle lingue europee', *La navigazione mediterranea nell' alto medioevo*, Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano di Studi sull' Alto Medioevo XXV, 14–20 Aprile 1977 (Spoleto, 1978), Vol. 2, pp.797–841.
18. Villani, *Cronica*, col. 763.
19. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, p.42; İnalcık, 'The Rise of the Maritime Principalities', 205, 207–8.
20. L. de Mas-Latrie, *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi*, Vol. 1 (Paris, 1891),

p.400.
21. Villani, *Cronica*, col. 501.
22. V. Laurent, 'Action de graces pour la victoire navale remportée sur les Turcs à Atramyttion au cours de l'automne 1334', *Eis Mnemen K.I. Amantou* (Athens, 1960), pp.25–41; cf. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp.32–3.
23. F. Halkin, 'La vie de Saint Niphon ermite au Mont Athos (XIV^{e} s.)', *Analecta Bollandiana*, 58 (1940), 24–5.
24. E.A. Zachariadou, 'The Catalans of Athens and the Beginning of the Turkish Expansion in the Aegean Area', *Studi medievali*, 3rd ser., 31 (1980), 821–38.
25. Mélikoff, *Destan*, p.53.
26. Joannes Cantacuzenus *Historiarum libri IV*, Vol. 1, ed. L. Schopen, in Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae (Bonn, 1828), p.539.
27. H. Ahrweiler, *Byzance et la mer*, Bibliothèque byzantine, *Etudes*, Vol. 5 (Paris, 1966), p.378; Vryonis, *Decline*, p.480–81; Kunstmann, *'Studien über Marino Sanudo'*, p.797; D. Jacoby, 'Les gens de mer dans la marine de guerre vénitienne de la mer Egée aux XIV^{e} et XV^{e} siècles', in R. Ragosta (ed.), *Le Genti del Mare Mediterraneo* (Naples, 1981), p.198; İnalcık, 'The Rise of the Maritime Principalities', 209, 211.
28. Ducas, p.110. This passage is inaccurately translated by H.J. Magoulias, *Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks* (Detroit, 1975), p.119; the term *pronoia* was used by Ducas instead of its Turkish equivalent *timar*. Cf. also, Marino Sanudo, *Vite de Duchi di Venezia*, in Muratori, *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, Vol. 22 (Milan, 1000), col. 905.
29. H. İnalcık, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn., s.v. *Gelibolu*.
30. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp.6, 133–4.
31. İnalcık, 'The Rise of the Maritime Principalities', 209–11. Nevertheless, a contemporary Italian chronicler describing the soldiers of Umur Paşa underlined the wide use of the white cap. 'La maiure parte de quessi Turchi portavano a loro usanza vestimenta bianche de panno de lino; larghe le maniche e longhe e corte a mezza gamma. Nulla differenza ene da le cotte de li Christiani cherichi. In capo cappielli bianchi co lo pizzo longo a muodo de lo cuollo de cicogna. Varve haveano foite e longhi capegli'; see 'Historiae Romanae Fragmenta ab anno Christi MCCCXXVII usque ad MCCCLIV, Neapolitana sive Romana dialecto scripta, auctore anonymo', ed. L.A. Muratori, *Antiquitates Italicae Medii Aevi* (Milan, 1740), Vol. 3, col. 359; on the white cap by which the *gāzīs* distinguished themselves from the rest of the population, see Wittek, *The Rise*, pp.39–40.
32. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, pp.314–17.
33. Cantacuzenus, *Historiarum*, Vol. 2, p.345.
34. E.A. Zachariadou, 'Notes sur la population de l'Asie Mineure turque au XIV^{e} siècle', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 12 (1987), 224–5; İnalcık, 'The Rise of the Maritime Principalities', 205–6.
35. İnalcık, 'The Rise of the Maritime Principalities', 210.
36. Cantacuzenus, *Historiarum*, Vol. 2, p.591.
37. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp.41–2, 160.
38. Zachariadou, 'Contribution', 194–5.
39. Zachariadou, 'Notes sur la population', 230.
40. Ibid., 229–31.
41. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp.160–63.
42. H. İnalcık, 'The Ottoman Economic Mind and Aspects of the Ottoman Economy', in M.A. Cook (ed.), *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East* (London, 1970), pp.209, 214; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp.78–80, 134, 163–5.
43. P. Wittek, 'Deux chapitres de l'histoire des Turcs de Roum', *Byzantion*, 11 (1936), 285–319; id., *The Rise of the Otttoman Empire* (London, 1938).
44. R.P. Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia* (Bloomington, IN, 1983); cf., however, I. Beldiceanu-Steinherr, 'A propos des tribus Atçeken', *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 30 (1987), 121–95; R.C. Jennings, 'Some Thoughts on the Gazi-thesis', *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des*

Morgenlandes, 76 (1986), 151–61; Gy. Kàldi-Nagy, 'The Holy War (*jihad*) in the First Centuries of the Ottoman Empire', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Eucharisterion: Essays presented to Omeljan Pritsak on his Sixtieth Birthday by his Colleagues and Students*, 3–4, Pt. 1 (1979–80), 467–73; C. Imber, 'Paul Wittek's "De la défaite d'Ankara à la prise de Constantinople"', *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, 5 (1986), 65–81; cf. however, E.A. Zachariadou, 'Süleyman çelebi in Rumili and the Ottoman Chronicles', *Der Islam*, 60 (1983), 268–96.

45. Inalcık, 'The Rise of the Maritime Principalities', 180–81, 184, 191–2, 197–8, 204, 210.
46. Georges Pachymeres, *Relations historiques*, ed. A. Failler, Vol. 1 (Paris, 1984), p.32.
47. A. Philippidis-Braat, 'La captivité de Palamas chez les Turcs: dossier et commentaire', *Travaux et mémoires du Centre de Recherche d'Histoire et Civilisation Byzantines*, 7 (1979), 142–3.
48. C. Huart, *Les Saints des derviches tourneurs* (Paris, 1922), Vol. 2, p.380; on the relations of the Mevlevi dervishes with the Turkish emirs of the fourteenth century, see P. Wittek, *Das Fürstentum Mentesche*, pp.60–63; id., *The Rise*, p.39; cf. Cl. Huart, review of H.A. Gibbons, *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire, Journal asiatique*, 9 (1917), 349.
49. Mélikoff, *Destan*, p.108: 'dün ü gün paşanin işidur gaza'.
50. Ibid., p.52.
51. Ibid., p.61.
52. Ibid., pp.57, 72, 78ff.
53. Ibid., pp.52, 60, 89ff; cf. Inalcık, 'The Rise of the Maritime Principalities', 214–15.
54. Melikoff, *Destan*, p.87.
55. Ibid., p.61; cf. Inalcık, 'The Rise of the Maritime Principalities', 190–91.
56. Huart, *Les Saints des derviches*, Vol. 2, pp.392–3.
57. Mélikoff, *Destan*, p.83: senündür el ü mal/her ne dilersen getürdüm üste al/elüm iklimüm senündür.
58. See p.214 above.
59. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp.39–40; Inalcık, 'The Rise of the Maritime Principalities', 193–4.
60. On this 'brotherhood' which is a central Asiatic custom, see Mélikoff, *Destan*, p.85, No. 1.
61. Ibid., pp.93–4.
62. On the Byzantine civil war, see G. Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State* (Oxford, 1956), pp.454–5.
63. Mélikoff, *Destan*, p.94; şimdi sen yer yüzünün sultanisin/bi-güman kim bahr ü berrün hanisin.
64. Mélikoff, *Destan*, p.98: niçün olursun Domestikosa yar?/zülm tekfur oğlına eyledi ol/...cumle ele şah edelüm biz seni;/ bana tekfur elin teslim edün/ne ta'alluk size oradan gidün.
65. Ibid., pp.99, 124.
66. Inalcık, 'The Rise of the Maritime Principalities', 195.
67. Ducas, p.130.
68. Critobuli Imbriotae, *Historiae*, ed. D.R. Reinsch (Berlin, 1983), p.27.
69. For example, the support offered by Murad II to Nerio II Acciaiuoli when threatened by the Despots of the Morea; see F. Babinger, *Mahomet II le Conquérant et son temps* (Paris, 1954), pp.66–7; cf. the policy of Süleyman *çelebi*, in Zachariadou, 'Süleyman çelebi in Rumili', 291–5.

The Image of the Byzantine and the Frank in Arab Popular Literature of the Late Middle Ages

ROBERT IRWIN

The impact of Christendom on the medieval Near East was massive – at least in the perception of western historians. Irritatingly, the Arabs do not seem to have shared that perception. The geographer Mas'ūdī, writing in the tenth century, was able to list briefly the known races of Europe at the time, not forgetting the peoples of Gog and Magog. His *Murūj al-Dhahab* also offered a very garbled list of the early French kings. The Mosuli historian Ibn al-Athīr, writing in the thirteenth century, presented the First Crusade (not that he recognized it as a crusade or a religiously motivated movement) as part of a general explosion of Frankish aggression which started in the 1080s and which embraced the conquest of Toledo and Sicily, the raids on North Africa and, finally, the invasion of Syria. The fourteenth-century North African historian Ibn Khaldūn, knew quite a lot about Andalusian history, for this territory was traditionally covered by Muslim historiography, but, beyond that, he had next to no interest in the history and culture of Europe. These are thin gleanings. They can be supplemented by accounts written by Muslim travellers and ambassadors to Europe, or based on their reports. One thinks of such familiar and often cited passages as al-'Udhrī's description of a Viking whaling expedition off the coast of Ireland, al-Ghazāl's perhaps fictitious account of a flirtation with the daughter of a king of the Vikings, Hārūn ibn Yaḥyā on his sojourn as a captive in Constantinople and Rome, and Ibrāhīm ibn Ya'qūb's less plausible account of the City of Women in Europe.[1]

But little was written about Christendom – at least if one restricts oneself to the mainstream of Arabic literature produced in the early and central Middle Ages by the '*ulamā*', schooled in the preoccupations of the mosque and *madrasa*. The lack of interest in and knowledge of Europe, Byzantium, the papacy, and the Holy War is the more surprising when one considers the many meeting-points between Islam and Christendom and the plethora of potential channels of information. Wars encouraged the coming and going of ambassadors, hostages, and captives. Then, in the later Middle Ages, there were substantial

communities of European merchants resident in such cities as Alexandria, Aleppo, and Damascus.[2] There was also a Muslim community in Palaeologan Constantinople with its own mosque.

It is also plain that many of the governing elite in Egypt and Syria in the late Middle Ages had been born and raised in Christian Europe. Arabic sources tended to be reticent on the individual origins of Mamluk emirs and sultans, and were inclined on the whole to present the disingenuously oversimplified picture of the elite as being recruited entirely from Kipchak Turks and Circassians. However, if one turns to European travellers' accounts of visits to medieval Egypt, one finds Arnold von Harff enjoying drinking sessions with a Danish and a Swiss German mamluk in Cairo in 1497.[3] Felix Faber, in Cairo in 1483, met a Catalan and a Genoese mamluk who had been imprisoned because they were fed up and wanted to go home. He and his party were later visited in Cairo by Sicilian, Catalan, and German mamluks. Above all they met many Hungarians who had been enslaved in the course of the Ottoman wars in the Balkans. These Hungarians were reluctant converts to Islam. They drank wine and blasphemed happily against the religion that had been forced on them. Faber gained the impression that the entire mamluk elite consisted of apostates longing to return to Christianity.[4] This was a vast exaggeration, but certainly there were plenty of mamluks who could have given their new Muslim brothers reasonably accurate information about Europe. Only one Arab seems to have availed himself of such an opportunity, the fourteenth-century encyclopaedist al-'Umarī, who got his information about the West from the Mamluk Balaban. Balaban had begun life as Domenichino Doria in Genoa, before being enslaved as a Mamluk and meeting al-'Umarī in a Syrian prison.[5] But, while the Arabic sources seldom mention Frankish mamluks, one can deduce that an important section of the mamluk elite were of Greek origin. One Greek mamluk even succeeded in becoming a sultan; this was Khushqadam, sultan in the years 1461–67. Not that Greek mamluks were referred to as Greeks.[6] They were called *Rūmīs*, the Arabic for Greek is *Yunān*. By the Mamluk period, Byzantine citizens were not regarded as Greeks – at least, they were not regarded as belonging to the same race as Homer, Alexander, and Aristotle. The fourteenth-century Syrian geographer, Ibn al-Wardī, tells us that the former lands of the *Yūnān* were conquered and occupied by the Rūm. He presumably refers to the Roman conquest of Greece.[7]

Muslim geographers of the late Middle Ages (from the thirteenth century onwards) were products of mainstream clerical culture and on the whole they have little to say about Christendom that is both new and interesting. An exception must be made in favour of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's

wholly or partly fictitious account of his visit to Constantinople in 1332 or 1334, where he claims that he was lucky enough not only to meet the reigning emperor Andronicus III, but also met the dethroned and tonsured Andronicus II.[8] A second exception may be made in favour of the aforementioned al-'Umarī, who thanks to his conversations with the Genoese Balaban, managed to present a splendid evocation of fourteenth-century Constantinople: the abandoned Bucoleon Palace, full of larger than life statues and haunted by jinn; the emperor in the New Palace, given over to idleness, enjoying concerts on the psaltery, and a victim of bullying by his patriarch. The patriarch and his priests kept guard over books of secret knowledge in order to stop them falling into the hands of the Muslims; the Hagia Sophia was the repository of the famous treasure of Toledo. The citizens of Constantinople dress like Turks and have hair-dos like plates. The imperial family in Trebizond have little tails, as do quite a number of other Trapezuntines. Al-'Umarī (and Domenichino Doria) offer an equally strange perspective on western Christendom, in which the Germans featured as Europe's Mongols and Germany as a land continually traversed by nomads.[9] (One of the problems that the Arabs had in forming an accurate image of Europe was that Europeans themselves often had a rather fanciful image of their own continent.)

Usually geographies of the period restrict themselves to listing place names. Relatively rarely does one find a description of the people who lived there – though an exception was often made for the Galicians of northern Spain – a ghastly people, ignorant and stupid, who never wash their clothes but wear them until they fall to pieces. They also, Ibn al-Wardī tells us, visit one another's homes without permission, by which he means that they seduce each others' wives.[10] But, generally, geographies are short on human interest and it is rare for the stereotyped description of a region to be accompanied by the racial stereotype that is appropriate for the region.

To some extent this gap can be filled by consulting treatises on the purchase of slaves. According to one such treatise, written by al-Saqaṭī in the early thirteenth century, Byzantine women are good for guarding and looking after possessions.[11] An anonymous work of the same period puts more flesh on this. The Byzantines generally have clear complexions, smooth hair, and blue eyes; they are obedient slaves, good for service and positions of trust; they are knowledgeable, careful, splendid, and very intelligent: the young slave is very teachable. They are wise and intelligent, but also mean, greedy, and stingy. For this reason their women are good for looking after the home.[12] This account is rather favourable – particularly if one compares it with the assessment of the Frank:

> They are light in colouring and mostly blue-eyed. They are big and brave, but also stupid and uncultured. However in handicrafts and similar skills they are very deft, practised, and interested. They are mean and greedy. One does not rely on them as slaves. They believe in their religion. Their women are good for nothing, for they are uncouth, brutish, and pitiless.[13]

The estimates of the qualities of the Byzantines and the Franks were supported elsewhere in other such treatises. The Byzantine, as a careful guardian of property, was practically a *topos*, and the judgement that Franks were unreliable and their conversions to Islam insincere was echoed later on.

However, it is unlikely that many Arabs derived their image of Christendom from a reading of texts on history and geography. It is arguable, that outside the precincts of academic institutions, the present-day historical consciousness of the British people has been moulded as much by historical fiction as it has been by historiography, and perhaps the same could be said for the Islamic Middle Ages. The common people and, to a degree, the governing elite, may have derived their images of past times and foreign parts from romantic fiction, from such romantic sagas as those of 'Antar, the Banī Hilāl, and Dhā't al-Himma.[14] The popularity of such fiction, heroic, and chivalric epics, was not of course restricted to the Arabs in the eastern Mediterranean. The Turks had their Sayyid Batal and *Danishmendname*; the Armenians had the epic of David Sassoun, the Georgians had *The Knight of the Panther Skin.* The Byzantines had *Digenes Akritas* and *Belthandros and Chrysantza.* It was a common taste in fiction and inevitably there was a lot of borrowing of plot motifs and images between the various cultures.

Some motifs were almost ageless and drifted, culture free. Many themes and motifs are common to Arab and Byzantine fiction: the lovers meeting, separating and finally being reunited, the castle of love, the half-caste hero, the Amazon warrior antagonist and so on. So much work has been done now on the (generally earlier) fiction of 'Antar, Sayyid Baṭal, and Delhemma and their links with non-Arab literature, especially with Digenes Acritas, that they will not be discussed here. Instead, *The Thousand and One Nights*, the *Sīrat of Baybars* and some other less familiar works of fiction will be briefly discussed, before moving on to fiction in less familiar contexts.

Gustave von Grunebaum's study of 'Greek Form Elements in the Thousand and One Nights' suggested that much of the material in the 'Nights' derives not from hypothetical Indo-Persian sources via the lost Persian story collection, *Hazār Afsāna*, but rather from classical and

later Greek sources.[15] (Perry's work on the sources of the Sindibad cycle of stories in Arabic similarly led him to postulate a western source for the frame rather than an Indian one. In the case of the Sindibad [Syntipas] cycle, the source was the legend of Secundus the Silent.)[16] The theory that there was an Indian and then a Persian source for the conjectural core of the *Nights* as it existed in the tenth century depends heavily on the testimony of two tenth-century Arabs. In a discussion of fanciful tales of the early Arabs, al-Mas'ūdī wrote that they were 'of the same type as the books which have been transmitted to us and translated for us from the Persian [Pahlavi], Indian and Greek, and which were written along similar lines: such as *Kitāb Hazār Afsāna*, which means in Arabic a 'Thousand Fables'...; people call this book a 'Thousand Nights'...'.[17] Ibn al-Nadīm wrote later and had certainly read al-Mas'ūdī. The bookseller and cataloguer, Ibn al-Nadīm, claimed that the Sassanian Persians were the first people to collect entertaining stories and the first such book to be written was the *Hazār Afsāna*. He went on to describe its frame story of Shahrazad and the king, a frame story which closely resembles that story of the Arabic 'Nights' as we find it in Arabic manuscripts from the fifteenth century onwards. The passage (which is long) has been much quoted.[18]

Another passage, a little later on in the same chapter of Ibn al-Nadīm's *Fihrist* has escaped discussion so far. In this second passage he lists 'The Names of the Books of the Byzantines about Evening Stories, Histories, Fables and Proverbs'. One of the books in the list is *Samsa wa-Dimn* which, according to Ibn al-Nadīm, was very like the famous Arab *Kalīla wa Dimna*, but not as well written. The last book on the list sounds even more interesting; it is *Shaṭariyus the King and the Reason for his Marrying Shāzād the Storyteller*.[19] 'Shaṭariyus' is probably a mistranscription of Shahriyarus, a Greek rendering of the *Arabian Nights*' King Shāhriyār. The existence of a Greek version of the *Nights* in the tenth century gives cause for thought. Perhaps a translation was made from a Persian or Arab version of the *Nights* prototype into Greek some time before the tenth century. If so, its subsequent possible dissemination and influence could be investigated by Byzantinists with a command of the literary sources. (It is noteworthy that Goossens claimed in 'Recherches recentes sur l'epopée byzantine' that almost every element in *Digenes Akritas* has a parallel somewhere or other in *The Thousand and One Nights*.)[20] Much less likely, though it cannot be flatly ruled out, is that the core of the early Arabic *Nights*, (and we do not know what was in that core), came not from Persia, as al-Mas'ūdī and Ibn al-Nadīm believed, but from the Greek stories circulating in the Byzantine period.

However, let us now turn to the content of the *Nights* themselves, the

Arabic stories as collected from the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries and the information they provide on the Arab perception of Franks and Byzantines. The long rambling epic of 'Umar al-Nu'mān in the *Nights*, whose earliest surviving recension is from the fifteenth century, is the richest in relevant material. As is characteristic in such epics, events take place within the framework of a legendary and telescoped time; there are jumbled and garbled apparent references to the Arab siege of Constantinople in 717, to Seljuk wars in Iran and Anatolia, to the Second Crusade's siege of Damascus and to specific crusaders. The individual Frank and Greek were not favourably portrayed: the Byzantine warrior, Luqa, had the face of an ass, shape of an ape, and look of a snake; the Byzantine dowager, Dhāt al-Dawāhī, was a witch, lesbian, and poisoner. However, though we can be pretty sure that 'Umar al-Nu'mān was in the process of composition during the period of the crusades and of the corresponding Jihad, there is a lack of real jihad spirit in the epic.[21] Although the Arabs do fight the Franks, the romance does not present the struggle as a war for the Faith, and, though the Frankish armies are preceded by priests and crosses, the Franks are only involved in the war as Byzantine auxiliaries. The wars with Byzantium are fought over women and battles are opportunities for displays of individual heroism.

In other stories the ill-omened, blue-eyed Frank features as the villain – ''Alā' al-Dīn Abū al-Shamat',[22] ''Alī Shar and Zumurrud',[23] ''Alī Nūr al-Dīn and Miriam the Girdle Girl'[24] – but the Muslim heroes (if that is the word, for some of them are really rather unheroic compared with their women) struggle not for the triumph of Islam but to rescue captive princesses. In contrast to the slave purchase manuals, the romancers regard Frankish and Christian women as rather desirable. Conversion is a common subject in the *Nights*, but more precisely it is the conversion of women which is the subject. ('The Tale of the Prior who Became a Muslim' is only superficially an exception, for the real function of the prior in the story is to testify to the conversion of a Christian woman to Islam.) The Frankish women convert for love, or, in Husn Miriam's case, because she has discovered that Muḥammad's coming is foretold in both the Old Testament and the New Testament. By contrast, male converts from Christianity are not to be trusted – see, for example, the evil wrought by one of the *musālima*, or converts from Christianity, in 'Ali Shar and Zumurrud'.

The highly unusual and touching tale of 'Sū'l and Shumūl' offers a fresh perspective on the subject of conversion. Though the story is certainly older, it was written down in the fourteenth century with view to inserting it in the *Nights*, but never achieved that canonical status. In this story love conquers all, even confessional prejudice. The

Yemenites Sū'l and Shumūl love one another, but then Shumūl is spirited away. Sū'l wanders through the Middle East in quest of her; singing of his love and searching for her in the monasteries and convents of the Levant. The monks listen to his versified plight with sympathy, but his quest is long. In 'Sū'l and Shumūl' Christianity is portrayed with sympathy and knowledge. Near the end of Sū'l's quest, in the monastery of Dār al-Ṭīn in Egypt, he actually meets a monk who used to be a Muslim but who apostasized out of love for a Christian girl.[25]

Fantasy is fantasy, but one tale which came to be included in the *Nights* and in other story collections is unusual in its circumstantial detail and (for me at least) its ring of authenticity. 'The Story of the Man of Upper Egypt' was transmitted, so the story tells us, by Shujā al-Dīn, *wālī* of Cairo during the reign of the Ayyubid sultan al-Kāmil. He had the story from the man of Upper Egypt himself. In 1184 the latter found himself blessed with an unusually good crop of flax, but since prices were low in Egypt that year he was advised to take the flax to the crusader port of Acre where prices would be better. He did so, rented a shop, and started trading and bartering away his crop. Then he began a relationship with a Frankish woman. At first this was a commercial relationship in which he was selling her flax cheaply because of her pretty face, but as her visits recurred and more flax was sold more cheaply, he fell in love with her; he then arranged with her duenna for her to come to him in return for money. When the time came, at the last moment he was seized by shame and compunction and sent her away; a second time the same happened, and then the truce between Muslims and Franks expired and town criers went round Acre announcing that the Muslim merchants had eight days to leave the city according to the provisions of the truce. Our flax trader moved on to Damascus where he started to sell the goods he had acquired in Acre, and branched out into trading in slave girls. Following Saladin's crushing of the Kingdom of Jerusalem at Ḥiṭṭīn in 1187, there were many slaves on the market in Syria, and in the course of a trade-off in slaves with the Sultan, the man from Upper Egypt was given the pick of a bunch of Frankish women. There he found the woman he had fallen in love with at Acre, and acquired her. When she recognized him, she was so stunned by this stroke of destiny that she converted to Islam. He then took her along to the kadi Bahā' al-Dīn ibn Shaddād to witness his manumission of her and their marriage. Subsequently, her family tried to ransom her, but after she had stated her own wishes before Saladin and the Frankish envoy, she was allowed to stay with her new husband. A little later, her mother used the Frankish envoy to deliver a chest containing her daughter's property. The couple found inside not only her clothes, but also the sealed bags of money that the flax trader had offered the young

woman to lure her into bed. They lived happily ever after and she became the mother of his fair faced children.[26]

More commonly Christianity is mocked in the *Nights*. The Byzantine patriarch in 'Umar al-Nu'mān mixes his excrement with the ambergris he scatters from his censer.[27] 'Alā' al-Dīn Abū al-Shamat, made the slave of a church in Genoa, is put in the toilet service of ten blind cripples who are dependents of the church.[28] When the beautiful Zayn al-Mawāṣif rests in a monastery, the monks all lust madly after her and when she goes, they have a statue of her made so that they can worship it.[29] Plainly the stories show hostility to Christians and Franks, yet equally plainly there was an underlying lack of seriousness about popular literature's portrayal of Islam's great rival. What we find is coarse mockery, not real venom. This stands out the more plainly if we compare their treatment to that of the Magians and the Jews in some of the stories in the *Nights*. The Magians (or Zoroastrians) are master villains, perverts, torturers, and cannibals.[30] The Jews in the late Cairene stories (inserted into the *Nights* perhaps as late as the eighteenth century), practice ritual murder and other atrocities.[31] The Christians on the other hand are hardly more than Indians facing the Muslim cowboys.

This unserious cowboys-and-indians approach to what Edward Gibbon called 'the World's Great Debate' reappears in the fragmentary script of the shadow play, *La'b al-Manār*, or 'Play of the Lighthouse' (of Alexandria).[32] The fragments that survive, mostly verses to accompany high points in the action, were written in the sixteenth century, but the play itself was certainly older and was probably first performed in the fourteenth or fifteenth century. The great lighthouse in Alexandria, which actually fell to pieces in the course of the early fourteenth century, serves in the play as the Muslim's watchtower and storehouse of weapons for use against the Franks. In its garrison are al-Rikhīm (nicknamed the Father of Cats, a stock character in Egyptian shadow theatre)[33] and his companion, al-Ḥāziq (nicknamed Cat). A Maghribi who has been trading in Venice disguised as a monk comes to warn them that a Christian crusader fleet is on the way.[34] This fleet turns out to be composed of Cypriot, Rhodian, Templar, Hospitaller, Catalan, and Venetian ships. The Maghribi's warning was really superfluous, for eventually a bombastic Catalan ambassador arrives to declare war: 'O community of Muslims I have come to with a message and I demand an answer'.[35] Later on there is a disconnected fragment of comic business involving al-Rikhīm and al-Ḥāziq (the Laurel and Hardy of this only sometimes heroic saga) and al-Rikhīm's attempts to interpret what a Christian is saying. The first outcome of his efforts is too fragmentary and too lewd to be detailed

here. But al-Rikhīm is urged to have another go: 'Say something more to him'. So al-Rikhīm goes to the Christian and says 'Speak!'. The Christian says 'Basheilishu kanakis faliqabsu balaqis'. 'Sweet things!' cries al-Rikhīm. 'What does it mean in Arabic?' his companion wants to know. 'He says bring one-legged, one-armed monsters in lanterns.' (The so-called translation is achieved by changing the consonants in the Christian's words.) The scene continues with similar punning, misunderstandings, or wilful mistranslations on the part of al-Rikhīm.[36]

In a later scene al-Rikhīm and the captain of a Frankish ship trade insults, before the Frank tries to tempt him on the ship with the promise of woven and dyed cloth, and then with the offer of the hand of his daughter Buma. But al-Rikhīm only professes himself to be won over by the promise of lots of pork and spice wine.[37] (The shadow puppet figure of the Father of Cats conventionally features as a hideous big-bellied man with a protruding rear.) There are other interesting though usually fragmentary scenes of comedy and martial bombast, before the play ends with the defeat of the Christians and a victory parade of the weeping captives in chains. 'Look O merchants on the sons of kings! What skill they had in thieving. How much they took in the dark of the night from ships on the sea.'[38] And yet, and this is perhaps the implicit theme of the play, they have been defeated by the ordinary common people of Egypt.

The role of common people, how they pit their wits and courage against villainous Franks, is again an important theme in that well-known work, *The Sīra of Baybars*.[39] It has survived in many manuscripts from the sixteenth century onwards. It was a professional story tellers' folk epic in serial parts, an Egyptian *roman feuilleton*, various versions of which were cobbled together between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries. It celebrates the exploits (at least 90 per cent fictitious) of the thirteenth-century Mamluk, who later became sultan, Baybars al-Bunduqdari. But there are many other heroes in this straggling farrago. Baybars is helped by a trusty band of Ismā'īlī Assassin cat burglars, as well as street ruffians, wrestling champions, and assorted holy men. The role of mamluks, other than Baybars, is correspondingly diminished, though historically they were of course the real defenders of Egypt and Syria from the Franks and the Mongols.

The villains include rival Mamluk emirs, corrupt Egyptian officials, street pimps and debauchees, crusader lords and other Europeans. But the master villain, medieval Islam's Fu Manchu, is the Christian who poses as Sultan Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb's Chief Kadi, Kāhin Juwān, Priest John. A Portuguese impostor, he is the evil brain who directs the crusaders in the East, the kings of Europe and even the pope against Baybars. Some of the *Sīra* is set on the *Sāhil*, the Frankish crusader coastline. There are

Christian attacks on Jerusalem, Aleppo, and the Nile Delta. A garbled and fictitious version of Louis IX's Damietta Crusade is presented by the epic. Baybars attacks and conquers Latakia. In one scene, early on in his career, Baybars intervenes in a dispute between a Lady Fatima and the Frankish lord Sarjawil in the Safed region over the provisions of a treaty governing the partition of agricultural revenue. Malcolm Lyons, in a discussion of one of the manuscripts of the *Sīra*, has rightly pointed out how much this fictitious incident actually reflects the realities of treaties for the partition of local revenue, as concluded between the Franks and the Muslim powers in the thirteenth century.[40]

But the struggle is not restricted to the war on the *Sāḥil*. Baybars and his companions have adventures all over the Mediterranean world. The Catalan corsairs are a particular menace (and in this respect at least I think the *Sīra* reflects Egypt's problems in the early fifteenth century).[41] The Muslims go to war against Constantinople, after Kāhin Juwān fabricates a letter from the emperor Bab Mikhā'īl (Michael Palaeologus), protesting at the closure of the Holy Sepulchre. Furthermore – and here there is certainly a relationship with *The Thousand and One Nights* – there is a Genoese princess, Miriam, who converts to Islam and marries a Muslim in Egypt. Later she is drugged, kidnapped, taken back to Genoa, and locked up in the Prison of Sighs, before being rescued. Various Muslim heroes have adventures in Genoa, while Baybars and his allies are active throughout the Mediterranean world and even venture as far as England. It is unfortunate, however, that the emphasis of the *Sira* is on plot and dialogue rather than on description and local colour, so that these foreign places hardly feature as more than names in the story. Towards the end of the epic, Juwān, his impostures exposed, flees to Rome, but the Muslims pursue him there and the villain is captured and crucified.

Why do the Isma'ili Assassins, who elsewhere have not received a good press, serve the epic's hero? According to the story tellers, it is because Baybar's rise to power and his triumph over the Christians and other enemies have been predicted in a secret book that has been in the possession of the Isma'ilis for centuries, the *Kitāb al-Yūnān* or *Book of Greek*. The *Kitāb al-Yūnān* is a fictitious specimen of what was a real genre in Arabic literature, namely *malāḥim* or prophecies. *Malāḥim* literature traced its origins back to the Prophet Daniel. These prophetic treatises, usually in vulgar Arabic, concerned themselves with the Last Days and the coming of the Messiah, the Antichrist and the Mahdi, but also they commonly detailed the futures of particular dynasties and rulers.[42] The destinies of Mamluks, Ottomans, and Timur were the subject of such treatises in the late Middle Ages. More generally, *malāḥim* literature may be seen as consolation literature,

offering hope in difficult times. A popular favourite in the Mamluk period was the *Saiha al-Būm fī Hawādith al-Rūm* or *The Hoot of the Owl Concerning the Events of Byzantium or Rome* by pseudo-Ibn al-'Arabī. It seems to have been extant in several versions, as its predictions had to be repeatedly revised to take account of events as they happened. *Inter alia*, the book of prophecy offered the Muslims the assurance that the world could not end until Constantinople had passed into the hands of the Muslims.[43] Another work in the same genre, the *Shumūs al-Ghurūb* or *Suns of the Setting* predicted the fall of crusader Acre and proclaimed that this would lead to the fall of Constantinople.[44]

The themes and images of *malāhim* writings infiltrated mainstream literature. In many of the geographies of the period one finds Constantinople and Rome (and occasionally the two were confused) treated as marvellous cities of the millenium. The cities are full of fabulous treasures – among them, talismanic statues, which, drawn doubtless from an older tradition of hermetic literature, protect the great cities of Christendom but often at the same time they spell out their doom. *Malāhim* and other themes from popular literature also found their way into chronicle writing. A marginal addition to the chronicle, the *Kitāb al-Sulūk* by the fifteenth-century historian and *'alim*, al-Maqrīzī, described how, when Acre fell to the Mamluks in 1291, the triumphant conquerors found within its walls a church and in the church a sepulchre of red marble and on the sepulchre a lead tablet on which there was an inscription in *Rūmī* (Greek):

> This piece of ground will be conquered by men belonging to the community of an Arab prophet who has a *sharī'a* (law). Those who follow him will triumph and his religion will become the greatest and it will conquer the regions of Persia and all parts of Rūm. When the year 700 approaches [namely circa 1300 C.E.], his community will conquer all the lands of the Franks and destroy the churches.

The Mamluk sultan, al-Ashraf Khalīl, was very gratified to hear this news.[45]

The research of Gotz Schregle and Ulrich Haarmann dealing with literature of the Mamluk period has underlined the importance of what Haarmann has called the 'literarization' of historical writing – by which is meant both the employment in annals of styles, techniques, and language more commonly found in the literature of entertainment and also the straightforward importation of fictitious incident into chronicle narratives that are otherwise often frankly dull.[46] It may be that the growth of an audience for history among the Mamluk elite

combined with a Turkish taste for myths and wonder tales had a role here.

One example of this phenomenon will be examined below – a passage in the generally, and perhaps justly, neglected chronicle of Qirṭā'ī al-'Izzī al-Khazindārī.[47] We know nothing about this man apart from what his chronicle tells us – that he was writing sometime between 1293 and 1340 – and what his name tells us – that he was almost certainly a mamluk, and perhaps at one time in the service of 'Izz al-Din Aybak al-Mansūrī, the sultan Qalāwūn's *khazindār* or store keeper.[48] Two fragments of his *Tārīkh al-Nawādir mimmā jāra li-l-Awā'il wa-l-Awākhir* (History of entertaining stories of early and late times) exist today. A late section of it, covering the years 1229–90, survives in the Gotha collection of manuscripts. One of his declared aims was to write about people outside the lands of Islam,[49] but the Gotha manuscript is for the most part a fairly brief annals covering events in Egypt and Syria. It uses earlier historians like Ibn Wāṣil, but its chronological accuracy is below average.

Every now and again, however, Qirṭā'ī reported something which cannot be found in his predecessors' works. Claude Cahen has written in two separate places about two such reports. First, when Qirṭā'ī wrote about events leading up to Louis IX's expedition to Egypt, he provides us with the surprising information that while Louis and his army were moving off (and heading presumably for Aigues Mortes), the German emperor Frederick II met them on his land and tried to dissuade Louis and the French from the enterprise. Finding that he had failed, Frederick then wrote to al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb to warn the sultan of what was coming Egypt's way. Qirṭā'ī quotes from the text of Frederick's letter. Cahen is dubious about the details and the story is not, I think, supported by any contemporary source, but Cahen is inclined to grant that there might be something in it.[50]

Secondly, Qirṭā'ī tells us about an incident in the reign of Baybars. A certain Arnaud of Jebail, who regularly looted Muslim lands and sent his prisoners to the Mongols, had planned to invade Egypt with the assistance of 10,000 Mongols from Hulagu. Baybars, in revenge, had him murdered and tried to arrange for the Templars to provide a getaway boat for the assassin. This Arnaud would have been assassinated in 1261 or 1265. There was no Lord of Jebail called Arnaud at this time. Cahen is doubtful, but again reports the incident for what it is worth.[51]

A third passage relating to Europe and the crusades is long, so a summary is offered here. Qirṭā'ī's chronology is vague, but refers to the section for events in the *hijrī* year 669 – that is August 1270 to August 1271.[52] In the early summer of 1271, as Qirṭā'ī accurately reported,

Baybars had sent a fleet to attack Cyprus. The expedition was a disaster and most of the crews were taken prisoner after the ships were sunk. In the same year the king of Cyprus sent some of these captives to be paraded around Europe. The kings of Europe (*al-Barr al-Ṭawīl*) were much encouraged by this, as was the pope, who is called Lakaf, which means Caliph (sic). The pope sent messages round Europe to stir up a new crusade, approaching all the kings of al-Rumania in al-Barr al-Ṭawīl, especially the Lord of Markarkatakūna (so it seems to read in the manuscript, but the vowelling is to some extent hypothetical), Messina, and Barcelona. The pope's message appealed for ships, men, and money.

Among the many in Europe who were supposed to take part in this crusade were the Bashqird, described as an accursed race and most awful people. They speak Turkish and have no kings or leaders. Among the Franks the Venetians are similar, except that they are modest and known for their wealth, whereas the Bashqirds are notoriously poor and troublesome. The Bashqirds believe that death in the Holy Land is better than life. These races we are talking about (and here I think Qirtā'ī means Europeans in general) put pepper in their drinks, because the ground they sit on is so cold. They are yellow-faced, blue-eyed, and red-haired.

There are five aspects of Muslim life that Europeans marvel at. First, they have never known a black man. When they do see one, they are afraid, believing that he is angry with them. Secondly, they marvel at the quadruped which kneels to be loaded, meaning the camel. Thirdly, they do not know of anywhere on earth where a man is bought and sold and a *ṣanja* (a cymbal?) is struck on (or beside) his head and he becomes a prince and possesses the land and the necks (*sic*) of the people. It is not possible amongst them. (This somewhat cryptic formulation refers, I believe, to the Mamluk system, where a slave may rise to become sultan.) Fourthly, they did not know that a Muslim can have four wives. This is not possible for Christians. Fifthly they are ignorant about legal depositions. Among them the magistrates (*ḥukkam*) are monks and priests. When two people are involved in a case, their respective neighbours bear witness for them. One of the European misfortunes is that they do not know about trade, buying, and selling, but only about gambling and destructive wine. This latter is important in their religion and beliefs.

Qirtā'ī has more marvels to unfold. The city of Markarkatakūna in the land of *al-Barr al-Ṭawīl* has 40,000 churches, not counting the monasteries in the environs. It has 200,000 pubs. These people do not count drinking wine or stealing as evil or sinful. Outside the city are taverns noted for evil and sin. It is difficult to locate Qirtai's

Markarkatakūna with any certainty, and it does not feature in the standard topographies of Yāqūt and al-Himyarī. However, it seems possible that one diacritic point too many has been added and one should read Markarankūna – or March of Ancona, the region standing for the town. In this period, it was governed by Charles of Anjou, but, in any case, Qirṭā'ī's Ancona is a fantasy city of sin and vice, a medieval Las Vegas.

Qirṭā'ī then proceeds to tell a tale of a crusade that never was. When Baybars heard of the crusader agitation in Europe, he became fearful that there would be attacks against him by the Franks and that the Mongols would join in from the east. He therefore sent for one of his envoys, a certain Ṣārim al-Mas'ūdī. Baybars told Ṣārim to go to the greatest of the kings of *al-Barr al-Tawīl*, the Malik al-Inkitara (King of England). This king has a brother who is also a king but of lesser importance. Ṣārim was to take with him 300 peppered wines, priceless emeralds, cotton, an elephant, and a giraffe. When Ṣārim reached England he was to salute the king and say that the sultan wished nothing from him, except to live in peace with him and be his brother. Ṣārim did as he was told, all went well and he returned from his embassy laden with equally precious gifts. The result was that when, four months later, the pope asked for the dispatch of English ships to Acre, the king refused, and, learning this, the other kings, lost heart. Then bad weather in the Mediterranean set in, the pope died that year and the crusade never materialized.

Some comments on Qirṭā'ī's information are called for. There is a surprising amount about the Bashqirds in orthodox medieval Arab geographies. The Bashqirds were, strictly, a Turkish people who had settled in Hungary, but sometimes Bashqird was a name which was applied to all Hungarians, including Magyars. In various sources the Bashqirds are described as Muslims, Christians, or pagans, but no account of them in Arabic seems to tally with that of Qirṭā'ī.[53] Their appearance in the context of a projected crusade and their readiness to die in the Holy Land perhaps reflects the impression made by the Hungarians who arrived with King Andrew of Hungary in Palestine during the Fifth Crusade.

Turning to the crusade that never was, if Qirṭā'ī's chronology is to be taken seriously, then the embassy to England would have been in the reign of Henry III. Henry did have a brother who was a king, Richard of Cornwall. But the year Qirṭā'ī is writing about in fact overlaps with the year in which Louis IX went on crusade to Tunis, while Edward of England, Henry's son, arrived in Acre to do some inconclusive crusading.[54] Henry did acquire an elephant, but it was at the beginning of the reign, not near its end.[55] There is no record in English sources of a

Mamluk embassy to England in the 1270s or at any other time. There was a Mamluk emir called Ṣārim al-Dīn al-Mas'ūdī, but he had died in a fracas in the Hall of Justice some years earlier.[56] What should we conclude from Qirṭā'ī's excursus into European affairs? Surely, it is that this amateur historian, whether panicking at his ignorance or faintly bored, settled down to tell lies at this point in his chronicle. The fact that the pages he devoted to the embassy to England are demonstrably nonsensical should encourage us to look with a colder eye on the other original snippets of information he offers elsewhere.

In conclusion, it is clear that, while popular literature devoted more space to Europe and the Europeans than one finds in works written by members of the clerical elite, nevertheless popular literature was not notably better informed about Christendom. The Frank and Greek tended to feature in popular fiction only as stereotyped plot movers. When popular literature touched on the themes of Holy War, it was not seriously engaging in polemic. Perhaps, rather, this literature gave wistful expression to the desire of the common people to take part in a struggle for the Faith, a struggle that had become in practice almost a monopoly of the Turkish and Kurdish elite. Even so, this sort of popular literary material makes a welcome change from the bombastic panegyrics of court chroniclers and the monocular vision of the clerical establishment.

NOTES

1. On mainstream medieval Arab literature dealing with Europe, see B. Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* (London, 1982).
2. On these commercial communities, see E. Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1983), *passim*.
3. A. von Harff, *The Pilgrimage of Arnold von Harff*, trans. and ed. M. Letts (London, 1946), p.162.
4. F. Fabri, *Le Voyage en Egypte de Félix Fabri, 1483*, trans. J. Masson (Paris, 1975), 3 vols, pp.413–14, 431–5, 913–15; c.f. H.F.M. Prescott *Once to Sinai: The Further Pilgrimage of Friar Felix Fabri* (London, 1957), pp.131–2.
5. Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery*, p.128.
6. W. Popper, *Egypt and Syria Under the Circassian Sultans 1382–1486 A.D.: Systematic Notes to Ibn Taghri Birdi's Chronicles of Egypt* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1955), Pt. 2, pp.13–14.
7. 'Umar ibn al-Wardī, *Kharīṭat al-Ajā'ib wa Farīdat al- Gharā'ib* (Cairo, 1939), pp.79–80.
8. Muhammad ibn Baṭṭūṭa, *The Travels of Ibn Battuta*, trans. and ed. H.A.R. Gibb, Vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1959), pp.499–513; cf. R.E. Dunn, *The Adventures of Ibn Battuta: A Muslim Traveller of the Fourteenth Century* (London, 1986), pp.170–72; M. Izzedin, 'Ibn Battouta et la topographie byzantine', in *Actes VI Congrès international d'études byzantines*, Vol. 2 (1951), pp.191–6.
9. M. Izzedin, 'Quelques voyageurs musulmans à Constantinople au Moyen Age', *Orient*, 9 (1965), 92; E. Quatremère, 'Notice de l'ouvrage qui a pour titre Mesalek Alabsar fi Memalek Alamsar', *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du Roi*, 13 (1838), 579–80; M. Amari, 'Al-'Umari, Condizioni degli stati Cristiani

dell'Occidente secondo una relazione di Domenichino Doria da Genova', *Atti della Reale Accademia dei Lincei*, 11 (1883), 67–103, especially 74–5.

10. Ibn al-Wardī, *Kharīdat*, p.79.
11. H. Müller, *Die Kunst des Sklavenkaufs nach arabischen, persischen und türkischen Ratgebern vom 10. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert* (Freiburg, 1980), p.104.
12. Müller, *Kunst des Sklavenkaufs*, pp.129–30.
13. Ibid., p.132.
14. On Arabic popular romances and epics, see R. Paret, *Die Geschichtes des Islams im Spiegel der Arabischen Volksliteratur* (Tübingen, 1927); M. Canard, 'Delhemma. Epopée arabe des guerres arabo-byzantines', *Byzantion*, 10 (1935), 283–300; H. Pérès, 'Le Roman dans la littérature arabe des origines à la fin du Moyen Age' *Annales de l'Institut des Etudes Orientales*, 16 (1958), 1–40; F. Rosenthal, *A History of Muslim Historiography* (Leiden, 1962), pp.164–7; U. Steinbach, *Dhāt al-Himma. Kulturgeschichteliche Untersuchungen zu einem arabischen Volksroman* (Wiesbaden, 1972); G. Canova, 'Gli Studi sull'epica popolare Araba', *Oriente Moderno*, 57 (1977), 211–26; P. Heath, 'A Critical Review of Modern Scholarship on Sirat 'Antar ibn Shaddad and the Popular Sira', *Journal of Arabic Literature*, 15 (1984), 19–44; B. Connelly, *The Arab Folk Epic and Identity* (Berkeley–Los Angeles–London, 1986).
15. G.E. von Grunebaum, 'Greek Form Elements in the Arabian Nights', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 62 (1942), 277–92.
16. B.E. Perry, *The Origin of the Book of Sindbad* (Berlin, 1960).
17. A. Shboul, *Al-Mas'ūdī and His World* (London, 1979), pp.124, 148–9.
18. Muḥammad ibn al-Nadīm, *The Fihrist of Ibn al-Nadīm*, trans. B. Dodge (Columbia, 1970), Vol. 2, pp.713–14. Bayard Dodge's translation is to be preferred to G. Flugel's edition of the Arabic text of the *Fihrist*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1871), since the latter was based on an inferior manuscript.
19. Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, Vol. 2, p.718.
20. R. Goossens, 'Recherches récentes sur l'épopée Byzantine', *Antiquité classique*, 2 (1933), 461–2.
21. *The Thousand Nights and a Night*, trans. R.F. Burton (Benares and Stoke Newington, 1885), Vol. 2, pp.77–283; Vol. 3, pp.48–114; c.f. on the saga of 'Umar, R. Paret, *Der Ritter-Roman von Umar an-Numan und seine Stellung zur Sammlung von 1001 Nacht* (Tübingen, 1927); R. Goossens, 'Autour de Digenis Akritas. La "Geste d'Omar" dans les mille et une nuits', *Byzantion*, 7 (1932), 303–16; cf. N. Christides, 'An Arabo- Byzantine Novel "'Umar B. al-Nu'man" compared with Digenis Akritas', *Byzantion*, 22 (1962), 549–604.
22. *The Thousand Nights and a Night*, Vol. 2, pp.223–4.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., Vol. 4, pp.29–44; 187–228; Vol. 8, pp.264–397 and Vol. 9, pp.1–18.
25. F.C. Seybold (ed.), *Geschichte von Sul und Schumul, Unbekannte Erzählungen aus Tausend und Einer Nacht* (Leipzig, 1902).
26. *The Thousand Nights and a Night*, Vol. 9, pp.19–24; Varsy, 'Anecdote des Croisades', *Journal Asiatique*, 4th ser., 16 (1850), 75–92. Note that Varsy's version is fuller and provides a number of circumstantial details that are not in the *Nights* version. Although Varsy did not identify his source, it was probably a manuscript of al-Ghuzūlī's *Maṭālī al Budūr fi Manāzil al-Surūr*, a fifteenth-century *belles lettres* compilation which includes the same story.
27. *The Thousand Nights and a Night*, Vol. 2, pp.222–3.
28. Ibid., Vol. 4, p.87.
29. Ibid., Vol. 8, p.259.
30. See in particular the stories of 'Qamar al-Zaman', 'The Fourth Voyage of Sinbad' and 'Hasan of Bassorah' in ibid., Vol. 3, pp.212–348; Vol. 6, pp.34–47; Vol. 8, pp.7–145.
31. See in particular the stories of 'The Three Princes of China' and 'The Merchant's Daughter and the Prince of al-Irak', in *Supplemental Nights to the Book of the Thousand Nights and a Night* (Burton Club edn., n.d.), Vol. 6, pp.213–28, 401–37.

32. P. Kahle (ed. and trans.), *Der Leuchtturm von Alexandria. Ein Arabisches Schattenspiel aus dem Mittelalterlichen Ägypten* (Stuttgart, 1930).
33. J. Landau, *Studies in the Arab Theatre and Cinema* (Philadelphia, 1958), p.24; C.E. Bosworth, *The Mediaeval Islamic Underworld: The Banu Sasan in Arabic Society and Literature* (Leiden, 1976), p.129 and n.109.
34. Kahle, *Der Leuchtturm*, pp.25–8.
35. Ibid., p.31.
36. Ibid., p.36.
37. Ibid., pp.46–8.
38. Ibid., p.67.
39. *Sīrat al-Ẓāhir Baybars*, 48 parts (Cairo, 1908–9). On its contents, see H. Wangelin, *Das arabische Volksbuch vom König Azzahir Baibars* (Stuttgart, 1936); W. Fischer, 'Die Nachwirkung der Kreuzzüge in der arabischen Volksliteratur', in W. Fischer and J. Schneider (eds.), *Das Heilige Land im Mittelalter; Begegungsraum zwischen Orient und Okzident*, (Neustadt an der Aisch, 1982), pp.151–4.
40. M.C. Lyons, 'The Sirat Baybars', in *Orientalia Hispanica*, 1 (Leiden, 1974), 490.
41. On Catalan piracy, see P.H. Dopp, 'Un corsaire du quinzième siècle, Pedro de Laranda', *Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts, Cairo University*, 2 (1949), 7–28.
42. On *malāḥim* see T. Fahd, *La Divination Arabe* (Leiden, 1966), pp.224–7; *Encyclopedia of Islam* (2nd edn.), s.v. *Malāḥim, Djafr, Mahdī*; A. Abel, 'Un Hadit sur la prise de Rome dans la tradition eschatologique de l'Islam', *Arabica*, 5 (1955), 1–14; id., 'Changements politiques et littérature eschatologique dans le monde musulman', *Studia Islamica*, 2 (1954), 23–43.
43. Abel, 'Un Hadit', 6–8; id., 'Changements politiques', 40.
44. Abel, 'Un Hadit', 8–12.
45. Aḥmad al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-Sulūk*, ed. M.M. Ziyada (Cairo, 1956–58), Vol. 1, Pt. 3, p.765n.
46. G. Schregle, *Die Sultanin von Ägypten, Sagarat ad-Durr in der arabischen Geschichtsschreibung und Literatur* (Wiesbaden, 1961); U. Haarmann, *Quellenstudien zur frühen Mamlukenzeit* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1970).
47. Qirtā'ī al-'Izzī al-Khazindārī, *Tārīkh al-Nawādir mimmā li-l-awā'il wa-l-awākhir*), Gotha MS.1655 (School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, microfilm 5348); cf. C. Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord* (Paris, 1940), p.79; G. Levi della Vida, 'L'Invasione dei Tatari' *Orientalia*, 4 (1935), 355–8.
48. There is nothing in Ibn Hajar's obituary of Qaratāy al-Ashar, Mamluk governor of Tripoli, to suggest that he should be identified with the historian; see Aḥmad ibn Hajar, *Al-Durar al-Kāmina* (Hyderabad, 1929–32), Vol. 3, p.248.
49. W. Ahlwardt, *Verzeichnis der arabischen Handschriften der Königlichen Bibliothek zu Berlin* (Berlin, 1897), p.54, MS. No. 9446.
50. C. Cahen, 'Saint Louis et l'Islam', *Journal Asiatique*, 258 (1970), 9–12.
51. C. Cahen, 'La Chronique de Kirtay et les Francs de Syrie', *Journal Asiatique*, 229 (1937), 140–45.
52. Qirṭā'ī, *Tārīkh al-Nawādir*, fols. 96b–99a.
53. On the Bashqirds see *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed. s.v. *Bashdjirt*; M. Canard, 'Ibn Fodlan chez les Bulgares', *Annales de l'Institut d'Etudes Orientales*, 16 (1958), 84–5; *Abu Hamid al-Grenadino y su relación de viaje por terras eurasiáticas*, ed. and trans. C.E. Dubler (Madrid, 1953), pp.27, 31–2.
54. S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, Vol. 3 (Cambridge, 1955), pp.332–7.
55. Matthew Paris, *Matthew Paris' English History*, trans. J.A. Giles, Vol. 3 (London, 1854), p.115.
56. Muhyī al-dīn ibn 'Abd al-Ẓāhir, *Al-Rawd al-Ẓāhir fī Sīrat al-Malik al-Ẓāhir*, ed. A. Khowaiter (Riyad, 1976), pp.249–50.

List of Contributors

Michael Angold is Reader in the Department of History at the University of Edinburgh. Apart from various articles, his publications include *A Byzantine Government in Exile* (Oxford, 1975), and *The Byzantine Empire, 1025–1284: A Political History* (London and New York, 1984).

Benjamin Arbel is Senior Lecturer at the School of History of Tel Aviv University, and member of the editorial panel of the *MHR*. He has published various articles and contributions on the history of the eastern Mediterranean during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, with special emphasis on Venice and Cyprus. His chapter on Cypriot society under Venetian rule is to be published shortly in the new *History of Cyprus* (Makarios Foundation, Nicosia).

Michel Balard is Professor of Medieval History at the University of Paris XII, and President of the French Society of Medievalists. His main publications are: *La Romanie génoise (XII^e – début du XV^e siècle)*, 2 vols. (Genoa and Rome, 1978); *Gênes et l'Outre-Mer*, 2 vols. (Paris and The Hague, 1973–80); *Notai genovesi in Oltremare*, 3 vols. (Genoa, 1983–88); *Les Croisades* (Paris, 1988).

Malcolm Barber is Senior Lecturer in the Department of History at the University of Reading. He has published *The Trial of the Templars* (Cambridge, 1978) and numerous articles on the Templars, Philip the Fair, the Cathars, lepers in medieval society, and popular crusading movements.

Bernard Hamilton is Reader in Medieval History at the University of Nottingham. His publications include *Monastic Reform, Catharism and the Crusades*, Variorum Reprints (London, 1979); *The Medieval Inquisition* (London, 1981); *The Latin Church in the Crusader States* (London, 1980); and *Religion in the Medieval West* (London, 1986). He is currently writing a general history of crusading, *The Crusading Achievement*.

Robert Irwin was Lecturer in the Department of Medieval History at the University of St Andrews (1972–77). Since then he has taught Arabic and Middle Eastern history at various universities. He is the

author of *The Middle East in the Middle Ages* (Croom Helm, 1986), and of three novels.

David Jacoby is Professor of Medieval History at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He has published numerous studies on Byzantium, the Crusader states of the Levant, western political, commercial and cultural expansion in the eastern Mediterranean, and the Jews in this area. His publications include *La féodalité en Grèce médinvale. Les 'Assises de Romanie': sources, application et diffusion* (Paris and The Hague, 1971) and two volumes in the Variorum Reprints series (London, 1975 and 1979); a third volume entitled 'Studies on the Crusader States and on Venetian Expansion' will appear in the autumn of 1989.

Peter Lock is Senior Lecturer in Medieval History and Archaeology at St Johns College, York. He is at present writing a study of the Frankish Aegean, to be published by Longmans. Previous publications include 'The Frankish Towers of Central Greece', *BSA*, 81 (1986), 'The Frankish Tower on the Acropolis at Athens', *BSA*, 82 (1987), and 'D.G. Hogarth: A Specialist in the Science of Archaeology', *BSA*, 83 (forthcoming).

Anthony Luttrell has taught history at numerous universities. He served for a number of years as the Assistant Director of the British School at Rome. His publications include *The Hospitallers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Greece and the West: 1291–1440*, Variorum Reprints (London, 1978), and *Latin Greece, the Hospitallers and the Crusade: 1291–1400*, Variorum Reprints (London, 1982), as well as various articles on later medieval history.

Paul Magdalino has been Lecturer in Medieval History at the University of St Andrews since 1977. He has published numerous articles on various aspects of Byzantine history, mainly of the twelfth century.

David Morgan is Lecturer in the History of the Near and Middle East at the School of Oriental and African Studies, the University of London. He is the author of *The Mongols* (Oxford, 1986), and *Medieval Persia* (London, 1988). He edited *Medieval Historical Writing in the Christian and Islamic Worlds* (London, 1982), and is Honorary Editor of the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.*

Jean Richard is Professor of Medieval History at the University of Dijon, and a member of the Institut de France (Académie des Inscrip-

tions et Belles-Lettres). He is author of *Le royaume latin de Jérusalem* (1953), *Les ducs de Bourgogne* (1954), *L'esprit de la croisade* (1970), *La papauté et les missions d'Orient* (1977), *Saint Louis* (1983), and various articles reproduced in three volumes of Variorum Reprints. Since 1980 he has been president of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East.

Elizabeth Zachariadou is Professor of Medieval History at the University of Crete. Her main publications include: *The Chronicle of the Turkish Sultans and its Italian Original* (Thessalonica, 1960, in Greek); *Trade and Crusade: Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin, 1300–1414* (Venice, 1983); and *Romania and the Turks (1300–1500),* Variorum Reprints (London, 1985).